

तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय

SANTINIKETAN
VISWA BHARATI
LIBRARY

954.292

N 167

308423

HAIDAR ALI

NARENDRA KRISHNA SINHA, M.A., Ph.D.



A. MUKHERJEE & CO. PRIVATE LTD. : CALCUTTA.

Published by

A. R. MUKHERJEE

Managing Director

A. Mukherjee & Co. Pr. Ltd.

2, Bankim Chatterjee Street,

Calcutta-12.

First Edition—1941

Price Rs. Increased price Rs. 20·00 only

Printed by

Sadhana Sinha Ray

at Kali Press

67, Sitaram Ghosh Street

Calcutta-9

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The idea of writing a monograph on Haidar Ali occurred to me in 1936. The first thing I did, was to read the volumes of Wilks as minutely as possible to ascertain whether the proposed work would be of any use. It struck me that Wilks had not utilised the contemporary Marathi, Portuguese, Dutch and French sources. The portion relating to Haidar Ali, though excellent by itself, is based on two main sources, English and Persian, local tradition and the information possessed by living characters giving his narrative the atmosphere and the directness which no neutral retrospect can ever have. I felt, however, that I would be justified in undertaking a work on Haidar Ali, if I could utilise the sources not available to Wilks. This work is not a history of Mysore from 1721-1782, nor specifically a biography of Haidar. It is a study in biographical form of a typical figure of 18th century Indian History. While not neglecting personal details, this work is concerned primarily with military and diplomatic activities.

The great Mysorean's career falls into three unequal parts. Between 1749-1761, we have the history of his rise from obscurity to power. Between 1761-1778, there is the predominantly anti-Maratha phase of the career of this warrior and statesman. By 1779, the anti-British feeling had gathered a momentum that was irresistible and for the rest of his life up to 1782 and for the duration of the rule of his dynasty, the anti-British aspect of the foreign policy was the dominant factor of the situation. In the first volume which is now given to the public, I have dealt with the first two phases. I propose to deal with the third phase, so far as it concerns the career of Haidar Ali, in the second volume, in which I would also give a description of his administration, his military system, the extent of French influence in his court and a picture of him in council and conversation. In order to form an estimate of his statesmanship, it may also be necessary to sketch the history of the anti-British foreign policy initiated by him up to its culmination under his son.

When I began my researches on this subject, I was well aware of the difficulties I would have to face. Some of the materials are in languages with which I had no acquaintance and I had to face the problem of collecting and utilizing them. I must put here on record that many scholars helped me in my quest in the best tradition of Indian scholarship. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt., C. I. E., lent me some of his rare books, helped me to collect some of my materials and was kind enough to read most of the chapters before the submission of the manuscript to the press. Prof. K. A. Nilkantha Sastri, M.A., of the Madras University supplied me with all the materials on Haidar Ali that could be gleaned from Tamil, Telegu and Kanarese manuscripts in the Mackenzie collection. Thus some useful information was made available to me in a form in which I could utilize them. Chevalier Panduranga Pissurlencar sent me reprints or transcripts of all the relevant Portuguese documents he had collected from Lisbon and Nova Goa. I have indicated in my bibliography how valuable his help has been. Mr. C. V. Chandrasekharan, M.A.(Oxon.), Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Travancore University, sent me an extract from Malayalam records in Travancore. Prof. Venkata Subba Sastri, M. A., Ph. D. (Lond.), of Mysore, guided me to some places of historical interest in Mysore and helped me to acquire some sense of locality which not even the most thorough knowledge of the Gazetteers can convey to an outsider. I should also acknowledge the debt which I owe to Dr. S. N. Sen, Ph.D., B. Litt., Keeper of the Records of the Government of India, who always took a very keen interest in my work and was ready to introduce me to scholars who might be of help to me. In the meetings of the Indian Historical Records Commission I got very useful information on records. I should also acknowledge my obligation to Dr. B. S. Baliga, M.A, Ph. D. (Lond.), Curator, Madras Record Office, and his staff, for the help I got in Madras in studying the records.

Dr. S. P. Mookherjee, M. A., D. Litt., Barrister-at-Law, President, Council of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts, took a sympathetic interest in my work and the Calcutta University Library acquired for me transcripts of many valuable documents from England and from different parts of India. In this

connection I acknowledge with gratitude the debt I owe to Dr. Nihar Ranjan Roy, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt. (Leyden), the Librarian, without whose promptness I might have to wait indefinitely for the arrival of transcripts of records from England. I take this opportunity of thanking him as also Mr. B. N. Banerjee, M.Sc., the Deputy Librarian, for their invaluable assistance, generously given. My friend Dr. S. C. Sengupta, M. A., Ph. D. of the Presidency College kindly read the manuscript and suggested improvements. Another invaluable helper is my friend Mr. Anil Chandra Banerjee, M. A., who has aided me in many different ways from the inception of this work in 1936 to its passing through the press.

Senate House,
Calcutta,
October 25,
1941.

N. K. Sinha

CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. Birth and Ancestry	1
II. Rise to Prominence, 1749-1755	4
III. From Prominence to Power, 1755-1760	16
IV. Reverses and Recovery, 1760-1761	29
V. Conquests, 1761-1763	37
VI. Relations with the Marathas, 1764-1765	46
VII. Relations with the Marathas, 1766-1767	53
VIII. Relations with the British, 1760-1767	59
IX. The First Anglo-Mysore War, Aug. 1767— March 1768	70
X. The First Anglo-Mysore War, March 1768— April 1769	81
XI. Relations with the Marathas, 1769-1770	95
XII. Relations with the Marathas, 1770-1771	102
XIII. Relations with the Marathas, 1771-1772	109
XIV. Relations with the Marathas, 1772-1776 Conquest of Coorg	114
XV. Relations with the Marathas, 1776-1778	124
XVI. Relations with the British, 1769-1775	136
XVII. Kanara and Malabar, European powers on the west coast, Navy	144
XVIII. Relations with the British, 1775-1779	164
XIX. The Diplomatic Background, 1779-1782	172
XX. The Second Anglo-Mysore War ; the victory of Palur	184
XXI. From Palur to Porto Novo	192
XXII. From Porto Novo to Sholinghur	200
XXIII. From Sholinghur to Annagudi	206
XXIV. From Annagudi to the death of Haidar	216
XXV. Haidar and the French	223
XXVI. Civil Administration	233
XXVII. Military system	259
XXVIII. Significance of Haidar's Career	270
Appendix A. Peshwa Madhav Rao I and the First Anglo-Mysore-War	275
„ B. Haidar and the Bombay Govt.	279
„ C. Haidar's negotiations with Coote	283
„ D. Treatment of the Prisoners of War	287
„ E. Bibliography	289
Index	299

CHAPTER I

Birth and Ancestry

Haidar was born at Budikote in the jagir of his father in 1721 or 1722.¹ His father, Fateh Muhammad, was a man of some consequence. The great grandfather of Haidar, Wali Muhammad, had migrated from Delhi to Gulbarga in the Nizam's dominions. It is claimed on behalf of the family that it belonged to the Quraish tribe though it had no rank and name in India. Haidar's grandfather, Muhammad Ali, who migrated to Sira, cultivated the soil and rented fields and gardens. He said to his sons who had worldly aspirations, "Our forefathers were pious holy men, and though they were competent to distinguish themselves in the world, they nevertheless strove to separate themselves from its ties and connections."² Fateh Muhammad was the fourth son of Muhammad Ali. He and his brothers became soldiers of fortune, refusing "to remain like foxes lurking in the holes and corners of obscurity."³ But Fateh Muhammad took some time to settle down. He was a soldier of fortune, serving one chieftain after another. There is some difference of opinion as to the sequence of his service under different chieftains, but it can perhaps be affirmed without fear of contradiction that he served for some time in Arcot and in Mysore and came to some prominence as a commander of four hundred foot and a hundred horse under Nawab Dargah Quli Khan of Sira. After the death of Dargah Quli Khan he attached himself to his son Abdul Rasul and was killed in a fight between Tahir Khan, the Subadar of Sira, and Abdul Rasul Khan. This event took place in 1728.

The family of Fateh Muhammed, which was at Dod Ballapur, was persecuted by Abbas Quli, a son of Dargah Quli who beat and imprisoned Haidar and his elder brother Shahbaz in order to extort more money from the family. The widow

1. At Dod Ballapur according to *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 6a

2. *Nishan-i-Haidari* translated by Miles, p. 5 ; Ms., f. 5a.

3. Ibid.

succeeded in sending information to Haidar Saheb,¹ a nephew of her deceased husband, who was an officer under the Mysore Government, commanding 100 horse and 200 foot. He petitioned the ruler of Mysore, who wrote to the Chief of Sira and he secured the release of the family after holding out threats to Abbas Quli. The family, now almost destitute, sought the protection of the Government of Mysore. Haidar Saheb, the elder, gave shelter to the family, presented his elder cousin, when the latter had grown up, to Nanjaraj, the *Dulwai* of Mysore. His own son, Ali Saheb, was at Maddagiri, commanding a body of 300 foot and 70 horse. On the death of Haidar Saheb, his detachment was placed under the care of Shahbaz, the elder brother of the future ruler of Mysore. Thus the family came to have a secure footing in Mysore, after passing through many vicissitudes of fortune.

Haidar Ali's illiteracy is said to have been due to the misfortunes of his family. "For ten years he was moved from place to place, the most convenient for the countries where his relations happened to serve, but so very unfortunate was he that though the Moormen in general are at great pains to instruct their children in reading and writing he is utterly unacquainted with either owing to the low circumstances of his friends or to his own idleness, but to the latter it is imputed." His illiteracy is thus explained in one of the earliest English accounts about him². As he grew up, he pursued the pleasure and sports of the chase. We are told that Haidar was too wild to conform to the restraints of a military life and for the first time saw military service at Devanhalli in 1749, as a volunteer horseman in his brother's detachment. Hossain Ali Kirmani,

1. Haidar's mother was the daughter of a Navayat merchant. The Navayats or New-comers were the descendants of Arab settlers who came to the south between the 8th and 16th centuries. According to Wilks, she sought the protection of Ibrahim Saheb, her brother, who was in the service of the Mysore Government at Bangalore and it was Ibrahim who later got Shahbaz into Mysore service. Wilks, however, makes mention of a Haidar Naik, a distant relation of Haidar Ali, as helping Devraj in his successful usurpation in 1734.

2. Orme Ms., Vol. 77, pp. 131-132.

This account of the early years of Haidar Ali is based on the Persian Mss. *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Or. 1865, *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* and Canarese *Haidar-nama*, Orme Ms., (Vol. 72) and the account of Wilks.

however, tells us that before entering Mysore service Shahbaz for some time served under Abdul Wahab Khan at Chittur and there his brother Haidar served under him at the head of his cavalry detachment of 200 horse. Haidar was successful in a shooting competition at Devanhalli, caught the eye of Nanjaraj, the *Sarvadhikari* of Mysore, and was raised to the command of 50 horse and 200 peons. The mist that envelops the early years of Haidar is now lifted and henceforth there is no difficulty in finding the steps by which he rose to power.

There is no doubt about the humble position of Haidar's parents and his family. He had not the advantage of birth or wealth. When we compare his obscure beginnings and think of the arts and accidents that enabled him to rise so high, we are reminded of the Fatimite Caliph, who silenced an indiscreet question on lineage by drawing his sword and saying, "This is my pedigree," and casting a handful of gold coins to his soldiers, said, "These are my kindred and my children".

— — —

CHAPTER II

Rise to Prominence, 1749-1755

Haidar's rise, like that of many other great men, was as much due to his energy, enterprise and daring as to his opportunities. A detailed study of his career from 1750 to 1760 leads logically to the conclusion that he had a nicely calculated programme which unfolded itself stage by stage. But so much of his success he owed to external complications with their quick turns and sudden changes in the course of events that it is very difficult to say what he owed to his own foresight and how much to circumstances. Intrepid and swift, he was always ready to take advantage of his opportunities.

The Government of Mysore was in the hands of two brothers, Devraj and Nanjaraj. Their usurpation was almost complete, though they had left to the nominal King 'the exterior appendages of royalty.' The position of the reigning monarch, Chikka Krishnaraja, was humiliating and fraught with danger. He was merely a shadow but a shadow in whose name potent conjuring tricks might be performed by any unscrupulous intriguer. Devraj was the *Dulwai* or commander-in-chief and Nanjaraj was the *Sarvadhikari*, controlling revenue and finance. But from 1746, Devraj, grown old and decrepit, allowed his brother to lead distant expeditions, himself undertaking during his absence the temporary charge of revenue and finance. This produced a confusion of authority which could be utilised against both if they quarrelled and separated as they actually did later on.

Mysore was a small state in a far-off corner at the junction of the Eastern and Western Ghats. In normal circumstances, it would not have been drawn into the power politics of those days. It was very far from the scene of the strife of the Mughals and the Marathas. But Shivaji had at one time under his control the forts of Gingi, Kolar, Hoskote, Bangalore, Sira, Bellary, Dharwar and the tableland of Mysore. A group of politicians around Shahu thought that Maratha expansion should proceed southward and not northward, and traditionally the Mysore state was included within the sphere of Maratha influence.

The Marathas could have easily conquered the whole of the region south of the Krishna. The chiefs of Cuddapah, Kurnul, Sira, Savanur and the rulers of Mysore, Arcot, Tanjore, Travancore, Cochin and Calicut could not have offered any serious resistance to the full weight of Maratha arms. But the North with its historical setting, the glamour of Mughal magnificence, had a much greater attraction. The South was a comparatively neglected bypath. Baji Rao, as also Balaji Baji Rao and with them Shahu, thought that the imperial highway led northwards. What strikes a student of Maratha imperialism is the diffusive nature of Maratha conquests from "the Krishna to the Attock." In their eagerness to strike at the trunk of the withering tree, they embarked upon a policy that would not certainly have affected the history of the South. It may be, as Grant Duff puts it, that Baji Rao comprehended the nature of predatory power and perceived its growth in turbulence and anarchy. As it was, under the inspiration of Baji Rao, Maratha imperialism made a choice and pursued a career that left Mysore alone. By the treaty of Warna (1731) between Shahu and his cousin Sambhuji of Kolhapur, the region between the Tungabhadra and Rameswaram became the field for the expansion of the Kolhapur branch, which was completely cut off from the North, Shahu reserving to himself half of the territory to be conquered. Kolhapur was not a powerful state and from it Mysore had not much to fear. But under Balaji Baji Rao the policy of southward expansion suddenly received the powerful support of the Peshwa himself as also of his cousin Sadasiv Rao Bhau¹. Without abandoning their forward policy in the North, the Marathas at the same time pushed southward. This Maratha menace to Mysore became very real from 1753 and the series of Maratha invasions during the Peshwaship of Balaji Baji Rao, begun that year, were repeated in 1754, 1757 and 1759. But Nizam-ul-mulk, too, claimed that he had the right to enter into the full territorial legacy of Aurangzeb and regarded Mysore as Mughal territory. "Aurangzeb's empire

1. S.P.D., Vol. 28, letters no. 63 and 65.

Murar Rao's letter to Sadasiv Rao Bhau complimented his cousin, the Peshwa, on his cleverness in securing the transfer of the whole of the Karnatak from Babuji Naik to him as his sphere of action and assured him of his hearty support in his southern enterprise.

on the west coast stretched in theory up to the northern frontier of Goa and inland to Belgaon in the Bombay Karnatak and the Tungabhadra river. Thereafter the boundary passed west to east in a disputed and evershifting line through the centre of Mysore dipping south-east-ward to the Koleroon river north of Tanjore."¹ The Nizam claimed sovereignty, the Marathas demanded *chauth* over all the states and principalities to the south of the Tungabhadra that had once submitted to Aurangzeb. Thus was Mysore suddenly drawn into the vortex of the rivalry between the Peshwa and the Nizam. The Marathas could not also be oblivious of the fact that some of the most important forts south of the Tungabhadra had at one time belonged to Shivaji.

In view of the Maratha menace, it might naturally be expected that Devraj and Nanjaraj would rely more and more on the Nizam. Nizam-ul-mulk's son, Nasir Jang, realised tribute from Mysore in 1746. The Mysore Government supported Nasir Jang in the war of succession that ensued on the death of Nizam-ul-mulk. But Nasir Jang was murdered in December, 1750, his successor Muzaffar Jang in January, 1751. It was only with the support of Bussy and his trained battalions that the power of the Nizam seemed to be securely established. Bussy was not recalled until July, 1758. The Mysore Government, however, failed to get the support of the Nizam in opposition to the Marathas. The reputed riches of the treasury of Seringapatam lured the courtiers of Salabat Jang, who forced on him a policy of plundering Mysore, and Bussy, to save his position, acquiesced. They invaded Mysore in 1755 and imposed on it a tribute of 56 lakhs.

A further complication was introduced into Mysore politics by the ambition of Nanjaraj. The French and English East India Companies were at war, backing rival claimants to the Subadari of Hyderabad and the Nawabi of Arcot. The French succeeded in installing their nominee Muzaffar Jang, and after his murder, Salabat Jang, at Hyderabad. They succeeded also in killing Anwaruddin, the Nawab of Arcot, and took his eldest son Mahphuz Khan prisoner, his second son Muhammad Ali

1. Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzeb*, p. 476.

flying to Trichinopoly, only to be besieged there by the French and their nominee, Chanda Saheb. But the war lingered on at Trichinopoly. At Muhammad Ali's suggestion Clive seized Arcot and held it out for fifty days against detachments sent by Chanda Saheb, thus proving, as Murar Rao said, that the English also could fight. But all this did not materially improve the prospects of Muhammad Ali because of the deficiency of his funds. His own troops were without pay and he had very little prospect of preventing a mutiny. Before Clive's Arcot exploit he had appealed to the inconsiderate ambition of Nanjaraj. Haidar's biographer compares the condition of Muhammad Ali to a "lamp the light of which glimmers and dies at the approach of morning." In such circumstances a more prudent man would not have agreed to come to his help and least of all the *Sarvadhikari* of the Mysore state which was so much menaced by the Marathas and the Nizam. But the cession of Trichinopoly with all its dependencies was a bait which the greedy Nanjaraj could not but swallow. Orme wrote five years later, "It is a characteristic of Muhammad Ali that in his adversity he will make any concession as he did to Mysore and on the glimpse of prosperity his views of acquisition are as extravagant." Devraj, more experienced and less headstrong, forbade him but Nanjaraj was not to be dissuaded. He embarked on this venture in which he wasted three years at the head of an army of 20,000 men and was obliged to return without receiving the least compensation or any security for its reimbursement. It is difficult to estimate exactly how much money was spent in this fruitless expedition. He must have spent at Trichinopoly 3 to 4 crores of rupees.¹ The very

1. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. ix, pp. 369-70—"Nandaraja spent 3 crores of state treasure in attempts to capture "Trichi" p. 239—"Nandaraja has spent 4 crores without the raja's permission." Kirmani's estimate—3,000,000 pagodas—is dismissed by his translator as gross exaggeration but the estimate of Wilks is that Trichinopoly alone cost the British 35 lakhs of pagodas. Kirmani's is an underestimate.

Kaifiyat of Haidar (Mackenzie Ms.)—three crores of Kanteray varaha. This seems to be an exaggerated estimate.

A Kanteray pagoda=3 Rupees

A Hikerry pagoda=4 Rupees

solvent Mysore state found itself faced with bankruptcy as a result of this expedition. The money paid to Muhammad Ali, the subsidies paid to the Maratha associate Murar Rao, the upkeep of an army of 20,000 for a period of three years, the money paid to seduce men in the service of Muhammad Ali, the Tanjore chief, the Pudukottai Poligar—all this must have totalled a colossal sum. The King of Tanjore wrote in 1754, when Nanjaraj, conscious of the fraud perpetrated by Muhammad Ali, had already joined the French, "Nanjaraj is very rich. He does not value money. He sends advances to the people and draws them on his side." Nanjaraj might have dazzled people with his offers but his obstinacy at Trichinopoly was the cause of his own undoing and the proximate cause of the rise of Haidar Ali. The sums spent at Trichinopoly and the drafts twice made by the Marathas and once by Salabat Jang made the Mysore state unable to meet its treaty obligations, pay its soldiery and defray its own expenses, resulting in troubles and confusion that provided Haidar Ali with his first opportunity.

Between 1749 and 1750 Mysore troops numbering 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot, commanded by Barakki Venkat Rao, were in attendance on Nasir Jang. Shahbaz and Haidar were in the retinue of Venkat Rao. Haidar was, at this time, at the head of 500 matchlock peons and 5 horsemen¹ besides some irregulars. Nasir Jang was assassinated by the Nawab of Cuddapah. The Mysore troops withdrew. But Haidar's Bedar peons took advantage of the confusion caused by the assassination and succeeded in taking camels laden with gold coins to Haidar's residence at Devanhalli. The author of *Nishan-i-Haidari* says, "On his route homewards Haidar fell in with 3/4 camels laden with treasure which the rebels had seized and were taking away. Haidar took possession of the treasure which he added to his own." The sudden affluence of Haidar is thus explained. Looting was a normal adjunct of war operations and Haidar was not the only party to profit by it. It has been asserted that the French share of this spoil was so considerable a sum "that everyone from the councillor to the writer, from the captain to the private, had his share and officers who only

1. Parkinson, Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

joined the service later looked back with regret to the happy days when a mere ensign received 60,000 rupees. Never had so much gold been seen at Pondichery. It was comparable with the solid gains of Plassey.”¹ In view of the importance of looting, Haidar made a systematic organisation of what was promiscuous and made the looters work for his benefit. It is also asserted by Wilks that in the course of the operations that ended with the assassination of Nasir Jang, Haidar’s men had succeeded in taking to his residence at Devanhalli 500 muskets and 300 horses ‘occasionally picked up in the field or stolen in the quiet of the night.’² But even more important than this acquisition of wealth that must have been responsible for the beginnings of his ambition, was the high opinion which he must have formed of the abilities of the French as a result of his first contact with them.³ Up to now the British had not done much to impress him. As Ananda Ranga Pillai writes, “They were like the jackal who burnt his skin in stripes in order to imitate the tiger and perished in anguish.”⁴ On his return to Mysore Haidar began to drill his recruits with the aid of a few French sepoy deserters. “He raised 500 sepoys and 200 horse, the former armed with European flintlocks which he had from time to time possessed himself of.”⁵ Nanjaraj was impressed by the exhibition of these new firearms and Haidar Ali with his ‘invincibles’ accompanied him to Trichinopoly when he embarked on this foolish venture.

Trichinopoly was Haidar’s great training ground. There, amidst constant strife and turmoil, his fibre was hardened, his observation quickened, his resourcefulness increased and his character developed. He gained his experience of the art of warfare at Trichinopoly. Possessing sound sense, clear insight

1. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. VII, Introduction I.

2. Wilks, Vol. I, p. 270.

3. Bowring says in his book *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* (p. 25) that Haidar even went to Pondichery on his way to Mysore, where he became even more impressed by the discipline of the French troops and the skill of the French engineers. I do not find this statement corroborated by any contemporary account.

4. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. VII.

5. Parkinson, Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

and resolution, he came to understand the western system of attack and defence. He was badly in need of such a training school if he was to play his part. The Mysore army command was so inefficient that Nanjaraj's troops made a night march to avoid the enemy with 10,000 lights as in a wedding procession. From February to December, 1752, the Mysoreans and the British were allies. But after the surrender and murder of Chanda Saheb Muhammad Ali gave to the Mysoreans only the island of Seringham, and sent messages and apologies without the least sign of handing over Trichinopoly. What is called 'the fraud of Trichinopoly' stood fully revealed. The English associated themselves with this fraud by pleading that they were merely auxiliaries. Nanjaraj had thus to join the French who were the enemies of the English and of Muhammad Ali. During this shortlived period of Anglo-Mysore friendship, Haidar could see for himself the brilliance and daring of Clive and the ability and spirit of Lawrence. He was an eyewitness of many of their attacks and counter-attacks. These were excellent object lessons to a man accustomed to see only the pusillanimities, makeshifts and blunders of his generals. Haidar Ali was at that time too inconspicuous a man to have his deeds recorded by Anglo-Indian chroniclers. Kirmani is prone to exaggeration. But we may perhaps agree with his statements that he took part in several night attacks on the French and Chanda Saheb and the predatory troops attached to his battalions brought from the French companies arms, tents and cattle and, in the course of a night attack, even two guns. The politics of his period, a strange embroidery of half friendships and hungry ambitions, brought Haidar into some sort of touch with two men who were his famous antagonists in later life—Muhammad Ali and Murar Rao Ghorpade. We read in a contemporary Persian manuscript that Haidar was sometimes present with Nanjaraj in the *Durbar* of Muhammed Ali where, performing his '*taslim*' (salutation) to Muhammad Ali, he would stand apart. But he caught the eye of the Arcot chief, who is said to have recommended him to his ally for further promotion.¹ Haidar Ali, who was a very good judge of men, must have formed his own opinion of the Khan, but he kept it

1. Br. Museum *Or.* 1865, f. 7.

to himself. When he became big enough to be the rival of Muhammad Ali, this knowledge acquired by close association must have stood him in good stead. Murar Rao, the Maratha chieftain of Gooty, had come to Trichinopoly with a detachment of 6000 troops. His army presented a remarkable contrast to those of Mysore and Arcot. "The whole army seemed as one family, the spirit of exploit he contrived to keep up amongst them by equitable partitions of plunder. This rendered them fond of their fatigues and they never complained but when they had nothing to do. The choice he made of his officers still more discovered his capacity. For there was not a commander of 100 horse who was not fit to command the whole, notwithstanding which every one was contented in his particular station and they all tried in perfect harmony with each other and in perfect obedience to their general. . . . Besides the qualities common to the rest of the Maratha nation, such as activity, stratagem, great dexterity in the management of their horses and sabres, they by their conflict against the Europeans surmounted in a great degree the terror of fire arms ; what is more extraordinary, they were even capable of standing against the vivacity of a cannonade from field pieces although this terrible annoyance struck all other Indians with as much terror as their ancestors felt when regular musketry was first employed against them."¹ This brilliant condottiere chief, paid by the Mysorean, fought at first on behalf of the English and Muhammad Ali and later on behalf of the French. Haidar was his comrade in arms in many a night attack and in many attempts to cut down convoys. But in his later life there is very little to show that at Trichinopoly Haidar learnt the secret of Maratha success in attack. He was perhaps too much dazzled by the discipline, the skill, the inventive power of the westerner as contrasted with the supineness and want of cohesion of his own people to make a study of any other method of warfare. He came to understand the natural difficulties and dangers of war with a European power in the excellent school at Trichinopoly. But somehow he failed to understand the other method of attack that was destined to give him much greater trouble. We have

1. Orme, Vol I, pp. 363-64.

no means of ascertaining the exact nature of his contact with Murar Rao, but if the Canarese record *Haidarnama* is to be believed, they were far from friendly. Haidar is said to have actually vowed vengeance against Murar Rao, "for the loss of a splendid gun called Vishnuchakra" which Haidar had captured and which Murar Rao's protest to the *Dulwai* compelled him to disgorge.¹

Throughout 1753 and 1754 Nanjaraj continued his attempts to seize Trichinopoly from Muhammad Ali and the English, the French co-operating with him in these attempts until their suspension of arms in October 1754, and Murar Rao co-operating with them up to July 1754, when he went back to Gooty. In these operations around Trichinopoly two officers of the Mysore army were very forward—one was Hari Singh, the other Haidar Ali. These rivals soon developed into sworn enemies.

When hostility first began between Nanjaraj and the British in December 1752, Captain Dalton from Trichinopoly wanted to establish a post to harass Nanjaraj at Seringham. Dalton was foiled by the sudden and unaccountable panic of a portion of his troops of which Hari Singh, the Rajput *Jumadar* of cavalry in the Mysore army, took the fullest advantage, "charged the fugitives with fury and cut down the whole party of Nabob's sepoy excepting 15 men."²

After the "fraud of Trichinopoly" had become fully revealed and before hostilities actually began between Nanjaraj and the British, Haidar did a good turn to Nanjaraj. Major Lawrence had given his advice to seize Nanjaraj and Murar Rao in one of their conferences with Captain Dalton. Mill says, "the danger which might have been averted by securing the persons of those enemies was of considerable amount."³ If the British themselves could entertain such an idea Muhammad Ali, who was not certainly very conspicuous for his moral scruples, would readily have agreed. It is said that Muhammad Ali asked Nanjaraj to go with his principal sardars to take possession of the fort in person. He had already passed the first gate

1. *Haidarnama*, quoted in Mysore Archaeological Report.

2. Orme, Vol. I, p. 271.

3. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 52.

Mill, *History of British India*, Vol. III, p. 116.

when Haidar Ali conveyed his apprehensions to Nanjaraj and said that it was not safe to enter the fort as it must be only a trap to capture them.¹ Nanjaraj then contented himself with sending only a detachment of 700 men into the fort. It is not unnatural to assume that Haidar was responsible for inculcating in the mind of Nanjaraj suspicions about the honesty of the British and the genuinenses of their assurances. This caution Nanjaraj, who was so eager to seize Trichinopoly, very badly needed and after the first wave of his enthusiasm had subsided, Nanjaraj himself must have realized how sound had been the warnings of Haidar Ali.

On the 10th may, 1753 an attempt was made by Major Lawrence from Trichinopoly to pass over to the island of Seringham and offer battle. In the operations of the day Hari Singh was conspicuous for his bravery. Galloping at the head of his cavalry, he charged on the left of the British line, breaking through, sword in hand.²

On the 13th February, 1754, 12000 Maratha and Mysore horse, 6,000 sepoys and 400 French troops with seven guns attacked a British convoy approaching Trichinopoly through the woods belonging to the Poligar Tondiman (modern Pudukottai territory). Hari Singh is said to have led the charge cutting down the marching platoons. "When the hurry of the action was over, Haidar, always attended by his Bedar peons, was found to be in possession of all the guns and tumbrils and Hari Singh claimed them as his own having actually carried them and such was the state of fact. The honour of the day perhaps belonged to Hari Singh but the guns were in possession of his rival and after a long discussion he was obliged to compound for one and leave the remaining three to Haidar as substantial trophies of a victory he had not gained."³

On the 14th August, 1754, a considerable British and Tanjorean detachment was marching to reinforce the British garrison of Trichinopoly. The French and Mysore troops attacked this detachment. They could not create much

1. *Haidarnama*.

2. Orme, Vol. I, p. 344.

3. Wilks, Vol. I, p. 322.

impression, but in the hurry of the fight the English rearguard by some mistake left the protection of the convoy. Haidar saw this and with a body of his troops fell on the rear of the convoy seizing 35 carts, some laden with arms and ammunition and others with baggage belonging to the British officers.¹

Hari Singh was conspicuous for his dash and daring, Haidar Ali for coolness and circumspection besides personal bravery. What was more, each attack on a convoy added considerably to Haidar's resources, but merely added to Hari Singh's reputation for his zeal in his master's cause. We should also note that Orme describes Haidar Ali as the best Mysorean officer at Trichinopoly. Dupleix sent Haidar a present in appreciation of his astuteness and zeal at Trichinopoly.² Hari Singh might sneer at him as a man who owed his rise to fawning and flattery but Haidar could look back with satisfaction upon the period of his stay at Trichinopoly in which he created a great impression on the mind of Nanjaraj as also earned the appreciation of the French on whom he had to depend very much for the success of his ambitious projects. The invasion of Mysore by Salabat Jang, with Bussy in his company, led to the recall of Nanjaraj by Devraj and he moved from Seringham on the 9th April, 1755, handing it over to the French. His own troops were in arrears for nine months and he had to discharge one-third of them on account of his financial difficulty. So great was his financial distress that the agents of Nanjaraj in order to meet their financial obligation to the French offered in July, 1753, "a parcel of jewels set with precious stones amounting to 5 lakhs of rupees and Nanjaraj's own turra set with precious stones, his sarpech, pendant and chains as a pledge for one lakh."³ Towards the end of his stay here, Haidar was officially at the head of 1500 horse, 3,000 regular infantry, 2,000 peons and 4 guns. He was now appointed *Faujdar* of

1. Orme, Vol. I, p. 369.

2. Portuguese Document No. III.

3. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol IX, Introduction. When Nanjaraj, disgusted with Muhammad Ali and the British, joined the French. Dupleix by his diplomatic dexterity obtained an agreement from him that he would get Trichinopoly on condition that he would pay the expenses of the French detachments helping him and also 3 lakhs of rupees a year.

Dindigul and he added to his corps the best of the soldiers whom Nanjaraj had to discharge on account of his financial embarrassment. He came to Dindigul at the head of 5,000 regular infantry, 2,500 horse, 2,000 peons and six guns.¹

Dindigul was conquered for Mysore by Barakki Venkat Rao from the Poligar of Uttamapalayam in 1745. The fort was situated on a rock 65 miles south-west of Trichinopoly and 45 miles north-west of Madura. About this time an English force was attempting to establish the authority of Muhammad Ali in the Madura-Tinnevely region. Instigated by Muhammad Ali the Poligars of Kannivadi, Palni and Virupakshi, who were dependent on Mysore, were withholding tribute.² The Mysore Government had thus to appoint somebody who could keep these rebel Poligars in check and also watch over the movements of the British at Madura and, if possible, thwart them in co-operation with the *Jamadars* of Madura and the Poligars of the Tinnevely region. The *Foujdar* of Dindigul must be a strong resourceful person. Haidar was selected for the post. An ambitious man thus got his first independent command.

1. Wilks, Vol. I, p. 352.

2. *Kaifiyat* of Haidar, MS. 32 (Mackenzie Ms.)

CHAPTER III

From Prominence to Power, 1755-1760

The first task of the new *Foujdar* of Dindigul was the subjugation of the rebellious Poligars led by Amminayaka and Appinayaka, the Poligars of Palni and Virupakshi.¹ As he approached their territory on his way to Dindigul, he offered his help to secure a remission of their tribute. Thus posing as a friend he obtained a safe passage and, on reaching Dindigul, organised his attack. There were 26 *palayams* or feudal estates under his jurisdiction.² If all the Poligars had united they could have put into the field 30,000 troops and easily overwhelmed Haidar. But these contumacious Poligars remained disunited and were brought to their knees with extraordinary rapidity. Kannivadi is 10 miles due west of Dindigul. It is close under the Palni hills. If harried on the plains, the Poligar at Kannivadi would retire to the hills above. Haidar took two months to clear away the jungles and obstacles which surrounded the Kannivadi fort. The Poligar was reduced to such a plight that he promised to pay 3 lakhs of *chakrans* and paid at once 70,000,³ but as he was unable to find the remainder, Haidar Ali sequestered his state, arrested him and sent him to Bangalore. At Palni, Haidar plundered everything valuable and compelled the Poligar, who had fled, to pay a fine of 1,75,000 *chakrans*. Virupakshi, 13 miles east of Palni, was also a very difficult country. But its Poligar had no heart to resist. When Haidar Ali entered the country only two of the Poligar estates were under resumption. He resumed all others, except five.⁴

At Dindigul, Haidar was also busy increasing his army and accumulating wealth. Wilks says on the strength of the evidence of eye witnesses that Haidar was an adept in fraudulent musters. On one occasion only 67 persons were wounded, but

1. *Haidarnama*.

2. W. Francis, *Gazetteer of the Madura District*. Vol. I, p. 183.

3. *Madura Gazetteer*. Vol. I, p. 239. A *Chakran*=1½ Rupees.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

he secured allowance for 700 and cleverly hoodwinked a commissioner sent from Seringapatam. Exaggerated reports of disturbances were sent and Haidar was permitted to increase his troops and by means of a circular muster ten thousand men were passed off as 18,000.¹ It has been asserted, certainly with some exaggeration, that he amassed wealth to the extent of 20 lakhs, as a result of his operations against the Poligars.² He was not content with merely playing the part of a pike in a pond. He is said to have obtained skilful French engineers to organise his regular artillery, arsenal and laboratory. All this kept him occupied during the years 1755 and 1756.

The *Jamadars* of Madura headed by Barkatullah and the Poligars of Tinnevely, who were resisting the attempts of the British and Muhammad Ali to conquer Madura, wrote to Haidar for assistance. They even offered to give up the district of Sholavandam, comprising a strong pass and the only road between Madura and Tinnevely, but Haidar, recalled temporarily to Mysore in 1757, was not at that time in a position to accept the offer. Madura surrendered to the British in 1757. Haidar came back to Dindigul in November, took the fort of Sholavandam without resistance and entered the district of Madura. He approached the walls of the city but found them much stronger than he had expected. He plundered the country and sent off the cattle and other booty to Dindigul. Yusuf Khan, the general of Muhammad Ali, described as the ablest of the Indian soldiers who fought in the Carnatic wars, now advanced upon him. Haidar "took post with a part of his army near the issue of the pass of Nattam in order to intercept the march."³ This pass, between the Alagarmalais and the eastern spurs of the Sirumalais, was according to Orme, one of the most difficult and dangerous defiles in the peninsula. Yusuf Khan attacked and his better disciplined army and his powerful guns worked havoc amongst Haidar's men. Haidar was defeated and withdrew. Collecting his detachments he returned to Dindigul.

While Haidar was consolidating his position in Dindigul, affairs at Mysore had taken a turn which provided him with further opportunities. Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao first invaded

1. Wilks, pp. 353-54. 2. *Haidarnama*. 3. Orme, Vol. II., p. 251.

Mysore in 1753. He had to be bought off from attacking Seringapatam by the payment of 30 lakhs and promises of greater regularity in future. He was accompanied by his cousin Sadasiv Rao Bhau in this expedition.

At the beginning of 1755, Salabat Jang and Bussy came to Mysore. The march of the Nizam's army was proverbially slow. If his brother from Trichinopoly could come in time Devraj thought that he would be able to take the enemy in the flank. But Salabat and Bussy marched very fast ; indeed, the celerity of Bussy's movements struck terror. Kunigal, the only fort that resisted, was taken by storm. Devraj was compelled to agree to pay 56 lakhs of rupees. The plates and jewels of the Hindu temples, as also the personal ornaments of the Raja and his family which were sold, only realized one-third of the sum. For the rest Devraj gave bankers' securities. But as no payment could be made the 'usurpers' Government lost all credit with the bankers. The Peshwa, whose army was operating about the Dharwar-Hubli-Kundgal region, was persuaded by Bussy not to make demands on Mysore. He therefore devoted his attention to settling Maratha claims on Bidnur, Basavapatna and Chitaldurg. He also captured various places in the Mysore territory to the north-west of that state.¹

The disgraceful failure of Nanjaraj at Trichinopoly, the inability of the usurpers to resist the encroachments of the Nizam and the Peshwa, and the collapse of their credit perhaps emboldened the King, who was smarting under their yoke, to conspire against them. The Raja, his mother and *Pradhani Pandit* Venkatapati Ayyan, who was at one time himself the *Sarbadhikari*, resolved to seize and imprison Nanjaraj and their plan was to restore Venkatapati Ayyan to his former position. Nanjaraj collected 4,000 troops and decided on attacking the palace. But Devraj pacified him and Nanjaraj contented himself with placing guards on the palace. The house of Venkatapati Ayyan was, however, plundered and Venkatapati and his wife were imprisoned at Manvallidurg, his son and son-in-law in Kabaldurg. Thus was the conspiracy nipped in the bud.²

1. S.P.D. Vol. 28, letters no. 111, 112, 113, 114. Papers for the years 1754-56 are not forthcoming because the Peshwa was himself on the spot.

2. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. IX, pp. 369, 370, 398.

This happened in October and November, 1755. The Raja was, however, impatient to get rid of the usurpers. Several months after this they heard that he was approaching Shahbaz (brother of Haidar) and Khande Rao (Haidar's *Mutsuddi*¹). On hearing this Nanjaraj and Devraj ordered the fort gates to be closed. They prepared to kill the Raja the next morning. But the Raja with his immediate retainers—1,000 in all—sallied forth with drawn swords, killed a large number of Nanjaraj's troops, and dispersed the rest. The Raja having gone back to the palace, Nanjaraj fired all the guns that he had mounted on the walls, and slew men, women and domestic servants of the King, numbering 100. Nanjaraj and Devraj then entered the palace and seized all the Raja's people. "They also resolved to kill the Raja but Krishnaraja Wadiyar's wife who had brought him up clung to him and vowed that they should kill her first. After much talk they decided to imprison the Raja and his family." Balaji Baji Rao's *vakil* protested against this treatment of the Raja, who is said to have sent a letter to the Peshwa by camel messengers.² This happened in August, 1756. Balaji however could not come to Mysore before April, 1757.

Thus it appears that Devraj and Nanjaraj were both in favour of removing the Raja by violence. The statement of Wilks that Devraj opposed the violent proceedings of Nanjaraj is not borne out by the above entry in the Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, which on this point was based on the information supplied by the Mysore *vakil*. But the brothers had their differences. These two masterful personalities were bound to part sooner or later. Devraj, grown old, resented, the hustling tactics of Nanjaraj.³ The differences that commenced with the Trichinopoly expedition became very acute in the beginning of 1757. Devraj thought it better to withdraw altogether and with his family, his personal adherents, 1,000 horse and 2,000 peons, he withdrew to Satyamangalam in February, 1757. From Satyamangalam he is said to have issued his orders to the *amils* of several districts assigned to Haidar to make their

1. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol. X, p. 181.

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 181.

3. Misunderstanding in connection with the treasury was the cause of their quarrel according to *Haidarnama*.

payments to him. This led to the coming of Haidar from Dindigul early in 1757.

In February 1757, Nanjaraj was the undisputed master of the Mysore kingdom. The King, he was sure, was now absolutely incapable of any attempt to wriggle out and Devraj, the senior usurper, was eliminated. Nanjaraj now required only a respite from foreign invasions to consolidate his authority. But this respite he could not get. The Marathas entered Mysore in March, 1757, and besieged Nanjaraj at Seringapatam. A battery of 30 guns was opened by Sadasiv Rao Bhau. One of the shots is said to have struck the top of the temple of Rangaswami and a gun in the battery burst killing several besiegers. Both parties feared divine wrath and decided to come to terms, Nanjaraj agreeing to pay 32 lakhs. Sadasiv Rao raised the siege but the usurper of Mysore could only pay 6 lakhs in cash. 13 *taluks* were handed over as security for the payment of the remaining amount.¹

After the departure of the Marathas, Haidar arrived at Seringapatam from Dindigul. He advised his chief to expel the Maratha agents as also the Maratha troops occupying these districts on the approach of the rains. The rivers would then swell and the Marathas would not be able to cross the Krishna and the Tungabhadra until the water level subsided. He would then have time to come with reinforcements from Dindigul.²

Before his departure from Dindigul for Seringapatam, Haidar had received from the chief of Palghat on the eastern frontier of Malabar an appeal for help, that chief being at war with the Zamorin of Calicut. Haidar sent Makhdum Ali, his brother-in-law, with 5,000 infantry, 2,000 horse and 5 guns. Makhdum advanced up to the sea coast. The Zamorin of Calicut agreed to pay a military contribution of 12 lakhs by instalments. Makhdum left an army of occupation. The Malabar chiefs, to get rid of this, offered through their agents to pay their dues to Devraj. Haidar in his turn waited on Devraj who was persuaded to surrender the districts of Haidar that

1. According to *Haidarnama*, these were Nagmangala, Kadaba, Banavara, Chenraypatna, Kikkeri, Haranahali, Kadur, Turkere, Belur, Chicknayakanahalli, Honnavali, Haliyurdurg, Kandikire.

2. Wilks, Vol. I, pp. 359-60.

he was enjoying and agreed to pay him 3 lakhs for the expenses of the Malabar expedition. Haidar surrendered his claims to the military contribution from Malabar and Devraj sent Hari Singh to realise the amount.¹ But this Malabar episode made Haidar realise how easy it was to conquer divided and distracted Malabar from the landside. Of this knowledge acquired by the reconnoitring expedition of Makhdum Ali, he made excellent use later.

The Government of Mysore was bankrupt. The pay of the soldiers was for several months in arrears, and there was a mutiny, which took a form peculiarly Indian. The soldiers sat in 'Dharna' preventing water and provision being carried into the apartments of Nanjaraj. This information reached Haidar at Dindigul, who thereupon went in person to Devraj at Satyamangalam, entreated him to be reconciled to his brother, arguing with every plausible reason that otherwise the Government would be entirely dissolved. Devraj was very ill, suffering from dropsy. There was a public reconciliation with his brother but shortly after he died. On his insistence Nanjaraj had made his submission and apologies to the Raja for the former outrage. The soldiers were demanding their pay. Nanjaraj asked Haidar and his assistant Khande Rao to make an adjustment. Haidar, "with constant demonstrations of deference of the Raja's order, distributed in lieu of money all public property that could be so applied down to the elephants and horses of the Raja's retinue." He compelled the accountants to produce true account and thus succeeded in discharging most of the soldiers. Then he seized the ringleaders and plundered them of all their property.² In all these transactions Haidar was all things to all men. Nanjaraj was grateful to him for his reconciliation with his brother before his death. The King looked upon him as his sole protector against Nanjaraj whose violence he could not possibly forget. The troops thought that they owed their payment entirely to his exertions. Haidar was

1. *Haidarnama* and Wilks.

2. This episode is narrated in a very confused manner by Kirmani. *Haidarnama* does not give a sufficiently detailed account. *Ms. Or.* 1865 gives a narrative that is palpably false. Parkinson trips over this pitfall. I had thus to depend on Wilks alone.

conscious of the strength of his position but perhaps felt that he was not strong enough to attempt to oust Nanjaraj at this stage. He must not be precipitate.

Hari Singh was the one man in Mysore who was thought to be a better soldier than Haidar. A man of implacable revenge, Haidar could never forgive or forget personal insults, injuries and rivalries. Hari Singh had always expressed openly his contempt for him as a soldier. His patron Devraj was now dead. He could not in these circumstances think of continuing in Mysore service. Haidar sent Makhдум Saheb with 1,000 horse and 2,000 infantry ostensibly to Dindigul but really to surprise and cut down Hari Singh. Having failed to realise the military contribution from Malabar he had withdrawn to Coimbatore, where he was refreshing his troops. He was cut down with most of his men in a surprise attack. Wilks says, "300 horses, 1000 muskets, 3 guns were brought in triumph to the capital.....3 guns and 15 beautiful horses were presented in form to the Raja. The remainder were appropriated by Haidar."¹

Devraj had promised to pay Haidar 3 lakhs for his expenses in Malabar. Nanjaraj recognised this claim. He was given an assignment on the revenues of Coimbatore. For his services in the recent disturbances and as a recognition of his fidelity and zeal he was given the fort and district of Bangalore as a jagir.²

But Haidar must now reckon with the Marathas. In pursuance of his advice, Maratha agents had been expelled from many of the ceded districts. Murar Rao of Gooty, dissatisfied with the part assigned to him in the scheme of Maratha expansion in the South, had become lukewarm to his master and even sympathised with a league against the Peshwa, composed of the chiefs of Cuddapah, Savanur and others. Balwant Rao Mehendele entrusted by the Poona Government with the

1. Vol. I. p. 369. Kirmani's account is very confused. But he admits that the sleeping party was attacked and put to the sword and Haidar appropriated most of their arms, baggage, money, utensils, horses and other articles.

2. Wilks, Vol. I. p. 369. The Bishop of Halicarnassus says that Bangalore was conferred on Haidar immediately before the siege of Mysore to quicken his zeal against Nanjaraj.

realization of dues from Mysore, engaged in fighting against the hostile combination. He succeeded in defeating Nawab Abdul Hamid Khan of Cuddapah on the 25th September, 1757.¹ But his cousin and heir, Abdul Nabi, still continued the fight and occupied the Marathas for a longer time than they could spare. In the mean time, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded with Murar Rao Ghorpade on the 11th May, 1757.² All these disturbances being over, Balwant Rao Mehendele would naturally turn against Mysore. The Peshwa informed Balwant Rao that Gopal Rao Patwardhan and Malhar Rao Raste had been instructed to advance and give him support against Mysore.³ But Balwant Rao was detained in the district of Cuddapah until February, 1758. The troops under Gopal Rao were employed near the Godavari under the Peshwa's son Viswas Rao. The Peshwa's plan is quoted by Grant Duff from an original letter from the Peshwa to Balwant Rao in which the latter was advised "to march to that place (Bidnur) as soon as possible...the whole would fall into his hands before the arrival of Gopal Rao when they must conjointly attack Chitaldurg."⁴ Grant Duff comments that if this scheme had been practicable it would in all probability have prevented the rise of Haidar Ali. But Balwant Rao, after being detained in fighting against the Poligars until February, had to go northward on account of complication in Hyderabad. The Mysoreans had a welcome respite of which Haidar took the fullest advantage ; he consolidated his hold, secured Bangalore, cut down Hari Singh and got the upperhand in all the affairs of Mysore.

About April 1758, the Marathas came again to Mysore under Gopal Rao Patwardhan and Ananda Rao Raste. Payments were demanded of the Mysore Raja. Haidar is now pretty frequently mentioned in the Marathi news letters. Every letter comments on the wavering attitude of the Raja of Mysore. The Marathas, however, adopted vigorous measures. An ultimatum was sent to the Raja of Mysore that in the case of noncompliance with the request for the payment of

1. S.P.D., Vol. 28. letter no. 146.

2. *Ibid.*, letter no. 185.

3. *Ibid.*, letter no. 205

4. Grant Duff, *History of the Marathas*, Vol. II

arrears, they would invade Mysore territory within 36 hours.¹ Everyone knew that Haidar counselled non-compliance. The Maratha chiefs wrote, "We shall let Haidar enter Bangalore and then raise our batteries and see how he forces them."² They commenced their march upon Bangalore in September, 1758, and invested it, occupying the districts of Bangalore, Kolar, Devanhalli and Hoskote. Even Channapatna, about 40 miles from Seringapatam, was taken. At Bangalore Srinivas Rao Barakki was besieged by them and soon the garrison there found itself faced with starvation. Srinivas Rao appealed to his father Barakki Venkata Rao at Seringapatam for help. Haidar relieved Bangalore by retaking Channapatna.

Some arrears were still due to the troops in service. Most of the senior generals of Mysore were unwilling to advance against the Marathas unless these arrears were paid. Haidar offered to take personal responsibility for arrears due to the men which were not heavy, and he was placed in charge of the field army to the disgust of the older chiefs who resigned. He placed respectable detachments at Maddur and Malavalli which guarded the approaches to the capital. Latif Ali Beg, the commandant at Maddur, succeeded in recapturing Channapatna by escalade.³ Haidar concentrated his force. Gopal Rao had to raise the siege of Bangalore⁴ and marched against Haidar who fortified his camp. Haidar occupied a difficult mountain terrain where horsemen could not penetrate. He never ventured out at daytime and contented himself with making night attacks in which he was incessantly active.⁵ This continued for more than two months. Haidar could not expect to defeat the Marathas in the open. But if he just succeeded in remaining on the defensive it might wear them out and induce them to withdraw. There is nothing to show that Haidar was victorious in the open field. In a letter dated August 19, 1758,⁶ we find Gopal Rao and Malhar Rao writing to their agent at Seringapatam that they had received a

1. S.P.D., Vol 28, letter no. 226.

2. *Ibid.*, letter no. 229

3. *Ibid.*, letter no. 242.

4. *Ibid.*, letter no. 256.

5. S.P.D., Vol 28, letter no. 254

6. *Ibid.*, letter no. 225

despatch from the Peshwa intimating that he was not inclined to exchange the ceded territory for money to be paid by the Mysore Raja. But, they added, as they had given their word they would abide by it if the Raja accepted their proposal. But what Haidar really did, was to agree to these terms after months of campaigning. That does not point to victory but rather to a desire to get the State embroiled more and more so that he could catch the reins of government that were slipping from the hands of Nanjaraj. The Marathas gave up their claims to ceded districts and received 32 lakhs of rupees in liquidation of all claims past and present. They were paid sixteen lakhs in cash by realising a forced contribution from all individuals. For the rest Haidar gave his personal security and such was his credit that the bankers in the Maratha camp agreed to make the advance on his assurance.¹ Haidar took the 13 ceded districts under his own direct management so that from their revenues he could liquidate his debt to the bankers.

"Haidar Naik has made you lose your reputation", so said the Peshwa to Gopal Rao.² But Gopal Rao would not agree. He asserted that Haidar Ali was not the man to pay this huge amount without being put to very serious difficulty. This statement seems to be justified. But the relief of Bangalore and the escalade of Channapatna were exploited by Haidar, who was welcomed as a victor who brought peace with honour.

The large assignments made to Haidar and the heavy payments made to the Marathas left the State unable to defray even the ordinary expenses. Arrears to troops began to accumulate. Haidar had become practically the commander-in-chief. The King could not forget the insults and injuries he had suffered from Nanjaraj and the old dowager of the late Doddevaraja conspired through Khande Rao with Haidar. Once again the old weapon of '*Dharna*' came handy.

The plot, as it has been described by Wilks, was a very simple one. Khande Rao instructed some of the leaders of the army who wanted payment of the arrears to approach

1. *Kaifiyat* of Haidar—the Mackenzie Ms., p. 33, says that Khande Rao, his *Mutsaddi*, and Viranna Chetti, a great banker, were his hostages.

2. *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 23.

Haidar. He protested that he was only responsible for the payment of the troops in his charge and they were regularly paid. The troops then requested him to use his good offices to secure payment from Nanjaraj. They repeated their request day after day and ultimately demanded insistently that he should go at their head to sit '*Dharna*' at the gate of Nanjaraj. Haidar complied with the demand, seemingly with great reluctance. Nanjaraj could see through the whole episode and perceived the full extent of the plot as soon as he saw Haidar at his gate. He had a talk with Haidar in which the details of his life in retirement were perhaps settled. Then he told the soldiery that in view of the misfortunes of his administration, he had decided to retire and resign office. They should better go to the King. Haidar then led them to the palace. The King, who was in the know, agreed to meet the demands of his troops provided Haidar renounced his relations with Nanjaraj, Haidar again agreeing with seeming reluctance. In order to enable him to pay the arrears and provide for regular payments to the troops, additional assignments were made to Haidar who thus had in his direct possession more than half of the kingdom. Nanjaraj was given a jagir yielding 3 lakhs of pagodas and he was to maintain 1,000 horse and 3,000 infantry. But on his way towards his jagir, he halted at Mysore whence he would not withdraw. His residence so near the capital was inconvenient. It was therefore decided by the King in council (the Raja in consultation with Haidar and Khande Rao) that he would not be required to maintain any detachment of troops and his jagir should be reduced to 1 lakh of pagodas and he must be compelled to leave Mysore. This Nanjaraj refused to do and Haidar was ordered to besiege Mysore. Wilks refers to an underplot of protracting the siege in order to make it the ground of future encroachment. He says that otherwise it did not seem that Haidar had profited much by his prolonged stay at Trichinopoly. There may be some truth in the statement. But Wilks makes no allowance for the fact that a man can do wonders when he has the energy of despair. Nanjaraj, a bungling aggressor at Trichinopoly, was defending his last ditch against an ungrateful man who owed every step in his rise to his personal favour. A Portuguese writer refers to the incredible valour of Nanjaraj and the ability of his white troops. Haidar's success would have been doubtful if Bento de Compos, the

Portuguese officer commanding Nanjaraj's white troops, had not violated the oath which he had taken over an image of the Virgin.¹ He deserted to Haidar, compelling Nanjaraj to capitulate. But this was only to be expected. These European adventurers, who fill so important a place in the history of India in the 18th century, made treachery a part of their profession. Whoever built his plan of defence on the support of these 'hatmen' built upon a foundation of sand. After his capitulation Nanjaraj was permitted to withdraw to Coonoor. To Haidar the districts taken from Nanjaraj had already been assigned, but not content with these he demanded that in view of the expenses of the siege of Mysore and the needs of defence he must have a further assignment. This is said to have been opposed by Khande Rao but there was no stopping Haidar and four more districts were added to his block of territory. This episode is said to have brought about an estrangement between Haidar and his erstwhile supporter Khande Rao.

Khande Rao began his career as Haidar's accountant. To him Haidar largely owed the perfection of the Bedar peon organisation that made his part in military expeditions so profitable to him. While Haidar was at Dindigul, Khande Rao represented him at Seringapatam and his zeal in his master's cause was unsurpassed. He became the link between Haidar and the royal family and his machinations developed into that successful scheme which led to the retirement of Nanjaraj and the installation of Haidar in his place. He was rewarded by being appointed the *Pradhan* or *Dewan* for that portion of the kingdom not yet assigned to Haidar, but he also remained

1. S. N. Sen, *A Portuguese Account of Haidar Ali*, *Calcutta Review*, December, 1937. Pissurlencar's document 11. Peixoto says, "with the second king were 2 European chiefs, one Manuel Alvoes, who had about 600 men with hats, 150 of which were Europeans, all Portuguese. The other chief was named Bento Dos Campos, who had also 400 of the same kind."

Haidar desired Peixoto to seduce the two European chiefs. But Manuel Alvoes, unlike Bento de Campos, could not come away and remained with the 'second king' till the fort was unavoidably given up when it was found undermined.

Haidar's *Dewan* for the assigned portion. In his dual capacity he could control the entire revenue administration. The mounting demands of Haidar created a feeling of disgust in the mind of Khande Rao. The dowager queen as also the puppet King could see that they had only exchanged King Log for King Stork. Haidar, master of the army and of more than half the kingdom, kept the King as a part of a pageant as Nanjaraj had done.

As we study the history of the rise of Haidar Ali, he does not appear to have possessed the daring and generous spirit of the hero, who courts danger and fame, disdains artifice and boldly challenges the allegiance of others. He is more conspicuous for the steady pursuit of his aims, the flexibility of his means and the ability to submit his passions to the interest of his ambition. His career was marked by implacable vindictiveness and gross ingratitude for revenge was profitable and gratitude expensive. Pride and virtue may recoil from many of his manoeuvres but one cannot but admire his power of assigning to objectives their true priorities which, combined with his brilliant opportunism, led him from success to success. He very adroitly used the machinery of fraud and the machinery of force first to establish and then to consolidate his authority.

CHAPTER IV

Reverses and Recovery, 1760-1761

Haidar's usurpation was complete. It was therefore natural that the court party would make an attempt to bring about his overthrow. Khande Rao, as Haider's *Dewan*, was expected by him to guard against such a contingency. Therefore they first of all won Khande Rao over. The prominent members of the court party were *Pradhan* Venkatapataiya, Venkatapataiya of the treasury, Viranna Chetty and Anniah Sastri.¹ Their plan, formed in consultation with the helpless, exasperated King and the queen dowager, was the expulsion and destruction of Haidar. Khande Rao was persuaded to turn his back on his patron and take an active part in his expulsion. Kirmani's interesting comment on Khande Rao's desertion is that "the water of a little pool soon becomes offensive." The conspirators also came to an understanding with the Maratha chief Visaji Pandit² and a concerted attack was arranged. Most of the troops of Haidar had gone with Mukhdum Ali to aid the French. Even Ismail Saheb and Peixoto had gone with another detachment to Anekal preparing to march towards Arcot. He was left with only 2/3 risalas of regular infantry (consisting of about 1,500 men), 400 horse of his own stable and 1,000 foot without arms.³ The date fixed for the ruin of Haidar was 12th August 1760. On the appointed day at dawn, a cannonade opened from the ramparts on Haidar, who occupied a position near the modern *Daria Daulat Bag*. Haidar was taken by surprise. A detachment sent by Khande Rao cut down Haidar's infantry and cavalry on the northern bank. The Marathas did not arrive in proper time. Khande Rao decided to wait for

1. *Haidarnama*.

2. S.P.D., Vol. 28, letter. no. 266. Visaji Krishna wrote to Balkoba Tatya, "The ruler of Mysore has agreed to pay tributes of 2 years according to an agreement with Gopal Rao and besides this to pay 3 lakhs for forage, and has also returned the posts he took and has come over to *Sarkar's* side (*i.e.*, side of the Poona Government)."

3. Portuguese document, no. III.

them before launching his final attack. Visaji was coming with 10,000 troops and 10 guns. Haidar and Khande Rao are said to have exchanged messages, perhaps to amuse each other. Haidar temporized till the night came and then sped up. He had seized all the boatmen of the river side with their baskets, ran away leaving his family, taking with him only 2/300 well-mounted horses and bags of gold and jewels. He was fortunate to find the landing place on the northern bank unguarded. The only explanation possible is that Khande Rao did not really want to kill him and was willing to facilitate his escape. Wilks says that this remnant of virtuous feeling was politically imprudent.¹ Manuel Alvoes in Haidar's service was killed and the other European joined the Brahmin.² Haider knew Khande Rao sufficiently well to count upon his treating his family with kindness.

Haidar went first to Anekal, where Ismail Saheb was posted with a cavalry detachment. Ismail was at once despatched to Bangalore to ascertain the fidelity of the commandant Kabir Beg, an old comrade. On receiving assurance from Ismail, Haidar made a dash to Bangalore at the head of the detachment at Anekal and reached there on the evening of the 13th. It was this indomitable spirit and this promptness that saved Haidar. But with the exception of Bangalore, Anekal, Dindigul and Baramahal, nothing now remained to him. He must begin his career anew. Visaji Pandit had joined Khande Rao with his troops. Haidar could at best only hope to stand on the defensive at Bangalore until Mukhdum Ali with his detachment succeeded in rejoining him. By persuasion and cajolry, Haidar succeeded in getting from the merchants at Bangalore a loan of 4 lakhs of rupees. It must be added here that Haidar later repaid this amount.³ He always wanted to keep on good terms with the bankers. This was the one trade guild with which every ambitious politician, even in those unsettled times, had to keep faith. Otherwise, he would find it very difficult to tide over crises.

1. Wilks, Vol. I., p. 418.

2. Peixoto, Book I.

3. Orme Ms., Vol. 33—a letter from John Strachey.

Haidar concluded a treaty with the French on the 4th June, 1760¹, with a view to expelling the British. In order to clear the way he took possession of the district of Barmahal, belonging to the Nawab of Cuddapah. He also seized Anekal from the poligar of that place. The fort of Tiagar was yielded by the French as a post of deposit and communication. When Mukhdum marched back post haste on receiving instruction from Haidar, his route was Tiagar, Krishnagiri, Rayakottai and Anekal.² But in the last place he found himself completely surrounded by the Marathas and the King's force. Kirmani says that although the Maratha were camel-hearted they were as numerous as the locusts and they buzzed round Makhdum like flies.³ He had to withdraw to Anchetty instead of advancing to Bangalore. To enable him to break through the cordon Haidar sent from Bangalore as many troops as he could spare without facing a collapse of the Bangalore defence. Haidar's relieving force numbered 1,400 foot, 300 horse and 250 coolies with powder and ball, 12 camels with money, 400 men with provisions and 500 workmen to level roads.⁴ It was commanded by Mir Faizullah, who was a son-in law of Dilwar Khan, the late Nawab of Sira, and who had joined him in the days of his adversity at Bangalore. Faizulla's relieving force passed through the middle of the Maratha troops under a brisk fire. This relieving force reached Kellamangalam, but Makhdum, who had the day before narrowly escaped being routed by the Marathas, was at Anchetty. In a fight in the open which was forced by the Marathas, Faizulla's detachment lost 900 foot and 130 horse in killed, wounded and prisoners. But division of plunder led to quarrel among the Marathas. Some of the prisoners succeeded in escaping in the midst of the disorder and in joining the main army. Makhdum was perhaps justified in saying, "The Marathas are more thieves than soldiers."⁵

1. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, Vol XII. Orme, Vol. II p. 642. The treaty was signed on the 27th.

2. Makhdum started from Tiagar on the 16th September, 1760. Orme, Vol. II, p. 686.

3. *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Miles, p. 82.

4. Peixoto, Book I.

5. *Ibid.*

But Haidar was now absolutely helpless. The relieving force was completely defeated and Makhdum was surrounded. Haidar's career seemed again approaching its close. Negotiations for peace with the Marathas had for a long time been afoot. The Marathas suddenly appeared to be very amenable and they now agreed to withdraw on his paying 5 lakhs and ceding Baramahal. This sudden turn in the wheel of fortune was a mystery to Haidar at that time, though he availed himself of the opportunity with alacrity. The Nawab of Arcot also paid a very considerable sum of money to the Marathas. Though Visaji thus sold himself to Haidar Ali and Muhammad Ali, his withdrawal was really due to the very difficult position of Maratha affairs in northern India, which later led to the disastrous defeat at Panipat on the 14th January, 1761. Visaji had to make the best terms he could in the existing circumstances. Pondichery surrendered to Coote on the 14th January, 1761. Three hundred French troops under Alain and Hugel took service with Haidar Ali. When Haidar became aware of the Maratha defeat at Panipat he refrained from handing over the Baramahal districts. The *Foujdar* of Krishnagiri, when approached for the surrender of the fort, said that he could not think of giving up forts and territory on a single order. When the Marathas insisted on an authentic repetition, Haidar plainly told them that no order or signature could be repeated.²

With the junction of the detachments commanded by Makhdum Ali, Haidar became numerically superior to Khande Rao. But he sent a considerable number of troops towards Salem and Coimbatore in order to recover that country from the agents of Khande Rao. In the contest which was inevitable he was to depend on his resources in that region. It became necessary to cover the operations of this detachment and for this purpose he crossed the Cauvery at Sosile. Khande Rao was there with his army, but Haidar, trusting too much to his superior ability, had again become numerically inferior. Khande Rao "compelled Haidar's infantry to change its front and charged it when in the Act of performing that evolution. On

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 15.

2. *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Miles, p. 89.

this occasion, his success was considerable and Haidar was defeated with very heavy loss but retired in tolerably good order.¹ Haidar now suddenly appeared in all humility before Nanjaraj at Coonoor. He must have had a very poor opinion of the intelligence of Nanjaraj to think that such stage acting would be effective. But so it was. Haidar appeared so repentant for his past misdeeds and ascribed all his misfortunes so readily to base ingratitude that Nanjaraj, always proud of the fact that it was he who had picked up Haidar, was completely deceived. It was given out that he would henceforth exercise the functions of *Sarvadhikari* with Haidar as the *Dulwai*. He lent Haidar Ali his own household troops numbering 1,500 and 3 guns.² What was more, he gave Haidar Ali the advantage of his name and influence. Nanjaraj's name worked wonders. The British records mention this strange combination—"A similarity of circumstances has produced a very extraordinary coalition in the Kingdom of Mysore. Nanjaraj was sometime ago obliged to fly from Seringapatam through the intrigues of Haidarnaik. The present Prime Minister lately supplanted Haidarnaik. Now both Nanjaraj and Haidarnaik have united their interest in order to oblige the King to sacrifice Khande Rao to their resentment."³ Haidar's troops and the household troops of Nanjaraj united at Kattemalalavadi. The royal army advanced under the command of Khande Rao. It consisted of 4,000 Sipahis, armed with European guns, 3,000 horsemen, 50 Europeans, 6 pieces of field artillery, necessary provisions and 200 topasses. Haidar's defeat was this time a certainty if in battle the greater number could be relied on to defeat the lesser. But Haidar now took recourse to a stratagem and the astute Khande Rao was so easily duped that this

1. Wilks, Vol. I, p. 426. I do not find this victory of Khande Rao as Nanjengad mentioned in any Maratha news letter or in the contemporary Portuguese accounts of Peixoto or Noronah or even in contemporary English records. The Persian Chronicles are not in the habit of mentioning Haidar's smaller defeats and they even pass off defeats as victories. But a defeat in the open field, as mentioned by Wilks, seems very probable. Otherwise we cannot explain the sudden appearance of Haidar as a suppliant before Nanjaraj at Coonoor.

2. Portuguese document, no. IIR—Noronah's account.

3. Military Consultation, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 17.

requires an explanation. In war the influence of moral causes is to that of physical as three to one, so said a great master of the art of war. A large part of the army held together by Khande Rao was composed of deserters. He could not therefore be very sure of the constancy of their devotion to his cause. This alone explains the success of so simple a stratagem. But Haidar could count unhesitatingly on the support of his soldiery who had flocked under his banner in the days of his adversity. He took advantage of Khande Rao's distrust of some of his officers to write some letters in the form of replies in which he promised them big rewards if they would slay their commander Khande Rao on that night. The messenger fell purposely into the hands of the guards of the camp and was taken to Khande Rao, who, suspecting a treacherous correspondence between his officers and Haidar, abandoned his army and rode away secretly to Seringapatam.¹ The whole army, rank and file, was in a state of dismay when the soldiers came to hear of the sudden flight of their leader. A disorderly flight now began. Haidar, who was informed of everything, arranged a concerted attack in the front and rear and it was so successful that by seven o'clock in the morning he was the master of the whole army, its guns, stores and baggage, only a few swift horsemen escaping. Haidar consolidated his success by incorporating most of the soldiers in his army. A contemporary Portuguese document puts this episode in a slightly different way : "As the majority of the Cabos (petty officers) in the army were Muslims, the astute and cunning rebel easily corrupted them with presents and promises, so that they fled precipitately leaving arms, artillery and all their retinue behind and victory declared for the fraudulent and rebellious Muslim."² Haidar halted for 4 or 5 days. Khande Rao was drawing his troops together at Seringapatam, where many of the fugitives had gathered near the Mysore gate. Four platoons of Haidar made a surprise night attack on these disorganised bands. After doing as much injury as they could they fell back. Haidar was not in a position to undertake a prolonged siege. He thought it better to leave Seringapatam alone for the time

1. Portuguese document, no. III—Noronah's account.
2. Portuguese document, no. II.

being and recapture those places in the South which were still in the hands of Khande Rao's men—Satgūd, Erode, Sankaridrug, Palni and Dharapuram. After this he marched back to Seringapatam. On his way he entered Mysore and left Nanjaraj there. He then made his approaches for the siege of Seringapatam. But it would have been impossible for him to effect anything since neither his army nor his implements of war were sufficient for the siege of such a place.¹ A few days after the preparations had commenced the King offered terms of accommodation. Khande Rao's influence was undermined by his misfortunes. The foreign officers as well as other agents at Seringapatam, the partisans of Haidar and Nanjaraj, were very solicitous to promote Haidar's reconciliation with the King and to sacrifice Khande Rao.² Haidar's biographer says that he fired a few shots at the palace of the Raja to frighten the women. As soon as these shots struck the zenana, a mighty cry arose from them and all the women making great noise and clamour went to the King. Frightened out of his senses at the tumult and the wailing of the women he sent a messenger to Haidar.³ Haidar's terms meant absolute surrender. The King was to hand over Khande Rao. Territory worth 3 lakhs only was assigned to the King and 1 lakh to Nanjaraj. Haidar was to assume the management of the remaining territory. One of the terms of the King's surrender was that Haidar was not to let Nanjaraj take upon himself the function of *Dulwai* and Haidar, ever true to his promise if it suited his interest, kept Nanjaraj in Mysore, the ex-usurper thus fading into complete obscurity. Haidar was requested not to molest Khande Rao⁴ and he said with condescension that he would cherish him like a pet bird of the harem. Haidar was very adept in making ambiguous pronouncements. Peixoto says, "Then commenced a great examination in which all those who had done anything against him did not escape condemnation. At all these en-

1. Peixoto, Book I.

2. It is not without significance that as a reward for negotiating the King's terms of surrender, *Pradhana* Venkatapataiya was rewarded with Kunigal taluk (*Haidarnama*).

3. *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 23, 23a.

4. *Ibid.*, f. 24

quiries Khande Rao assisted under the care of a guard and promoted all Haidar Ali's objects as the desires of one upon whom his life depended. When all the business was over, he was put into a cage and sent to Bangalore, where he was kept for more than one year until his death.¹

Haidar was ruthless, relentless and remorseless. Khande Rao had brought him very near to ruin. That he succeeded in emerging victorious out of this conflict was largely due to his luck, his undaunted spirit and his utter unscrupulousness. But it is amusing to find his biographer indignantly recording the 'villainy and ingratitude' of this Brahmin, who according to him, deservedly died the 'death of an inauspicious crow', while Haidar himself is described as the true avenger of ingratitude. In this connection we would do well to mention a remark made by Yasin Khan, a privileged companion of Haidar in his convivial hours. Once Haidar was pronouncing a philippic against ingratitude (*nemuc haramme*) and looked at Yasin Khan. "Why look at me," said he, "you had better consult Nanjaraj on this subject."² Khande Rao's ingratitude was only comparable to that of Haidar, the only defence being that Khande Rao failed while Haider succeeded. Now at last after the defeat of Khande Rao Haidar could feel that he was safely established in supreme authority of the *Khodadad* (the state of Mysore as described by him).

Khande Rao's fate arouses our pity. He was no doubt a man of considerable ability. A very capable administrator, an able financier, he also developed, without any military training, a flair for military affairs. But he lacked what his adversary had in abundance, robustness, unperturbable solidity and obstinate determination.

1. Peixoto, Book. I.

2. Wilks, Vol, I, p. 422.

CHAPTER V

Conquests, 1761-1763

The Nizam Salabat Jang was an imbecile. His brother Basalat Jang was for some time his *Dewan*. But another brother, Nizam Ali, a successful intriguer, ousted him and Basalat retired from Hyderabad to his seat of Government at Adoni. Salabat Jang became a puppet in the hands of Nizam Ali, who imprisoned him in July, 1761, and 15 months later usurped the throne by murdering him. Basalat Jang at Adoni had naturally very ambitious views of independent sovereignty in the South. A belt of Maratha territory in the south and south-east prevented the realisation of his views of expansion. But in 1760-1761, he had a more open field. The Udgir and Panipat campaigns had directed Maratha attention to other regions and Maratha detachments that might have gone to the South were sent to the North or kept at hand to face the contingency of an Afghan push southwards. Basalat "began to draw within the circle of his own possessions the most convenient and accessible fragments of the shattered states around him,"¹

He decided to attempt to annex Sira with its dependencies and Hoskote and other forts that were occupied by the Marathas. But Basalat Jang's ability and resources were not equal to his ambition. He found Sira too strong for him, passed it by and laid siege to Hoskote, which he thought he would be able to take. Hoskote was then garrisoned by seven hundred peons under Mukunda Sripat.² It stood a siege of two months and there was still no likelihood of its early surrender. Basalat was at the end of his resources. Hoskote was only 18 miles from Bangalore. Haidar was watching this situation and he knew well how miserable was the plight of Basalat. He sent Faizulla to the camp of Basalat, offering to pay 3 lakhs

1. Wilks, Vol. I, p. 437

2. *Nishan-i-Haidari*. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

provided he was invested with the office of the Nawab of Sira, a post which he hoped to be able to conquer from the Marathas.¹ Haidar did not bother himself with the question whether Basalat Jang had the right to make even a paper grant of Sira and its dependencies. The *sanads* were made out and Haidar Ali Khan Bahadur became the Nawab of Sira. De La Tour tells us that it was arranged with Basalat Jang before the siege of Sira that all the artillery, ammunition and everything that could be carried away should be the share of Basalat Jang and Haidar should only take possession of the place itself.²

In October 1761, Haidar came to Hoskote with his army and paid his respects to Basalat Jang. The fort was soon taken. Haidar next marched to Dod Ballapur, which was a dependency of Sira and where resided Abbas Quli Khan, who had inhumanly persecuted Haidar's family in its misfortune 32 years ago³. "Haidar sought his revenge with the virulence belonging to the memory of a recent injury." But Abbas Quli apprehending this had fled with his women and indispensable baggage to Arcot. The combined army of Basalat and Haidar then advanced to the siege of Sira. With his fine park of artillery, manned by Europeans, Haidar had very little difficulty in taking Sira. By successful undermining he is said to have blown up two bastions and compelled the besieged to surrender.⁴ Sira was the Maratha depot of provisions and military stores for the Carnatic expeditions. "All this was seized by him and applied to his own use and without any delay or the knowledge of anyone, he buried underground all the heavy artillery and such stores as he wished to reserve for himself and throwing out 4 or 5 pieces of artillery damaged and split at the muzzles with a parcel of old and useless stores he sent a letter with congratulations on the capture of the place to

1. Noronah says that Haidar negotiated through Mir Muhammadi Khan, father of Mir Fatzulla Khan, a favourite of the aforesaid prince, to obtain the administration of Sira for 5 lakhs which he promised to pay at once and a continued annual tribute of 2 lakhs of rupees.

2. De La Tour, p. 51.

3. See Chapter I.

4. The siege lasted one month (*Nishan-i-Haidari*).

Basalat Jang.”¹ Thus befooled, Basalat withdrew to Adoni at the beginning of 1762.

Haidar, now master of Sira, began to conquer its dependencies one by one. But the task was not so easy. The Poligar of Chick Ballapur, 14 miles to the east of Dod Ballapur, put up a stubborn resistance. In the course of 3 months Haidar had a thousand people killed.² Murar Rao of Gooty, whose territory lay to the north-east of Haidar's new acquisition, tried to create a diversion in favour of the besieged Poligar. Haidar had sufficient troops to carry on the siege of Chik Ballapur and at the same time to defeat Murar Rao in the field. Murar Rao sent Siva Rao Ghorpade and Khande Rao Ghorpade with 2,500 troops. Four miles from Chik Ballapur they were met by a Mysore detachment of 3,000 foot and 1,200 cavalry and, after suffering a defeat, had to fall back.³ Another attempt at diversion was made but this also failed. The troops of Murar Rao were again defeated. But Haidar became convinced that the conquest would cost him dearly if he persisted and he decided to make peace with the Poligar for 7 lakhs of rupees to be paid in 3 instalments.⁴ The first instalment was paid. Haidar therefore withdrew to Devanhalli. The Poligar now put 500 Marathas of Murar Rao within the fort and himself withdrew to Nandidrug, an almost impregnable fort at the distance of 3 miles. Thus duped, Haidar became furious. He made a forced march from Deonhalli and by a supreme effort took Chik Ballapur after ten days. He made no direct attack on Nandidrug but arranged that the garrisons of Chik Ballapur, Devanhalli and Bangalore should devastate the country and cut off supplies. In order to prevent Murar Rao from furnishing supplies, Haidar took the offensive against him. Kirmani says, “The troops of the Rao were scattered like grain shaken out of a slit bag and they did not drink water until they arrived at the walls of Gooty.”⁵ Haidar also came up with the Marathas at Penukonda inflicting a

1. *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 26-27.

2. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

3. Orme Ms., Vol. 72. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter No. 7.

4. *Nishan-i-Haidari*. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

5. *Nishan-i-Haidari*, Ms., f. 27, 27a.

crushing defeat on them. Some of the principal officers of Murar Rao were taken prisoner, among them Khande Rao Ghorpade. Haidar took Penukonda as also Madaksira.¹ "Haidar conquered that part of Murar Rao's dominions most convenient for his new acquisition of Sira amounting to 3 lakhs of pagodas yearly."² The Chik Ballapur Poligar at Nandidrug was practically starved into surrender. Haidar's treatment of the Poligar was the severest imaginable. The Poligar had not only stubbornly resisted him but had at one time successfully made him the victim of stratagem. So Haidar singled him out as an object of almost personal revenge and meted out to him an exemplary punishment. He was despatched as a prisoner to Bangalore and his two sons were converted to Islam.³

The Rayadrug Poligar submitted willingly, for which he was ever afterwards marked out as the special favourite of Haidar. This generous treatment of those who willingly submitted was not without its effect. We are told that at the time of his Malabar expedition, the generous treatment of the Poligar of Rayadrug induced the Zamorin to surrender. The Harpanhalli chief surrendered on being summoned to do so. The Chitaldrug Poligar was less prompt and attempted evasions. His country was therefore overrun by Haidar's cavalry. He had to agree to pay a fine of 3 lakhs of rupees besides the usual tribute. Kirmani says, "The Poligar of Chitaldrug took the head of submission out of the veil of rebellion and entered the circle of obedience, paid 2 lakhs in lieu of *peshcush* and 1 lakh as a present."

The greatest opportunity of his career now came to Haidar. The Chitaldrug Poligar introduced to him a youngman who told him that he was Chen Basaviyya, the adopted son of Baswappa Nayak, the Bidnur Chief who had died in 1754. He was only 9 years old at that time and was therefore placed under the guardianship of the widow of the deceased monarch. But his friends were obliged to remove him out of the queen's power because she had designs against his life and wanted her

1. S.P.D., Vol 37, letter no. 20. Orme Ms. Vol., 72.

2. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

3. *Nishan-i-Haidari*

brother to become the ruler in his place.¹ For his safety he was sent to Chitaldrug. Haidar was requested to take up his cause and he readily agreed. It was stipulated that for his services Haidar would get 40 lakhs. Haidar had of course other views, but these were kept carefully concealed at that time. At each stage Haidar issued proclamations in the name of Chen Basaviyya. The people flocked with great joy to receive him. It was more or less like a triumphal march. The army advanced via Santa Bidnur, Shimoga, Kumsi and Anantapur. At Kumsi Haidar is said to have found Lingana, the prime minister of the late Raja, who had been imprisoned there and he offered to guide Haidar through a secret path by which the defensive outworks could be evaded. At each halt the Rani increased her offer to buy off Haidar. She went so far as to promise him 18 lakhs of pagodas. As the army reached Bidnur, the queen with her brother fled to Bellalraydrug, 70 miles southward. The defensive works were, however, sufficiently strong. Haidar, guided perhaps by Lingana, left some troops to confront them, and most of the men were sent to the rear by the brink of a river which ran across the town. There were not enough Bidnur troops to oppose them on that side. Everyone ran away. It is said that under instruction from the queen, fire had been set to the palace but Haidar had it extinguished. On the approach of Haidar many people of Bidnur had fled below the ghats. The loot which Haidar got at Bidnur is said to have been immense. Haidar garrisoned Bidnur and all the strong places with Mysore troops. Chen Basaviyya had up to now been treated with all marks of royalty and undoubtedly his presence undermined the opposition of the queen's partisans. The Poligar of Chitaldrug,

1. Orme Ms., Vol. 72. Peixoto says, "Chen Busveia was sent away to be put to death. These had compassion upon the young prince and instead of taking away his life left him in the woods. He came to Chitaldrug." Wilks writes as follows : The queen had formed a connection of shameless publicity with a person named Nimbeia. The youngman protested. The lovers employed a Jetti while shampooing in the bath to dislocate his neck and destroy him and they selected an adopted infant in his place. Chen Busveia announced that he was concealed in the house of his preserver for 5 years. My account is based on *Orme Ms.*, Vol. 72. The story of Wilks has the smell of bazar gossip though a *Mackenzie Ms.* (Local Records, Vol XXIV) supports it.

who accompanied Haidar, was Chen Basaviyya's most ardent supporter. As Peixoto says, "The country people, the merchants visited him as one whom they regarded as their king. But the Nawab had small thoughts of giving up what he wanted for himself, especially as he said that this place alone would serve him for a safe refuge if the wheel of fortune should turn about."¹ Haidar occupied one after another Basavarajdrug, Honaver, Mangalore and also Bellalraydrug where the queen had sought shelter. The conquest of Bellalraydrug shows Haidar's art at its best. Haidar sent messages to the garrison, telling them that their master was there. Why should they stand against him? The people thereupon gave up the queen and her brother.² Peixoto is surprised at the ease with which Bidnur was conquered. He says, "If the place had been in the hands of one who knows how to defend it, four such armies as these could not have taken it."³

When the conquest of Bidnur was complete Haidar thought that he could now safely reject the claims of Chen Basaviyya, declare him an impostor and assert his own authority. All the important places were in the hands of his own troops. Whatever popular feeling there might be in support of Chen Basaviyya could be easily suppressed. In this connection Michaud tells us a story which is also mentioned in outline by Parkinson. This youngman, who was sixteen years of age and had been haunted by all the illusions of youth, had known love in the valley where they had hidden him during his childhood. This sentiment followed him from the heart of his solitude to the pomp and noise of his new court and the woman who was the object of his sentiment accompanied him to Bidnur. Haidar saw her and became the rival of the prince who owed to him his kingdom. He wanted her as the price of his conquest. The young Raja, who was still in an age when one prefers the heart of a woman to a kingdom, ventured by his refusal to expose himself again to the risk of losing his crown. Haidar, irritated, used violence and took away by force the young favourite of the Raja. This first

1. Peixoto, Book II.

2. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

3. Peixoto, Book II.

injustice was soon followed by another. Haidar wanted to remain the master of his kingdom. The Raja was removed by force from his place to Maddagiri.¹ Haidar was no doubt a man of strong impulse. The rivalry in love with Chen Basaviyya was perhaps true. But it is too much to assume that Haidar would otherwise have handed over Bidnur to the helpless prince and contented himself with the loot acquired. It might be said of Kanara, 'the land of gold' as the Portuguese called this granary of theirs, that once Haidar had seen it, he was not certainly going to give it up. Generosity was a virtue to which Haidar was, like most politicians, a stranger. Chen Basaviyya, the dowager queen and her brother, the rival boy King, were sent to Maddagiri and Haidar, gorged with spoil, proclaimed his authority in a manner he had not done in any part of his dominions. Everywhere else he ruled in the name of the Mysore King ; Bidnur he regarded as his *Swarajya*. Bidnur was named Haidarnagar and was proclaimed as his capital. Here for the first time he asserted the right of striking coins and issued his earliest coin, the so-called Bahaduri pagoda. He was extremely cautious, exhibited only the initial letter of his name, and associating his coinage with Hindu deities he undoubtedly showed very remarkable toleration on the part of a Muhammadan.⁴ But the exclusion of Chen Basaviyya and the circumstances connected with it must have been very disagreeable to a large number of people who felt that they had been duped. A number of conspiracies were organised for which Haidar put upwards of a thousand people to death.³ Bidnur was henceforth the most tranquil possession. But as it was exposed to the attack of the Marathas—the first expedition of Madhav Rao in 1764 showed how vulnerable it was—Haidar

1. Michaud, Chap. II, pp. 41-42.

Parkinson's account—"He was very fond of a favourite woman. Haidar sent some of his people for her, which being communicated to the raja, they were dismissed with great contempt. Haidar pretending to take offence ordered the raja to be made a prisoner."

2. Obverse : Haidar's initial on a granulated field. .

Reverse : Siva seated with Parvati on his left knee ; in one of the god's right hands a *Trisul* and in one of the left a deer.

3. Orme Ms., Vol. 72.

did not make Haidarnagar his capital, and the state of Bidnur remained an outlying but very important part of his extensive dominion. Venkatappaiah was left as the governor of this province with its mint town at Haidarnagar. This province extended in the east up to Holalkere within 20 miles of Chitaldrug and below the Sahyadris on the sea coast it extended from Mirjan to Mangalore. The conquest of Sunda next year extended the jurisdiction of this province up to a small fortified promontory 24 miles south of Goa.

It has been said that Haidar regarded the Bidnur windfall as the foundation of his future greatness. The loot of Bidnur alone is said to have brought Haidar 12 million sterling, according to the estimate of Wilks. The Marquis of Alorna, in his instructions in 1748, referred to the immense hoarded wealth of Bidnur. He wrote, 'The rice trade that supports the whole of Malabar and some parts of Muscat, richly contributes to the vast wealth of the country which the king hoards and is thereby made the richest of his class. This wealth does not serve any other purpose than that of hoarding'¹ De La Tour had a very fertile imagination. But even when due allowance is made for his tendency to exaggerate, his account nevertheless enables us to understand what impression the story of the plunder of Bidnur left on the minds of his contemporaries. The French who accompanied Haidar in the expedition said that Haidar caused pearls and precious stones to be measured in their sight with a corn measure and that when two heaps of gold in ingots and trinkets had been piled up, they surpassed the height of a man on horseback.²

In December 1793, Faizulla was sent to Sunda. The King, Savai Immadi Sadasiva, was weak and unwarlike. It has been said that he inherited from his father his kingdom, timidity and vices. He was too indolent and dilatory to put up any effective resistance. He fled to Lower Sunda, to Siveswar on the coast about eight miles north of Karwar. He surrendered to the Portuguese his territory below the ghats in exchange for an asylum and a fixed stipend. The Portuguese

1. S. N. Sen, *Studies in Indian History*. (Marquis of Alorna's Instructions.)

2. De La Tour, p. 58.

seized Ponda, Canacona and Cape Ramas.¹ Faizulla Khan seized Shiveswar, Sadasivgad and Ankola. The whole of Sunda except the portion under the Portuguese, now formed a part of the territory of Haidar. According to Fryer, in 1676 it was estimated that the pepper country of the Sunda Raja would yield a revenue of 30 lakhs of pagodas.

1. Portuguese! Ms., no. II & LXXXI.

CHAPTER VI

Relations with the Marathas, 1764-1765

The third battle of Panipat is regarded as the beginning of the end of Maratha ascendancy. But we are too much accustomed to think of the effects of this battle in terms of North Indian politics. It must not be forgotten that the echo of this battle resounded far and wide and Maratha affairs in the South were materially influenced to the detriment of the Maratha cause.

The disaster of Panipat diverted Maratha pressure from territories lying south of the Tungabhadra, leaving Haidar absolutely free to pursue his plan of advance. It was not until 1764 that the Marathas once again marched in this direction. But in the meantime Haidar had not only consolidated his position in the Mysore State but had also conquered Bidnur, Sunda and Sira with its dependencies. He tried to bring Savanur, Kurnul and Kurpa within the orbit of his influence and form what may be described as a defensive cordon. Not content with the Tungabhadra frontier, he advanced to the north-west of that river. Taking advantage of this temporary Maratha eclipse, he also took Dharwar and Bankapur. In diplomacy too he was successful, for the Nizam had been conciliated.¹

Fortunately for the Maratha cause, there was one chieftain on the other side of the Tungabhadra, Murar Rao of Gooty, who proved to be a thorn by the side of Haidar and maintained an unequal fight against him. He was practically fighting singlehanded. We read in the *Bakhar* by Sathe that in the course of his first expedition Madhav Rao recognised the services of Murar Rao and on receiving a representation from him, invested him with the title of *Senapati*.²

The ruler of Savanur, a dependent Maratha ally, had been recently overpowered by Haidar. He took the earliest

1. S.P.D. Vol., 37 letter no. 23

2. Rajwade, Vol. IV

opportunity of joining the Peshwa as soon as he crossed the Krishna. We read in a Marathi letter dated the 17th April, 1764—"Our troops making halts came here. Savanurkar has been saved. Otherwise Mir Faizulla with 10,000 troops would have marched on Hangal. He had an intention of finishing Savanurkar. But the Peshwa reached quickly."¹

Madhav Rao, the greatest of the Peshwas, must be regarded as the most formidable antagonist whom Haidar had to meet on the battle-field. Haidar was no doubt defeated by Smith as also by Sir Eyre Coote, but he could keep the influence of these defeats confined within a narrow sphere. But Madhav Rao inflicted on him defeats in the field and followed up each blow by the recovery of valuable territory. In his wars with the British Haidar had the initiative in his hands throughout, but in his clashes with Madhav Rao the initiative always rested with the latter. Haidar's offensive against Madhav Rao led to disaster and the failure of his defensive was no less complete. Peixoto writes that the Marathas were well-directed and their perseverance was great. The Maratha military system was shaken by very serious defeats, but this young Peshwa, resolute, courageous and dignified, always prompt and active, had the capacity of crushing the enemy by paralysing his will power. Wherever he was personally present, success always greeted the Marathas. He was invariably on the offensive but his progress was always marked by prudence and method. The Maratha plan "to deceive, to surprise and to overwhelm" was at its best under Madhav Rao. Haidar found himself unable to stem the ceaseless tide of Maratha advance. It was only the early death of this formidable antagonist that saved Haidar and weakened the Marathas in the Carnatic.

Madhav Rao reached Savanur, where the Pathan Chief met him with 1,000/2,000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry. After this he marched from Savanur to the banks of the Tungabhadra. Meanwhile Haidar reached Harihar with 35,000 troops, infantry, artillery and cavalry. There was an engagement at

1. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 40. According to Kirmani, the ruler of Savanur had helped the Rani of Bidnur.

Ratehalli, 36 miles south of Savanur and 70 miles south-east of Dharwar. Gopal Rao and Vithal Shivdev came out one morning.¹ Haidar, seeing that their troops were small in number, marched against them and advanced 5 miles, hoping to overwhelm them. The Maratha troops retreating before him did not number more than 4,000. Haidar moved slowly, threw rockets and pursued them as they retired. They kept on retiring and he continued to pursue them until there appeared suddenly before him a Maratha army of about 50,000(?). Haidar instantly sent a message to Faizulla Khan to advance from the camp with heavy artillery. He halted on the banks of a rivulet which was dry. The Maratha artillery fight continued for $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Haidar had 40 guns but most of them were three or four pounders. The Marathas had practically surrounded the Mysore camp. Faizulla Khan succeeded in penetrating their lines with only 3,000 troops and joined Haidar. He suffered terribly and managed to ward off the attack a little before sunset, only after the Marathas had withdrawn their artillery. On the Mysore side the dead were upwards of a thousand and the wounded were about a thousand. The date of the action as given by Peixoto is 3rd May, 1764.²

Haidar raised batteries around his camp, waited for the Marathas and engaged them twice without much advantage to either side. Madhav Rao decided on an attempt to destroy the Mysore camp. He wrote to Haidar "that he had heard his name at Poona, where many of his heroic actions were related, and that he had come to seek him and fight him, for his father had advised him to cultivate friendship with all good soldiers and that was his own wish. But as he did not know whether all that was said was true, he had come himself to try him and he would expect that the Nabob would quit his entrenchments to-morrow, come to his camp, where he would find him ready. If, on the contrary, this was not done, he would perceive that Haidar was no soldier and what was said of him was more than untruth. He would visit his camp and batteries the next day and tell him of the delight with

1. S.P.D., Vol 37, letter no. 32 (2nd day of the Sudha Baisakh).
 2. Peixoto, II

which he left Poona to come and engage with him.”¹ Haidar laughed, but when he heard from his spies in the Maratha camp that Madhav Rao was in earnest and had ordered all his chiefs to take betel in ratification of their oath, he marched after midnight to the entrenched fort at Anawatty where he arrived about 7 a.m. that day. As the fort had several hills around and as Haidar had posted his men to guard the roads between the hills, the Marathas could not penetrate. Haidar could now see that the Marathas would not be able to do him great harm for want of time, as the rains were at hand. In view of the approach of the rainy season, Madhav Rao left his camp divided among Savanur and other forts under the care of Gopal Rao and Sayaji Pant. Haidar also made barracks for the infantry, big enough to enable the infantry to form in them and to fire, if necessary, without marching out or wetting their arms. He also took other precautions.²

About the end of June or immediately after the beginning of the campaigning season, Haidar marched from Anawatty, descended on Bankapur, planned an attack on the isolated force of Gopal Rao and threatened Savanur. Peixoto says that in the course of this march Haidar sent some of his horsemen to show themselves to Marathas and to withdraw before them towards places of ambuscade. But this attempt to steal a march over the Marathas and use their own tactics against them failed entirely. Says Peixoto, “We remained there from 7 o'clock in the morning until three in the afternoon, but the Marathas could not be enticed.”³ Haidar withdrew again to Anawatty. The Peshwa was then free to invest first Mudhol and then Dharwar. In Dharwar there was a garrison of Haidar, commanded by Mir Faizulla's brother. Faizulla himself with about 9,000 troops and 7 guns came within fifteen *Kos* of that fort. Between the fort and his

1. Peixoto, II, paragraph 100. 2. Peixoto, II, paragraph 101.

3. Peixoto, III, paragraph 2.

Aitihasik Lekh Samgraha, II: Haidar started with 15,000 *gardis*, 6,000 cavalry, came to Hangal, suddenly marched to Bankapur, took 4½ hours' rest there, arrived at dawn at a brook between Savanur and Bankapur, hid there and made a few troops stand out. But Gopal Rao Pathwardhan would not come out.

army there was the Maratha army under Gopal Rao and Raste. Ultimately, however, he thought it prudent to withdraw and the fort was taken at the beginning of November.¹

Madhav Rao now advanced to attack Anawatty and encamped near it on the 16th November, 1764 (29th Nov., according to Marathi news letters). Haidar assigned to every chief his position in the camp and told everyone that he would not receive any succour although in the greatest distress. Nobody was to quit his position under pain of death or the ruin of his house and his family. No one was to leave his position to bring succour to another. "None of these precautions was sufficient, for the perseverance of the Marathas was great."

Haidar had erected a very strong battery away from the lines of encampment, mounted with 8 twenty-four and eighteen pounders. Mir Faizulla Khan, who was in charge of it, had 3,000 men to defend it and along with him was the Portuguese commandant Joseph Menzes. The Maratha camp was at a distance of about six miles. Every morning the Marathas would come out, skirmish in detached platoons and then press Haidar's army heavily on one wing. Haidar used to march out for 6/7 days and then would not march out at all. The Marathas now came nearer and nearer until, on the 1st December, there took place a severe fight in which Haidar suffered a heavy defeat. He was on this day the dupe of an artifice which an experienced commander like him ought to have seen through. The Marathas came out early in the morning with their horse artillery numbering 54 pieces. Eight guns were placed on a small hill close to the Mysore outpost at the end of a wood. This was seemingly a very exposed position for the Marathas as Maratha horsemen could not enter the wood except in small numbers. As these light guns caused great loss, Haidar ordered an attack there and these guns were taken with great ease by Ismail Khan. Haidar then ordered Haji Muhammad Khan to take the hill upon which the guns stood and to defend it against the Maratha soldiers who would certainly try to regain not only the lost guns but also the position from which they had been dislodged. But now the troops who had taken the

1. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 51.

Maratha guns were overpowered by the Maratha horse and compelled to retire, whereupon Haidar sent a reinforcement of 2,000 to their support. But Ismail Khan and most of his troops were cut to pieces. "Four field pieces were lost, the Nabob also was wounded in two places but not dangerously. In order that he might escape being taken or known, he took off all his clothes and a topas and a caffree brought him safe to the camp."¹ The Maratha estimate was that between 1,000-1,500 *gardi* troops were killed and six cannon were taken. It was a great victory. The fight lasted from midday till 2 p.m.²

Immediately after this battle peace negotiations were started but these proved abortive. On the 26th December an attempt was made by Haidar on the Maratha position which was defended by a river. He only succeeded in making them withdraw from the banks. For some time the war continued faintly on both sides. On the 11th February, the Marathas broke up their camp and began their march in the direction of Bidnur. Haidar at once retraced his steps towards Bidnur as quickly as he could. His first halt was at Shikarpur, where he had some encounters with the Marathas. He was obliged to retreat farther and farther to Anantapur and thence to Bidnur. The Peshwa had in the mean time succeeded in taking Honnali without firing a shot and Kumsi was annexed after a siege lasting 3 days. Faizulla Khan, however, offered resistance at Anantapur. But on the 27th February, 1765, he fell back from Anantapur to Morangary outside the gate of Bidnur where breastworks and entrenchments were made.³

Raghunath Rao joined the Maratha Camp about the end of January, 1765. Haidar was now anxious to conclude a treaty and considering the plight in which he was placed, the terms that were granted were very lenient. Madhav Rao wrote to Nana Farnavis, "After taking 2/4 places in Bidnur territory, I raised batteries at Anantapur. After taking Anantapur, I intended to advance and conquer Bidnur. Haidar sent his *vakil* and with great eagerness began his negotiations. In the opinion

1. Peixoto, III, paragraph 21.

2. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 55.

3. Peixoto, III, paragraph 43.

of Raghunath Rao negotiations must not be protracted. So I have concluded the treaty.”¹

The terms of the treaty :—

- (1) Haidar was to pay 28 lakhs as tribute.
- (2) He had to give up the *taluks* of Bankapur, Harihar and release the brother of Gopal Rao.
- (3) He had to give back the territory of Murar Rao and the territory of the ruler of Savanur.²

These extremely moderate terms, it has been suggested, were due to the desire on the part of Raghunath Rao to enlist the support of Haidar Ali for the furtherance of his personal ambition. When we take into consideration the later career of Raghunath Rao, the suggestion does not seem to be unwarranted. Madhav Rao was in a position to demand that Haidar must also give up Sira, Chitaldrug, Rayadurga and Harpanhalli. If he had advanced farther he might even have taken Bidnur. Though he did not insist on a further restriction of Haidar's sphere of influence, he succeeded in driving Haidar from the region between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. With Murar Rao and the ruler of Savanur restored to their old position and power, Maratha offensive could at any time be resumed south of the Tungabhadra.

1. S.P.D., vol. 37, letter no. 63, dated 30th March, 1765.

2. S.P.D., vol. 37, letter nos. 60, 61, 62, dated 12th and 13th March, 1765.

CHAPTER VII

Relations with the Marathas, 1766-1767

In March, 1765, Madhav Rao agreed, as we have seen, to negotiate a treaty with Haidar and conclude his first campaign against him. In the course of the negotiations Madhav Rao demanded that Harihar and Basavapatna should be included in the list of territories ceded by Haidar. The desire to retain these two outposts on the other side of the Tungabhadra seemed to be a part of a plan to occupy Bidnur, of which Basavapatna was the key. Haidar, therefore, got a clear indication that the Peshwa wanted to resume the offensive against him at the earliest opportunity. But he had won over Raghunath Rao and the Peshwa was prevailed upon to remain satisfied with the cession of Bankapur and the restoration of the possessions of the chieftains of Gooty and Savanur along with the payment of twenty-eight lakhs as tribute.¹ But Haidar knew quite well that the Maratha danger would reappear very soon and he knew how formidable his Maratha opponent was.

Haidar might have turned to the Nizam or the British against the Marathas. But his policy, as has been said by Khare, was like that of Shivaji in relation to Bijapur, Golconda and the Mughals.² He had an eye on the territory of all and he did not find it to his interest to enter into a scheme of alliance with any of them, least of all with the British. The Madras Governor wrote to Verelst, "We must fix Haidar as a friend or overthrow him as an enemy ; the former notwithstanding all our advances we have hitherto found impracticable."³ The Peshwa had in the mean time succeeded in persuading the Nizam to join in a scheme of offensive alliance against Haidar. Nizam Ali was at first induced to join hands with the Peshwa against Janoji Bhonsle who was compelled to

1. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter nos. 60, 61, 62.

2. *Lekh Samgraha*, Vol. III, Introduction.

3. Select Committee Proceedings, 16th January, 1767, p. 78.

cede a large portion of the territory he had secured earlier by means of his double treachery at Rakshasabhuvan. The Nizam got a tract of territory giving an annual revenue of about 15 lakhs (ceded for the firm establishment of peace and friendship as a prelude to conjoint operations against Haidar).¹

Haidar was in the meantime plotting with the malcontent Marathas to create sufficient difficulties for the Peshwa in his own home territory. He walked in the footsteps of Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk who had adopted a similar policy against Baji Rao. The Peshwa's excellent espionage system brought to his notice the fact that Babuji Naik was in correspondence with Haidar Ali and gave him presents. The Naik was asked to surrender the forts in his charge. He shut himself up in Sholapur but was compelled to submit and surrender his possessions, contenting himself with a personal allowance of one lakh.² Anticipating a quick Maratha advance, Haidar demanded contributions from the chiefs of Bellary, Chitaldrug, Rayadurga, Harpanhalli and other places.³

Before the start of the expedition against Haidar in November, 1766, Nizam Ali concluded an alliance with the British. The East India Company engaged "a body of their troops ready to settle the affairs of His Highness's government in everything that is right and proper whenever required."⁴ Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty the British representative was informed that the Nizam required the assistance of the British troops against Haidar Ali, and that as he would take the field in less than a month, he expected the British troops to join him by the end of December. He was assured that the British would use all the despatch in their power.⁵

What were the motives of the Nizam in thus securing the

1. Khare, *Aitihāsik Lekh Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 602L, dated 20th September, tells us that earlier there was an understanding between the Peshwa and the Nizam that whatever big expeditions were to be undertaken would be done after informing each other.

2. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter nos. 99, 117.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Select Committee Proceedings, 16th January, 1767, p. 58.

5. *Ibid.*, 77.

assistance of the British in a war against Haidar in which the Marathas were already his ally ? It has been suggested in another connection, "The Nizam would never break his relations with any. To continue negotiations with all the Powers is his policy. But in the end whatever comes in practice depends upon Providence. He never tries to break off negotiations from whatever side they might come."¹ But such a facile explanation of his motives would be inadequate in this case. Grant Duff suggests that without British aid the Marathas would have dictated in any scheme of the partition of Haidar's territory. But now Nizam Ali could legitimately expect that with British aid he would be in a position to dictate his own terms. Madhav Rao could not, however, be so easily over-reached.

Without waiting for his ally, Madhav Rao crossed the Krishna in January, 1766. His first campaign had convinced Haidar that it would be improper to fight pitched battles with the Maratha chief. He fortified Bangalore, Bidnur and Sira, remaining at Seringapatam with his troops. Along the route of the march of the Marathas, the supply of water was poisoned and corn was either burnt or buried. Wilks writes, "However efficacious against a regular army, the project is mere theory against the overwhelming mass of genuine Maratha invasion which covers the whole face of the country and almost divests of poetic fiction the Muhammadan illustration which compares them to a cloud of locusts. Such a plan may distress but cannot stop such an army." Madhav Rao came to Rayadurga in February and "pushed on through the imperfect desert to Sira."² The Marathas had a front of 25 miles, marching in parallel lines. They would take fodder from house-tops, leaves and roots and provide themselves with water by digging the dry beds of rivers. Within the space of a month the Peshwa realized from Kanchangutta, Godwal, Bellary, Sidnur, Adoni, Kurnool, Kanakagiri, Chitaldrug, Devdrug and Rayadurga about 25 lakhs of rupees in *hundi*, besides clerkship charges that were paid separately in cash.³

1. S.P.D., Vol. 31, letter no. 135.

2. Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. I, p. 302

3. Khare, *Lekh Samgraha*, Vol. II, Introduction.

Haidar's brother-in-law Mir Reza, who was in Sira, came out of the fort and took his stand with a view to fighting a pitched battle. He was defeated and forced to take shelter inside the walls. Two hundred horses of Mir Reza were taken by the Marathas, about 300 of his men were wounded and 40/50 were killed. The Marathas also seized five of the seven guns he had brought out. Sira was well-stocked with provisions and garrisoned with select troops numbering about 12,000. But as the batteries of the Peshwa advanced, Mir Reza thought discretion to be the better part of valour and offered to desert to the Marathas. Gopal Rao Patwardhan being the mediator and guarantor for the Peshwa. Mir Reza was given Gurumkunda, his old paternal possession, on condition that he should keep 2,000 men for Maratha service. This was in February, 1767.¹ Early in March the Peshwa took Maddagiri, a mountain fort very difficult to assault. Although Haidar was confident that it would hold out the wall was demolished on the second day of the attack and men in the fort came down for negotiations. The King and the dowager queen of Bidnur were found imprisoned in the fort.² The Peshwa released and honoured them.³ He continued his onward march and succeeded in taking Channarayadurg, Madaksira, Dod Ballapur, Chik Ballapur, Devanhalli, Hoskote and Kolar.

These repeated blows, and the news of the approach of Nizam Ali, made Haidar sue for peace. The Peshwa was eager to conclude a treaty before Nizam Ali could intervene. It is said that the Peshwa asked the Nizam to send Rukn-ud-daula and Sher Jang ahead and insisted upon the settlement of some preliminaries demanding that a distance of 40 miles must be maintained between the two camps.⁴

Haidar was sufficiently intimidated at the prospect of the combination and at the news that messengers were coming and going between the two camps. With characteristic diplomatic ability he proposed to the Peshwa through Gopal Rao a joint

1. S.P.D., Vol 37. letter no. 141. *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no, 678

2. See p. 43

3. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 147, *Bombay Diaries*, p. 142

4. *Lekh Samgraha*, Vol. III. letter no. 706. The treaty should be concluded before the arrival of the Nizam, so said the Peshwa.

march against Muhammad Ali and the English. Madhav Rao saw through the game and said that the Nizam, and through him the English, were his friends. He himself would march to Bangalore and the Nizam would take Seringapatam.¹

Haidar had no alternative but submission. He had to agree to pay a tribute of 31 lakhs of rupees. Sira, Chik Ballapur and Kolar were to be given back to him but Maddagiri, Channarayadurga, Dod Ballapur, Hoskote and two other *Parganas* were kept by the Marathas. Haidar also got back Ganeshgad, Nandagundi, Gudibanda, Kotikonda and Namgandlu.²

Nizam Ali was thus deservedly outwitted. Peixoto writes, "Nizam Ali much disliked the peace just concluded and asked Madu Rao what had obliged him to agree to it and to retire. He replied that he had received his tribute and made his agreement and it was already late to retire to Poona. Therefore he had decided to depart, for the Nabab was resolved to make the island of Seringapatam the seat of war and the affairs would not so soon have ended as Nizam Ali might think. Besides it was not his custom to make war with those who paid tribute."³ Nizam Ali had expected success as a gleaner but was completely out-manoeuvred.

In connection with this second expedition of Madhav Rao several facts deserve notice. Mir Reza deserted to the Marathas, most probably because he feared that his brother-in-law would degrade and dishonour him for failure against them. Madhav Rao did all that could be done to placate him. But an incident happened near Channarayadurga that explains how ill at ease Mir Reza was in the Maratha camp. At Channarayadurga, one night, his camp was looted by the hooligans, the looters penetrating even into his zenana. Some *gardis* and Pindaris, who were dissatisfied with Mir Reza, went to the camp of Murar Rao, and in conjunction with some people there, made this loot. The Maratha newsletters report that when the Peshwa heard about it, he looked like god Siva when angry. Forty or fifty of these looters had their hands chopped off. The Peshwa in person went to the camp of Mir Reza, sent him

1. *Lekh Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter no. 701.

2. S.P.D.. Vol. 37. *Lekh Samgraha*, Vol. III, letter nos. 721, 718.

3. Peixoto, V. paragraph 16.

dressess, utensils, sweets, horses, camp equippage, even cash and jewellery. Mir Reza was on bad terms with Murar Rao and it was his suspicion that Murar Rao was personally responsible for this incident. But investigations proved that neither the troops of the government nor those of any prominent Sardar had anything to do with this unfortunate episode. He was paid about a lakh of rupees as compensation by the Peshwa.¹ But in view of the bitter relations subsisting between Mir Reza and Murar Rao the Peshwa could not perhaps remove altogether the suspicions of the former.

What were the motives of Madhav Rao in undertaking this expedition and how far was Haidar successful in thwarting him ? Wilks says that the Marathas were always guided by two objects : anticipating others in plunder during the confederacy and exclusive conquest after its close. The Maratha chiefs "professed nothing short of the entire subversion of Haidar's usurped authority."² Thus in his view the Peshwa succeeded only as a true Maratha in anticipating his ally in plunder and in nothing else. To this extent Haidar must then be considered successful. But there is no evidence to prove that Madhav Rao actually contemplated the entire subversion of Haidar's authority. Such an attitude was at the root of his third expedition, not of the second, in which it appears that he was still feeling his way. With the undependable Nizam as his ally, no such plan could possibly have been contemplated by him. Letter after letter written from the Maratha camp emphasises the Peshwa's desire only to realise tribute from Haidar. Haidar's ambassador Karim Khan offered 12 lakhs only in December and January and later raised the offer to 21 lakhs. The Peshwa's demand was first 70 lakhs. In March it came down to 40 lakhs. The Peshwa's plan originally was that Haidar should give back all the territory of the Maratha *Raj* and its dependants as also the state of Sunda. Besides this he expected a tribute of 57 lakhs.³ A modification of his war aims was inevitable in view of the change of the foreign policy of the Nizam.

-
1. *Lekh Samgraha*. Vol, III, letter no. 692, dated 8th March.
 2. Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. I, pp. 300, 301.
 3. *Lekh Samgraha*, vol. III, letter no. 658.

CHAPTER VIII

Relations with the British, 1760-1767

At the beginning of 1760 Haidar Ali was the absolute master of Mysore. The Seven Years' War between France and England which was raging in Europe had its repercussion in India. Lally, hard pressed at Pondichery, was using every means to avert an imminent catastrophe. He approached Haidar who agreed to lend him the services of 4,000 Mysorean horse, who were expected to bring provisions to the beleaguered city. The main body of the Mysore army remained at Tiagar, collecting provisions, and a party got into Pondichery, but on the 18th July 1760, the main body with the convoy reached Pondichery, after inflicting a severe defeat on Major More. In this encounter the British loss was 35 Europeans killed and wounded.¹ Haidar's attachment to the French was founded on the principle of self-interest for they supported him in his usurpation.² In the event of a favourable termination of the Anglo-French War he could expect to secure Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinnevely and some other places in the Carnatic. Though the outlook for the French was gloomy Haidar agreed to support them and he might have given the Anglo-French War a very different turn if in the mean time the monarchical party in Mysore headed by Khande Rao, till then a staunch supporter of Haidar, had not planned to drive him from power. They got the aid of a Maratha army under Visaji Pandit and on the 12th August 1760, Khande Rao made a sudden attack, which compelled Haidar to fly to Bangalore.³ He could not overwhelm the field force of Khande Rao and recover his position until May 1761.⁴ Meanwhile the British had easily disposed of the French.

To prevent Haidar from giving effective aid to the French, Yusuf Khan from Tanjore was directed to make incursions into that part of Mysore which lay nearest to him, and Captain.

1. Despatches to England, 31st July, 1760, Paras 14, 15, 30.

2. Military Consultations, Vol. 13B, 1607, p. 1127.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. 13A, 2760, p. 778.

4. See pp. 33-34.

Richard Smith with a part of the Trichinopoly garrison attacked and took Karur, a Mysore possession.¹ The British even thought of enlisting a body of Maratha horse to enter the Mysore country and compel Haidar to recall his forces from Pondichery. It was only for want of money that this could not be done.² At this stage occurred the internecine struggle in which Khande Rao had a temporary advantage over Haidar. Khande Rao wrote friendly letters to the President of Madras and the Nawab of Arcot, informing them that Haidar was a rebel and it was Haidar who had sent the troops under Makhdum Ali to assist the French.³ In these circumstances, Haidar had to recall Makhdum's detachment. The King of Mysore intimated to Richard Smith at Trichinopoly that he was willing to enter into an alliance with the English. Captain Smith was authorized by his Government to open negotiations to this effect but, as the motive was only to gain time until the French were crushed, he was to make proposals "either to the King of Mysore or to Haidar as from circumstances shall appear to him best calculated to serve the present purpose without concluding any definite treaty which is always to be referred to our approval and determination."⁴

Haidar was pressed so heavily by the Marathas and Khande Rao that his ruin seemed imminent when most unexpectedly the Marathas agreed to depart on Haidar's ceding Baramahal and paying 3 lakhs in cash. The Marathas were also in a position to aid the French at Pondichery and the French even offered 20 lakhs, 5 immediately, and Jinji was to be delivered up. The Nawab of Arcot settled with the Marathas for 10 lakhs, 5 to be paid in twenty days and the remainder in three months.⁵ Pondichery surrendered to Coote on the 16th January 1761. Three hundred French troops under Alain and Hugel took service with Haidar Ali.⁶

With the loss of Maratha aid, the King of Mysore became

1. Despatches to England, 3rd November, 1760, para 13.

2. Despatches to England, 31st July, 1760, para 15.

3. *Ibid.*, 3rd November, 1760, para 14.

4. Military Consultations, Vol. 13B. 18th December, 1760, p. 1132.

5. Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 32.

6. Despatches to England, 4th February, 1761, para 25, Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 15.

anxious to secure British support. In view of the growing power of Haidar and his coalition with Nanjaraj, Khande Rao was naturally earnest in his desire for British friendship. At one stage the British had even contemplated restoration of Karur in return for one lakh of pagodas,¹ but now they were conscious of the strength of their position and were not in a mood to entertain such a proposal. The King of Mysore's *Bakshi* (who was near the British frontier) told Richard Smith that Haidar was the enemy of the British as well as his master's and that "the King was very desirous of British friendship and he expected every hour to be invested with full authority to conclude a treaty of alliance." Smith wrote, "He has received orders to join me should I call upon him to oppose Haidar Naik. This he assured me of and his intentions to comply." Smith further informed the President and Council, "The King is a weak man. Assurance of British friendship might engage him to continue firm in his opposition to Haidar Naik."² The Nawab of Arcot also proposed that a body of troops be sent to enable the King of Mysore to reduce Haidar.³ But the Board resolved that "the recent proofs of the loss which the French Company sustained by their troops in the Deccan notwithstanding the immense revenues assigned for their support is a warning to us not to plunge the Company into the same difficulties by sending their troops into parts so distant from their capital."⁴

After the triumph of Haidar over Khande Rao, the King of Mysore was entirely divested of the management of his country and Khande Rao became a close prisoner. The whole affair left a trace of bitterness behind. Though the British had negotiated with the King of Mysore with the object of temporising at the end, yet Haidar could not altogether forget that at the most critical stage of his affairs the British were about to join his mortal enemies just as he had joined theirs. Letters in general terms written to him during this period remained unanswered.⁵

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 25.

2. Military Consultations, Vol. 14A, 1761, p. 102.

3. *Ibid.* Vol. 15, p. 451.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.* Vol. 14A, p. 102.

In these circumstances it is no wonder that French influence in Haidar's camp continued to increase. Seven or eight French officers under the command of Colonel Du Muy and Mons. De La Tour, styled commandant, came to Mangalor with the intention of joining Haidar.¹ Haidar had the reputation of being closely united to the French and he is said to have given protection to and gathered together the scattered remnants of the French nation in India. A very remarkable minute dated 10th July 1762, which was a plea for sending a respectable force, laid the greatest emphasis on this danger from this professed enemy of the British, who was also closely united to the French. The Nawab of Arcot began to express his apprehension at a report of Haidar's intentions to enter his province. But he continued to repeat his warnings so often² that this had no effect on the mind of the President and Council, who learned to laugh at his scare which they thought it was the Nawab's interest to create.

While the Madras Government and the Mysore chieftain were eyeing each other with suspicion, the Bombay people, perhaps more intent on trade, obtained from Haidar an exclusive right to purchase pepper in preference to all others and they even suggested to the Madras people that as some dispute subsisted between Haidar and the Nawab of Arcot, the President and Council should try to settle it.³ They were so very friendly to Haidar that they even supplied him some cannon, gunpowder and firearms when he pressed urgently for aid in men and stores at the time of Madhav Rao's expedition (1764-1765), and this at the risk of antagonising the great Peshwa. Their argument was that they could not afford him to lose Bidnur and Sunda, countries in which he had given them valuable privileges.⁴

A noticeable feature of South Indian history during these years was the enmity between Haidar Ali and Muhammad Ali. Apart from their mutual personal dislike, which must have been very intense, there were many other points at issue. The territorial dispute concerned the districts of Dindigul, Karur,

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 16, 1762. p. 1

2. *Ibid.* p. 3 ; *Ibid.*, Vol. 18A, p. 74 ; *Ibid.* Vol. 18B, p. 334.

3. Military Consultations, Vol. 18B, p. 568, 14th August, 1763.

4. *Ibi* .

Kodumudi, Uttamapalaiyam, Palni, Virupakshi and Pallapatti. Between 1682 and 1730 these districts were dependent on Trichinopoly. Towards the end of the reign of Queen Minakshi of Trichinopoly, Karur and Kodumudy had been seized by the Mysoreans. They were retaken by Chanda Saheb. When Chanda Saheb was taken prisoner and put to death, there was a *Foujdar* under him at Dindigul who agreed with the Mysoreans to deliver these places for a considerable sum of money and other presents. Muhammad Ali therefore thought that he had every right to these places and the Mysoreans ought to surrender them.¹ In 1760, when Haidar helped the French, Smith took Karur which was to be handed over to Muhammad Ali. Haidar agreed to deliver up Malpaddy which he had taken and wanted Karur back, but he met with a rebuff. He was told, "Caroor was taken by us at a time when he had joined the French and made himself party in the national war and the supplies he sent to Pondichery enabled them to hold out longer than they could otherwise have done. It was but reasonable that we should keep Caroor as a conquest made from them or their allies who had without any reason taken up arms against us. As the treaty of peace only obliged us to restore to the French their ancient factories, we are left in possession of everything else as a reward for success and the immense expense we had been at in obtaining it. Agreeing at part of this expense being charged to the Nabob it was but just that he should share in the advantages our arms had gained and therefore Caroor was delivered up to him. The Nabob might indeed claim it by another title."² The Nawab of Arcot also advanced some claims to the Cuddapah country which Haidar was absorbing into his own dominions.

Besides these territorial disputes there were other causes of friction. British troops were cantoned at Vellore to the grave irritation of Haidar, who naturally regarded this with apprehension.³ Haidar entertained in his service Raja Saheb, son of Chanda Saheb, Muhammad Ali's mortal enemy. He also gave shelter to Mahphuz Khan, the elder brother, and as

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 23A, p. 614

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 64

3. Military Consultations, Vol. 24, p. 10

such a potential enemy, of Muhammad Ali. All this, however, might not have led to war but for bungling British diplomacy. Haidar himself explained that the situation was not irretrievable. He wrote, "What reason has the Governor to be displeased at Mahphuz Khan's coming ? If a firm friendship is established between the Governor and me, I know how to give him a proper answer."¹

The President and Council of Bombay informed the Government of Fort St. George on the 4th April, 1766, that in his last invasion of the Malabar country Haidar had attacked some of the powers with whom the Bombay Government were in alliance. They judged from some circumstances in his conduct that they might be under the necessity of coming into a rupture with him. They made a request that in such a case the Madras Government should be ready to assist them in their operations against Mysore.² Madras in reply advised them to accommodate with Haidar because they were endeavouring to avail themselves "of the grant of the circars contrary to the inclinations of the soubah who had earnestly desired assistance from Haidar Ali to dispossess us." Therefore, in case hostilities were started against Haidar, he was sure to join Nizam Ali and this would prevent their bringing the Nizam to terms.³ This was in May, 1766. In July Haidar made an offer through his *vakil*. He expressed his desire to live on the most friendly terms with the English. He made his offer in the following words : "I have got a large force. The English have the same. If both be united, the Mogullians and the Marathas can do nothing. If there be an occasion on that side my troops will go to their assistance and if on my side their troops will come to my assistance. Mention this to the Governor and if he is of the same opinion and if the gentlemen of the Council agree thereto the settling it cannot be managed by a correspondence of letters for which reason you should bring a proper Gentlemen and a letter under the seal of the seven Councillors."⁴ The Madras Government decided to send Bouchier, a member of the

1. *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, 1766, p. 384.

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, 1766, p. 213.

3. Despatches to England, 22nd February, 1767, para 70.

4. Military Consultations, Vol. 24, 1766, p. 213.

Madras Council, along with Muhammad Ali Khan. A letter from the Nawab to Haidar Ali was thus drafted : "It is desirable that between the governor of the Payenghat and the governor of Balaghat, a sincere friendship and alliance should be established."¹ Bouchier was also instructed to get the earliest information of Haidar's intentions, the number of troops assembled and the details of preparations. It was patent that the British did not believe in the reality of the proposed offer. About defensive alliance Bouchier was told that nothing more particular should be engaged than in those general terms that their friends and enemies shall be the same... that the British would be ready to give him assistance provided the peace of the country would admit of it.²

But Haidar was also negotiating with Nizam Ali and Bouchier could receive no certain intelligence of the place and time of the interview. He had to return to Madras without even interviewing Haidar. The President and Council of Madras apprehended that Haidar and Nizam Ali had entered into an alliance to invade the Carnatic. This open rebuff, Haidar's return to Coimbatore without so much as sending an answer to their letters, made the people at Madras more forward in their overtures to the Nizam.³ They hoped to steal a march over Haidar. The British envoy received his rebuff early in August and Calliaud's treaty with the Nizam was signed on the 12th November.⁴

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 24, 1766, p. 406.

2. *Ibid.* p. 436. Instructions for James Bouchier, para 9.

3. Despatches to England, 22nd February, 1766, para 74.

4. *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. I, p. 11.

Wilson draws our attention to the military advantage resulting from this treaty. "Madras alliance with the Nizam in 1766 against Haidar has been generally condemned but the movement had an indirect advantage of great military importance. Till then the various battalions of the army had not been brigaded, indeed they had not always been kept together as battalions but had been often dispersed by wings and companies. Under Colonel Smith, who accompanied the Nizam with the English detachment, they were drawn together by battalions, brigaded and placed under picked officers. European and native. The force was thus formed and kept together for a considerable period, as a camp of exercise, of which the good effect was soon apparent."

On the 18th November the President and the Council of Madras wrote letters to Bombay and Tellichery to the following effect : "We may be prevailed to assist (the Nizam) in reducing the Mysore Government within its ancient and proper bounds and which we cannot but look upon as favourable opportunity of checking the ambitious designs of a man from whose violence, immense conquest, riches and power the peace of the Nabob's dominions is liable to be disturbed, and indeed his refusing to admit Mr. Bouchier who set out to negotiate with him sufficiently evinces how little desirous he was of our friendship and alliance and that nothing but proceeding to extremities can bring him to reason."¹

Apprehending a concerted attack as a consequence of the treaty between the British and the Nizam Haidar sent back his *vakil* with a letter expressing his concern at his not having been able to see Mr. Bouchier and desiring that he might return to settle the terms of friendship and alliance, but the Madras Government now decided to conceal their real intention as much as possible. The President informed the *vakil* that it was the constant care of the British Government to live in terms of friendship with every Government but that they could not but be alarmed at his master's dubious conduct which had put them to a considerable expense in drawing their troops from different parts but they were well pleased to find him inclinable to adopt peaceable measures.²

It is interesting to note that a treaty of peace and friendship between the East India Company and Haidar Ali was actually proposed by the Bombay Government on the 11th July, 1766. By it they were to enjoy all grants and privileges they had enjoyed under the former chiefs from "Cape Ramos to Penny South" and they were not to suffer any impediment or molestation in any other settlements in this region. In all matters of trade and business the English were to have preference. The 12th clause of the proposed treaty provided that Haidar was not to enter any alliance prejudicial to the interest of the company, nor must he attack any other country, and more particularly the

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 24, p. 615.

2. Military Consultations, Vol. 24, p. 649.

Nawab of Arcot and the Raja of Travancore. Haidar evaded this clause and himself put forward his demand in the following words : "Whenever the Honourable Company may be in want of troops I will furnish them with 10/15,000 men from the Sarcar and on the contrary should the Sarcar be in such necessity, the Honourable Company are to supply me in like manner as is consistent with our firm friendship and is also the cause of dread to our enemies."¹ Here we have the same proposal of a defensive alliance.

This Bombay project failed on account of the same reasons that prevented a rapprochement between Madras and Mysore, British policy taking a definitely anti-Haidar tone. The Madras Government objected to the proposed treaty as inconsistent with the treaty they had made with the Nizam. The curious part of the whole business was the foolish British belief which finds expression in the letter from Madras to Bombay—"We flatter ourselves that he will look upon our alliance with the Soubah in the same light as he did formerly that of the French who frequently attended the Soubah in his expeditions to Mysore, yet Haidar Ali continued in friendship with Pondichery."²

The Nizam advanced with his British auxiliaries into the Mysore country. Madhav Rao, his ally, was already plundering other parts of Mysore. But Haidar did not give up his attempt to win the Nizam over. Mahphuz Khan was sent with 50,000 pagodas and some elephants as a present to the Nizam. Sonapat Rao, who had been the *Dewan* of Anwar-ud-din, was also with the Nizam. Among the influential courtiers Sher Jang showed his decided dislike of the English treaty.³ The flattering offers of Haidar Ali, and the influence of these three friends of Haidar, converted the vacillating Nizam from an anti-Mysore to a pro-Mysore attitude.

The British now found themselves in a morass from which they found it impossible to extricate themselves. The difficulties of the situation were reflected in a letter written to Smith who was commanding the English detachment accompanying

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 26A, pp. 16-26.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Military Consultations, Vol. 26A, pp. 65-104.

the Nizam. The President and Council of Madras wrote, "If all the arguments and any other you can suggest prove fruitless and the Soubah seems determined to return to Hyderabad, you must then hint (provided you can learn beforehand that the Marathas will readily embrace the proposal) that you hope His Highness, though it is not convenient for him to remain with his whole army, will leave a part to act in conjunction with us and in that case we shall endeavour by means of the Marathas to accomplish the end proposed by the expedition. In case he cannot leave any troops that you hope he will have no objection to our entering into an agreement with Madhav Rao to assist each other against Haidar Ali. This however must be touched on in a light manner and if you perceive it raises jealousies or distrust of your intention you are to endeavour to remove them by the strongest assurances that we never mean to lose sight of our connection with Soubah."¹

The utter failure of the diplomacy of the Madras Government became more visible when Lt. Tod, sent to the camp of Madhav Rao, submitted his report. He wrote, "I blush when I think the degree of contempt I was treated with considering my station and those I represent. Nevertheless I kept my temper, showed as little sign of disgust as possible."² Madhav Rao concluded separate treaty with Haidar and went away. The Madras Government antagonised Haidar and then, deserted by the Nizam and insulted by the Marathas, they found themselves completely isolated and confronted with the Nizam-Haidar alliance. The background of diplomacy that explains this situation is a story of incredible bungling. They had flattered themselves with the hope that they would "reduce the Mysore Government within its ancient and proper bounds as well as check the designs of a man dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the Carnatic."³ But now they found that before any defensive plan had matured and arrangements had been made for adequate provisions they had to face the Nizam-Haidar combination. Their hollow alliances and diplomatic counterplots were foiled completely by Haidar who

1. Military Consultations, Vol. 26A, p. 243, para 5.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 381.

3. Despatches to England, 22nd February, 1767, para 75.

made them look ridiculous. In this connection the following remarks of the Court of Directors¹ deserve notice :

“After having for successive years given it as our opinion, confirmed by your approbation, the maintaining an army for the support of the Suba of the Deccan was endangering the Carnatic and would tend to involve us in war and distant and expensive operations and the grant of the Circars was not to be accepted on those terms you at once engage in that support and send an army superior to that which in the year 1764 you determined would endanger your own safety. You justify this measure by the advice from the committee of Bengal, which never countenanced so great a division of our force, and on the principle of checking the Maratha power which all your measures seem to counteract.

In the year 1766, in your letter to Bombay, dated 24th June, you express yourself averse to a rupture with Haidar Ali, whose power you deemed a restriction on the Marathas. Before the year is closed, the power of Haidar is assigned as a motive for a union with the Suba and the reducing it becomes the principal object of your policy.

Much has been written of the necessity of checking the Marathas which may in some degree be proper but it is not for the English East India Company to play the part of umpire in Hindustan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power amongst themselves and their quarrels would have left you at peace.”

1 Company's General Letter to Fort St. George, 13th May, 1768.

CHAPTER IX

The First Anglo-Mysore War

FROM THE SKIRMISH AT SINGARPETTAH TO THE COLLAPSE
OF THE HYDERABAD-MYSORE ALLIANCE

(August, 1767—March, 1768)

Haidar and the Nizam carried the war into the territory of the Nawab of Arcot. The seniormost military officer of the Madras Presidency was Colonel Smith. He was encamped near Melpatty. About the 14th of August he moved about 11 miles southward. The British news service was so inefficient that Smith heard nothing definite of Haidar and the Nizam until about the 25th of August, when he was informed, to his surprise and astonishment, that Haidar's horse were driving off the bullocks sent out from the British camp for forage, and that about 4,000 horse of Haidar commanded by Makhdum Sahib were plundering around. Smith also heard that Haidar and the Nizam were besieging Kaveripatnam, some of Haidar's horsemen even entering the Carnatic through the pass of Singarpettah. The British could not attempt the relief of Kaveripatnam with their small army which was also in great want of provisions and other necessities. Leaving the garrison to get the best terms it could, the British army marched about 16 miles south-east. It wanted to hasten to Trinomali (Tiruvannamalai) where Smith hoped to be joined by Wood's division which was expected to come from Trichinopoly. The army under Smith was very small in number, the whole English force being 600 Europeans and 6 battalions of sepoys. Haidar's army numbered 210 Europeans, 800 excellent Mughal horse, 12,000 other cavalry, 5,000 grenadier sepoys, 8,000 sepoys with European muskets, 1,000 topasses with muskets and 4,000 matchlocks. Of these 18,000 infantry of his, 12,000 were really good. He had 49 cannon of all sorts. The Nizam had 25/30,000 horse, 10,000 foot and 60 pieces of cannon.¹ On August 30 Smith marched to Singarpettah. The whole way was covered

1 Orme Ms., Vol. 215.

with woods and bad for the movement of cannon. He passed the Pennar (Ponnaiyar) twice in the course of this march. Haidar's horse followed but kept out of sight. On August 31, at about 6 a.m. Smith marched through the Singarpettah pass. Haidar's horse attacked the party but after a brisk fire made by the British they retired. The comment of a British soldier is significant. He writes, "I should hardly have been brought to believe that any horse in the world would have attacked infantry in so thick a wood, which in many places only admitted of our marching by files but that was not all for many of them scrambled over a steep rugged hill. Their notions of war are so different from ours."¹

Battle of Changama—Haidar's plan was to cut the small British army to pieces near Changama. Smith was marching in the following order : Major Bonjour with Captain Calvert's battalion led the van. The Nawab of Arcot's horse, about 1,000 in number, marched in their rear. The baggage was immediately after them. On the right of the baggage, Cooke's battalion was marching by files, on the left Cosby's in the same order. The rear of the whole was closed by Major Thomas Fitzgerald and his grenadiers of different corps. Haidar had sent Raja Ramchandra Rao of the Nizam's army with 5,300 horse and some infantry to take possession of a village and a hill directly on the road the British were to pass. Haidar's plan was to check them in front while he would attack the rear with the main body. A smart fire was kept up from their musketry and rockets and his cavalry was also put in motion. But Cosby's battalion being the one nearest the village attacked the village with fixed bayonets and dispersed the Nizam's troops. As a large body of Haidar's sepoys and horse were pushing up the right of the British line, a British battalion was posted there. The hill was attacked to the south by Haidar's best sepoys. Haidar, sensible of the advantage secured by the British in having the hill, made several attempts to regain it. In one of these attempts Haidar led his sepoys himself and received a contusion on his leg. At one stage of the fight Haidar's troops had possessed themselves of the village and were driven out by the grenadier sepoys. Haidar found it impossible to break

1 *Ibid.*

in. The British lost 20 killed and 150 wounded including 5 Europeans. Haidar and the Nizam are said to have lost 1500 in killed and wounded. The fight took place on the 2nd September and it lasted from 1 o'clock in the afternoon till dark¹. This battle produced on Haidar's mind a very high opinion of the British commander which was of service to the British afterwards.

Pursuit in the absence of cavalry was impossible. The British army next morning continued to march, Haidar's troops plundering the baggage from distance. As Bonjour moved on with his detachment and baggage, he was followed by a large body of Haidar's horse. On his route there was a river which had little water at this time. Its banks were steep and bushy and the ground was very uneven. Haidar's horsemen got in, plundered heavily and even cut the bullocks carrying tumbrils. These tumbrils were later recovered. The advance guard of the British army reached Trinomali about noon on the 4th and the rear guard reached about the evening—"a march of 27 hours without the least refreshment for men or beasts who were never unloaded."²

The battle of Changama was a very indecisive fight. The British commander-in-chief was constrained to admit, "The enemy's horse got into the Carnatic by various passes before me. I found large bodies of them near Trinomali." One curious feature of the events of these days was the desertion of Lt. Hichcock, "an example, considering all circumstances, unexampled."³

On the 5th September, Haidar advanced and encamped about six miles from the British, the Nizam's whole force joining Haidar's. The confederates used to alarm the British by

1 Orme Ms., Vols. 33, 215.

2 Select Committee Proceedings, 13th October, 1767.

3 But Wilson in his *History of the Madras Army* tells us that this was not unexampled. "The persons who were in those days willing to come to India in the Company's service were, for the most part, reckless adventurers and their position exposed them to many temptations. So late as 1761, a Captain Coulson, commanding at Chittapet, marched out of that place and with his garrison and guard joined Haidar Ali."—Copy of a letter from Smith to the Secret Dept. at Fort St. George—Select Committee Proceedings, 13th October 1767.

throwing rockets. On the 8th Colonel Wood's detachments from the south joined Smith's. Haidar ought to have attempted to prevent this junction but Wood was absolutely unmolested and had not even a sight of Haidar's army. The British army now marched 8 miles northward to Kalaspakkam. The Mysore army contented itself with exchanging some shots with the flanking parties. On the 14th of September Smith with his army returned to the high ground near Trinomali and on the 16th the British army again retired to Kalaspakkam, being in the greatest want of provisions. Some grain was found by them buried in the village. On the 21st a large body of Haidar's cavalry appeared in front of the British army. The grenadiers under Major Fitzgerald were ordered to move towards them. They were driven away with the help of field pieces. This body subsequently went to St. Thomas' mount and threw the inhabitants of Madras into the greatest consternation. "The Governor, Muhammad Ali and his son together with Colonel Call and almost all the council very narrowly escaped being taken in the country house in the Company's garden. Happily for them a small vessel that by accident was opposite the garden furnished them with the means of escaping."¹

On the 24th the British army again marched towards high ground. These marches and counter-marches of the British army were undertaken with a view to drawing the confederates into the open field and bringing them to action, but as yet they were of no avail. On the 25th September, the British marched by the left about two miles which brought them nearer their encampment and directly to it, on which the Mysore army immediately struck their tents. The British army found the ground very unfavourable for attack. The Mysore army marched 3 miles southward among high hills and threw up several strong redoubts. They thus strengthened their encampment as a precaution against night attacks.

1 *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. II, p. 596. The news of this raid was magnified into a story of the capture of Madras. The price of the Company's stock fell from 275 to 222. Select Committee Proceedings, 27th October, 1767, p. 327.

Battle of Trinomali—On the 26th September, to the surprise and satisfaction of the British, the confederate army advanced with 19 pieces of heavy cannon, 18 and 24-pounders towards the British camp, keeping a swamp between the two armies. As a smart cannonade was soon begun by the Mysore army, the British naturally thought that the confederate army wanted to drive them out of their encampment without coming to close action. Smith's guns being inferior in weight he did not find it possible to reply to the brisk Mysorean cannonade. But he gave orders to his men to move off by the right, making a circuit round a high hill that lay between. Captain Cook was ordered to take possession of the hill. The Mysoreans thought that the British were retreating and moved by the left round the opposite side of the same hill. They were surprised to find the British advancing, the British movement being screened from their view by the hill. A group of their topasses and sepoys had taken possession of some straggling rocks in front of them. Another body tried to get up the hill from which they were driven away. The rocks were attacked by the British in front and the Mysorean troops were driven back, but they kept up a smart musketry fire. The main body of the English army advanced into the plain further right. The confederate infantry in this part of the field kept aloof, and immense bodies of cavalry formed a kind of semi-circle around the British, waiting apparently for an opportunity of cutting in. But, curiously enough, they appeared to be quite at a loss until put to flight by the British field pieces. Very late in the afternoon a body of horse attempted the right flank of the British army but Major Fitzgerald in the rear wheeled round and warmly received them and they rode off. It was quite dark when Smith took possession of the field of battle. The confederate army retired to their fortified camp. Haidar placed his best troops in the redoubt where he himself remained in command. The Nizam moved off immediately. All night the confederates engaged themselves in removing their baggage. The British, a mile off, could observe this with the help of their lights. Smith wanted to swoop upon the opposing camp. "But he found himself in a swamp and a rascally spy informed him that it was impossible to get to their camp without going a great way about. This information was next morning found to be false but it robbed Colonel of a great

deal of glory.”¹ Smith had to content himself with two field pièces which the confederates could not carry off. Haidar’s practice after a defeat in the field was to bring up the rear himself attended by the pick of his cavalry. Smith regretted : “2,000 good horses would have put us in possession of both the enemies’ armies.”² The Nizam left Haidar at midnight after the battle and reached Singarpettah before he halted. Major Fitzgerald and Colonel Tod were sent to intercept Tipu in the course of his return from the mount, but he was much too quick for interception.

The monsoon now began in all its violence. The English army entered into cantonments at Trichinopoly, Conjeeveram and Trinomali. The confederates quarrelled and then separated. The Bengal Government, always bolder than Madras, now advised the Madras Council that this blow should be followed up by further blows against the Nizam and concessions must not be made too early. “Something similar to the Government established in these provinces might we think be set up to advantage on the coast without extending the company’s influence quite far or reducing that of the Suba too much... The expedition to Hyderabad may still be pushed with vigour... if it should be necessary to bring about a change of persons in the Subaship we shall exert our influence with the King to have the appointment sanctioned by the royal sanad.”³ The Madras Government, though not averse to the idea of having a puppet Nizam, wanted to know “if the king might be inclined to send any of his sons or any of the royal race and if he can supply money or give any security of reimbursing the expense we may be at to support any appointment he might make of a Suba to the Deccan.” From Calcutta came the reply : “The grand power we ought to aim at is to have the Carnatic, Mysore country and the Deccan under the influence of British power

1 Orme Ms., Vols. 215, 33.

2 Select Committee Proceedings, 27th October, 1767, p. 330. According to De La Tour, Haidar withdrew his army into the camp without leaving the English any mark of victory except one of the three pounders they themselves had lost before. The English made no prisoners except a Portuguese officer. The number of killed in the army did not exceed 400. (pp. 316-17)

3 Select Committee Proceedings, 27th October, 1767, pp. 332-334.

and form an effectual barrier against the Maratha encroachments.”¹ Shah Alam went to the extent of issuing a blank royal *farman* for any appointment to the Subaship of the Deccan that might appear as most favourable to the interests of the East India Company.

But in the Mysorean the British had to reckon with an enemy very different from the easy-going type with which they were familiar in the East. Even during the monsoon Haidar set about assembling his troops under the walls of Kaveripatnam. “Not less than 600 carriages daily passed to and from Bangalore and Kaveripatnam.”²

Haidar began his march early in November, 1767. He very easily took Tirupattur and Veniyambadi. The garrison of Veniyambadi consisted of companies of sepoys under Lt. Robinson and Lt. Davis, who were taken prisoner. Smith wrote to Orme, “Haidar treated them handsomely, received their paroles and set them at liberty. The sepoys there he confined except those who took his service. Others were carried upcountry to discipline his troops.”³ After this Haidar laid siege to Ambur which held out. Although Haidar brought 27 pieces of heavy cannon and raised 9 batteries, Ambur offered stubborn resistance. Haidar made two breaches in the wall but found it impossible to approach them. He could ascend only by two roads which again were so hard of access that troops without arms could with great difficulty crawl up. No wonder that Calvert, who led the defence, found it easy to fill up the breaches. Haidar wanted to finish his business before the approach of the main body of the English army. Failing to stagger people by the briskness of his fire as he had hoped, he wrote threatening letters and is said to have offered to make Calvert the commander-in-chief of his own forces. But in the meantime provisions within Ambur ran short and the men became fatigued. Smith wrote to Orme, “The Europeans, to their utter disgrace and shame as Englishmen, came in a body, begged for heaven’s sake he could give up the place. I believe

1 *Ibid.*, 20th December, 1767. p. 458.

2 Orme Ms., Vol. 33.

3 Orme Ms., Vol. 33.

it is the first instance known throughout our history of European forces to surrender a town to blacks. Calvert was mildly telling them the bad consequences it must produce among the sepoys. They at length grew ashamed of their dastardly conduct."¹

For all these reasons the English army could not wait longer. Though miserably equipped it marched from Vellore on the 2nd and 3rd December and only seven days' rice, carried on 600 bullocks, was all that Smith was able to obtain in all the Carnatic, "a pretty prospect again." Ambur was relieved on the 7th, Haidar trotting off to Veniyambadi.

*Affair of Veniyambadi*²—The British army moved at 3 a. m. next day. At about 9 a. m. Major Fitzgerald sent news that he perceived the enemy. Haidar was in a very advantageous position. His army was encamped at the back of the fort on an island but the river was not very deep. In front of him lay the bank which was very steep. His rear was covered by the fort, his left by the village and *pettah* of Veniyambadi. To his right was a ridge of mountains. He had to run up a redoubt on the high road but had to withdraw it again. The British army had a deep water course and a paddy field to its left and a wooded, bushy country to its right intersected by large gullies. Therefore the British army had to push straight forward. Haidar had some guns on the opposite bank, but the inexperienced gunners could do the British very little harm. The guns that flanked the British towards the left were attacked by a British battalion, but Haidar drove them off. As the British gained the opposite bank, the Mysore army retired to the fort and *pettah*. There was the greatest confusion in the British army on account of the ugly descent. Had Haidar's cavalry done their duty, the British would have had to suffer terrible losses. From the fort and village Haidar's men fired, and though very soon driven off, the entire army of Haidar got off with amazing quickness. Smith wrote, "They have a knack of retreating with so great celerity, (neither mountains, nor anything else can stop them) that we could not get one piece of cannon from

1 Orme Ms., Vol. 33

2 *Ibid.*, Vol. 215, Vol. 33, pp. 25-58, 63-105.

them. The moment they find themselves inclined to run for it, Haidar orders 10,000 horse in the rear to keep you in check. No troops dare break or pursue in disorder with such a body of cavalry ready.”¹ During the action Monsr. D’Aumont with 50 French hussars came over from Haidar to Smith.

Haidar’s army withdrew to Kaveripatnam. After taking Tirupattur the British marched upon Kaveripatnam. Colonel Wood’s division joined Smith on 20th December, 1767. The British army now consisted of 1,500 European infantry, 9 battalions of sepoys, 30 guns and 2,000 Indian horsemen. Smith found Haidar very strongly posted. His redoubts were too strong to be attacked. Smith wrote, “Our sepoys on a plain would overturn the enemy from their wonted success ; but this I full well knew that Haidar’s sepoys, secured with a strong parapet, a ditch and thorny bushes around a reboubt, would then make a good fight and give much trouble to drive them out, as they had heavy cannon and light ones in each of these redoubts. The fort and *pettah* and three strong hills within shot of the town all commanded each other and formed a chain of strength sufficient to stop our career.”² Still he remained before Kaveripatnam because he knew that some of the officers of Haidar were discontented and some had even applied for service with the British. He wanted to see whether an opportunity would offer. There was also hope of a convoy coming to help him for which he had to wait. On the 26th December, Haidar attempted to cut it off. He moved so rapidly sword in hand through Wood’s part of the camp that Wood could not even get into his track. Haidar took with him 4,000 horse, 1,000 sepoys and 2 small field guns, in order to intercept Major Fitzgerald who had been sent with 2 companies of grenadiers, a battalion of sepoys and 2 guns to reinforce the convoy. Fitzgerald received timely information and put all the grain and all the bullocks it could hold into an old mud fort. With this fort securing his rear, he drew up his men on two faces of the mud fort and took care to secure his angles. Haidar’s field guns were ill-pointed. He therefore

1 Orme Ms., Vol. 33.

2 Ormr Ms., Vol. 215.

tried to confuse Fitzgerald's men with rockets. Mysore cavalry approached in three bodies, but steady fire compelled them to gallop off. Haidar rallied them and himself charged at their head. The Mysore horsemen now advanced briskly with horrible screamings. Haidar's horse was shot under him and his turban was beaten off with a ball. But he had to retire and as usual he covered his own retreat successfully.¹ Forty-eight hours before the convoy arrived at Kaveripatnam nobody in the British camp had grain. Even then the supply brought by Fitzgerald was sufficient for four days only. But Haidar had marched away to Bangalore with the greater part of his force. The British were now free to move as they liked.

By the end of the year, the Nizam made his approaches for peace and wanted to manoeuvre the British into the position of a power suing for terms. But the Madras Government demanded that he must either quit Haidar Ali and throw himself into the hands of Colonel Smith or retire immediately to Hyderabad. When Smith was at Kaveripatnam many messages passed between him and the Nizam. Haidar who knew of this correspondence, coaxed, flattered, promised and threatened. As a preliminary to negotiations Smith insisted upon the Nizam's quitting Haidar, which he did. The Hyderabad-Mysore alliance was from the beginning very unreal and it could not stand the strain of defeats. Lt. Col. Hart took possession of Khammemet which has been described as the key to the Deccan. Though the Nizam expressed a desire for a reconciliation, he remained encamped opposite the Damalcherry pass, waiting to see what Haidar alone could do. But the Nizam now heard with dismay that an army was getting ready for the reduction of Hyderabad. He sent Rukn-ud-daula and Raja Ramchandra to negotiate with the British. It is the characteristic of the tortuous diplomacy of the Nizam's *darbar* that a messenger was at the same time despatched to Haidar Ali to reassure him that the negotiations would be spun out till he got the assistance of 10,000 more horse.² The British, however, kept themselves in readiness to march through the Damalcherry pass. There was not much difficulty in

1 Orme Ms., Vol. 215.

2 Select Committee Proceedings, 18th March, 1768, pp. 145-146.

making the Nizam agree to British terms as Rukn-ud-daula was sensible of the British power to remove his master. Moreover, Colonel Peach had already made himself master of Warangal and was encamped 5 *kos* from thence on the road to Hyderabad. A treaty was concluded between the Madras Government and the Nizam on 22nd March, 1768. The 9th article of the treaty runs as follows : "Asaf Jah recognises Haidar Naik as a rebel and usurper and as such divests him of and revokes from him all sanads, power and distinctions conferred by him or any other suba of the Deccan."¹

1 Select Committee Proceedings, 27th April, 1768, p. 217.

CHAPTER X

The First Anglo-Mysore War

FROM THE EXIT OF THE NIZAM TO THE CONCLUSION
OF PEACE

(March, 1768—April, 1769)

Haidar was now left alone to fight the British. He had to march from the eastern part of the peninsula to the western to meet the British threat in Malabar. Smith and Wood were thus given the fullest opportunity of taking the offensive in the east.

The English army in two divisions was now engaged in driving out garrisons of Haidar Ali from the many different strong places in which they were entrenched. Having reached Bangalore, Haidar set off for Mangalore, leaving Makhdum Sahib with about 3,000 horse and some irregulars to hover about the division commanded by Smith. There remained yet another force to harass Wood's division. Wood went with his detachment to Trinomali and Smith left for Tirupattur. Colonel Smith sent his heavy artillery to Colonel Wood who reduced Singarepettah and Dharampuri. Smith turned to Kaveripatnam, which he took on 23rd February. Colonel Wood was directed to proceed south on the fall of Dharampuri.

Smith blockaded Krishnagiri being informed that it had only a month's provision. The English daily expected that the place would be given up. People who were intercepted informed Smith that the place could not hold out long. It has been suggested with reason that this was nothing more than a finesse of Haidar to encourage the British to wait and thus keep them inactive and prevent their pushing to Bangalore, in which case he would have been compelled to return from Mangalore. Krishnagiri was not "a very important place but after having waited so long, prestige demanded that it should be taken." It did not surrender until 2nd May, thus serving the purpose for which the defence was intended. Even then the *qiladar* was allowed to march out—this being one of the conditions of surrender—with troops, arms, colours etc. and one field piece, "the first demand of the kind made by an

Indian officer which we must attribute to that military spirit which Haidar took every opportunity of instilling into his troops, expressed by rewards to the deserving and severe punishment upon the coward or traitor." Smith explains this stubborn resistance in words that do not disprove the fact that the defence of Krishnagiri was intended as a decoy to enable Haidar to finish the Mangalore operations. Smith says, "The qiladar seems modest in his replies and says how can he betray a trust committed to his charge by the best of masters and at whose hands he had received many favours. The truth is Haidar secures the families of all those men he gives command to, and if they behave ill he destroys the remainder. No wonder then these fellows are desperate."¹

With a view to assisting the operations against Haidar Ali the Bombay Government had sent a force for the reduction of his possessions on the Malabar coast. They sent an army of 400 Europeans and 800 sepoys under the command of Major Gavin by land and Watson by sea and they possessed themselves of Mangalore and the largest portion of Haidar Ali's fleet. Thereupon Tipu advanced with 1,000 horse and 3,000 foot. Major Gavin went out to meet him and a skirmish took place. Gavin's plan was to march upon Bidnur. A Mysore army commanded by Tipu got possession of the Mangalore bazar on the 2nd May but was repulsed from the fort. On the 9th May the British army near Mangalore heard that Tipu was joined by a reinforcement of 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse with a train of artillery and that Haidar himself had come down to join them. In consequence the British detachments embarked on the night of the 11th May and went to Tellicherry. The retreat itself was so panic-stricken and precipitate that they left all their sick in the hospital, all the field pieces and practically everything except 250/300 muskets. The sick in the hospital included 80 of the European infantry and 170/180 of the Bombay sepoys and they fell into the hands of Haidar Ali, who thus succeeded in completely crushing the rebellion on the Malabar coast and driving the

1 Orme Ms., Vol 215.

English into the sea.¹ The success at Mangalore gave Haidar stores, guns and money, and to his people boldness. He also got a fine train of field artillery at Mangalore.

In the meanwhile after taking Dharampuri Wood had marched against Salem and Atur. He took Namakkal on the 25th May, Erode on the south side of the Kaveri on the 8th June. Wood then captured Satyamangalam and marched towards Gazalhatty pass. Having got possession of it he marched towards Coimbatore which surrendered without much opposition. This was on 5th July. Dindigul surrendered on the 4th August. Thus was completed the subjugation of the southern countries. The plan was to cut off the supplies of Haidar from the south as a preparation for the siege of Bangalore.

Colonel Campbell at the head of a detachment of troops succeeded in seizing Venkatagiri on the 16th June and Mulbagal on the 23rd. The fort of Mulbagal was surprised by a stratagem. Jaffar Hussain, Haidar's recruiting officer, who was then at Mulbagal, was won over and admitted some British troops, dressed as his recruits. Mulbagal was of great consequence, as it lay on the direct road to Bangalore and secured communications with Venkatagiri and Kolar. It surrendered to Campbell on the 28th June.²

The division under Smith marched from Krisnagiri on the 20th June. On the 31st May it had been decided that the army should enter the Mysore country. On the 1st June Muhammad Ali, Nawab of Arcot, arrived in the British camp along with two field deputies, Messrs Call and Mackay. It was hoped that the Nawab's authority over the *amildars* would ensure plenty of supplies in the bazar of the British army. Colonel Smith differed from the Madras Government regarding the method of conducting the war. The field deputies were therefore appointed in order that those who had been responsible for planning the expedition might give their advice and influence the prosecution of the war. Messrs Call and Mackay, together with the Commander-in-Chief, formed a council of war in which the majority would decide, the Colonel agreeing to this arrangement because it took away from him

1 Select Committee Proceedings, 20th July, 1768, pp. 291-93.

2 Orme Ms., Vol, 215.

a portion of his responsibility and rendered frequent references to Madras unnecessary.

The British plan of war was to invade the Mysore country and besiege Bangalore. After completing the subjugation of the southern countries Wood would join Smith, and of the two divisions one would besiege Bangalore and the other would watch Haidar, who, however, came back to Bangalore from Mangalore on the 29th July. The main British army under Smith marched from Krishnagiri on the 20th June and reached Budikote on the 4th July. Hosur was besieged and on the 11th captured, Smith attacking it from the north and Campbell from the east. On the 12th July Anekal surrendered. The British advanced with the intention of taking post near Hoskote and there they wanted to wait for cavalry and stores from Madras intended for the siege of Bangalore. Colonel Wood, who had already secured Dindigul, was ordered to join the main army as soon as possible. On the 24th July the British army advanced 5 miles south of Hoskote on a fine high ground and there they intended to remain for some time. Murar Rao of Gooty came with 3,000 horse, 2,000 sepoys and some pieces of cannon and joined the British army on the 3rd August. On the same day the British also received definite information of Haidar Ali's coming to Bangalore.

On the 22nd August, about midnight, Haidar with 6,000 horse and one battalion of sepoys made an attempt on Murar Rao's camp which was half a mile on the right of the British encampment. He broke through the entrenchments with elephants and entered it, but the Maratha chieftain forbade his people to mount, got Haidar's horse entangled in the tent and obliged his men to retire, leaving 150 killed and wounded and several elephants.⁴ They had very nearly carried him off, having penetrated to the door of his own tent and wounded him, his son and some of his generals.

On the 4th September the British army moved from the ground at Hoskote to follow Haidar who had gone from Bangalore with a considerable force to intercept Wood arriving at Budikote from the south to join the main army. Smith

1 Select Committee Proceedings, 31st August, 1768, pp. 563-64.

fell back to Malur and there left all the baggage and camp followers and even the tents. Haidar had counted on meeting only Wood's division and Wood would have beyond doubt been surprised and defeated.¹ But on the 6th, when Smith met Wood on the march, an unlucky salute from Wood in compliment to Smith gave the alarm to Haidar's camp and he was immediately in motion. It was impossible for the British to intercept him, for his excellent bullocks marched at the rate of 2 feet to one of the British. But the English dragged on their artillery. Haidar would not make a stand, and put up a fight. Wood's pursuit was too precipitate for the rear to keep up. He lost 2 pieces of artillery which were, however, later retaken. Haidar's horse fell on his rear, attacked the Poligar troops who had loitered behind a tank and, but for the assistance of Lang, would have cut them off. The pursuit failed as it was bound to fail. Haidar went towards Gurumkonda, a detachment under Lang being sent after him ; the remainder of the British army marched to cut off, if possible, his return to Bangalore. Most probably Haidar's principal design in this manoeuvre was to recruit his army and overawe his vassals who had been emboldened by his ill success. The British army gathered at Kolar, ready to commence the siege of Bangalore, but Smith and the field deputies were of the opinion that "so long as Haidar remained in the field with so numerous an army the attack on Bangalore would be too arduous an attempt and that he must be first defeated before it could be undertaken with a prospect of success." Bangalore fort was also very admirably constructed, fitted with all the necessities of war and provisions for 12 months. The walls were of stone. The well built bastions were turfed, the ramparts wide, the ditch deep, the glacis and esplanade excellent. There were batteries on the salient angles and redoubts without ; 3,000 of Haidar's best sepoys were within the walls and more than 7,000 other troops. Haidar himself, with 10,000 sepoys, 7,000 horse and 20,000 Poligar

1 Wood had got through the pass and had been a very short time on the ground when Haidar appeared. Wood's troops were worn out by their long marches and Haidar should have attacked at once. Next morning Smith's division joined Wood's on the march.

troops, was outside, ready to come to its relief. "All this could not have been vanquished by the threats of a half-starved, ill-recruited, ill-supplied, ill-paid, harassed army."¹

An excellent opportunity of concluding the war was missed by the Madras Government owing to excessive greed. Haidar made offers of accommodation to Smith when he was being pursued towards Gurumkonda. Lang, who was in charge of Wood's division on account of Wood's illness, was obliged to halt at Punganuru for want of provisions. He was reinforced by Smith and his mission now was to prevent Haidar from running into the Carnatic. At this stage came the peace offer. Haidar's *vakil* arrived in the camp on the 23rd September. On the 3rd October finding that nothing could be done, he left. The Madras Government demanded a reimbursement of all their expenses, calculated on an extravagant scale, and wanted that a barrier should be set to the Carnatic consisting of some forts ; and they also wanted territorial cession worth six lakhs of annual revenue to defray the cost of garrisoning the places. The Madras Government only thought that they were going to restore territory worth 30 lakhs of annual revenue and calling upon him to cede territory worth not more than six lakhs of annual revenue. Fallen though his fortunes were, Haidar thought he could not accept such terms. Malleison comments : "Rarely have rapacity and extortion met with a prompter punishment. Driven to bay, the wild and untutored genius asserted itself. From the recovery of Mulbagal began the series of success ending in the triumph of Haidar Ali."²

Finding himself only pursued by a detachment of the army, Haider returned to Mulbagal which he succeeded in taking by surprise through either the neglect or the treachery of the garrison consisting of the troops of the Nawab of Arcot. Call, the field deputy had, without Smith's knowledge, withdrawn the British sergeant and his sepoys and replaced him by an officer of the Nawab. On receipt of this information Haidar surprised the garrison and took the fort without resistance.

On hearing this Wood, who had resumed the command of his detachment, marched towards Mulbagal to retake it. He

1 Orme, Ms., Vol. 71 (original Ms. scored through).

2 *The Decisive Battles of India*, p. 221.

attempted to take it by escalade but was unsuccessful and was repulsed with some loss. The next day, the 4th October, on Haidar advancing with an army to throw up a fresh supply of provisions, an action took place between him and Wood.

*Battle of Mulbagal*¹—Haidar first took two guns which had been advanced with a picket and he obliged the picket to retreat. Wood was with the picket but he did not know that Haidar's army was so near. He thought that this was only a detachment and that the main army of Haidar would not be able to come up. Haidar pressed the picket very hard but Lang brought the British line up. Then the action began. Encouraged by their success, Haidar's army became exceedingly bold. Wood formed his line behind some rocks. Haidar made some furious charges and once even cut through several battalions of sepoys of Captain Mathews. The face of the battle was changed by a providential accident. Captain Brooke, who had been left with some companies of sepoys to guard the baggage, shouted the name of Smith, the British Commander-in-Chief, from which an impression was aroused that he had come to assist the army. This threw the Mysorean army into confusion and enabled Wood to draw his men together. About 250 were killed or wounded on the British side. Haidar is said to have lost about 1,000 men. But more such victories as that of Mulbagal would place him in a position to dictate his terms.

Next morning Smith joined Wood. A few days after the army returned to Kolar. Smith left the army on the 19th November in obedience to orders from the Presidency dated the 2nd November. In Smith's opinion, the real motive which induced the Madras Government to recall him to Madras was to let Wood take command, for they had a better notion of his generalship. Wood was now left in sole command, the field deputies, as also Muhammad Ali, having also gone to Madras.

As soon as Smith was gone Haidar, who had no reason to think highly of Wood, became more confident and more daring. His plan was to destroy by perpetual harassment rather than hazard a pitched battle. Under Wood's command the opera-

1 Orme, Ms. Vol. 215 ; Vol. 33, pp. 63-105 ; Vol 71.

tions of the British army consisted in little more than marching and counter-marching, without any possibility of an action. On the 19th November the British, after leaving two 18-pounders and all heavy baggage, came to Hosur, where Haidar moved round to the rear, around the British, with his cavalry. while his infantry and guns pushed towards Bangalore, where he attacked the *pettah*, took the two 18-pounders and a great quantity of baggage, made the English draw back and was off as usual. On November 22, Haidar took Wood completely by surprise at Arlier. Wood had just time to strike tents and make disposition of his forces. A warm cannonade began which lasted from noon till evening when Haidar drew off quite unmolested. The English lost about 20 Europeans and 200 sepoys in killed and wounded. As Wood began to march next morning, he was followed close by Haidar's troops. The British army was obliged to halt and form. Another cannonade began which lasted till 11 a.m., when they drew off hearing of the approach of Fitzgerald who now commanded Smith's division. The British failed to bring Haidar to an engagement at Bagalur, withdrew to Hoskote and thence to Kolar. The Presidency, disappointed in Wood, recalled him and gave the command to Lang, whose first step was to move the troops towards Venkatagiri, leaving Haidar free to enter the southern districts. Haidar went southward, retook Dharampuri and marched towards the Coimbatore country, so recently conquered by Wood. Major Fitzgerald was sent with a detachment in pursuit of Haidar. It was impossible for Fitzgerald to get up with Haidar, who kept several days' march ahead of him. Haidar retook every fort on his way—Salem, Atur, Namakkal, Erode, Dindigul, "in short all Wood's late conquests with the addition of Karur." Such an easy reconquest has been explained by the fact that these places had been put under the management of the Nawab of Arcot and every place was left practically without provisions and the troops had not received any part of their salary, which had been lying so long in arrears. But this cannot explain why Captain Orton surrendered at Erode even though he had 200 Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoys under him.

Haidar now advanced into the Carnatic and stationed himself near Arialur. He sent parties of his horse to plunder the

Carnatic. While Fitzgerald with his detachment was watching Haidar's motions at a distance, Lang was withdrawing his stores from Kolar to Vellore, a distance of about 100 miles.¹

Smith, having received orders to take the command of the army again, arrived at Chetput on the 28th January, 1769.² Haidar being then at Trinomali, Smith marched in that direction. On arriving at Trinomali he heard that Haidar had marched to Tricalore. Hearing that Haidar had marched eastward, the British marched towards Chetput. Determined to bring Haidar to a decisive action, Smith divested himself of every useless encumbrance. As Haidar had the advantage in point of heels, the British found themselves terribly handicapped. A body of 3,000 horsemen of Haidar harassed the British rear, supplied Haidar with information and kept all information from the British. On the 19th the British army, in its vain pursuit of Haidar arrived at Chetput. At this stage there was a cessation of arms for 7 days. But the negotiations continued up to the 12th March, when Haidar's *vakil* was finally withdrawn. The Madras Government proposed a truce for 40 days and wanted that during the negotiations Haidar's army would be at Atur and the British at Jagadurgaon. Haidar proposed that his army should be at Wandiwash, the British at Conjeeveram, and hostilities would cease for 7 days. But that would place him in the heart of the country whence with his swift cavalry he could be near Arcot or Cuddalore before the British. The negotiations for truce having failed, the armies were constantly in motion, without the British being able to approach nearer than a day's march and Haidar making from place to place.

On the 14th March Smith received intelligence that Haidar was making a push to pass the British army on the Mysore road. Smith, moving in hot pursuit, cut across and advanced towards Wandiwash. The plan of pushing forward to Madras was frustrated. Not receiving certain intelligence Smith marched further northwards, reaching Chingleput on the 16th.

¹ Select Committee Proceedings, 1st March, 1769, p.101.

² Early in 1769, Haidar offered to come to terms, but Bouchier vacillated and while affecting to treat, directed Smith to threaten the enemy's force. Haidar lured Smith to the southward. (*Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. II, p. 592).

Some of Haidar's cavalry in the flank deceived Smith, who thought that the main body was in front, which however was not the case. Smith marched to Conjeeveram where he found Colonel Lang with his division. Not knowing anything about Haidar's movements Smith arranged that he would move to Wandiwash and Lang would march further to the westward, hoping that one or the other party would catch the Mysorean or get him between the two. Smith reached Wandiwash on the 23rd March. On the 27th March Smith heard that Haidar, having sent all his baggage and guns to Atur, had with his cavalry and light infantry passed the right flank of the British and got between them and Madras. On hearing this Smith marched as fast as he could. On the 29th Smith reached Karanguli, on the 30th he reached Chingleput ; on the 31st Smith came to Vandalur, where he was ordered by the Madras Government to halt.¹ Haidar having compelled them to open negotiations for peace and Dupre having been sent to his camp for that purpose. But it is only proper to note that from the military point of view the situation of Haidar was very difficult. There were then in Madras 2,000 sepoys, 400 Europeans, a light train of artillery, with Colonel Campbell, Major Bonjour and a number of old officers. Lang with his force was on the Arcot road, Smith's force close on the heels of Haidar's cavalry which was exhausted with fatigue. Whatever might be the mistake from the military point of view, the political calculation proved to be correct.² He twisted himself skilfully into a peace through the characteristic weakness of his enemy on the field and in the cabinet.

A treaty was concluded on the 4th April, 1769. The treaty provided for the mutual restitution of conquests, except the fort of Karur and its districts which would be held by Haidar. Haidar could argue that this was also restitution of conquests as Karur had been formerly cut off from the dominions of the Mysorean. It also provided that in case of either of the parties being attacked, they would mutually assist each other to drive

¹ Orme Ms., Vol. 215.

² We must not, however, omit to mention that "there was but provision for only 15 days in the Black town when the peace was concluded."—Dupre to Orme—Select Committee Proceedings, 21st April. 1769, p. 207.

the enemy out. Some difficulty was caused in the wording of the treaty as neither the Nawab of Arcot nor Haidar Ali would give to the other his proper titles. The difficulty was obviated by the Nawab agreeing to give to the British power to settle for the Carnatic Payenghat in general terms. Bombay was included within the terms of the treaty and in lieu of the ships of Haidar taken on that coast the Madras Government surrendered the stores at Kolar.¹

The Anglo-Mysore War of 1767-69 is interesting as it was the first war in which the British Government finished by suing an Indian power for peace. Haidar is said to have ordered a caricature to be made, representing the Governor and his Council kneeling before him. Haidar was shown holding Dupre by the nose, depicted as an elephant's trunk, pouring guineas and pagodas. Smith also was in this picture, holding the treaty in his hand and breaking the sword in two.

The overwhelming superiority of the European soldier over his Asiatic rival, of which the Europeans got a clear impression in the battle of St. Thome, had been confirmed by the issue of the engagements at Arni, Kaveripak, Plassey, Kondur, Machhlipatnam, Biderra, Uduanala and Buxar. The failure of the British in this campaign therefore requires some explanation. The Indian armies, inspite of great numerical superiority, were no match for the European whose spirit, temper, discipline, fire control, swiftness and superior technique took the former by surprise. Against this mere personal bravery was helpless. But the element of surprise was by now over. The other Indian powers saw that the Indian sepoys trained by the Europeans were gaining resounding victories for their masters. Naturally, chieftains like Haidar Ali started employing Europeans to train their armies. Captain Mathews writes about the battle of Mulbagal, "I never saw black troops behave so bravely as Haidar's, all his foot were led on by Europeans." Haidar himself, though no match for Smith, was as a general far superior to commanders like Wood and Lang. Moreover, he had so much advantage over the British in cavalry that he could make ravages, cut off the convoys, paralyse the British intelligence service, secure his own retreat after defeat, and

1 Select Committee Proceedings, 21st April, 1769, pp. 222-228.

prevent Smith from taking advantage of his victories. Next to beating the enemy the pursuit is the most important thing in war and in pursuit, the British army was literally paralysed, Haidar told Srinivas Rao, the *vakil* of Sir Eyre Coote, in 1782. "You will march four coss in a day, more you cannot for your lives and so keep trotting after me all round the country. My business in the meantime I shall take care to despatch." This lack of mobility was a factor which contributed to British failure in 1769. Smith was so weak in cavalry that he had to reduce the theatre of operations as much as possible to the mountainous country.¹ Haidar's army, so superior in cavalry, had much greater mobility and was more daring than the British. Haidar made full use of this superiority especially in the later stage of the war ; marching, fatigue and exertion were his special weapons.²

But what hampered and weakened the British army most seriously in the conduct of the war was the constant interference of the Council of Madras. The point where civilian

1 De La Tour writes, "The excellence of the English cavalry is acknowledged in Europe and its advantages consist less in the goodness of the horse than in the choice of the horsemen. The officers who were first entrusted with the formation of a body of cavalry in India thought to establish and preserve the same discipline among them without attending ; to the great difference of time, place and persons. The recruits sent from England to India were in general libertines and people of bad character, and as the company will not dismiss a soldier, all the punishment inflicted on a horsemen is to reduce him to serve in the infantry so that a man is no sooner put among the cavalry than he is sent back again to his former station."

2 Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. 1, p. 280. The measures undertaken by the Government at the repeated request of Colonel Smith were the following ;—The Nawab was requested to place 20,000 of his cavalry under the British officers of the Madras Government. This was done in December, 1767 ; but the whole of this body returned to Arcot early in 1768, being in distress for want of pay. A body of horsemen under Ibrahim Beg, a soldier of fortune who had joined the British in 1766, after the acquisition of the Northern Circars, was placed under Colonel Wood. They left the camp and joined the Nizam. Then the Government decided to raise the number of British horsemen to 100 and to increase the foreign hussars from 60 to 100 and 500 good horses were obtained from the Nawab and mounted by selected sepoys. This was all the exertion made.

control of military operations becomes presumptuous may be easily defined. Arnold, in his *Lecture on Modern History*, says, "There must be a point up to which an unprofessional judgment on a professional subject may not only be competent but of high authority, although beyond that point, it cannot venture without presumption and folly. The distinction seems to be originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing and that of perceiving whether it is well done or not. What we understand least in the profession of another is the detail of the practice." The appointment of field deputies was an example of interference in detail. As the writer of the *Orme Ms.*, Vol. No. 17, puts it, "The Madras Government is a set of licensed plunderers, who scarce equal to the honest arts of commerce, grasped in idea, imaginary sceptres and disposed of kingdoms not their own." Smith complained that Chevalier de St. Lubin, the French adventurer, gained the confidence of the Council and suggested the plan for the conquest of the Mysore country and Colonel Smith had to conform to the direction of field deputies who were dictated by the Chevalier. Colonel Smith protested against these measures, sensible of his shameful and ridiculous part. This was responsible for his recall and the appointment of Wood, whom they regarded as an officer of vigour and resolution and whose achievements in the south they contrasted with Smith's failures. They were so obstinate in this belief that after the Mulbagal action in which Wood was really worsted by Haidar, they resolved, "we cannot sufficiently admire the bravery and resolution of our troops under the disadvantage of ground which they laboured under and persevered at the same time with Haidar's whole force".¹ What crowned all these disabilities was the dishonesty of this remarkably inefficient yet meddlesome Council. They supplied the army through contractors with whom they were in league to plunder. Oxen were taken by force from people on hire at 1 pagoda per month and after the expiry of a month or so, they would be informing the owner that the beast was dead and then it would be passed to the account of the Company as purchased at full value.² As a consequence of all this, Smith

1 Orme Ms., 41—Sketch of Col. Wood's conduct— extracted from Madras Records.

2 De La Tour, p. 267

found it very difficult to secure oxen for the conveyance of artillery, ammunition and baggage.

The Madras Government attributed their defeat to the want of a carefully laid up reserve of funds, 'the rock upon which the French were wrecked in the last war.' It was asserted that they could not assemble a sufficient body of cavalry because they apprehended that their means would be exhausted before those troops could be brought to act. "Had the Nabob of Arcot before it was too late exerted his utmost powers, it might have been effected and this amongst others, is a striking proof of the dangers of a divided power." It was verily a coalition of cripples, called upon to war with a man who, in the words of Smith, "possessed immense treasure, force and every article he wishes for, sole master of his actions without control."¹

The Court of Directors' comment on the war is significant. They wrote, "The several powers of India, whose dread of our name and arm had contributed, in a great measure, to our prosperity and security, have seen terms of peace dictated to our Governor of Fort St. George, by a country power, at the gates of Madras. The Company's interest and influence in India have suffered such diminution and discredit that the most consummate abilities, persevering assiduity, unshaken fidelity and intrepid courage in our future servants, may perhaps be proved insufficient in many years to restore the English East India Company to a proper degree of credit and dignity in the eyes of the nations and inhabitants of Indostan. It is our opinion that you have so untruly made us principals in the quarrel with Haidar, the said war has been very improperly conducted and most disadvantageously concluded."

1 Smith to Orme *Orme Ms.*, Vol 33.

CHAPTER XI

Relations with the Marathas, 1769-1770

In the proceedings of the Select Committee of the 10th March, 1771, we read : "From the present conduct of the Marathas both in the North and in the South and from the genius, spirit and ambition of Madhav Rao, we are inclined to suspect that their designs are not confined to the mere collection of chauth but extend to the subjection of the whole peninsula." This suspicion had a basis of truth.

Krishna Rao Ballal informed Nana Farnavis that the third expedition of the Peshwa against Haidar was undertaken to humble Haidar completely with the assistance of some of the Poligars in the South as also the chief of Chitaldrug and Murar Rao of Gooty.¹ The Peshwa himself wrote that he intended bringing together all the Poligars, including the chiefs of Cuddapah and Kurnul, to defeat Haidar and to reconquer territory worth 2/3 crores of rupees, which Haidar had seized by force and cunning.²

Haidar gave Madhav Rao grave offence. He attempted to stir up the Peshwa's domestic enemies against him. He maintained secret communications with Raghunath Rao and even after Janoji Bhonsle's complete reconciliation with the Peshwa in 1769, he tried to stir him up against the Peshwa.³ But these were small matters compared with the systematic encroachment of Haidar on the Maratha sphere of influence. Two years' tribute had also remained unpaid. Haidar felt strengthened by the defensive alliance he had concluded with the British. Mir Reza, his brother-in-law, who had three years before deserted to the Marathas, now returned to his former allegiance.

Mir Reza and Haidar together attacked Mahimaji Sindhia, the Maratha *Foujdar* of Chik Ballapur, who had a garrison of

1 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 194.

2 *Ibid.*, letter no. 198.

3 S.P.D., Vol. 29, letter no. 236 ; Vol. 38, letter, no. 151, 198.

about 850 men. The strength of the Mysore army was about 10,000. Mahimaji retreated first to Cuddapah, thence to Gooty, but could not get help anywhere. He returned to Anantapur. In the meantime Talpul held by Rakhmaji Bhonsle was seized treacherously by Haidar. He called Rakhmaji for negotiations but seized him and put many of his men to death. Haidar next advanced to Anantapur. Mahimaji withdrew to Haidar. Gopal Rao Patwardhan protested against this aggression of Haidar and tried to dissuade him from doing mischief in the *taluk* of Chik Ballapur. Haidar replied : "It was agreed between us that within four months Sira, Hoskote and Ballapur *taluk* would be returned to me, but even after the lapse of two years with a man of your worth as the go-between this has not been done. Please request the Peshwa to right this wrong. Mahimaji Sindhia, *qiladar* of Ballapur, was taking into his service some of our dissatisfied men and was fomenting trouble in our own territory. Hence I drove him out."¹

Haidar then went to the territory of Murar Rao of Gooty. Murar Rao thought it proper under the circumstances to placate Haidar by seeing him. Haidar gave him presents and induced him to make an agreement promising to pay 50,000 rupees every year.² He took tribute by force from Chitaldrug, Harpanhalli and other places and proceeded upto Harihar. Lakshman Hari, the Maratha *Mamlatdar* of Haidar, thought it prudent to see Haidar and placate him. Haidar then advanced to Savanur and the Marathas heard that the ruler of Savanur had paid 40,000 *hons* secretly to him and thus brought him off.³

Madhav Rao proceeded systematically. There was nothing inadequate or haphazard about his arrangements. With an army numbering approximately 75,000 the Peshwa was in a position to spare a considerable number of troops to occupy the conquered territory. Of the conquered forts those which were easily defensible were garrisoned by the Marathas. Unimportant forts were systematically dismantled so that

1 S.P.D., Vol, 37, letter no. 172.

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 827.

3 *Ibid*, letters no. 833, 834.

Haidar might not seize and utilize them as points of vantage. Peixoto notes with some surprise that the Peshwa did not pillage or cause any damage. Therefore many forts surrendered voluntarily.¹

On the approach of the Peshwa, Haidar withdrew to Anawatty and the forest of Udagani with his infantry and guns. He kept about 25,000 troops with Mir Reza Tipu Sultan, Venkat Rao Barakki and Makhdum Ali ; 20,000 were scattered in different forts and nearly 35,000 were always with him.² The Peshwa kept a small force of about 10,000 to watch Haidar's movements. He himself encamped 20 *kos* in advance of Haidar towards Seringapatam. If Haidar came out the Peshwa intended to advance towards Seringapatam and conquer his forts on the way.³ Gopal Rao remained encamped near Savanur and the Peshwa near Seringapatam. Haidar had become wiser after his two encounters with Madhav Rao. He did not intend to fight a pitched battle. He commissioned Tipu to collect all the straw and wood that he could, burn all that could not be removed, to fill up the wells and ponds and to give notice to the people to retire from the villages into the larger fortified places. Having executed as far as possible the orders of his father, Tipu fell back to Seringapatam.⁴

In January 1770, the Peshwa captured Budhehal, Kandikire and Chiknaikanhalli. The Peshwa's itinerary reports that in February he reached Nagmangal *via* Turuvekire. The ruler of Chitaldrug and Murar Rao of Gooty accompanied the Peshwa. The Peshwa pulled down some forts to the ground and garrisoned some others. Even then in some of the conquered forts he had to keep the men of Chitaldrug and in some the old guard of Haidar with a small number of Maratha troops. Nagmangal was razed to the ground but Bellur was garrisoned.⁵ Haidar had fortified Bangalore and Seringapatam where he hoped to be able to hold out for four to six months until the

1 Peixoto, VI, 45

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, IV, intro.

3 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 184.

4 Peixoto, V, 163

5 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 973.

advent of the rainy season. Without wasting his time in besieging Bangalore and Seringapatam, the Peshwa marched towards Chik Ballapur and Kolar. After taking Devanhalli he demolished it as also Magadi. Then he proceeded to Chik Ballapur which surrendered after four days' siege. Nandidrug had also to be besieged and when its *Foujdar* agreed to surrender the place 400 Maratha troops were placed there. Kolar was taken and razed to the ground. At Mulbagal thirty men, who were taken prisoner, were killed because they had looted the fair of Venkatagiri. About the 10th of April the Peshwa retraced his steps to Devarayadurga without attempting to capture Bangalore or Seringapatam. In the course of his return journey he stormed the hill fort of Nijgal, directing the attack himself. The fort held out for 8 days and the Peshwa's brother Narayan Rao received a bullet wound in the wrist.¹ Peixoto, who was in Haidar's camp, records : "We had frequent news of the Maratha and there were some days in which they took two or three forts which might have held out for some months."²

Haidar was at Udagani.³ Thence he went to Tarikire. Gopal Rao came from Savanur to Harihar. Haidar succeeded in sending detachments that surprised the Maratha garrison at Chiknaikanhalli. There were 1,100 men of whom only about 150 were Maratha troops, 400 belonging to the Poligar of Chitaldrug, and as the rest were Haidar's old garrison, he had no difficulty in smuggling 300 of his own men. The Marathas were caught and their noses and ears were cut off. The Maratha garrison from Kandikire and neighbouring places took fright and fled away. The Peshwa on hearing this sent 3,000 cavalry with Narasing Rao Dhaigude, Shahji Bhonsle of Akalkote and Mahimaji Sindhia towards Chiknaikanhalli. He also directed Gopal Rao to go from Harihar to Mattod, so that their men might not take fright and fly away, and he might be in a position to watch Haidar. Mir Reza had been commissioned by Haidar to divert the energies of the Marathas and to prevent them from getting

1 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 206.

2 Peixoto, V.

3 In the Shimoga district, in the western part of his dominions. Udagani is to the north of Shimoga, Tarikire is to the south of it.

their forage. He was a constant source of trouble to the Maratha garrisons and the Peshwa's attempts to catch him failed.¹

Haidar, however, had his own difficulties. If he tried to recapture any place, he might be crushed between Gopal Rao and the Peshwa, who would come up by quick marches. If he sent small batches against Gopal Rao, the latter would run away and would at a favourable opportunity turn back to attack him. Haidar therefore decided to make a night attack.² But Gopal Rao was very alert. He himself, Nilkantha Rao and Parasuram Bhau watched at night by turns. But Haidar was a man of many wiles. His news service circulated the rumour that he would march towards Seringapatam and some of his belongings were sent daily to that place. One day he fell back from Tarikire. Gopal Rao felt assured by this news and slackened his night watch. Haidar now advanced with about 13,000 *gardi* troops 4,000 cavalry and 25 guns. Peixoto says that Haidar's troops numbered 2,000 horse and 6,000 foot. By rapid marches he approached the Maratha camp. Now occurred an incident that was very interesting. A Muhammadan *gardi* of Haidar came running to the Maratha camp to inform them that Haidar was coming to make a night attack. But the Maratha troopers would not believe him and they began to crack jokes with him. They spent several hours discussing this till at last somebody awakened Gopal Rao and informed him. Gopal Rao found himself in a fix. If the news proved to be false he would become a laughing stock. But if he remained unprepared, he would be overwhelmed. The Moslem *gardi* assured Gopal Rao that he had been once in the service of Peshwa Balaji Rao and the happy memories of that service had impelled him to come to give this information in all sincerity. He said, "If this news happens to be false, kill me, but be on your guard." Before Gopal Rao could be fully ready Haidar's guns began to boom and his rockets came in showers. Here we give Peixoto's description of the night

1 *Lekh Samgraha*, IV, intro.

2 The account of the night attack is based on *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no 899.

After the night attack Haidar marched back to Kadur from which place he had advanced.

attack : "With about 2.000 horse, 600 foot, 8 field pieces, 700 rocket boys, with flambeaus ready to be lighted, 16 pieces of hand artillery, the attack was launched. As soon as those who were to begin the attack were perceived by the enemy, they beat to arms but did nothing but endeavour to retreat, leaving their camp and tent and many of their worst horses behind them and waited for daylight to see whether they could recover anything. When we had gained the entrance to the camp the field pieces began to play as fast as possible and the rocket boys to throw their rockets, but the effect could not be seen for the great darkness and it was found that we had fired into the camp only. The two advanced battalions were in great confusion and would, if they had been opposed by any enemy, have been certainly surrounded and lost. Day came on and showed us the enemy's horse within pistol shot of our advanced battalions. Austin de Menezes made the enemy retreat. The Nabob gave orders for the whole of the artillery to fire with a high elevation. The enemy then retired out of the reach of our shot but facing us. The enemy's camp was plundered. The Nabob finding that the enemy was watching for an opportunity to avenge themselves if any one should offer itself, resolved to let his troops rest until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ordering the whole to form a circle in the midst of which a small tent was pitched for himself and then we ate what we had without delay. The time came to retire. The Marathas followed us all the way but made no impression upon us. We took two colours from the Marathas, also took some horses alive, with many tents and utensils. About 200 horses were killed, but few people. On our side the loss was only three men." The Maratha version of their total loss was 55 horses and 25 men. The wounded on the Maratha side did not number more than 150.¹

The campaigning season was practically over. The Peshwa now withdrew. But he left Trimbak Rao Pethe in command with Gopal Rao Patwardhan and Murar Rao to help him. Trimbak Rao was not an unworthy successor.

1 Peixoto, V, paragraphs 185-195.

As we review the campaign of 1769-70 we find that the plan of Madhav Rao was to deceive Haidar by a show of taking forts and make a quick march at an appropriate moment and crush him in collaboration with Gopal Rao. Haidar would in such a case have been taken in between the two armies. He was conscious of this. When the Peshwa fell upon Nijgal and Devarayadurga with Haidar stationed at Banawar, the Peshwa was in a position to realise his plan. Perceiving this trend of the Peshwa's operations, Haidar quietly retired to Seringapatam.

Though Madhav Rao failed to crush Haidar in an open fight, he succeeded in occupying so many of the important forts of Haidar in the northern part of his dominion that Trimbak Rao Pethe, who was left by the Peshwa in command during the rains, was in a position to commence his next campaign with advantage.

Throughout this campaign Haidar was on the defensive but he hoped to terrorize the garrisons placed in the newly captured Maratha forts by means of Mir Reza's operations. He expected to carry on operations on the interior lines himself and crush at least Gopal Rao but failed in his objective.

CHAPTER XII

Relations with the Marathas, 1770-71 ; the battle of Chinkurali

The campaigning season of 1770-1771 opened definitely in favour of the Marathas. Unfortunately for the Marathas the Peshwa could not come on account of his ill health. He had begun his march from Poona, but suddenly became so ill that he had to cancel his programme. However, he sent 10,000 troops and ten cannon under Appaji Balwant and Malhar Rao Panse to join Trimbak Rao.¹

Trimbak Rao who commanded the Maratha army in the Carnatic during the Peshwa's absence, besieged Gurumconda towards the end of September, 1770. Saidu Mian, Mir Reza's nephew, whom Mir Reza had left in charge of Gurumconda, resisted stubbornly. Gopal Rao Patwardhan, with his army, was at a distance of about 12 *kos* towards Seringapatam. This advance outpost prevented any succour arriving from the Mysore capital. Mir Reza himself continued to sulk in the camp of Haidar.² Though the siege lasted two months and a half, no succour could be sent by Haidar and all attempts to divert Maratha attention failed disastrously. Gopal Rao defeated three Mysore generals, Chandroji Jadav, Balaji Pant and Syed Muhammad, who were surprised by him at Punganuru. Only Syed Muhammad could run away. The other two were captured. After taking Gurumconda, Trimbak Rao encamped between Kolar and Mulbagal.

Gopal Rao Patwardhan died early in 1771. Sometime before his death, he had gone to Adoni, then to Kanakgiri and thence, as his health broke down completely, he withdrew to Miraj. Vaman Rao, his eldest surviving brother, was asked by Trimbak Rao to come quickly with troops.³ He found the main army at Devarayadurga. This advance from the Kolar-

1 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 224.

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letters no. 1016, 1028, 1029.

3 *Lekh Samgraha*, letters no. 1086-1089.

Mulbagal region towards Tumkur was in pursuance of the order of the Peshwa. He wanted that the Maratha army strengthened with the troops and cannon sent by him, should march towards Bidnur.¹ This explains why Vaman Rao found Trimbak Rao at Devarayadurga. Relieved by the absence of Madhav Rao and more confident of his strength, Haidar might have decided to give Trimbak Rao a fight in the open, or to prevent an invasion of Bidnur. Whatever his motive might have been, he came out of the protection of his forts. He possibly calculated that with a Mysore army in the rear, the Bidnur invasion plan must be abandoned by the Marathas.

Trimbak Rao in the meantime had advanced from Tumkur to Hebbur. Haidar had 8,000 good horse, 15,000 gardi troops, 10,000 Canarese infantry and 45 guns.² Trimbak's army numbered 40,000 horse, 10,000 foot and he had also 30 pieces of heavy guns, not less than 32-pounders.³ Haidar came to Magadi. He intended to deceive Trimbak by tying 2,000 torches to the horns of bullocks and sending them in the direction of the Maratha camp. He hoped thus to mislead Trimbak as to the point of attack and then to fall on the flanks of the Maratha army. When he found that Trimbak had seen through the stratagem, he retreated to the Magadi forest. The Maratha army came from Hebbur to Turuvekire. Haidar left Magadi forest and near Nagmangala took shelter in the mountains of Melukote. He wanted to move from one strong position to another. When Trimbak heard of this, he decided to attack Haidar on the move. Haidar's rear-guard had an encounter with the advance guard of the Marathas, in which about 1,500 Mysore troops were engaged. On the Maratha side about 100 men were killed or wounded and 300 horses of Haidar were taken. The Maratha army was at a distance of 1 *kos* from Haidar. Overnight Haidar moved a little to the west of Melukote to Machi. In Trimbak's report

1 *Ibid.*, letter no. 1069.

2 This is the Maratha estimate. According to Stuart, Haidar had 14,000 infantry and 6,000 horse. But he says that Haidar had 50 field pieces.

3 Stuart puts the total number of Maratha troops at 80,000, obviously an exaggeration.

we read, "Hearing this news, I advanced to have a view of the place which was guarded by Haidar's guns. There was a deep forest for a *kos* or a *kos* and a half on all the four sides. A big *maidan* was surrounded by mountains and high cliffs. To take our guns to the *maidan* was a difficult task in view of the fact that our enemy was Haidar. If he attacked us it would be difficult to retreat with the guns. I came back. There was a path for him to go to Seringapatam on which I kept guard."¹ An attack on Haidar from the west was not easy but was practicable. Haidar himself apprehended an attack from that side. A large number of Maratha troops was kept there but the guns were taken to the mountains on the east of Melukote to fire upon Haidar's camp. The Mysore army formed nearly a crescent facing west. The Maratha troops stationed on the mountains in front of Haidar sent arrows and taking up *jizails* began to rain shots from them. They also took guns of large calibre up there. "The annoyance was without an interval and, however slovenly, was extremely harassing and not ill-adapted to the single object of driving him from the position, without risking an action or exposing a point to attack."² For eight days this state of things continued. As his provisions were failing him, Haidar decided to retreat to Seringapatam. The retreat began on the 5th March in the night. "To delude the Marathas, Haidar ordered fires to be lighted as it was the usual time of cooking supper and marched with the baggage in front of his army in a single line for the convenience of passing the narrow defile."³ How could the Marathas get information about Haidar's movement? Stuart says that two miles from the mouth of the defile, the soldiers of the wing of the first line saw a party of Maratha horse and fired on them. Wilks says that Narayan Rao, the officer commanding the regular infantry, fancied he saw or heard the enemy in front. Most inexcusably and not without some suspicion of treachery he opened a gun which communicated the intelligence of this night march to the Marathas. Trimbak Rao's report, however, gives a different

1 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 226.

2 Wilks, Vol. II, p. 141.

3 Stuart's account.

version. The Maratha guards on the mountains, seeing that everything was peaceful in the camp of Haidar, reported this unusual calm to Trimbak Rao. Therefore he sent some troops in the direction of Banawar and Kadur and at midnight sent Krishna Rao with troops towards Seringapatam.¹ Haidar had in the meantime advanced about three miles. When he heard the gun, he could at once foresee an engagement next morning and made his arrangements accordingly. He collected the baggage in as square a body as possible. "He then formed the cavalry placing at the angles the spearmen and the rocket boys. He thus formed a grand square and ordered his cavalry to cut down without any question any sepoy who would quit his rank."² In the meantime the Maratha guard, placed on the road leading to Seringapatam, had sent news to Trimbak Rao who began to gather all his troops. Krishna Rao, sent ahead in the direction of Seringapatam, had the first brush with Haidar. When the night had four hours left the fight began.³ The Mysore army advanced fighting continuously on the way. Trimbak reached there with all his troops, but as he had not been able to bring his guns, nothing very effective could be done. Haidar continued to move on till he reached Chinkurali.

*Battle of Chinkurali*⁴—The Marathas were, however, on his left and kept pace with him. They divided into small parties and rode within 100 yards of the Mysore army to draw away their fire. So great was the strain on the Mysoreans that they wilted under its pressure. Stuart writes, "They succeeded, for notwithstanding I had given orders to my European sergeants to cut down any man who presumed to fire without order, yet it had no effect, for upon two sergeants putting my orders

1 S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 226.

2 Stuart's account.

3 S.P.D., Vol. 37 letter no. 221.

4 Orme Ms. No. 8, pp. 51 54, gives Mr. Stuart's account of the battle fought on the 6th March, 1771 between Haidar and Trimbak Rao. Stuart writes that he led four battalions of Haidar in this engagement. This version of the encounter has been compared with the Maratha version as embodied in the newsletters contained in S.P.D., Vol. 37, and Khare's *'Aitihāsik Lekh Samgraha'*, Vol. IV. The Marathas have named this Battle of Moti Talab after a large tank near Melukote.

into execution they swore they would murder us hat fellows and would have kept their oath but were prevented by the cavalry which killed 8 or 10 of the most turbulent which quieted their mutiny.”¹ The Marathas repeatedly charged the rear face of the army. The Maratha artillery arrived at one o'clock and with their 30 pieces of no less than 42-pounders, they commenced a heavy cannonade. Haidar's army being very close together, they did great execution. A shot fell among a string of camels carrying rockets and falling on one of the boxes of ammunition blew them up. Haidar was, however, pushing towards a hill which would give him great advantage. The Marathas perceiving this divided into three bodies, made a general charge attacking simultaneously the rear as also the right face and the left face. The left face, in which the raw levies of Haidar were stationed, immediately gave way and fled up the hill which was skirted by a mass of loose angular stores. The Marathas entered the square. The cavalry of Haidar instead of resisting fled, riding over the right face of the square. The rear face was attacked front and rear and could no longer stand. Thus the Marathas gained a complete victory. Haidar was in the front face and when the left face was broken, he had to quit his horse and in the rush he was carried up the hill. “Standing on a millstone, he viewed on all sides with furious anger, the victorious career of these wild men, the Marathas, as they charged and pursued his troops. At that moment, Ghazi Khan Bede (a Mysore Pindari) presented himself and with the greatest difficulty forced him from the field and attended by only 14 good horse escorted him to Seringapatam.”²

The entire equipment of the Mysore army, its store, all its artillery, fell into the hands of the Marathas. They got 40/45 guns, 20/25 elephants and 7/8,000 horse besides baggage and treasure. Among the captives were Mir Ali Reza, Yasin Khan and other big *sardars*, besides 50 Europeans. Lala Mian was slain. Yasin Khan very much resembled Haidar Ali and gave himself out as the Nawab. The Marathas discovered his

1 Stuart's account.

2 *Nishan-i- Haidari*, Miles, p. 197.

identity several hours after the capture and this perhaps facilitated Haidar's escape.

Trimbak Rao was slightly wounded by a bullet on the right ear. Mir Faizulla who was with the Mysore army, but in disgrace and without any military command, succeeded with a few followers in cutting through the Maratha ranks while they were intent on plunder.

Wilks writes that this was no battle and although the day was lost to Haidar it was not won by the Marathas. They did not follow up the victory. The capital was practically without any means of resistance and an immediate vigorous effort would have completed the downfall of Haidar. But the Marathas were so much intent on plunder and division of spoil that they let ten precious days pass before they appeared before Seringapatam. In the meantime Haidar had succeeded in gathering fugitives and preparing means of resistance. In this connection we should keep in mind a statement of De La Tour which explains this unaccountable lapse of the Marathas. "As it is not customary in India to make prisoners of common soldiers or even subaltern officers, the greatest part returned to him, though without horses or arms ; but by means of his resources, Haidar established his army, in a short time, in a better state than before. It will scarcely be credited that he purchased again of the Marathas themselves the greatest part of the arms and horses they had taken from him : but this arises from the nature of their government, which is purely feudal, every man having a right to dispose of his share of the plunder as he thinks."¹ It was a great Maratha victory from the point of view of military tactics and strategy, but the fruits of victory could not be garnered because of the defects of Maratha character and military organisation.

Wilks seeks an explanation of this surprising defeat of Haidar in the fact that "Haidar had drunk in the evening to an imprudent excess ; and not having relieved the effects by his usual period of sleep was in a state of stupid inebriety."² But the retreat which began at 9 p.m. must have been planned

1 De La Tour, p. 250.

2 Stuart on whose account Wilks seems to depend does not in any manner support this view that Haidar was drunk and thus bungled.

before the evening and a man with such an active military record, responsible for so many night attacks in his numerous campaigns, cannot be pictured as so much of a toper that he would drink to excess before commencing his fateful retreat to Seringapatam with the Marathas on the watch ready to cut his army down. Strategically and tactically the Melukote-Chinkurali affair shows the limitations of Haidar's generalship and it is not necessary to seek an explanation in the use of "strong liquor as a sensual indulgence or as a soporific."

In the confusion of the night of the retreat, Tipu though repeatedly summoned could not be found to lead the van and Haidar, beside himself with rage, gave him "a most unmerciful unroyal beating with his cane." Tipu therefore swore that he would not draw his sword that day and he kept the oath. In the confusion of the defeat he succeeded in retreating in the garb of a Maratha Pindari and joined his father at Seringapatam when, overwhelmed with grief at the thought of having lost his son, Haidar Ali was praying for him in a tomb to the north-east of the fort. Syed Muhammad is said to have narrated to Wilks that he and Tipu begged their way through the Maratha ranks as a travelling mendicant and his attendant.

CHAPTER XIII

Relations with the Marathas, 1771-1772

Haidar's complete defeat at Chinkurali on the 6th March, 1771, was not followed by a collapse of his military power. Peace was not concluded until July, 1772, and though Haidar lost valuable territory, he was far from being crushed for ever. His power and prestige suffered diminution, but his defeat only became a spur to a great recovery in the future.

The campaign from March, 1771 to July, 1772 has been dismissed very summarily by Wilks with the comment, "The minor operations of this desolating war, offer no illustrations of character." His very inadequate treatment of this campaign is due possibly to the fact that he had no access to the Marathi records dealing with this campaign. In that case, he could have found a guiding thread through the mazes of detail.

The Peshwa wrote to Trimbak Rao that he was not in favour of a siege of Seringapatam. He was of opinion that 10,000 troops under one chieftain would be sufficient to check-mate Haidar. With the remaining troops Trimbak was to go to Bidnur, which the Peshwa thought he would be able to take in two months. In the opinion of the Peshwa Bidnur was the easiest place to take of the three still in Haidar's possession. Bangalore and Seringapatam were more difficult propositions¹. But Trimbak did not follow the Peshwa's plan. He continued the siege of Seringapatam for a month and three days. He then left a part of the army to watch Haidar and at the beginning of the campaigning season himself went to plunder Baramahal, Dindigul and Coimbatore. He perhaps wanted to secure the co-operation of Muhammad Ali and his allies, the British, for prosecuting successfully the siege of Seringapatam. *Vakils* were also sent to Pondichery. He required a park of artillery manned by Europeans skilled in siege operations. The Madras Government observed about the Marathas: "By their numerous and superior cavalry they can ravage and lay waste the

1 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1124, 21st March, 1771.

countries they invade with little opposition but they find it very difficult to reduce forts of strength for which reason they are very desirous of securing the assistance of Europeans."¹ The French were not perhaps in a position to agree, neither could Trimbak prevail upon the British to join him in his campaigns against Mysore. His operations thus did not lead to any fruitful results. But the plan of the Peshwa was calculated to succeed, and if pursued with vigor, might have compelled Haidar to cede Bidnur when he concluded a treaty in July 1772. We do not wonder that even Parasuram Bhau wrote that Trimbak was prolonging the war for his own sake, because he was enjoying a semi-royal position, listening to daily music and exercising command over 40,000 troops and their camp followers.²

On an auspicious day,³ Trimbak encamped near Seringapatam and began cannonading. Haidar had, in the meantime, raised his army to 10,000.⁴ Trimbak tried to stop Haidar's communications with Mysore. He himself, Vaman Rao Patwardhan and Murar Rao Ghorpade were on different sides of the beleagured city. The siege lingered. Haidar had devastated the country around so completely that he could calculate that famine in the Maratha camp would compel them to withdraw. There was a'so no fodder in the surrounding country. Fodder from housetops had to be brought by the Marathas from a distance of about 25 *kos*. Trimbak would be compelled to move away before the flood of the Kaveri. Haidar, of course, began to negotiate through the Maratha chief Ananda Rao Raste. He agreed to pay 45 lakhs in course of three years if he got back his lost territory. The terms were clearly unacceptable to the Marathas. Haidar felt the strength of his position at Seringapatam and he was not in a mood to yield.

1 Military Department—Despatches to England, 28th February, 1772, para 14.

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1166.

3 "Chaitra Suddha Pratipad." This tendency to make astrology dictate military operations was a great weakness of the Maratha military system.

4 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1122.

Trimbak Rao withdrew after a month and three days and came to Moti Talab, 10 miles north-west of Seringapatam.¹ His plan was to enter into cantonments during the rains and at the beginning of the next campaigning season to march southward and conquer Haidar's territory in the south, then march back on Bidnur and take it.² In the meantime Channapatna Maddur, Sidlaghatta and other places that still remained to be taken had already been occupied by the Marathas. Haidar sent a detachment under Muhammad Ali Kumedan to protect his territory. Trimbak Rao attacked him on the way. Many of his men were killed and wounded and he was almost encircled. He killed the wounded in his own army so that their wailings, as they felt that they were being deserted, might not communicate the news of his flight to the Marathas. After this horrible deed, he succeeded in escaping.

During the rainy season Trimbak Rao remained at Bellur. Towards the end of September, he began to take those forts of Haidar which he had previously been unable to garrison. Negotiations were going on through Appaji Ram, Haidar's envoy. Trimbak Rao demanded the payment of 60 lakhs and also wanted Haidar to join him if he attacked Arcot. "If we go below the ghats, he should join us," so said the Maratha leader. Trimbak Rao consented to give back the places around Seringapatam but for the restoration of Chik Ballapur, Nandigad and other *taluks*, he advised Haidar to approach the Peshwa.³ But Haidar knew that the Peshwa was dying and he could count upon the chaos that would overtake Maharashtra on the demise of the Peshwa. The negotiations were naturally abortive.

At this stage Trimbak Rao received an appeal from the ruler of Tanjore who was besieged by Muhammad Ali of Arcot. Trimbak was very eager to go below the ghats and also to plunder Haidar's territory on the way. He left Vaman Rao and other Maratha chiefs with part of the army to watch

1 Fort St. George, 20th May, 1771 : 'The Marathas suddenly decamped. We impute this to the want of forage and provisions.'

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1128.

3 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1151.

Haidar and to protect the territory so recently conquered from him. With 35,000 troops Trimbak marched towards Tanjore from which place Muhammad Ali had already withdrawn.¹ From the Tanjore King Trimbak Rao got four lakhs and he also got some money from the Nawab of Arcot.² Trimbak Rao heard that Tipu was coming in that direction with a Mysore detachment. Apprehending some secret understanding between Tipu and the chief of Arcot and the English he wrote to Vaman Rao asking him to come to the region of the ghats. But Vaman Rao heard that a large detachment of Mysore troops was besieging Narayanagarh. He had to rush there, defeat them and raze the fort to the ground. He then came near the ghats and remained stationed at Uttaradurga. Tipu had to return as quickly as he could to Seringapatam. Trimbak entered Baramahal and realised tribute from different places. He also looted Coimbatore. From September, 1771 to February, 1772, he plundered Haidar's possessions there. Then Trimbak Rao returned and encamped near Bangalore. Thence he marched to Dod Ballapur where Vaman Rao too joined him. With only Bangalore, Seringapatam and Bidnur left to him, with the Maratha army of occupation harassing his communication, Haidar's prospects were indeed very gloomy. Trimbak now thought of attacking Bidnur and planned a wholesale devastation of the country. But the Peshwa wrote to him that as there was no prospect of his recovery, the campaign must be concluded as soon as possible. At last after two months' negotiations a treaty was concluded.

The Marathas were to retain Sira, Hoskote, Dod Ballapur and Kolar with their dependencies, with the exception of Bangalore in exchange for which they would get Maddagiri. Gurumconda was also left in their hands. The Marathas agreed

1 A battery was opened against Tanjore by Muhammad Ali and the English on the 22nd October. Approaches were carried till the 27th when a practicable breach was completed and peace was made between the Nawab and the Raja.

2 Select Committee Proceedings, 15th April, 1772. "We have now the pleasure to acquaint you that the Nabob's Vakil has accommodated with the Maratha general and they are returned into the Balaghat by which we have been eased from the apprehensions we have been under,"—Fort St. George, 7th March, 1772.

to give up the rest. Haidar promised to pay Rupees 50 lakhs and ten lakhs in addition as *Darbar* charges, to be paid to Trimbak Rao and other *Sardars*. He paid 24 lakhs in cash, 5 lakhs in kind and gave bankers' securities for the remainder. The campaign ended in July, 1772.¹

This campaign, so inglorious in Haidar's career, was largely responsible for the strong anti-British turn of later Mysore foreign policy. Haidar's caustic reply to a query of Srinivas Rao, the British *vakil*, in July, 1782, explains what opinion he formed of the value of the alliance with the British after his experience of these months. He said, "When the Marathas had entered my country, I wrote them in a variety of ways, desiring them to send succour. In reply they at first told me that they would send them, and after some time they said they had written to Europe and expected orders from thence. To this I urged that it would be a year and six months before their orders could be obtained from Europe and of what use would their succour be then. The Governor's answer was that without orders from Europe they could do nothing and yet at length after a long time had elapsed, they pretended that till then they had received no directions."² Trimbak Rao contributed materially to bringing about this estrangement. Haidar could not easily forget these months of stress and strife. The deep artifice of Trimbak Rao led to no immediately fruitful results. The British did not join him against Haidar, nor Haidar against the British. But in Haidar's eyes the value of British friendship stood clearly revealed.

¹ *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1171, dated 18th May. Wilks says that Haidar promised to pay Rs. 30 lakhs, one half at once, the remainder thereafter—5 lakhs as *darbar* charges. S.P.D., Vol. 37, letter no. 233 states that Haidar paid 25 lakhs in cash, 6 lakhs in kind and remaining 19 lakhs in 3 equal annual instalments.

² Select Committee Proceedings, 26th August, 1782.

CHAPTER XIV

Relations with the Marathas, 1772-1776 : Conquest of Coorg.

The unscrupulous ambition of Raghunath Rao was the most disturbing factor in post-Panipat Maratha politics. Both the domestic history and the foreign relations of the Maratha state were affected by the activity of this man, who, in spite of his occasional noble impulses, was capable of a very steady and unwavering pursuit of his own selfish ends, irrespective of what it might cost to the state. A close study of his relations with Haidar Ali shows that from the beginning he looked upon the ambitious Mysorean as a possible support in his bid for power and as an asylum in case of failure. As early as 1765, we find him pursuing a policy of friendship with Haidar in the most sedulous manner possible. To Raghunath Rao's intervention Haidar owed a peace very favourable in the existing circumstances. From the letters of the Peshwa, it appears that he was not willing to grant such favourable terms but yielded to the persuasions of Raghunath Rao.¹ He was later detected advising the Nizam to join with Haidar and make an attack on Poona. At that time he was in captivity for his ceaseless and active opposition to the Peshwa. To create an alarm in the mind of the Nizam he informed him that the Peshwa and the Bhonsle would soon march against him, so that he should forestall them by advancing in co-operation with Haidar.² The excellent intelligence service of Madhav Rao unearthed this secret correspondence. But before his death in November 1772, Madhav Rao set Raghunath Rao free. The dying Peshwa represented to his successor Narayan Rao and his uncle Raghunath Rao the necessity of concord for mutual safety. But the two fell out and six months after this Raghunath Rao was again incarcerated. In captivity, Raghunath Rao opened a correspondence with Haidar Ali. In order that he might not awaken suspicion, Raghunath wrote

1 Sec p. 52.

2 S.P.D., Vol. 38, letter no. 193.

to Appaji Ram, Haidar's *vakil*, and Appaji Ram wrote to Haidar. The messenger was seized and even Appaji Ram was watched.¹

As Raghoba himself became the Peshwa after the murder of Narayan Rao, he had to abandon the policy of courting Haidar. The interests of the state were for some time identified with his own. In his captivity, he is said to have entered into an "agreement with Haidar's *vakil* to restore to his master the whole country conquered by Madhav Rao, only reserving a chauth of 15 lakhs a year provided he would effect his release and settle him in the Peshwaship." Mostyn says that in September, 1773 the *vakil* was "demanding the performance of the treaty but as Haidar in no shape contributed to bring about this new revolution it is uncertain how this affair will terminate."² Shortly after the murder of Narayan Rao, Raghoba wrote to Haidar as also to Murar Rao Ghorpade to help the Raja of Tanjore, who was besieged by Muhammad Ali and the English. To induce Haidar Ali, Appaji Ram was to acquaint his master that he would give back to Haidar the forts of Maddagiri, Dod Ballapur and Hoskote. But before this offer could be communicated to Haidar Tanjore had fallen.

Raghunath Rao knew that he was not popular and that there was secret opposition to his regime. He wanted to heal domestic discord with the balm of national triumph and the two enemies against whom victories would redound most to his credit were the Nizam and Haidar Ali. He defeated the Nizam but granted him terms so favourable that they betray either a want of political sagacity or a definite desire to attach the Nizam to himself by his generosity. He then planned an expedition into the Carnatic and his grand scheme was the expulsion of Haidar from the Maratha districts as also the punishment of Muhammad Ali and the English. In January, 1774, when Raghunath Rao was engaged in this expedition, he came to know of the *Barabhai* conspiracy and of the attempt to oust him from power, almost all

1 *Mostyn's Diary*, 12th April, 1773. S.P.D. Vol. 27, letter no 236. Mostyn goes so far as to say that a guard was put on Appaji Ram.

2 *Mostyn's Diary*, an entry dated 25th September, 1773.

the important ministers having been banded against him. His attitude towards Haidar was bound to change in these circumstances. He was now eager to have Haidar as an ally. Mostyn made an entry on the 4th February, 1774, that Haidar had settled matters with Raghoba but whether he would assist him was not certain. Appaji Ram, Haidar's *vakil*, was astute enough to notice that detachments of the army had begun to withdraw. He could not therefore be in a very yielding mood. By the treaty of Kaliandrug, Haidar recognised Raghunath Rao as the Peshwa and agreed to pay him and him only an annual tribute of 6 lakhs. The territory conquered by Madhav Rao in his three expeditions was ceded to Haidar. Baji Rao Barwe was left as Raghunath Rao's agent at the court of Haidar. Taking advantage of the complications in Maharashtra, Haidar took between February, 1774, and March, 1776, Sira, Maddagiri, Dod Ballapur, Hoskote, Gurumconda, Bellary, Cuddapah and Gooty and made Kurnul tributary.

Raghunath Rao had a glimpse of success. He succeeded in defeating and imprisoning Trimbak Rao. But this gave, as Grant Duff puts it, only a momentary life to a drooping cause to which the birth of Madhav Rao Narayan on the 1st April, 1774, dealt a mortal blow. Raghunath Rao withdrew to the north and, as Sindhia and Holkar deserted him, he retired towards Gujarat. The subsequent events of Anglo-Maratha history are well known. The treaty of Surat was concluded on the 6th March, 1775. After this Raghoba wrote a letter to Haidar proposing that he should take possession "of the whole of the Maratha territory up to the right bank of the Krishna and be ready from that advanced position to assist him in the execution of his designs with military as well as pecuniary aid. In pursuance of this, Haidar despatched 16 lakhs of rupees."¹ Grant Duff, however, says that Haidar's help was confined to 80,000 rupees. Baji Rao Barwe, Raghunath Rao's agent at Seringapatam, tried his utmost to quicken the zeal of Haidar but the latter was in no haste and would only proceed according to his

1 Wilks, Vol. II, p. 173.

plan without being hustled by his ally. Regular correspondence was, however, maintained. From this we learn that Haidar demanded a *sanad* for the ceded territory as also a receipt for the amount¹ which he had paid

When the British temporarily deserted the cause of Raghoba and concluded the treaty of Purandhar with the Government of Poona in March, 1776 Raghoba decided not to agree to the terms of this treaty. He contemplated seeking an asylum in Haidar's court. After the treaty of Purandhar he remained at Surat with 200 men. He then came to Daman and asked the Portuguese to give him an asylum or conduct him to Haidar Ali's territory by the water route. Raghunath Rao even contemplated going from Malwan to Kolhapur and thence to Haidar's territory by sea.²

Even when the British ultimately decided to take up the cause of Raghoba in right earnest, Raghunath Rao was not without misgivings about the expediency of this alliance with the British. The Governor of Goa wrote in December, 1778, "In the conferences which I have continually had with the said envoy of Raghoba, he sufficiently affirms the mistrust that his master has that the English may dominate him in the same way as the Nabobs of Bengal and of Surat and not only with the object of avoiding this subjection but also of maintaining himself respected in the possessions that he intends to have, he desires earnestly the help of our troops, an alliance with this state and protection from our august sovereign."³ So Raghunath Rao was insistent on Haidar's co-operation even at the time when the British were doing their best for him. "March up to Miraj and attack them from behind," so wrote the importunate Raghoba¹ to Haidar. But as his prospects became more and more unpromising, Haidar became less and less liberal. Raghoba's people at Seringapatam complained that Haidar would not meet their expenses and the bankers would not give them loans.

1. S.P.D., Vol. 36, letters 283, 305.

2. *Lekh Samgraha* letters 1918 and 2196.


3. *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XI.—"Some unknown dealings between Raghoba and Portuguese." (Pisurlencar).

4. S.P.D., Vol. 36, letter no. 305.

But Raghunath Rao served Haidar a very useful purpose. As the civil war became merged in the Anglo-Maratha War, Haidar's bargaining power with the Government at Poona increased. As every year rendered a war between Haidar and the British more and more inevitable, he was in a position to make a virtue of necessity and ask the Poona Government to confirm him in the possession of the territories, ceded to him by Raghunath Rao, as a price to induce him to embark on war. In this bargaining he succeeded. The death of Madhav Rao, the murder of Narayan Rao and the quarrel between the *Barabhai* and Raghoba, gave Haidar a welcome respite from Maratha invasions and an opportunity not only to regain what he had lost to the Marathas but also to conquer Coorg and reconquer Malabar.

Haidar's relations with Coorg began in 1763, after his conquest of Bidnur. It has been asserted that Coorg was to some extent dependent on the Ikkeri family of Bidnur and Haidar having absorbed that Kingdom could claim some sort of suzerainty over Coorg. But all that Haidar did after the conquest of Bidnur was to make an enquiry about the right of Coorg over the Suliya region in the Mangalore *taluk*. He was told that in the days of the Bidnur chief Somasekhara Nayak, the Coorg chief Dodda Virappa had got this tract partly by purchase and partly as a present. The district of Yelusavira was also a disputed region. Dodda Virappa¹ had fought for

1. The following genealogy of the Rajas of Coorg is extracted from Rice, *Mysore and Coorg Gazetteer*, Vol. II



this district with the Mysore chief Chikka Deva Wadiyar, a compromise being effected by which Coorg retained the district and Mysore receiving a portion of the revenue. Haidar made a demand that these tracts, for which the Coorg chief paid the revenue to Mysore, should be surrendered to him. Chikka Virappa yielded to the demand and gave these tracts to Mysore. But Haidar was not to be so easily satisfied. Coorg provided him with the best communication with Malabar. Before embarking on his Malabar expedition, he sent Faizulla Khan to Coorg in 1765. But after repeated engagements Faizulla had to confess defeat and fell back. Haidar thereupon expressed a desire to conclude peace with the Coorg chief and even offered him the Uchingi district, provided he agreed to pay 3 lakhs of pagodas. The Coorg chief agreed to these terms, paid 1/4th of the promised sum and even sent his *Dulwai* as a hostage to Faizulla Khan. But the district had not been handed over when Chikka Virappa died, being succeeded by Muddu Raja and Muddaya, who held joint sway. They requested Faizulla Khan to give them the territory promised. Faizulla demanded payment of the balance of the three lakhs promised by his predecessor. The rulers replied that from the trend of events it appeared that he wanted to take the money but keep the territory to himself. Fighting began again. Half of the troops of Faizulla Khan were cut down. As he attempted to withdraw to Mangalore, most of his belongings fell into the hands of the Coorg chiefs. Hearing of these defeats Haidar proposed peace and for the sum of 75,000 pagodas already paid, surrendered two other districts but not Uchingi. He fixed the boundary between Mysore and Coorg at Sarve. This was in 1768. Haidar badly needed peace in this region in view of dangers elsewhere. This explains the mood of accommodation so unusual with him.

Mudda Raja and Muddaya died in quick succession in 1770. Coorg was now rent by a succession dispute. Linga Raja wanted to make his nephew king, whereas Mallaya wanted to place his own son on the throne. Mallaya prevailed and himself ruled in his name. They pressed Linga Raja so hard that he with his nephews sought shelter in Mysore. He wrote to Haidar and saw him in his *Darbar*. Haidar was naturally very pleased to find division in the Coorg ruling family. But

at that time he was in the midst of a life and death struggle with the Marathas¹. After the withdrawal of the Marathas in 1772, the death of Madhav Rao and the murder of Narayan Rao, he got leisure to indulge in these schemes of ambition, his cherished object being the conquest of Malabar. Coorg must now be occupied if the occupation of Malabar was to be permanent.

The Coorg tradition is that Linga Raja encouraged Haidar. The Marathas had left desolation and famine behind them. Linga Raja suggested that plenty of grain would be found in Coorg. In pursuance of his advice Haidar in 1773 marched into Coorg by way of Arkalgad but was repulsed with loss. He had to fall back. He wrote to Linga Raja about the impassable nature of the roads. Linga Raja advised him to advance through that part of Coorg which was full of his supporters, whom he assured that, if successful, Haidar would restore the kingdom to him. Haidar's troops this time found little difficulty in entering Kiggatnad and were joined by Linga Raja's partisans. They now marched straight to Mercara. Devappa Raja fled to Kottayam where he was plundered. Still feeling very insecure he fled in disguise to the Maratha country, reached Harihar, where he was caught by Haidar's men and sent to Seringapatam. He was there put to death along with his children.

Coorg was restored to Linga Raja on his agreeing to pay a yearly tribute of Rs. 24,000, but he was compelled to cede to Mysore Suliya, Yelusavara and the two other districts that Haidar had previously surrendered in return for 75,000 pagodas. In return he was permitted to take a portion of Wynad. Linga Raja died in 1780. His sons being of tender age, Haidar assumed entire possession of Coorg and placed a Muhammadan garrison in Mercara. The princes were taken to the Hassan district in Mysore. Haidar proclaimed that when these princes grew up and learnt their business, their kingdom would be handed over to them. Subbarasya, formerly treasurer of Coorg, was placed in charge of administration.²

1 See Chapters XI-XII.

2 This account of Haidar's relations with Coorg is based on *Tarikh-i-Coorg*.

Haidar had already succeeded in retaking Sira, Maddagiri, Channarayadurga, Gurumconda, Hoskote and Dod Ballapur. But two important places, Bellary and Gooty, yet remained to be conquered. Dodappa Nayak, the chief of Bellary, owed his allegiance to Basalat Jang of Adoni, but in 1769 he had transferred it to Haidar Ali and considered himself free to withhold tribute from the Adoni chief. Actually, he did not pay his tribute to anybody. For this Basalat Jang's minister Devichand and the French corps of Adoni under Lally besieged the place. He was persuaded to apply for relief to Haidar, according to Wilks, by Haidar's emissaries, who usually performed the functions of a fifth column. But according to a Maratha news letter¹ as also a *Mackenzie Manuscript*, Krishnappa Nayak, ruler of Rayadrug, suggested the plan to Haidar, who made a forced march from Seringapatam to Bellary. He fell on the rear of the besieging army. Devichand was killed and Lally escaped with the greatest difficulty. Haidar knew already that the chief of Bellary was on the point of surrendering. As the surprise was complete, Haidar got all the siege materials and found the approaches in tact. The ruler of Bellary had no alternative but to run away.² Haidar annexed Bellary. Basalat Jang had to purchase Haidar's forbearance by paying three lakhs of rupees.³ Ranmosth Khan, the ruler of Kurnul, also paid three lakhs.⁴ Haidar then besieged Gooty.

The capture of Gooty was an event of great importance. Murar Rao of Gooty was the only independent chief south of the Tungabhadra who might be regarded as a menace to Haidar. From Kurnul Haidar sent him a message that he

1 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1539.

2 *Mackenzie Ms.* (Local Records, Vol. XXIV, Kaifiat of Bidaruru) gives us the following account of the taking of Bellary: "Due to an internal strife the Kurubars of Bellary were expelled from the city. They went over to Arikiri and Adoni and assisted the Mughals to invade and occupy Bellary. Information of Mughal occupation was sent to Haidar by Krishnappa Nayak, the Samsthanik of Rayadrug. Haidar came and conquered the place. Dodappa Nayak with a few followers ran away from Bellary. Krishnappa Nayak of Rayadrug was entrusted with the care of Bellary, in addition to his original *taluks*."

3 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1763.

4 Or, 1865, p. 17.

should surrender to him his share of the spoils of the Maratha victory at Chinkurali,¹ the guns as also the places given to him by Trimbak Rao, and make a present of a lakh of rupees in lieu of grain and forage for his horses. Murar Rao hurled defiance and insults, referring to Haidar having begun career as a *Naik* which he contrasted with his own position as a *Senapati* of the Maratha Empire. Haidar thereupon advanced to Gooty. The place resisted for three months. Murar Rao hoped, not unnaturally, that he would get succour from Poona or Hyderabad. Nana Farnavis tried his best, but to no purpose. Between Miraj and Kolhapur, the Marathas had about 40,000 troops but there was no leader to lead them to the relief of Murar Rao. As a writer remarked in disgust, this was the business not of one man but of *Barabhai* and that accounted for the want of purpose. The French guns from Bellary and a battering train from Seringapatam began to hurl destruction, but the fort of Gooty was so strong that only famine or treachery could reduce it. The town and lower forts were however carried by assault, but on the immense rock that formed the upper fort no impression could be made. If the siege dragged on, reinforcements might reach Gooty. This was the consideration uppermost in the mind of Haidar. As Murar Rao's supply of water almost failed, he too expressed his readiness to pay seven lakhs in cash and valuables and for five lakhs he agreed to furnish hostages.

Mir Reza, who was in charge of the negotiations, brought to Haidar's camp cash, valuables as also six hostages. One of them was the young son of Yunus Khan, formerly commander-in-chief of Gooty, who had died in 1768. Haidar treated him with such a show of consideration that the young man was thrown off his guard and in an outburst of confidence, not knowing that he was being gulled, he told Haidar that his chief would not have agreed to such terms if the supply of water had not almost failed. Thereupon the appraisers under instruction from Haidar delayed and reported that the total amount including cash and valuables was worth only 5 lakhs. Haidar announced that negotiations were at an end and recommenced the siege in the full knowledge that there was no

1 See Chapter XII.

water in the reservoir. Murar Rao had now to surrender unconditionally. He as also his sons Venkat Rao and Narsing Rao were taken prisoner. They were sent to Kabbaldurg, where Murar Rao died shortly after. Other members of the Ghorpade family lingered in the Mysore Bastille.¹

With the fall of Gooty in March 1776 Haidar got under his control all that was included within the Maratha sphere of influence south of the Tungabhadra. Ranade's comment on the fall of Gooty deserves mention. He writes, "Tanjore suffered the same fate as the other Maratha settlement at Gooty and for the same fault, namely, that it cut itself off from the confederacy and began to shift for itself. This is the lesson that the story of this settlement is well calculated to teach, and it is a lesson which illustrates the strength and weakness of the Maratha power—strong when confederate and unable to retain independence when the union is broken up."²

However true this statement may be with regard to Tanjore, it is inapplicable to Gooty. Up to 1761, Murar Rao no doubt appears as a mere condottiere chief but with the advent of Madhav Rao, Gooty under Murar Rao very loyally played the part assigned to it by the head of the Maratha state—that of an advance outpost in a land where Maratha suzerainty was exposed to the active hostility of a rival power. The fall of Gooty was due to the distractions in the Maratha state and its want of leadership. For three long months Murar Rao carried on the fight with his own limited resources but no arrangement could be made to relieve him. This shows only the weakness of the Maratha confederacy, not its strength.

1 My account of the fall of Gooty is based on *Lekh Samgraha*,

2 Ranade, *Rise of the Maratha Power*, p. 254.

CHAPTER XV

Relations with the Marathas, 1776-1778

Haidar supported Raghoba. The ministerial party at Poona succeeded in winning over the Nizam. Haidar's conquest of Bellary and Gooty, his threat to Adoni and his persistent northward advance united the Nizam and the Poona *Darbar* against him. Before the plan and the preparations could be completed, Haidar was already on the move. He sent Sripat Rao and Krishna Rao Shimoga to the Tungabhadra to create troubles in Maratha territory.¹ They came to Harihar and Halyal and directed their attention against Lakshmeswar. After them, Mir Reza came with about 8,000 troops. He took Bankapur. After Mir Reza Haidar came in person and realized tribute from the Poligars of the district. But he now heard that a treaty had been concluded between the British and the Poona ministry (Treaty of Purandhar, March, 1776) and the Maratha troops from Gujarat were coming to the South. The nominal king had died ; there was some trouble at Seringapatam and the Nairs in Malabar were in rebellion. Haidar went back to Seringapatam in June leaving Mir Reza with about 8,000 troops at Bankapur. Mir, at one stage, advanced up to Dharwar, looting and burning. Though he was also recalled to Seringapatam the operations were successful in the sense that the people felt that the Marathas could give them no protection against such looting. Haidar's agents who were left there had no difficulty in realising tribute between June and October, 1776. The Poona *Darbar* could not yet organise an expedition. The cultivators could not be blamed for becoming reconciled to the yoke of Haidar Ali. With the Kitturkar Desai, terms were settled at 4 lakhs.

Throughout this period the Maratha *Darbar* was busy suppressing an impostor who posed as Sadasiv Rao Bhau. The ministerial party heads now arranged with the Nizam

1 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1865.

that his general Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa and the Maratha general Haripant would march against Haidar Ali and divide the conquered territory equally between the Poona Government and the Nizam.¹ But Haripant had not paid his troops for three years. They were clamouring for payment and Haripant was not in a position to start. Konher Rao and Pandurang Rao, the Patwardhan chiefs, informed the Poona Government that they would advance with 10,000 troops.² It was shameful, they argued, that the Mysoreans should be allowed to besiege Dharwar. Haripant could come after them and undertake the more ambitious scheme of conquest in co-operation with Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa.

Besides the Patwardhan chiefs, Pandurang Rao and Konher Rao, several other Maratha chiefs also took part in this expedition. They were Krishna Rao Panse, Sivaram Ghorpade (nephew of Murar Rao), Nilkantha Rao Sindhe of Manoli, the Deasi of Nargund and other chiefs of Dharwar district. As the Marathas advanced, Haidar's troops had to raise the siege of Dharwar. They fell back on Bankapur, but about 3,000 Canarese infantry remained under cover of forests in Dharwar and continued to harass the cultivators. In December, 1776, the Marathas recaptured Hubli

The ruler of Sirhatti who hated the Marathas wanted Haidar's complete victory. He asked Haidar for reinforcements that would overwhelm these chiefs. Haidar sent Muhammad Ali Kumedan with about 7,000 disciplined infantry and 3,000 cavalry and 9 guns. Baji Rao Barwe, the agent of Raghoba in the court of Haidar, was there with some Maratha troops to co-operate with Kumedan. Out of his eagerness to free Patwardhan territories Pandurang Rao advanced too far. Kumedan had a safe retreat at Bankapur. The forests protected him and the ruler of Sirhatti supplied information. Muhammad Ali Kumedan at Bankapur had an army of 7,000 cavalry, 10,000 infantry and 11 guns.³ While the Patwardhan army was at a distance of 4 *kos* from Saunsi, Muhammad Ali Kumedan reached that place which belonged to the ruler of

1 *Or.* 1865, p. 19.

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1936.

3 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 1961.

Sirhatti, who accompanied him. The Marathas posted themselves at a distance of 2 *kos* from the Mysore army at Awashi. Apprehending a night attack Pandurang Rao stood at a distance of 1 *kos*, alert and watchful. He decided to attack the Mysoreans in the morning. Heedless of the remonstrance of the more cautious and experienced commanders, he started for Saunsi. The Kumedan kept 6 guns and about 6,000 disciplined troops in ambush. On both sides of the fort of Saunsi he kept 3,500 cavalry in two batches. The remaining troops under the chief of Sirhatti were kept in the fort¹ The Marathas could see only the cavalry, not the hidden infantry. As they advanced a tremendous fire of grape and musketry poured in on their flank. The cavalry and infantry made a concerted attack. The Patwardhan troops fled and soon the rout became so wide-spread that it could not be checked. Konher Rao was killed, Pandurang Rao was wounded and taken prisoner and so was Shiv Rao Ghorpade. Krishna Rao Panse alone among the chiefs succeeded in escaping with 3 or 4,000 cavalry. Pandurang Rao died in captivity. The other prisoners were released after 4 years for a heavy ransom. Shiv Rao Ghorpade was not, however, released.

The Poona Government now felt that they must do something to retieve the situation. Haripant was not yet ready. Parasuram Bhau, who at Kolhapur, was asked to advance against the Mysoreans in the Dharwar-Bankapur region. He reached Manoli on the 22nd January, 1777. The fugitives from Saunsi and troops from Kolhapur were altogether about 10,000 in number. They were gathered at Manoli. As Bhau had not enough money, his troops began to loot even in Maratha territory. It was impossible to face Muhummad Ali Kumedan with such troops. The Mysoreans had besieged Dharwar, which was at a distance of 14 *kos* from Manoli. From Manoli a mountain track through deep forest led to Dharwar. It was called Manoli *Bari*. Other very small bypaths also existed but this alone could be used by the troops with their equipments. The forts to the west of the *Bari*—Murgod, Ekodi, Dodwad—were in Maratha hands. From Dodwad Dharwar was only 10 miles distant. Parasuram Bhau's task was to protect these forts, to

1 *Ibid.*, letter no. 1968.

force the Mysoreans to raise the siege of Dharwar, to prevent their seizing the forest, to hold on till Haripant came and then to take the offensive.

It was settled that 5,000 troops should remain at Ekodi and guard the region up to Dodwad and watch the movements of Muhammad Ali's troops. The Pindaris were sent to Hubli. To besiege a strong fort like Dharwar with the Marathas so near, Muhammad Ali required one contingent to face them, one to guard the camp and another to man the batteries. As he, had not sufficient troops to effect all these, he fell back. He had sent some of his guns and equipments to Bankapur, but finding that Bhau did not attack he brought these back to Hubli and remained there very cautious and watchful. The Pindaris at times penetrated to Lakshmeswar and the Mysore Berads and Pindaris looted each other alternately. These skirmishes, however, did not lead to any battle. Though Bhau apprehended that it would be difficult for him to bring fodder from Manoli, he could not move away very far as the Desais of Kittur, Nawalgund and Dambal would then join Muhammad Ali. He, therefore, decided to remain near about Manoli ready to march quickly if Kumedan attempted to take the forest. Muhammad Ali was receiving reinforcements. Bhau also wrote to Poona and to Miraj for reinforcements, but no succour came to him. The Maratha troops from Gujarat had returned in July, 1776, but even now their accounts had not been settled. Kolhapur troops were looting places in the Miraj territory on the other side of the Warna. It was rumoured in the army of Bhau that Haidar had supplied the Kolhapur people with 3 lakhs of huns in order to prevent the Marathas giving undivided attention to the Dharwar-Bankapur region. Troops had to be diverted to that region.

Bhau had to remain at Manoli, and Kumedan at Hubli. Kumedan decided to take Manoli *Bari* by a surprise attack. He sent 4,000 troops on the eastern side of the forest as an advance guard to watch the movements of the Marathas. Bhau daily crossed the *Bari* up to a certain distance with a view to mounting watch and feeding his horse on the excellent crop that was then growing. He also wanted to show his enemies his sangfroid. To lure the Marathas, Kumedan retreated 10 or 12 *kos* towards Bankapur. He wanted to throw

Bhau off his guard and then make a night attack. While Bhau was encamped at Ugargal, he with about 12,000 disciplined infantry, 7,000 cavalry and guns attacked him on the night of 22nd March. But Bhau could not be easily duped. He knew beforehand that the attack was coming. He skirmished but withdrew with his equipments to the other side of the *Bari*. Bhau encamped at Manoli and Kumedan at Ugargal. Bhau kept on harassing and Kumedan was in such constant danger that he had to retire to Hubli. Thus Bhau did all that could be expected of such a small army as his. The Kittur chief and the Nawalgund chief could not desert to Haidar. The Manoli *Bari* remained in Maratha hands.¹

Haripant and Haidar (July, 1777)—Haripant came to the support of Bhau but his army being in arrears, his soldiers were disobedient and it was necessary to pay them before the Maratha army could move with a definite purpose. A loan from Ramachandra Narayan Huprikar was secured and the troops were paid one lakh of rupees. The troops of Parasuram Bhau were also in arrears for 4 months. The Poona *Darbar* sent 2 lakhs of rupees to Haripant. Apprehending that the return of the disaffected soldiery would mean the ruin of Maratha power in the Krishna-Tungabhadra region, they promised to send more in following months.

The troops of Haripant came to Sirhatti on the 19th July. The chieftain of Nawalgund paid Rs. 65,000 as tribute and after realising this sum Bhau came with his troops to Sirhatti on the 29th July. Together they took the *pettah* and besieged the fort. The troops within the fort expected succour from Haidar's troops stationed at Saunsi and Bankapur. On the 31st August, Bhau attacked but failed to carry the fort. Next morning he renewed the attack and the fort was taken.² With the exception of Saunsi, all the other important places in this region were now once again in Maratha hands. Parasuram Bhau marched against Saunsi, the last important possession of the Sirhatti chief, who was both Haidar's lackey

1 *Itihas Samgraha*, letters 1998, 2004, 2012, 2041, 2058, 2064.

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letters 2157, 2162.

and his ally, and Haripant advanced to realize tribute from Savanur. Now they heard the news that Haidar was besieging Chitaldrug. The ruler of Chitaldrug sent his minister Purushottam to Haripant applying for succour. But Haripant was himself very uneasy, as he was not quite sure of his own hold over his troops. Receiving no assurance from the Maratha chiefs the ruler of Chitaldrug began to negotiate with Haidar who insisted that he should pay 14 lakhs as *nazrana* and furnish contingents for his army. The Chitaldrug ruler agreed to pay in instalments. But regarding the valuation of Chitaldrug coins there was a difference of opinion, Haidar's valuation being half that of the ruler of Chitaldrug. Hearing that the Maratha generals had not gone away, the latter refused to pay anything and fighting began once again.¹ The ruler of Chitaldrug made frequent sorties and killed large numbers of Haidar's troops. But Haidar did not flinch. In the meantime he was carrying on negotiations with the Poona *Darbar* through Lachman Rao Raste. His proposal was that the Tungabhadra should be regarded as the boundary between the two kingdoms. He promised to pay three years' arrear tribute and release Pandurang Rao, who had been taken prisoner at Saunsi. But the Maratha *Darbar* wanted territory on the other side of the Tungabhadra as also the release of Murar Rao but in this matter Haidar was adamant. Negotiations naturally broke down.²

The troops of Haripant continued to be heavily in arrears. The Poona *Darbar* could not make the payments it promised. Bhau took Saunsi and Misrikot. The Maratha chiefs then heard that having come to terms with the chieftain of Chitaldrug, Haidar was marching towards the Tungabhadra. But the river being in flood there was no possibility of his crossing it and taking them by surprise. Bhau gave Dharwar and Koppal to Ramchandra Huprikar for which he paid 4½ lakhs. The tribute of Savanur was fixed at three lakhs 15 thousand rupees.³ Haidar having come to terms with the ruler of Chitaldrug advanced 5 *kos* from Harihar. Both the armies were

1 *Lekh Samgraha*, 2148.

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 2156.

3 *Ibid.* letter no. 2165

waiting for the floods to subside. The Chitaldrug chief now broke the terms of the treaty in the hope of getting Maratha aid.¹ He wrote to the Maratha generals proposing to meet their expenses.

Abaji Mahadev and Tulaji Puar, agents of Raghunath Rao were active, sowing the seeds of treachery.² They were at Bankapur. They paid liberally and succeeded in corrupting some Silahdars. Haripant had his suspicions but had no full knowledge. Khare writes : In this expedition 30/35,000 troops were engaged more than half of this belonging to the feudal lords. But they too were unable to pay their men. If the expenses amounted to Rs. 20/- per month per horseman, four months' campaigning must have cost 28 lakhs. But they could not realise more than Rupees 14,30,000/-³

Besides the horsemen there were infantry and *topekhana* which must have cost well nigh twelve lakhs in four months. The army was altogether in arrears to the extent of twenty-six lakhs. Therefore there was much dissatisfaction and Haidar's agents found a very congenial soil in which they sowed the seeds of treachery.

The Chitaldrug chief promised to pay Rs. 1,25,000 at their first halt if they crossed the Tungabhadra at Galagnath. About this time Haripant also got 4½ lakhs from Poona. Haripant and Bhau with their troops crossed the Tungabhadra on the 24th November at Galagnath. Haidar thereupon moved from his position 5 *kos* from Harihar to Harihar. When he heard that the Marathas were going to Chitaldrug he prepared to meet them. The Chitaldrug chief promised the Marathas a sum of 5 lakhs of rupees for their support. But Bhau was now ill, suffering from dysentery and fever. This was a great handicap. The routes lay through mountains and jungles in which it was very difficult to advance with his full equipment.

1 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2156.

2 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2153.

3 2 lakhs from Poona.

4 lakhs loan raised by Bhau.

4½ lakhs Dharwar & Koppal *taluks*.

65,000 Nawalgund tribute.

315,000 Savanur ribute.

Haripant therefore decided to take a different route—to proceed towards Bellary where he hoped to meet Dhaunsa, the general of the Nizam, and then advance along the plain country to Chitaldrug. He therefore directed his march towards Hampi.¹

That terrain too, was not suitable for cavalry. Haidar was at the back of the Maratha army at a distance of 5 to 10 *kos* with about 12,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry and guns.² He began to pursue and sought a convenient strategical position for attack. The Marathas found it difficult to turn back and attack, the mountain terrain making cavalry movements so difficult. The Marathas crossed the Sondur *Bari* and came to the plains of Adoni. Haidar took his station at Daroji at a distance of 15 *kos* from them. The Marathas kept their camp equipages at Ramdurg and their army was stationed at Rarawi. The Marathas halted there for a fortnight. Bhau had recovered sufficiently to be at the head of his detachment once again. The Marathas were expecting the arrival of Dhaunsa, Nizam's general, and their plan was to proceed to Chitaldrug with the combined army. "Do not meet the enemy before I come," wrote Dhaunsa, but the prospect of his turning up was now more remote than ever. The Marathas were in a very difficult position. Haidar kept a very big detachment at Daroji and he placed another at Murgod at a distance of 17 *kos* from Bellary. The Marathas were caught between the two forces. Reinforcements could arrive only with great difficulty. Haripant's plan was to send all his baggage beyond the Tungabhadra and to adopt the traditional Maratha method of guerilla fighting till Dhaunsa arrived.

When Haripant's baggage was being removed to the other side of the river. Haidar suddenly attacked (1st January, 1778). A small detachment had gone out to protect the supplies that were coming. They were surrounded on all sides. They succeeded, however, in rejoining the main army, though Govind Rao was killed and Mahimaji and Anand Rao were wounded. The Maratha army formed a circle to enable the bazar to remove peacefully to the other side of the Tunga-

¹ *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 2197.

² *Ibid.*

thadra.¹ Haripant and Bhau suspected treachery in their ranks. They decided not to take the offensive but slowly retreated and the two armies were almost within sight of each other near Rarawi. Haripant knew that Manaji Sindhia was in league with Haidar. Manaji Sindhia was actually caught with a letter from Haidar. To punish him Haripant and Parasuram suddenly attacked his camp, but Manaji escaped. His wife and mother-in-law were found there and his camp was looted. Manaji had received one lakh of *huns* besides jewellery and cloth from Haidar and out of that 75,000 *huns* were found in his camp. Jaswant Rao Mane, an accomplice of Manaji, was blown from the mouth of a gun.² One Jamadar *gardi* was also beheaded. This incident caused some stir among other Maratha sardars in the camp, for after a few days when Mahadaji Raji Bhonsle and Nilakantha Rao Morat, two big Maratha sardars, were caught for the same offence, they were sent to Poona for their trial. Haripant had to continue his retreat, his cavalry covering it successfully from Haidar's harassment. After crossing the Tungabhadra the Marathas met Dhaunsa, the general of the Nizam. But Dhaunsa proved to be absolutely undependable.³ Either because he was really chicken-hearted or on account of the Nizam's hesitant policy, he would not take the offensive. To show that he did not care for the Maratha-Nizam coalition, Haidar even sent batches of his troops to loot Maratha territory on the northern bank of the Tungabhadra. He looted all the places in the Koppal region, received one lakh of *huns* from the Dambalkar Desai and took back all the places from the Lakshmeswar *pargana*. His son Tipu with 10,000 selected horsemen attacked Dharwar. Haripant had kept there a garrison of 3,000 troops. But Tipu looted the town and the mint before he was forced to retreat, and on his way back to the main army he succeeded in taking Hubli by holding out threats. Dhaunsa's slow marches, his plunder of Maratha territory and his unmistakable unwillingness to stir also helped to paralyse the army of Haripant.⁴ Haripant

1 *Lekh Samgraha*, letters no. 2220 and 2221.

2 *Lekh Samgraha*, letters no. 2228, 2231.

3 *Lekh Samgraha*, letter no. 2234.

4 *Lekh Samgraha*, letters no. 2250, 2251, 2254.

naturally asked the Poona Government for reinforcements. Moraba and Holkar were scheming against Nana Farnavis who was reluctant to send reinforcement. But he was persuaded to send Appa Balwant with 5,000 troops to reinforce Haripant. The Marathas decided to cross the river at Singtalur and go again to the assistance of the ruler of Chitaldrug. But from Dhaunsa they met with a flat refusal. He said, "If you insist on crossing, I would retreat."¹ Bhau and Pant told him plainly that in case he refused to cross they would treat him as an enemy. He at last agreed to join. On the 24th March, 1778, they again crossed, for the second time.² But after 10 or 12 days they were obliged to fall back in order to counteract the machinations of Moraba in Poona. Letters from Nana reached Bhau and Tatyā on the 5th April and on the 6th they turned back.

Moraba Farnavis, the cousin of Nana, was one of the most important members of the ministerial party. With the aid of Holkar, he had succeeded in getting the upper hand and compelling Nana to retire to Purandhar. Moraba was thinking of the restoration of Raghoba. But Nana was a man of deep artifice. As the Kolhapur chief was creating disturbance in the interest of Raghoba, Mahadji Sindhia was deputed against him. Nana's plan was that Mahadji and Haripant should unite at Merich and march upon Poona for the restoration of his ascendancy. It was publicly given out that they were to form their rendezvous at Kolhapur and march against Haidar. This well-concerted plan deceived both Haidar and Moraba. Nana reassumed his former power. But Haidar was thus left free to subdue not merely the chief of Chitaldrug but also all the territory between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. Grant Duff says that Haripant outwitted Haidar by realizing from him a large sum of money as the price of his withdrawal which for other reasons was absolutely necessary. But this view does not seem to be corroborated by any contemporary Marathi record.

1 *Ibid.*, letter no 2251.

2 *Ibid.*, letter no. 2273.

Haidar had now an open field. He took one after another all the important places in the Krishna-Tungabhadra Doab. Only Dharwar resisted for a considerable period. The Desais of Nargund, Sirhatti and Damal submitted readily and were confirmed in their respective territories on promising to pay their usual tribute to Haidar. Each of these chiefs had to pay as his *nazrana* a sum equal to the annual revenue. With the Savanur Pathan chief Haidar later formed a marriage alliance. The Chitaldrug Poligar was besieged for the second time. This time he had no escape, especially because the Muhammadan troops in his service were seduced. The Poligar surrendered and was sent with his family as prisoners to Seringapatam. Shaikh Ayaz, a Nair *chela*, was left as the Governor there. Mir Sahib was sent against Cuddapa. After taking Chitaldrug Haidar joined him. The Pathans surrendered after some resistance against overwhelming odds. Cuddapa was thus annexed. The Pathan Nawab had withdrawn to Sidhout ; but his position was untenable and he had no other alternative but to surrender. He was taken as a prisoner to Seringapatam.

This completes the story of Haidar's conquests.¹ As a French document puts it : "By steps rather slow but sustained, by a constant good fortune he has formed a new power, comparable to a torrent that upsets and destroys all that it meets on the way."² His annexations in the north up to the Tungabhadra and between the Krishna and Tungabhadra were made at a time when the Maratha power was paralysed by internal feuds. When the Maratha state recognised all these acts of aggression Haidar attained the zenith of his power and prosperity.

Two facts governed the political situation in South India. There was in the first place the deep-rooted Maratha-Mysore rivalry. The second factor was the British attitude that ranked Haidar Ali as 'their natural enemy.' A French memorandum notes : "By an adroit policy the English have fomented

1 *Or.* 1865, f. 22, Haidar, always ambitious, thought that he wasted his money if he paid his troops in peace.

2 *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XIII, paper by K. A. Nilakantha Sastri.

division and maintained the war between these two powers (the Marathas and Mysore). It is a work of more than ordinary policy to prepare by negotiations the reunion of rival powers."¹ Haidar's career after this is to be studied as part of a wider conflict against British ascendancy, the opportunity for this being provided by British diplomatic bungling. No doubt he had his first war with the British in 1767. But there is no reason to think that at that time he looked upon the British power as irrevocably hostile to him. There was a strong desire, on the other hand, to enlist British support against the Maratha power, geographically and traditionally his rival. Not until 1775 was his disillusionment complete. He may not inappropriately have said, "I wasted several years of my life by the supposition that England was a great nation." He told the ambassadors of Muhammad Ali that war was perhaps inevitable. Once this decision was made, rapprochement with the Marathas was the next step, provided the Marathas showed willingness. The diplomatic revolution, for which the administration of Nana Farnavis was responsible was the logical outcome of what was inherent in the situation. But we must give to Nana's government due credit for its capacity to get rid of the weak and childish feeling of traditional rivalry that does not take note of the new orientation in politics and diplomacy.

¹ *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XIII, paper by A. K. Nilakantha Sastri.

CHAPTER XVI

Relations with the British, 1769-1775

Wilks, in his estimate of Haidar, says that he had no passion, good or bad, to disturb the balance of the account."¹ Between 1769 and 1775 Haidar became convinced that, as matters stood, he must join the combination opposed to the British. We cannot also deny that he had just grounds to complain against the English Government.

The 2nd article of the treaty of 1779 that ended the First Anglo-Mysore War provided that "in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked they shall form their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out."² No doubt this article was very inconvenient to the East India Company, giving them all the embarrassments of an offensive alliance without any of its advantages. But this ought to have been an argument against the conclusion of the treaty and not an argument against its observance after it had been concluded. This treaty of 1769 was naturally regarded by Haidar as the most important part of his plan of resistance to the Maratha invasion which might come at any time. The Maratha State, under the wise guidance of Madhav Rao, the greatest of the Peshwas, had recovered from the effects of the stunning blow at Panipat. Twice before, in 1765 and in 1767, Haidar had to oppose the invasion of Madhav Rao and he knew that this most formidable enemy would again invade his country and try to occupy the largest portion of it permanently.³ In view of this Maratha menace and the genius of the Maratha leader, Haidar could not expect success unaided. This treaty of 1769 was, therefore, the sheet anchor of his foreign policy.

1 Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. II, p. 379.

2 Military Consultations, Vol. 33, 1769, p. 231. Observation: "We were fully sensible of the difficulties in which we might be involved. But no peace could be expected without it."

3 For details, see chapters VI, VII.

When in January, 1770, Madhav Rao was in the field, accompanied by organized garrisons and a field force, Haidar sent a *vakil* demanding British aid. Madhav Rao also sent his *vakil* to Madras. But the Government of Fort St. George decided that "it must be our endeavour to remain neutral." In their letter to the Bengal Government they argued as if the treaty of 1769 was non-existent and there was no obligation imposed by it. They wrote that if Haidar was helped that would not be sufficient to crush the Marathas and would expose the Carnatic to Maratha ravages, but if the Marathas got British help, they might blot the Mysore State out of existence and thus become more dangerous, and if Haidar found the British willing to assist the Marathas, he would accommodate matters with them and turn in his anger upon the Carnatic. "Our greatest apprehensions at present are," wrote the gentlemen at Fort St. George, "that affairs will be settled between them¹". They feared that if the campaign ended before the campaigning season was over, the Marathas might enter the Carnatic. They protracted the negotiations under various pretences. The Madras Government did not expect the campaign to last long. But though Madhav Rao was taken ill, he left Trimbak Rao behind him to continue the campaign. Trimbak Rao was not an unworthy successor of Madhav Rao in command of the Maratha army. At Chinkurali on the 6th March, 1771, Haidar was completely defeated. Soon after the battle, he solicited the assistance of the Company and made an offer of considerable presents to the Company, the Madras President and Hastings, provided his request was complied with. But he got no reply. Only the gentlemen at Bombay on Haidar's application sent him 500 stands of arms. The desolating war continued for 15 months even after Chinkurali. A treaty was concluded and the third Maratha-Mysore War came to an end in June, 1772.²

As the campaign continued, the Madras Government ordered detachments to Trichinopoly and Vellore, with a view to putting on the appearance of being in readiness, should either of the

1 Select Committee Proceedings, 1770. Letter from St. George, 13th February, 1770.

2 For details, see chapters XI-XIII.

two contestant parties invade the Carnatic. They wanted thus to keep alive the hopes and fears of both parties.⁴ But this attitude underwent a remarkable change when it became evident that the Marathas were trying to subjugate Mysore permanently. In that case the British would find their territory constantly exposed to Maratha ravages and devastations. The Government of Fort St. George now became apprehensive that they might subject themselves to the imputation of a breach of faith. But the Nawab of Arcot showed his disinclination to co-operate against the Marathas. He had refused to execute the instrument of his participation in the treaty of 1769, and as the war dragged on, he showed more and more anxiety to comply with Maratha request for help. But the Madras Government also became more and more conscious that good policy required them to assist Haidar. On the 12th June, 1771, they wrote, "Haidar Ali still continues to press us for assistance which we have it not in our power to grant, as it is impossible for us to attempt anything without the revenue and resources of the Carnatic, which are entirely under the control of the Nawab, who pressed us earnestly to a junction with the Marathas to subdue Mysore. In this system he is warmly seconded by Sir John Lindsay, Crown representative at Arcot."² the Nawab being taken especially under the protection of the Crown by the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris. About the end of the year 1771, the Bombay Government instructed Sibbald, their Resident at Onore, to learn from Haidar Ali whether he would deposit a sum of money adequate to the expense they might incur in affording him assistance. The Government of Fort St. George also wrote on the 21st December, 1771, "We have desired he will inform us what supplies of money and what provisions he can furnish should the orders we expect from Europe authorize us to assist him."³

As we examine the records relating to the infraction of the treaty of 1769, we find the Madras Government at no stage willing to abide by its terms. It pledged them to all the evils

1 Select Committee Proceedings, 1770. Letter from Fort St. George, 15th April, 1770.

2 Select Committee Proceedings, 12th June, 1771.

3 Select Committee Proceedings, 3rd Feb., 1772.

of an offensive alliance which they had been anxious to avoid. Throughout the war (from January, 1770, to June, 1772) the Madras Government followed a line of conduct that amounted to a passive infraction of the treaty. The Nawab of Arcot and Sir John Lindsay, the Crown representative, urged an active violation of the treaty by joining hands with Madhav Rao for the destruction of Haidar. Wilks writes, "The Government feeling the impossibility of executing the treaty in opposition to the Nawab and the representative of His Majesty and resolved not to destroy the power which they were bound by treaty to defend, evaded the whole question, by representing both to Haidar and the Marathas the necessity of waiting for the result of a reference which they had made on the subject to their superiors in England."¹ The line of conduct adopted by the Madras Government is thus sought to be justified. Some merit is actually claimed for this passive attitude because the intricate political system placed insuperable impediments against the performance of their engagements to Haidar. But if we look at the matter from Haidar's point of view a different interpretation is not unjustified. When a treaty is concluded, the contracting parties are expected to accept terms with a full sense of responsibility, a clear knowledge of its implications including the constitutional difficulties and handicaps. The elementary principles governing inter-state relations were thus violated. To add insult to injury, in the 24th month of this long-protracted war, in which they were pledged to defend him, the Madras Government asked him what money and provisions he could furnish if they were to assist him and some time after he was informed that the Home Government had forbidden any assistance to either of the two contestants.

This infraction of the treaty of 1769 was not the only event that alienated Haidar from the English. British attitude regarding his supplies of military stores caused further ill-feeling. After the conclusion of the treaty of 1769 by the Madras Government, the Government of Bombay deputed two men to enter into an agreement for what remained to be adjusted for the benefit of the Company on that coast. A treaty was concluded in 1770, by which it was arranged that

¹ Wilks, Vol. II, p. 215.

the British were again to have a factory at Onore for pepper and sandal wood and an exclusive right was given to the Company for purchasing the entire quantity of these articles "the amount of which (as expressed in the treaty) or as much of it as the Hon'ble Company choose to be made good in guns, saltpetre, lead and in ready money." Repeated applications were made by Haidar in consequence of this treaty for warlike stores. In 1772, however, the Court of Directors disapproved of this treaty. After the intimation of the disapproval, the Government of Bombay evaded supplying him with military stores and Haidar naturally turned to the French who began to supply him liberally. The Bombay Government was of opinion that it would have been much better to send him to some extent the articles he desired, as otherwise the French were getting the profits of these highly charged articles at the same time that they were acquiring an ascendancy in his counsels.¹ In March, 1775, the Government of Fort St. George sent to the Bengal Government a resume of the state of affairs in their part of the Deccan. They wrote that Haidar possessed a valuable extensive territory, a well-regulated government, a numerous well-disciplined army, with a revenue said to amount to three crores. He had by then recovered the whole country he had previously lost to the Marathas, taking advantage of the confusion in their affairs following upon the death of Madhav Rao and the assassination of Narayan Rao. The French supplied him with military stores and French adventurers entered into his service.² But for this the British were not entitled to make any complaints as they themselves were directly responsible for the pro-French turn of Haidar's policy. It cannot be denied that in 1771, when the Marathas were encamped in Haidar's territory, they proposed to compromise their differences with him provided he joined them in an attack upon the Carnatic. The offer might not have been sincere. But "Haidar made known these proposals to the British Government that he was willing to forget the causes of personal animosity towards Muhammad Ali and to hope that the English would mediate a reconciliation; he authorised his envoys to

1 Secret Proceedings, 8th March, 1775.

2 Secret Proceedings, 13th March, 1775, p. 298.

propose as the condition of prompt and effectual aid the immediate payment of 20 lakhs of rupees and the cession to the English of the provinces of Baramahal, Salem and Atur ; finally the ambassadors were directed openly to announce in the event of the rejection of all these advances Haidar's reluctant determination to throw himself on the French for support (October 1771)".¹

The British helped Muhammad Ali to seize Tanjore by storm on the 17th September, 1773. Calculating that this acquisition of Tanjore would bring about an estrangement between Muhammad Ali and the Marathas Haidar once again made an attempt to enter into an alliance with the British and the ruler of Arcot. He made the first advances for amicable settlement and sent his deputies. He proposed a treaty that would renew the violated conditions of the treaty of 1769, to be executed by the British, Muhammad Ali and Haidar. When the Government of Bombay seized the island of Salsette, thus making a war with the Marathas inevitable, Haidar naturally hoped that the Nawab of Arcot as also the President and gentlemen at Fort St. George would be more than willing to accept his offer.² Muhammad Ali dragged on these negotiations, and even suggested some modification of the terms proposed, thus expressing his willingness to enter into an alliance provided the terms were modified.

1 Wilks, *History of Mysore*, Vol. II, p. 219

2 Secret Proceedings, 13th March, 1774, pp. 335-336.

Haidar proposed the following terms :—

"In case the Mughals (meaning in particular the Nizam) or Marathas should proceed against the country of my Circar in order to remove and expel them therefrom a sufficient force with a commander of importance, should be sent to act in conjunction and alliance with me, and to make a war upon the enemy and I also in case the Mughals or Marathas should attack the country of the Nabob Wallajah or the English, will send the forces of my Circar to act against the enemy, in conjunction and alliance with them and drive them out. Whether peace or war be determined on towards the enemy, myself, the Nabob and the English are to be of one mind and to act entirely in concert, either in continuing the war or concluding of a peace—the expenses of the troops to be paid in this manner—To a European soldier 15 rupees—and to each sepoy seven and a half rupees per month and the officer shall be paid as I may be advised from them at the time I require them. The pay of my troops to be to each horseman 15 rupees and each sepoy 7½ rupees per month and the officer to be paid as I shall write from hence at the time.

In the meantime, as internal dissensions increased in Maharashtra. Muhammad Ali could see for himself that there was no immediate danger from the Marathas. He now became lukewarm, his ambassadors Ali Nawaz and Fateh Ali began to amuse Haidar with their evasions and ultimately Haidar dismissed them with a civil letter. One of the ambassadors himself mentioned that "they wasted seven months in the hope of the arrival of the treaty and Haidar, at length thinking that the Nabob did not wish for friendship, established by a written negotiation and only meant to keep up appearances till an opportunity should offer for executing measures of a

Whatever articles etc. out of friendship may be wanted out of the dominions of each other, shall be purchased by the subjects of each without molestation on either side.

If the Moghul or Maratha chief with a design to create a misunderstanding between us, should begin a correspondence, they (the Nawab and the English) shall not take any measure in compliance thereto, but shall communicate the papers to me and I also, if they write to me will from hence give advice thereof, which must tend to the increase of sincerity and the confirmation of union between us.

The security between us for these articles of Agreement shall be a solemn oath in the name of God, the Saint of God and on the glorious Koran."

The Nawab proposed the following terms :—

"In case the Marathas or any other enemy should come into the country the above person (meaning Haidar) should send a sufficient force, with an officer of rank, who shall act in conjunction and concert with my forces and those of the English Company in order to expel and drive out the enemy from my dominions. In like manner whatever foe shall enter the country of the said person, I will send a sufficient force, under a leader of importance, who shall act in conjunction and unanimity with his army to effect his expulsion. The pay of the troops on both sides to be at the rate of 15 rupees per month for a horseman and 7½ for a sepoy and that of the officer to be settled at the time they are required advices there on being sent along with the auxiliary troops."

"With regard to the merchandise that may be wanted from each other's countries, it is necessary that the particulars thereof shall be first transmitted".

"If the Marathas or other chief in order to create a disunion between us should begin a correspondence neither side shall act in compliance therewith, but shall give mutual notice of the writings that come to them."

"No protection shall be afforded to the subjects of enemies of each other and those that have fled away in disgust shall be delivered up again."

We should keep in mind the British comment on the treaty: "We are not aware of any advantages that could be derived from such a treaty either to the Nabob or the Company..... although its direct object is peace, it would alternately draw us into hostilities and distant operations, in supporting Haidar Ali Cawn." (Copy of a paper sent by Haidar Ali.)

contrary nature, said that it was his business therefore to be upon his guard and take measures on his part."¹ Haidar himself was quite outspoken. He told Ali Nawaz Khan that for seventeen months he had been desiring a confirmation of friendship with the Nawab but the Nawab paid no attention. "Though the English have assisted Raghunath Rao, yet whatever he gained by so poor a support? He will not be successful against the Poona army. Members of the Poona administration desire my alliance and assistance on the part of the son of Narrain Rao and have sent me envoys of consequence. What we agree upon will in time be known."² When the ambassadors returned they reported that Haidar would now seize Cuddapa, Kurnul and Adoni after which he would reduce the whole country south of the Krishna, would form an alliance with other nations like the French and the Dutch, who were opposed to the English, establish good relations with the Marathas and come to a rupture with Muhammad Ali and the English.³

From 1769 Haidar tried his utmost to remain on terms of friendship with the British and Muhammad Ali. But convinced now that this was impossible he definitely went over to the other side. It was the bungling diplomacy of the British and the short-sighted policy of Muhammad Ali that forced Haidar Ali into the arms of the Marathas and the French, thus making things so difficult for the British between the years 1779-82. When we speak of the irreconcilable enmity that existed between Haidar, Tipu and the British, we should take the circumstances of the years 1769-75 into consideration. Haidar had undoubtedly just grounds to complain of the English Government.

1 Secret Proceedings 23rd October, 1775. The verbal narration of Ali Nawaz Khan.

2 *Ibid.*

3 *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XVII

Kanara and Malabar ; relations with the European Powers on the west coast ; Navy.

Haidar conquered Bidnur in 1763 and Sunda in 1764. These conquests brought the ports of Onore (Honaver), Mangalore, Bhatkal and Piro (Sadasivgad) in his possession. The King of Sunda, thus kicked out of his dominions, sought shelter with the Portuguese at Goa, who gave him a pension of 12,000 Xerafins. which was later increased to 20,000. He was first sheltered by the Portuguese in the miserable village of Bandona but was later given a country house near Goa. The more humane treatment accorded to him by the Portuguese in later years was due to a fear that he might otherwise join Haidar or the Marathas, thus carrying to them his rights over Ponda, Canacona and Sanguelim, of which they might be eager to take advantage.¹

Having got possession of Honaver, Mangalore, Bhatkal as also Sadasivgad, Haidar could now think of having a navy of his own. The English and the Portuguese had their navies on which so much of their power depended. Even the Peshwa had a fleet of his own. Without a navy Haidar would be at the mercy of these maritime powers on the sea coast. He naturally thought of having a naval arsenal on the western coast and drew up a scheme for the construction of ships of war. In 1765, according to the Portuguese Haidar had 30 vessels of war and a large number of transport ships.²

Having concluded a treaty with Madhav Rao in 1766, Haidar was free to explore new avenues of expansion. He decided to attempt a conquest of Malabar. Before undertaking this venture, he kept a corps of observation consisting of 3,000 horse, 4,000 regular infantry and 10,000 peons at Basavpatna in order to watch the Marathas and descended

1 Portuguese Documents, II, III, VI.

2 Sen, *Studies in Indian History*.

into Kanara with a view to marching towards Malabar. This was in January, 1766. After 4 days' halt at Mangalore the army resumed its march, a fleet advancing by sea. Peixoto thus describes the fleet : It consisted of 80 vessels, 13 topsail vessels, several manchoos of war, besides a great many shybars and small craft for the transport of war materials and provisions for the passage of the army across the rivers. The Dutch account differs from the Portuguese. According to the former, the fleet had 2 ships, 7 smaller vessels and 40 gallivats, besides more than 50 other vessels laden with provisions. The fleet had two commanders, one a Muhammadan, who directed everything on board except what related to navigation and duty on board, which were entrusted to a European commander named Stannett.¹ In the Malabar campaign, the fleet of Haidar rendered the greatest assistance. It accompanied the army up to Calicut, conveying the necessaries. Thence the greater part of the fleet returned to Mangalore, the smaller craft remaining to facilitate passage across the rivers.

The conquest of Malabar was perhaps Haidar's most arduous feat of arms. It would not have been possible but for the complete disunion that prevailed among that fighting section of the people—the Nairs. Geography offered the greatest difficulty to the would-be conqueror. "After a mile or two of a narrow strip of sand near the coast, the scene changes and the country begins to swell towards the barrier of the ghats, at first in range after range of low red laterite hills with paddy flats fringed with cocoanut gardens winding in front of the recesses and later in the long spurs, deep ravines and thick jungles that mark the rise of the hills. Towering over all, their slopes clad in dense forests, the majestic mountains of the western ghats keep watch over the favoured land at their feet. The long array of the ghats maintain an average elevation of 5,000 ft high. They run parallel with the coast at a distance of some 20 miles as far as Vavul Mala or Camel's Hump abreast of Calicut. There they turn sharply eastward and after bending northwards round the Nilambur Valley

¹ Peixoto, Book III, para 53. He was not under the orders of the Muhammadan except in the embarkation and disembarkation of troops.

recede inland as far as the Vada Malas north of the Palghat gap. South of the gap they rise again in the Ten malas or Southern hills, some 4/5,000 ft. high and gradually swell once more into the giant Anamalas."¹ Most of the rivers are navigable only for a few miles from their mouths. Communication was at that time extremely difficult on the landside. Wheeled traffic was practically unknown in those days and even bullocks were not used. Horses were not to be found. Highways did not exist and the roads were "only narrow foot-paths running at random through paddy lands." Rainfall between June and September, during the period of south-west monsoon, is so heavy that small water-courses feeding rivers overflow their banks and convert the green paddy flats into placid lakes. Between October and December, the period of north-eastern monsoon, the rainfall, if not so heavy as during south-west monsoon, is considerable. On the slopes of the ghats a fall of 300 inches in the year was not uncommon. The campaigning season, therefore, could not be a long one and the rebel was sure of immunity from attack for the greater part of the year. At the beginning of his conquering career in Malabar, Haidar was not in possession of Coorg to which Malabar gave access *via* the Perambadi *ghat* nor was he in possession of Malabar Wynad to which led the Periya pass. The Tamarasseri *ghat* led to Mysore, the Karakkur *ghat* to the Nilgiri district. But the Palghat gap (25 miles wide) leading to the plains of Coimbatore was by far the most important for the movement of his armies from the landside so long as Haidar did not conquer Coorg. These difficulties of communication determined the movements of Haidar's army in Malabar.

The political condition of Malabar was very favourable to the ambitious Mysorean invader and this enabled him to overcome his natural difficulties. Northern Malabar had been at one time united under the Kolattiri whose territory extended from Mt. Delli to the Kotta river. But disintegration had advanced very far and North Malabar was in a state of anarchy 'a sea of intrigues, conflicting interests and mutual jealousies.'

1 *Madras Gazetteer*, Malabar and Anjengo, Vol. I, by Innes and Evans.

The Kolattiri's sway was now confined to the town of Chirakkal. The Muhammadan chief Ali Raja was master of Cannanore. The Kadattanad chief ruled between the Mahe and the Kotta rivers. There was an offshoot of the Kilattanad family north of the Kavvyi river. The Kottayam *taluk* was partly in possession of Iruvalinad Nambiyars and partly of the Puranad or Kottayam Rajas. The malcontents of the Kolattiri family had at one time invited the intervention of the Bidnur chief and in the course of his advance Haidar asserted that he had come to collect a Bidnur claim of two lakhs of pagodas against the Kolattiri.¹

The Nairs who formed the feudal and military aristocracy of the west coast have been classed by Burke with the Mamelukes of Egypt. Feudalism makes for anarchy and Malabar was no exception to this rule. At Cannanore, there was Ali Raja, the Muhammadan chief 'lord of the deep.' He was a thorn in the side of his nominal suzerain, the chief of Chirakkal. He went to Haidar at Mangalore when Haidar conquered Bidnur and he became Haidar's agent in Malabar.² Peixoto tells us that Ali Raja told Haidar that he could conquer Malabar with ease and find there great wealth. Haidar ordered him to go to Cannanore, gather his troops together and provide adequate ammunition.³

Haidar's army, according to the Dutch, numbered 40,000 including 10,000 cavalry and 450 Europeans. He took with him 4 months' provisions. The route was Mangalore-Manjeswar-Koomal-Mt. Delli. The fleet accompanied the army. Haidar advanced ravaging, pillaging, burning and killing. At Beliapatam 500 Nairs defended the fort for one day. But the artillery bombardment was successful and the Nairs fled.⁴ Small craft conveyed light baggage to the other side. The Nairs abandoned the fort of Chirakkal which was soon occupied by Ali Raja. The Kadattanad chief, who was very much under the French influence, resisted the Nawab. From Chirakkal, the Mysore army advanced to take possession of

1 *Madras Gazetteer*, Malabar and Anjengo.

2 Peixoto, Book III, para 50.

3 *Ibid.* He presented to Haidar a silver table worth Rs. 400/- and a new vessel he brought from Calicut.

4 Peixoto, Book III, paras 54, 93.

Kottayam. They had to pass the Anjarakandi river. The river banks were very high and hence difficult for artillery and horse. The Nairs on the opposite side numbered 30,000. Haidar mounted two batteries with 26 guns of all calibres. As these began to fire the Nairs withdrew. About 1,000 Nairs were killed ; some fled to the woods, some to Tellichery and Mahe.

Haidar then advanced to the territory of the four Nambiaris. Gul Muhammad Khan, younger brother of Faizulla Khan, was sent to explore the country. The detachment was composed of 50 European cavalry, 4 regiments of light foot and some horse, two field pieces and one regiment of topasses. The Nairs took cover behind their plantations. They poured forth a terrible musketry fire. The Nairs repelled three attacks. Reinforcements under Lala Mian reached the Mysore army. They feigned a retreat, 500 of the best horse being placed in ambush. The Nairs were turned and had 832 killed and about as many wounded. Gul Muhammad lost 200 troops. This action took place on the 16th March, 1766. Next day the whole army advanced against the Zamorin of Calicut, the cavalry in advance scouring and ravaging the open country.

In South Malabar dominated by the Zamorin, the Nairs forming the feudal and military aristocracy played as important a part as in the north. Haidar required no agent like Ali Raja to give him an idea of this part of the country. The Zamorin of Calicut had attempted in 1756-57 to conquer the territory of the Palghat Raja. Haidar was then the *Foujdar* of Dindigul. The Raja of Palghat had applied to Haidar for assistance and Haidar had sent 2,000 cavalry, 5,000 infantry and five guns under Makhdum Ali. Makhdum Ali had then advanced almost up to the sea coast. The Zamorin had to fall back, restore the districts of the Raja of Palghat, and promise to pay an indemnity of Rs. 12 lakhs. The indemnity was not paid and Haidar was now in a position to enforce it. The Zamorin died in 1758. His successor, in his attempts to absorb Cochin, came into collision with the Travancore state, strengthened by Martanda Varma, and ultimately concluded a treaty with his successor Ram Varma in 1762.² Before the new Zamorin could recover from the effects of these wars the storm broke.

1 Panikkar, *The Dutch in Malabar*.

The Nairs fought resolutely, taking advantage of strong places. Many burnt themselves in their own houses. Some threw their families into wells, filling them with straw, setting fire to it and leaping into it. Venkata Rao Barakki was detached with some cavalry to capture the Zamorin of Calicut. He advanced rapidly and succeeded in surrounding the Zamorin who had to surrender.¹ The Zamorin hoped that like the chieftain of Rayadrug he would be granted favourable terms. Calicut was occupied by Haidar who assured the Zamorin that Calicut would be returned to him after he had restored order and enforced obedience among the chiefs. He promised the Zamorin territorial integrity as a subordinate ally. But the Zamorin's nephew, his heir presumptive, still continued to resist. With a large number of Nairs he sustained many attacks. Haidar sent large bodies of cavalry against him. Haidar really intended permanently to annex the whole country as far as Ponnani. One of his generals, Hafizulla Khan, was beaten off with the loss of 300 men and 2 captains of topasses, one of them an Englishman. He was recalled and rebuked, after which he died of anguish. The Zamorin could not prevail over his nephew to stop his resistance, nor was he in a position to collect the amount he had promised to pay. He heard that Haidar was putting pressure upon his people for payment. Apprehending that he was no better than a prisoner, the Zamorin, with the help of 4 or 5 Pathans who were with him, had cloths soaked in oil with which he put fire to the house in which he was kept and burnt himself to death. The Zamorin's suicide, according to De La Tour, was due to a feeling of remorse caused by letters which he received from his nephew and the Kings of Travancore and Cochin containing the bitterest reproaches and execration.²

The Zamorin's nephew and family withdrew to Cranganore.³ The Dutch, however, advised the Cranganore chief to remain neutral. The conquest of the Zamorin's territory was completed about the middle of April as is proved by a letter of the

1 Peixoto.

2 De La Tour, p. 71.

3 Dutch record, No. 5. The Zamorin's family with 19 elephants took refuge in a pagoda in the state of Cranganore.

Dutch factors from Cranganore to Cochin, dated the 13th April, 1766. At Calicut Haidar made regulations for the government of the kingdom. He enlarged and improved it. In order to secure his hold, he established additional posts in different parts of the country and stored these with food and ammunition. A detachment of 3,000 regular infantry under Reza Ali was posted in Malabar to serve as a moving column. Aided by the Moplahs of Ali Raja, they were to maintain peace. The civil government of Malabar was entrusted to Madanna. Haidar withdrew to Coimbatore.

After they had been at Coimbatore for 25 days, news reached them of the rebellion in Malabar. Malabar had in reality been only half-subdued. The revenue measures of Madanna which were in violation of the customs of Malabar precipitated a crisis. It was too much to expect that the warlike Nairs would submit so tamely. The Zamorin princes came to the north from Cranganore with about 1,000 men. Their troops very soon increased to about 5,000. They marched to about 4 or 5 miles west of Ponnani, where they maintained their position. North of Calicut, the Kodattanad, Kolattiri and Kottayam chiefs collected about 25,000 men. Ali Raja was bottled up. The blockhouses that Haidar had built were cut off from reinforcements by the rivers which had swollen into torrents on account of rains. They were also cut off from the movable column at Calicut. News of this widespread rebellion reached Haidar Ali at Coimbatore, his agent at Ponnani succeeding in communicating the news by means of a Portuguese sailor, who ascended the river in a bamboo boat travelling only in the night.¹

Haidar prepared to return to Malabar in spite of the difficulty of the roads and the waterlogged condition of the paddy fields. He began his march at the height of the rainy season. The foot soldiers were to take nothing but blankets, without drums or colours. The horses had no saddles and the riders were to be as unencumbered as the horses. Even the Nawab was without saddles. No bazar could accompany the army. Elephants carried ammunition and provisions. 10,000

1 Peixoto, Book IV. Dutch record, No. 8.

infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 300 Europeans and 12 pieces of cannon advanced. The movable column of 3,000 left by Haidar in Malabar had been practically immobilised by the Nairs at the junction of the Tuta and Ponnani rivers, whence it could neither advance nor retreat. The Nair princes were overtaken by Haidar in a prepared position at Putiyangadi in the Ponnani *taluk*. They had entrenched their camp, fortified with a ditch and a parapet planted with palisades well-furnished with artillery. Though the first attack failed, the place was ultimately carried and the Nairs were completely routed. The Nairs were magnificent light troops in an ideal country for guerilla warfare but they were no match for disciplined troops in pitched battles. Peixoto, who accompanied Haidar in his Malabar expedition, records : "The Nairs are more afraid of 5 men on horseback than 500 sepoys. Many a time more than a hundred armed Nairs ran away before a single horseman. In the Malabar kingdoms there were no horses nor were they ever invaded by horse."¹ Organised resistance was now at an end. Haidar established his headquarters at Manjeri, in the midst of the Moplah fanatical zone. Thence his troops sallied forth, carrying fire and sword. Madanna and Raja Saheb formed two bodies to ravage all the Nair districts, killing all who were of the Nair caste, even women and children. The rate of payment was five rupees for the head of every able-bodied Nair, four for old men and three for women and children.² For captives brought alive the rate was the same. The troops were more eager to bring people alive, for that would save the trouble of carrying the heads. It has been said that about 4,000 in one village destroyed themselves. For those who were taken alive Haidar formed the plan of transplanting them to other parts of his dominions. The experiment was not a success. All these operations took about a month. Haidar then left Malabar, stationing Madanna at Coimbatore and Raja Saheb at Palghat, where he erected a fort to secure communication between Malabar and

1 De La Tour says (p. 68), "Haidar perfectly acquainted with the genius of all the people of India held himself assured of the victory and founded his expectation on his cavalry."

2 Peixoto, Book IV.

Coimbatore. Madanna was in charge of civil and Raja Saheb of military administration of Malabar.

After the conquest of South Malabar, Haidar naturally wanted to bring Cochin and Travancore also under his control. The Dutch power had declined. Martanda Varma, the famous King of Travancore (1729-1758), had defeated them completely at Colachel in 1741 and had put an end to Dutch dreams of conquering Malabar. The Dutch attitude towards the contending Malabar princes was henceforth one of nervous neutrality, which changed into one of 'servile subservience' towards the Mysore conqueror.¹ At Cochin and at Cranganore the Dutch still looked a formidable power. They had their forts and ships in those places. They did not betray any weakness in this region. Haidar was eager to be very friendly with the Dutch and the reasons are obvious. He hoped that they would be of some use to him against the British. The Dutch expressed a wish that the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore should be allowed to enjoy with them the friendship which the Nawab had expressed for them. Haidar's minister in charge of these negotiations advised the Dutch envoy at Cannanore to plead only for the security of Cochin in view of the Company's special interest there but not to mention Travancore as that would be disagreeable to Haidar. The Dutch envoy agreed. Haidar, on the other hand, assured the Dutch envoy that he would not alarm the Raja of Cochin provided that chieftain sent his envoys to make a settlement.² Regarding Travancore the Dutch were willing to negotiate with Haidar with only one end in view : as they had advanced large sums to Travancore for pepper their investments should remain undisturbed in case Haidar occupied Travancore. But about Cochin and Cranganore, the Dutch were willing to placate Haidar by all means in their power. These chieftains were very much dependent on the Dutch.³

Martanda Varma of Travancore had defeated the Dutch and, with the help of a Brahmin bureaucracy and a mercenary army and foreign experts like Fleming De Lannoy, had

1 Panikkar, *Malabar and the Dutch*.

2 Dutch records, No. 5 and No. 13.

3 Dutch records, No. 5 and No. 13.

made Travancore the greatest state on the Malabar coast. But we cannot be very enthusiastic about his political sense or his patriotism. When pressed hard by his enemies, he had at one time sought the aid of the Mughal governor of the Carnatic. Against the Dutch he had even approached Dupleix. It was his own speedy victories which had saved him ; otherwise his allies might have established their grip on Travancore. When Haidar was *Foujdar* of Dindigul, he had already established his reputation of being a good soldier who had resources that might be of use to Travancore if his alliance could be secured. Martanda Varma hard pressed by rebel chiefs in north Travancore, had invited him to come to his help. But peace was speedily restored. This foolish and unpatriotic proposal of Martanda Varma provided Haidar with his opportunity. He was willing to offer his assistance but Martanda Varma backed out, his chiefs having already made their submission. Haidar demanded compensation which was not paid and this partly explains Haidar's stiffness with regard to Travancore. Moreover, he could never feel secure in Malabar with Travancore unsubdued. Rama Varma, the successor of Martanda Varma, has been described as a prince in the true tradition of Malabar chivalry. When Haidar demanded of him 200,000 ducats and 10 elephants he refused to comply with these unreasonable demands.¹ He drew closer to Muhammad Ali and the British. The ruler of Travancore also enquired whether the Dutch Company would assist him in case he were attacked by the Nawab. The Dutch attitude was not, however, encouraging. The most effective reply of Rama Varma to Haidar's intended aggression was the completion of the celebrated Travancore lines, already begun by De Lannoy in 1764. The long line which De Lannoy built was easy to defend. It has been thus described by George Powney, the English East India Company's agent at Trivandrum, in a letter to the Government of Madras in 1790—"They run from west to east and extend to Annimalai mountains where they terminate on the top of one of them. The lines consist of a ditch about 16 feet broad and 20 feet deep with a thick bamboo hedge in it, a flight parapet and good rampart and bastions on rising

¹ Dutch records, No. 5 and No. 13.

grounds almost flanking each other. From one entrance of the lines to the other they are only assailable by regular approaches from the north."¹

Haidar was preparing for an attack on Travancore. He believed that the Nairs found their refuge in Travancore whence they emerged to create disturbances in his territories. But the defensive measures taken by Rama Varma against a possible attack by Haidar Ali made the subjugation of Travancore a very difficult proposition. Before Haidar could embark on this venture, he heard the news of the treaty between the Nizam and the English and the second invasion of Madhav Rao. He had to devote his whole attention to meet this menace. After the withdrawal of Madhav Rao came the First Anglo-Mysore War, which was followed by the third invasion of Madhav Rao. In 1769, however, Haidar overran seven villages at the foot of the Western Ghats on the north-western side of Travancore—Gudalur, Kambam, Puddupatti, Anumandanpatti, Kuchanur, Chakkayankottai and one half of Uttamapaliyam. These places had been conquered by Martanda Varma in 1756.² This shows that Haidar would not let slip any opportunity of injuring Travancore. But as a realist he could not overlook the fact that events elsewhere were more pressing. Travancore, therefore, had a respite.

While Haidar was engaged in his distant expeditions and at times suffering reverses, the hope of independence revived among the Nairs. They took several of Haidar's block houses and Haidar's lieutenants in Malabar were in constant alarm. Then came the British expedition to Mangalore, its initial success and its ultimate failure. The pressure of his difficulties made Haidar decide on abandoning Malabar. He was quite sure that he could reconquer it whenever he would be free from his difficulties. Madanna informed the chiefs that Haidar was going to give up Malabar if only the chiefs re-imbursed the expenses he had incurred. The Malabar chiefs paid the price willingly, the purchase, as

1 Travancore Resident's letter quoted by Panikkar. The Dutch Resident at Cranganore wrote on the 3rd June, 1769 that the *Dulwai* of the King of Travancore was seriously engaged in cutting down the forest trees, in order to make a line of defence up to the Cranganore river.

2 An extract received from the Director of Records, Travancore.

Wilks puts it, of a dream of independence.¹ Peixoto says that from the Zamorin Haidar received 1,200,000 rupees and his kingdom was delivered upon the 8th March, 1769.² This gives us an idea of the sums which other chieftains must have paid. The detachments of Haidar in Malabar would have been cut down. But this artifice enabled them to extricate themselves and return in triumph loaded with money. But Haidar left out Palghat and Cannanore in his negotiations. These places were calculated to serve as *points d'appui* in future.

After the murder of Narayan Rao on the 30th August 1773, and the end of Maratha aggression, Haidar embarked without misgivings on his plan for the reconquest of Malabar. To facilitate this reconquest he occupied Coorg and Wynad. Before this, his army had to go to Malabar either via Bidnur and North Kanara or via Coimbatore Palghat gap. Now a short direct road from his dominions was opened. Haidar erected the fort of Mercara in a central position in Coorg, almost midway on the road from Seringapatam to Mangalore. The Nair chiefs were too much divided among themselves to put up a concerted resistance.

Two of Haidar's officers, Syed Saheb and Srinivas Rao Barakki, advanced through Wynad descending on Calicut. It soon fell. The allied Nair chiefs were attacked from two sides. They had to fall back. The Zamorin withdrew to the hills in the interior. The other chieftains also took refuge in the mountain recesses. The Zamorin, who had retired to the south, thought of going to Travancore. He was not allowed by the Dutch to enter Cranganore. The King of Travancore did not want to embroil himself in these troubles by giving shelter to the Zamorin. But he eluded all vigilance, seized two boats and landed at Chertala in Travancore. He was there taken prisoner. The rulers of Cranganore and Cochin hastened to come to terms with Haidar and paid him heavy sums of money. Cochin paid Rs. 2,00,000 and Cranganore Rs. 5,00,000 in two instalments and 3 elephants. Haidar's people searched for the rumoured

1 Wilks, Vol. II, p. 61,

2 Peixoto, Book IV.

hidden treasures of the Zamorin at Cranganore. Very little was actually found. It has, however, been estimated by the Dutch that in this expedition of Haidar the forced contribution amounted to more than 10 lakhs and 90 elephants.¹ Travancore, though eager to give Haidar no offence, made no payment. Rumour went forth that Haidar would take the next favourable opportunity to enter Travancore. The Nair chiefs arranged their terms of dependence and Srinivas Rao Barakki was left as the Governor of the province.

Haidar's relations with the Portuguese on the Malabar coast have certain distinctive features. The Chief of Sunda, driven out of his dominions, surrendered to the Portuguese his possession below the ghats, comprising Ponda, Canacona, Cape Ramos, Sanguelim, Piro (Sadasivgad) and other important places. This was in 1764. We might naturally expect that Haidar would now attempt to secure these places from the Portuguese by force of arms, and the Portuguese at Goa were actually apprehensive. Haidar succeeded in taking Piro (Sadasivgad) and even besieged Cape Ramos (Cabo de Rama). The Portuguese had a sufficient number of troops to defend it. They also apprehended that Haidar would attack Anjidiva Isles whose fortifications were also improved. De La Tour informs us that the French officers, under him refused to fight with the Portuguese² and Haidar had to make peace with them as it was not possible for him to take the place without the help of his French engineers. A Portuguese record corroborates this statement of De La Tour to some extent. The secretary of state, Francisco Xavier de Medonca Furtado, was informed: "This new potentate, after conquering the whole kingdom of Sunda, came with a great army to attack the fortress of Cabo de Rama. I was compelled to take on my shoulders its defence which by the grace of God fortunately succeeded. The reputation of the royal army made the enemy withdraw after reaching close to the fortress."³ Haidar was thus compelled to conclude a peace with the Portuguese. He retained Piro

1 Dutch record, No. 13.

2 De La Tour, p. 59.

3 Portuguese Document, V.

(Sadasivgad). The Portuguese were courted both by Peshwa Madhav Rao and Haidar Ali while they were fighting with each other. The Peshwa expressed his desire to receive help from the Portuguese, proposed that the Maratha and Portuguese fleets together should wage war against Haidar in all his ports in Malabar and that he would offer, besides pay for the men, the lands he once took from the Portuguese in the north and future conquests would be shared equally between the two allies. Haidar on his part offered the help of his army through his general Faizulla Khan.¹ This is the Portuguese version of the negotiations. The Portuguese succeeded in maintaining their neutrality.

Portuguese trade in Haidar's dominions in Malabar was not inconsiderable. Before Haidar's conquest of south Kanara they had a factory in the port of Mangalore which was fortified with artillery and a military garrison. The Portuguese subjects traded freely in Mangalore and other ports in Kanara. Bidnur gave them a concession in the prices for rice and the Portuguese missionaries had a free and safe entry in that kingdom. The Portuguese ran a brisk trade in chillis besides exporting rice from Haidar's territories because the local produce of this staple commodity did not suffice for more than six months. To maintain friendly relations with the Portuguese Haidar restored to them their factory and trade privileges in Mangalore. But in 1768, when the British attacked Mangalore the Portuguese were reported to have given them a free entrance through their factory. When the British captured the battery of the bar, Shaikh Ali, the governor, ordered the Portuguese captain to open fire against the English, holding out threats that otherwise he would be arrested and the fortifications of his factories would be sealed. But Cunha Cusmao, who was in charge of the factory, recruited many Portuguese and Indians to defend

1 Portuguese Document, VII. A Dutch record gives us an information not corroborated by any other source—"The Rajahs of Molondin, Bonsol de Maratas and Sunda with the aid of the Portuguese had combined their forces and had joined to resist Haidar Ali Khan and that on a place far from the frontier of Goa between the allies and the forces of Haidar Ali, a naval battle had taken place and that the Nabob had suffered the greatest loss."

the factory against the Governor and sent information to the English where to embark with the least risk to safety and gave them assurances of help. But when the English conquered the port and the land they took away from Cunha Cusmao his sepoy and retinue and compelled him to pull down the Portuguese flag. He was removed from his post and sent to Goa.¹

The Portuguese gave Haidar another provocation.² They apprehended that the English would try to take Piro (Sadavivgad) belonging to the Nawab and they heard that there was a proposal of an Anglo-Maratha alliance and a possible division of maritime ports. They thought that they could not allow Piro to fall into the hands of the English or the Marathas without bringing ruin to Goa. Therefore they made a very clumsy attempt to occupy Piro with a view to embarrassing the British. This was an outrage which Haidar had every right to resent. But Haidar really desired to retain the friendship of the Portuguese and on the Portuguese making their apologies, an order was sent to Shaikh Ali which permitted the Portuguese to establish their factory in Mangalore. The restitution was complete and the factory at Mangalore yielded them an income of 16,253 Xerafins. Haidar even permitted the vicars of the church to have all their old liberties and one of the clauses of the new agreement provided that "The voluntary wish of any gentile to become a Christian should not be objected to on the part of the Sarcar."³ Haidar went further and released the five priests he had imprisoned for their pro-English attitude.

But in 1776 Haidar suddenly revoked all these privileges ; he stopped the Portuguese merchantships, confiscated the cargo, arrested the crew and sent them to be employed in the public works.⁴ He brought down the Portuguese banner from the factory at Mangalore, imprisoned the factors, as also the Portuguese garrison, and removed their artillery. Some years elapsed before he would agree to receive a Portuguese

1 Portuguese Document, XIII

2 Portuguese Document, XVII.

3 Portuguese Document, XXXI.

4 Portuguese Document, LXXXII.

envoy. He was then on his march against the British. He enumerated his grievances against the Portuguese, accused them of being pro-British and demanded an alliance against the British people as a condition precedent to the restoration of privileges. He had another string to his bow. The exiled King of Sunda had died in Goa. The guardians of his minor son were won over and Haidar proposed to restore to the boy King his ancestral dominions. As Martinho de Melo e Casto commented in his letter to the Governor of Goa, "It is necessary for a man to lose his faculties of reasoning to believe these professions of Haidar." Of course Haidar had no intention of really restoring the boy King to his possessions; the boy King of Sunda in his custody would give Haidar a convenient pretext for attacking Goa with a view to reconquering for his ward that part of Sunda which had been dismembered by the Portuguese. The boy King was not, however, allowed to go out of Portuguese territory. The Portuguese could not conclude an offensive alliance with Haidar in view of the existence of an alliance between the English and the Portuguese in Europe. But even Martinho de Melo e Casto is constrained to comment in the following words: "We ought to yield to the obligation of defending the port of Mangalore. This was what we had to do once we were established there even if we would not abide by any treaty. If this was not done in 1768, it was only on account of the mean perfidy and pusillanimity we acted with on that occasion when our Portuguese factor allowed them to enter through the factory and went to attack treacherously the stronghold of Piro under the fictitious pretext of occupying the same in order to defend it. From this abominable deception we will have to bear contempt and humiliation which Haidar Ali Khan characterised the Portuguese nation with."¹

With the Dutch on the western coast² Haidar had much to do and he hoped that he would be able to enlist their support

1 Portuguese Document, LXXXII.

2 Dutch Records, No. 5 & 13, and letters from Cochin—5th Oct., 17th Nov., 17th Dec., 1775; 3rd Aug., 3rd Oct., 31st Oct., 28th Nov., 21st Dec., 1781.

against the British. In 1763 an envoy of Haidar came to Cochin on his way to Ceylon and the Dutch agreed to look after the envoy on his voyage to Ceylon. The Dutch took advantage of this to draw Haidar's attention to their privileges in Kanara. When it became apparent to them that Haidar was determined to conquer Colastrye, the Dutch, while congratulating him on his victories, drew his attention to their privileges and mentioned the sums which they had advanced to the chiefs and to Ali Raja. But so long as Haidar did not extend his territories beyond Kanara, they were not very willing to supply Haidar with arms and ammunition. As rice was Kanara's only produce and as the Dutch Company did not intend establishing more offices between Surat and Cochin, the Dutch did not think it worth while to cultivate sedulously the goodwill of their potent neighbour. But the onward advance of Haidar changed the Dutch attitude. The Dutch governor of Cannanore had been hitherto very careful not to give any offence to Haidar. He would not plead even on behalf of the Prince Regent of Colastrye lest Haidar might be displeased. The Mysore chief was willing to be on friendly terms with the Dutch and he even agreed to pay the money which the Dutch Company had advanced to the chiefs for pepper, "though he had refused this to the French and the British." The Dutch were assured of the enjoyment of their existing privileges. But Haidar's counter-proposals were significant. He said that he had heard that the Dutch had their difference with Muhammad Ali Khan which might lead to war. In that case he proposed to help them with an army of 30,000 and his entire fleet, provided they agreed to help him in his need. The Dutch avoided these commitments. It was too much to expect that the Dutch would embark on a war with the British merely to accommodate Haidar.

The Dutch policy was to keep Haidar in good humour without offending any other power. The best and largest elephants from Ceylon, carpenters and blacksmiths to build ships for him at Calicut as also military stores were supplied by them to Haidar. But Sardar Khan, Haidar's governor at Calicut, was not willing to recognise the Dutch claim that the Cranganore chief was their vassal. Sardar Khan even attacked Cranganore whence he was repulsed. The Dutch

complained, "he is acting as an enemy who has declared war."¹

When Haidar was for the second time at war with the English, the Dutch were also at war with the English in Europe. Haidar sent assistance to the Dutch at Negapatam. He entered into an agreement to live in close alliance and friendship with the Dutch on the Coromandal coast. Haidar also offered to help the Dutch on the Malabar coast with his troops. They declined active military help. They said, "The King of Travancore is a faithful ally of the Dutch, the fort of Cranganore has a strong garrison. The King of Cochin is a faithful ally. We do not need the help of your troops which you so kindly offered." They were, however, eager to settle the existing differences with the Government of Mysore regarding their rights over Cranganore and other places. The Dutch tried to help him as much as they could by providing him with information and furnishing him with military supplies. But the British command of the seas stood in the way of their being more helpful. In November, 1781 Haidar wrote to the Dutch authorities for the supply of 24-pounders. They replied that they had no 24-pounders but they were ready to send two 18-pounders with 100 balls but on account of the proximity of the English war ships, Haidar must carry them.

This brings us to a consideration of Haidar's naval power. We have already drawn attention to the strength of Haidar's navy at the time of the Malabar expedition of 1766 and to the immense service which it rendered in that expedition. Ali Raja of Cannanore is said to have conquered the Maldive Islands and blinded its King. For his cruelty Haidar deprived him of the command of his fleet² with which alone he might have conquered the Maldives, and appointed Stannett in his place. The Moplahs were great navigators and they formed

1 This movement of Sardar Khan was intended to threaten Travancore. North Cochin was overrun and Trichur fort captured. But the Travancore lines stopped further advance and the next few years were wasted in fruitless negotiations for an alliance and for a free passage through the Dutch territory along the coast. *Gazetteer Malabar and Anjengo Districts*.

2 De La Tour, p. 63.

an excellent crew to man the ships that Haidar built. But the difficulty was about command. The fleet, according to Peixoto, had two commanders, Stannett and Latif Ali Beg. In 1768, when the Bombay Government sent a squadron of ships with 400 European troops and a large number of sepoys to attack Haidar's seaports on the Malabar coast, Haidar's naval power completely collapsed. The British ships appeared off Onore. Latif Ali Beg was not liked by Stannett and the latter took the earliest opportunity of joining the English with two ships, two grabs and ten gallivats. Though the British expedition miserably failed on land, Haidar's navy met with an untimely end. Wilks and Low attribute this desertion of the English commandant to his disgust with the superintendence of Latif Ali Beg, formerly a cavalry officer. Wilks, however, adds that this desertion was in conformity to a previous pact.¹ We must not forget that the treachery (*dāgābāzi*, to use the language of Jaswant Rao Holkar) of a European officer in the employment of an Indian power was a rule rather than an exception in India of the 18th century. S. N. Sen's conjecture is that Haidar appointed Latif Ali Beg as a joint commander because he could not implicitly trust the Englishman.

Undaunted by his first failure Haidar attempted to build and equip a new fleet in his sea ports. William Townshend from Onore reported in October, 1775, that at Onore Haidar's craftsmen were working as speedily as possible. The shipbuilding programme² there included the following :

One Grab—	103½	feet keel		
„ „ —	56¼	„ „		
„ „ —	54	„ „		
„ „ —	98	„ „		
„ „ —	72	„ „		
One Gallivat—	52	„ „		

According to Portuguese reports in 1778, Haidar was for the second time building a large fleet. He ordered the construction of sailing ships in all places on the coast where such work could be undertaken. He is said to have offered very

1 Wilks, Vol. II, p. 58

2 Secret Proceedings, 12th February, 1776. Letter from Onore, 3rd Oct., 1775.

favourable terms to Colen Dinamarquez, a distinguished shipbuilder of Goa. But the patriotic shipbuilder declined the offer in order to serve his own state.¹

He approached the Dutch in 1775 for more carpenters and blacksmiths to build ships for him at Calicut. In December, 1778, he had eight three-masted ships carrying 28 to 40 pieces of artillery and many other ships of smaller tonnage. In the Gulf of Bhatkol, he began to build a huge mole where at full tide a large fleet would find it easy to anchor. He also planned a large enclosure for merchants. He entrusted the execution of this ambitious scheme to a Dutchman named Jose Azalares. The estimated cost was 17 lakhs of pagodas. The work was not, however, finished and the scheme was far too ambitious. In 1780, Sir Edward Hughes entered Mangalore harbour and destroyed two ships, a large grab, 3 ketches and many small vessels at anchor. Thus Haidar's second attempt to build a navy failed completely.²

Referring to Haidar's attempt to establish navigation on the Tunga, Buchanan says, "I doubt not that Haidar's lighters of 8 ton burthen were found very useless. The attempt is, however, no impeachment on the sagacity of Haidar, who having been educated in a place remote from every kind of navigation, could have no idea of what boats could perform, nor of what obstacles would prevent their utility." Haidar's own ignorance of navigation placed him at a great disadvantage in his attempts to build up a navy. His technical advisers were European adventurers who could not be expected to have the necessary zeal in his cause. It would also be idle to expect that Haidar would so soon be able to build a navy strong enough to cope with the British. If he had a comparatively longer period of peace, he might have with his energy and resources made some real progress and given the English a fair fight. As it was, his first clash came only four years after he had begun his shipbuilding experiment and the second after a preparation of only 5 or 6 years. Where the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French failed, he could not expect an easy success, nor had he had the necessary respite.

1 Portuguese Document, XXI.

2 Low—*History of the Indian Navy*, Vol, I, Sen—*Studies in Indian History*, pp. 146-54.

CHAPTER XVIII

Relations with the British, 1775-1779

In 1775, Haidar informed the ambassadors of Muhammad Ali that as their master did not wish for his friendship, it was Haidar's duty to be upon his guard and take measures on his own part.¹ After this, every year Muhammad Ali would report the progress of Haidar's preparations and the certainty of his invasion. But his predictions came to be treated with ridicule by the Madras Council which regarded these repeated warnings as merely false alarms. The only consequence of all this was that the Madras Government affected to disbelieve the news service of Muhammad Ali and remained utterly unprepared.

But Haidar was true to his word and made no secret of his attitude or of his preparations. The chaos prevalent in Maharastra gave him respite from the annual Maratha inroads and he could take Ratnagiri and Bellary. It was now apparent to everybody that he would next attempt to take Gooty from Murar Rao, Adoni from Basalat Jang and Kurnul from its *foujdar*. These chieftains were naturally uneasy and were anxious to enter into an alliance with the British. Muhammad Ali argued, "There is no time to be lost, for should Haidar get possession of Cuddapa and bring the neighbouring sardars under subjection, it may then be too late to attempt to stop him".² He thus gave sufficient warning, but in 1776 the Government of Madras would not raise a finger in support of Murar Rao, when Haidar was besieging Gooty. After a prolonged siege Haidar took it and sent Murar Rao and his family to his state prison. Three years later, when mutually recriminatory letters were passing between Haidar and the Madras Governor, the latter wrote, "If I were disposed to complain, you have furnished me with ample grounds in the reduction of Murar Rao, who

1 Secret Proceedings, 23rd Oct., 1775 : The verbal narration of Ali Nawaz Khan.

2 Translation of a letter from Nawab to Governor Wynch, 4th December, 1775.

was included in the treaty of 1769 as our friend and ally and by your proceedings against the zamindars of Cuddapa and Kurnul with respect to Basalat Jang, against whom I also hear you have some designs."¹ Perhaps conscious of the impolicy of having allowed Haidar to overpower Murar Rao, the Government of Fort St. George showed the greatest zeal in supporting Basalat Jang, thereby alienating the Nizam. They thus sought to make up for a sin of omission by a sin of commission. But chronologically the episode of Basalat Jang comes later.

The Maratha preoccupation lasted up to the end of May, 1778. Haidar had not the opportunity, even if he had the inclination, to face the British at this time. There was partial identity of interest as both Haidar Ali and the British supported Raghunath Rao against the ministerial party. This was undoubtedly an opportunity to bind him closely as an ally. But the aspect of affairs was altogether very unfavorable for the British. The President and Council of Fort St. George wrote, "Haidar has long solicited and even importuned this Government to enter into a close union with him but the consideration of temporary inconvenience arising from the terms of such a union, which could only be founded upon agreements of mutual assistance and support, has hitherto obstructed the measure and Haidar has been consequently left in difficulty and distress to seek aid of foreign nations particularly the French. The reluctance on our part to accept the repeated offers made by Haidar at a time when our assistance might have been useful to him will no doubt render it more difficult to obtain assistance or at least a neutral conduct on his part."²

The President and Council of Bombay proposed in a letter, dated 9th May, 1778, to appoint a Resident at the court of Haidar Ali to penetrate and counteract French and Dutch designs. The French and the Dutch maintained Residents at the court of Haidar Ali. But even in this matter there was some difficulty as it was necessary to bring Muhammad Ali to consent to it. In a letter written from Bengal to Madras,

1 Secret Proceedings, 13th May, 1779.

2 Secret Proceedings, 10th August, 1778.

we read, "We request you will use your endeavour to convince him of the appointment, to obviate any jealousy it might create." The Madras Government naturally argued that considering the situation of Haidar with respect to the Carnatic and the Company's possessions on the coast, it was better to send an intelligent person from the Madras Presidency to reside at Haidar's court than from Bombay.¹

But now the British and the French found themselves at war and this introduced a complicating factor in Anglo-Mysore relations. Had not the British commenced this war with so great a superiority by occupying Pondichery in October, 1778, Haidar who was so strongly inclined in favour of the French might have taken a more decisive attitude from the beginning. To keep Haidar neutral amidst so many enemies opposed to the British, it was necessary to preserve the superiority of British arms and to be thoroughly prepared for any contingency. But the disastrous retreat of Talegaon and the Convention of Wargaon showed such a glaring weakness on the western front that Haidar's attitude stiffened and more so because he fully knew how unprepared the Madras Government was. The Government of Madras was not altogether unconscious of this aspect of affairs. As early as the beginning of 1777, the President and Council of Fort St. George wrote, "We have resolved on the increase of the number of our battalions by reducing the present establishment of 1,000 men in each to 700, which will enable us to garrison the forts of the Nabob under our charge and take the field at a short notice with 2 battalions of Europeans, 3 companies of artillery and 9 battalions of Sepoys. But troops cannot be maintained, military operations cannot be conducted without money and herein we fear we should fail. The very report of a force of 1,500 Europeans and 12,000 black troops assembled with the means of payment in our treasury would command respect from all and would be likely to deter any from attempting to disturb the Carnatic."² But diagnosis is not cure. The same Government reported in February, 1779, "It is certain that we are by no means in a condition with respect to resources ever to

1 Secret Proceedings, 25th June, 1778.

2 Secret Proceedings, 20th January, 1777.

oppose any powerful attempts either of the French or of Haidar Ali.¹ Even then Haidar might not have been free to begin a war with the British had not the escape of Raghoba from the custody of Sindhia to General Goddard's camp induced the ministerial party at Poona to change their attitude to Haidar and enter into an offensive alliance against the English.

The British expedition to Mahe has been regarded as one of the events that precipitated the Second Anglo-Mysore War. Mahe was a French possession through which Haidar received his military supplies. When the British expedition under Braithwaite was sent, Haidar's *vakil* formally acquainted the President of Madras that his master looked upon the settlement of Mahe together with all the settlements on the Malabar coast as under his protection. Haidar himself wrote, "In my country there are factories belonging to the English, Dutch, Portuguese and the French. Besides these there are many merchants here who are considered as my subjects. If any one entertains designs against those traders, I will without doubt take the best and most considerable methods to give them assistance."² The British Government could not be expected to acquiesce in this. The question, however, was one of expediency and the Madras Government quite logically argued, "It became a question with us whether it would be safe or prudent to pursue this expedition we had set on foot against Mahe. We saw the additional risk to which it was exposed and the inconvenience of sending such a body of troops at this time out of the Carnatic but we perceived also the particular advantages that would result from the successful execution of our measures. We saw that this was the only opportunity that might offer for removing the disadvantageous impressions which have been occasioned everywhere by the late defeat, that the appearance of diffidence and timidity on this occasion would strengthen and confirm these impressions and probably operate more to our prejudice than any failure that would happen from the prosecution of the enterprise, and lastly that the withdrawing of our troops would be inevitably followed

1 Secret Proceedings, 18th March, 1779.

2 Secret Proceedings, 18th March, 1779. Letter from Haidar Ali to the Governor.

by the capture of our settlement at Tellicherry which, though perhaps not important in itself, would in the eyes of the country powers be considered as a victory of no small consequence to the French and perhaps induce those now wavering to declare openly in their favour.”¹ Mahe fell on the 19th March, 1779, in spite of the fact that Haidar’s troops assisted in its defence and his flag had been hoisted on it. But it must be admitted that even if the British had withdrawn from Mahe in view of the protest of Haidar, that would not have prevented the war, made almost inevitable by other causes unconnected with the French war.

Another incident which is said to have precipitated the Second Anglo-Mysore War was the stipulation of the Government of Fort St. George for the unconditional defence of Basalat Jang. The facts may be thus briefly narrated. Basalat Jang, a brother of Nizam Ali, was in the enjoyment of his *jagir* of Adoni, Guntur and other places. As he was suspected of being very pro-French and the treaty between Nizam Ali and the British entailed Guntur on the East India Company on the demise of Basalat Jang, the Government of Fort St. George was authorised by the Government of Bengal to take steps to remove the French influence from the court of Basalat Jang. Though approaches were made to Nizam Ali, no further steps were taken until December, 1778, when the President and Council of Fort St. George, in consequence of overtures made by Basalat Jang, “proposed an agreement for farming the Guntur Sircar during his life and for obtaining the dismissal of French troops in his service by supplying their place in the protection of his country by detachments of the Company’s forces.”² But in this excessive eagerness to foil the French they did not take cognizance of other circumstances relating to Basalat Jang. This loose condition of defending the other possessions of Basalat Jang was what created difficulties. In order to give his assistance for the protection of Adoni and Raichur threatened by Haidar’s onward march, the Government of Fort St. George ordered a company and a half of European artillery, 2 companies of infantry and 4 battalions of sepoys.

1 Secret Proceedings, 1st March, 1779, pp. 326-27.

2 Secret Proceedings, 20th March, 1780, p. 415.

"But the route of this army by the province of Cuddapa and Kurnul amounting to at least 200 miles road distance was across the territories of two powers, namely, Haidar and Nizam Ali, and no previous notice had been given nor permission obtained to pass a military force through these territories. Naturally the Nizam and Haidar Ali appeared extremely jealous of these proceedings and used all their endeavours with Basalat Jang to make him keep the Guntur Sircar in his own hands and stop the march of troops. The Nizam went so far as to propose in strong terms to his brother that his district should be given at rent to Haidar and Haidar, with a view to terrifying him, invaded his country with a considerable force and threatened the entire conquest of it if he hesitated to break off his agreement with the Company. Basalat Jang submitted to the will of the powerful chiefs and the march was countermanded."¹ But it cannot be denied that this incredible bungling, besides making British opposition too patent to Haidar, served also to alienate the Nizam. The reasons are not difficult to find. "The brothers in the despotic Governments of India are all pretenders to the masnad, despotism being only supported by a few of the great military servants of the prince and by their envy and mutual suspicions of each other. There is foundation for jealousy and Basalat Jang being a prince of the governing family, the Nawab will never be easy while British troops remain with him. A proper provision of jagir and personal security may be guaranteed to him. But as long as a party continues with him, it will be difficult either to satisfy the Nawab's pride or remove his suspicions. Haidar is no less jealous of our getting a footing in Adoni, having marked that country as a quarry for the first favourable opportunity."² Thus it is apparent that this was the most impolitic step in the whole course of transactions and was undoubtedly largely responsible for stiffening the attitude of Haidar and Nizam Ali. The British method of dealing with him further exasperated Haidar. He told the British *vakil* Srinivas Rao later that in the course of three years he must have written to Banaji Pant, his own *vakil* at Arcot, a hundred times that he wanted to

1 Secret Proceedings, 20th March, 1780, p. 416.

2 Secret Proceedings, 14th February, 1780, p. 240.

preserve peace. But every day brought to him news of a fresh dispute on the frontier of Dindigul. He threatened that he would enter the Carnatic, waste the whole country and burn and reduce all to ashes. But in reply the Madras Government referred to Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Ali again referred back to the Madras Government.

Haidar recapitulated his grievances against the Government of St. George in the following terms : "Your territories lie contiguous to mine from Dindigul to Cuddapa and continual disturbances are raised by you in my country. The chief of Telicherry gives protection to the Nairs dependent upon me, keeps their families in his factories, assists them with lead, powder, firearms and commits disorder in my country. When you are thus acting in this unruly manner what treaty subsists between you and me or which of us has violated it ?"¹

Let us review the principles of Haidar's foreign policy, so far as it concerned the British. In his early years his close association with the French gave him an anti-British bias. Their attitude during the critical years 1760-61 was not conducive to better relationship. When they suddenly joined the Nizam against Haidar, he was surprised and antagonised but he turned the table on them, won over the Nizam, cornered them, and dictated his terms at the gates of Madras. As a realist, however, he must have felt that a defensive alliance with the British must be the mainstay of his foreign policy. The Nizam was entirely undependable and in any case, not a strong pillar of support. The Maratha was the principal enemy who had twice defeated him and seized valuable territory from him. In these circumstances, British military power might be utilised in a defensive alliance against the Marathas. But the third Maratha invasion convinced him that there was no reliance on British promises. The Madras Government was shifty, intractable and absolutely undependable. Even then he tried his utmost to court Muhammad Ali and to bring about a closer rapprochement. He could feel that the Maratha menace could not be countered in any other way. But Muhammad Ali and the British were in no mood to meet his advances. Failing to win them over and disgusted with

1 Secret Proceedings, 8th May, 1710, p. 607.

their exasperating delay, their shifts and their subterfuges, he decided to abandon once for all his futile policy of trying to make friends with them. But it was not possible for him to remain aloof from the momentous happenings in the south and to throw two bridges across, one to Poona, another to Madras. Once it became apparent that the British were not going to join him in a defensive alliance against the Marathas, he had to reckon with the prospect of their joining an offensive alliance against him in future. That possibility must for ever be eliminated and here was the grand opportunity which the first Anglo-Maratha War provided. As the Court of Directors put in their despatch, "Grown to a formidable height of power, with a genius so aspiring, reasons so various, his authority throughout every part of his dominions so completely established, he became an object of first importance in the political system of India."¹ The Marathas with a better sense of the realities of the situation naturally drew near him and the active anti-Maratha phase of his career ended. War with the British being more or less inevitable after this, the main preoccupation of his life, as that of his son later on, was to crush the British. Haidar became convinced that he must make a supreme effort in this direction, in alliance with the Marathas and the Nizam if possible, without them if necessary. As he told a British ambassador later, he decided to expunge the English name from the Carnatic.² It became the dominant motive of his life henceforth and determined every military venture, every diplomatic move.

The capture of Mahe by the British, the Basalat Jang affair, the boundary disputes, the friction in Malabar—all these exasperated and perhaps contributed to the growth of the anti-British frame of mind but Haidar never allowed his feelings to influence his policy. As Wilks put in another connection, "Everything was weighed in the balance of utility." We are told that Haidar later regretted this change of policy. If this was so, it must be put on record that perhaps no change of policy was, before adoption, better calculated or more carefully pondered over.

1 Military Dept.—Despatches from England, 3rd April, 1780.

2 Forest, *Selections*, Vol. II. Proceedings, 26th Aug. 1782.

CHAPTER XIX

The Diplomatic Background, 1779-1782

The four chief powers interested in the Deccan and South India were Haidar Ali, the Nizam, the Marathas and the British. Of these the weakest and least aggressive was Nizam Ali who could gain little by war and wished to steer, as far as possible, an inoffensive course between conflicting interests. The Maratha state was a loose confederacy of principalities the rulers of which often had different, if not incompatible, aims and pursued independent policies. Their power or ambition, however, extended in varying measures from the west coast to the east and from the Ganges to beyond the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. The wide range of their influence as well as their central position made them a danger to all the British Governments, Bengal, Bombay and Madras as well as to the Nizam and Haidar. The confirmation of Haidar's power depended on security against both the British and the Marathas. He realized very clearly that his resources were not equal to a war on two fronts and that the first condition of success in a war against the British was the alliance or at least the neutrality of the Marathas. Fortunately for him, just at this time events played into his hands and led to the conclusion of the Maratha-Mysore alliance. This momentous diplomatic revolution was a very remarkable event in Indian history though it failed in the end to attain its objective.

At the court of Poona Raghunath Rao had lost credit as it was felt that his conduct 'had invariably tended to dissension, loss or dishonour'. Nana Farnavis came to power and although it was some time before he got rid of rivals like Sakharam Bapu and Moraba Farnavis, by June or July 1778 his influence was securely established and he became the director of Maratha foreign policy. He also played the role of the Peshwa in preserving the link of interest which bound the Maratha confederacy. The British would naturally have preferred a more pliant chief such as Raghunath Rao. They perhaps expected him to play in Western India the part that Mir Jafar had

played in Bengal and Muhammad Ali in the Carnatic. Raghunath Rao's weakness had been revealed in 1776 when the Treaty of Surat, concluded between the Bombay Government and Raghunath Rao, was set aside by the Bengal Government and the Treaty of Purandhar concluded with the ministerial party. Raghunath Rao had gone so far as to offer to cede to the British the whole Konkan, to put the Company's troops in possession of one of the passes of the Ghats and give it the right of Sardeshmukhi over the jagirs in the Maratha Empire.¹ This explains the ardour of the Bombay Government in the cause of Raghoba. "Their passions were enlisted in his cause" wrote Hastings, "it was in effect their own."² Holland, the British representative at Hyderabad, wrote, "His Highness is apprehensive that our establishing Raghunath Rao in the possession of the Poona Government will be but a prelude to our attacking his own possession. He conceives that our connection with the Maratha chief extends to our engaging in hostilities against him".³

Hastings himself realized perhaps that Raghoba was too unpopular to recover or retain power. He had, however, his own candidate in Mudhoji Bhonsle of Nagpur. The interference he intended in Maratha affairs differed from that designed by the Bombay Government only in the person of the puppet. He knew that there was a line of cleavage in the Maratha confederacy. The Bhonsles of Nagpur had almost systematically ranged themselves on the side of the enemies of the Peshwa. Elliot, private Secretary to Warren Hastings, was sent to negotiate a treaty in 1778 but died on the way. Negotiations were renewed through Weatherston in January, 1779 but Mudhoji had no wish to go to war with Poona and used the British offer merely to bargain. Hastings soon realized his error and abandoned this scheme which Grant Duff has characterised as "unjust, inconsistent, complicated and injudicious."

1 Grant Duff, Vol. II, p. 323.

2 *Ibid*, p. 361.

3 M. M. C., 13th Sept., 1779, pp. 1301-1307.

Nana Farnavis sensed the danger inherent in British policy towards the Maratha State whether it emanated from Bombay or from Calcutta. As he sought to thwart British attempts to raise puppets in the Maratha State he became gradually more and more conscious of the British menace to the stability of the Maratha state.

Fear and suspicion were deepened by the presence at Poona of a French adventurer St. Lubin. He had arrived in November, 1777. The British were always apprehensive of French designs to re-establish their power in India and at this time relations between the two countries in Europe were strained. On behalf of the Peshwa, the Governor-General was informed that "the French envoy did not come at the request of the writer but under orders of his sovereign, a fact which entitled him to the greatest respect. He could not therefore be summarily dismissed. The writer had to wait till he himself applied for permission to depart."¹ But the explanation did not dispel British fears. In preparation for a French war which was daily expected² an army under Colonel Leslie was sent overland to Kalpi to strengthen the forces of the Bombay government. In May, 1778 Leslie crossed the Jumna and marched through Maratha territory. The British representative at Poona applied to the *Darbar* as well as to Sindhia and Holkar for passports to facilitate the march. The Peshwa replied, "The Governor-General should have first informed him of the desire of sending a detachment of the English forces and on receiving his answer should have fixed its route. From time immemorial none of the Company's forces have ever passed overland. It was only proper that the English detachment should have taken the established route to its destined post."³ But Hastings replied that he could not agree to recall the troops as long as Bombay needed them.⁴ Col. Leslie put

1 C. P. G. Vol. V, no. 972—This Frenchman finally quitted Poona on the 12th July, 1778. In any case after the secure establishment of Nana Farnavis in power there was no reason to think that the French were receiving any encouragement from the Maratha Government.

2 On the 7th August, 1778 the Government of Bengal received official intelligence of the war.

3 C. P. C. V, 1080.

4 *Ibid.* 1227.

garrisons in the forts and made collections in the Maratha territory. This provoked and alarmed the Poona Government, which had other serious complaints—that not even one article of the Treaty of Purandhar had been fulfilled and that the British had given asylum to Raghunath Rao and fomented sedition in the Peshwa's dominions.¹ War was now inevitable.

On the 1st January a British army of about 5,000 men accompanied by Raghunath Rao advanced towards Poona. It approached within 20 miles but was obliged to retreat in the presence of superior forces and compelled on the 14th January to sign the Convention of Wargaon. The troops were allowed to return leaving hostages and Raghunath Rao gave himself up to Mahadji Sindhia. The Convention was repudiated by the Bombay Government and Colonel Goddard, who had succeeded Leslie, succeeded in reaching Surat before the end of February. Negotiations were renewed for a treaty on the basis of that of Purandhar with some additional safeguards against the French.² But the Bombay Government, with the approval of the Supreme Government, now wished to take up the cause of Fateh Singh Gaikwad. British policy of interference in Maratha affairs sought fresh openings and never missed an opportunity of taking advantage of division among the Marathas. The Marathas, on the other hand, elated by their victory demanded the evacuation of Salsette. The Nizam was friendly to them and his chief councillor Muin-ud-Daula was pro-Maratha. He had also great influence over Mudhoji Bhonsle, the ruler of Berar, through his Dewan Divakar Pandit. At this

1 Since the departure of John Upton everything was in suspension and Thomas Mostyn who was British representative at Poona replied to Nana Farnavis that he was unable to see him without an order from the Governor of Bombay. *Ibid.* 1222.

2 The Poona Government were expecting all the while the secure establishment of Anglo-Maratha friendship and were thinking of sending their full force against Haidar Ali. With Raghunath Rao in Mahadji Sindhia's custody they perhaps felt that the English would have no pretext of renewing the war. But their diplomacy also showed evidence of their awareness of possibilities of conflict. They were in correspondence with Haidar Ali. They demanded arrear peshcush from him and invited him to join his forces against the English. Haidar is said to have remarked soon after receiving a letter from the Poona ministers that a cloud of misfortune seemed to break on the head of the English.—C. P. C. VI, 7.

moment, Raghunath Rao eluded his guard, fled towards Broach and reached Goddard's camp on the 12th June. The British welcomed him and gave him princely *nazr* and a generous allowance. The Marathas demanded his surrender and the cession of Salsette. The position during these critical months, July to September, 1779 was thus described later by Mudhoji Bhonsle : "When Raghunath Rao fled from the custody of Mahadji Sindhia and joined Colonel Goddard at Surat Divakar Pandit happened to be in Poona at that time. The Peshwa's minister told him that at one time they were faced with two enemies : Haidar Ali, who was usurping their territory in the South and the English who were fighting in Raghunath's cause. They asked his opinion regarding the best way to meet the situation. The Pandit told them that they ought to make friends with the English and together oppose Haidar Ali. The ministers agreed and negotiations were immediately opened with Colonel Goddard only to meet with failure. Having no alternative they came to an understanding with their old foe Haidar Ali."¹ Towards the end of the monsoon of 1779 Goddard informed the Bombay Government of the report of a general confederacy of the Marathas, the Nizam and Haidar. The Nabob of Arcot also wrote in September, 1779 on this league—The Nizam "is making a peace with Haidar and is in alliance with the Poona minister."² There has been some controversy as to who took the initiative. Hastings reproached Nizam Ali later that "by his connivance and at his instigation the Marathas and Haidar Ali were confederates."³ But it seems likely that Haidar made the first overtures to the Peshwa. Such was the report of Muhammad Ali's agents. The Marathas gave no definite reply for some time expecting the British to accept their terms. But as soon as they discovered that the Bombay Government would not yield, they hastened to close with Haidar's offer. From the despatches of the Maratha envoys at Seringapatam we learn that the alliance was formed in the month of Aswin

1 C. P. C., VI, 7.

2 *Ibid.*, V., 1607.

3 *Ibid.* VI. 63.

(September-October).¹ The next object of Nana Farnavis was to bring in the Nizam. He had grievances against the British at this time and the demand of the Madras Government for the remission of the *peshcush* of the Northern Sarkars (June 1779), their treaty with Basalat Jang (April) and the subsequent march of Colonel Harper's force through the territories of the Nizam and Haidar deepened his resentment. The Madras Government provoked the Nizam further by letting the Guntur Sarkar to the Nawab of Arcot.²

The Nizam himself thus described the situation : "The rulers of Poona..are attached to me..Mudhoji Bhonsle is my ally and is as one with the rulers of Poona and Haidar Naik who entertains enmity against the English Company having lately entered into a treaty with the Poona ministers, agrees with us in all matters."³ But Haidar was not very well disposed to the Nizam. He complained that the Nizam had played him false when he was at war with the British. Only two years before Dhaunsa had raided his territory, plundering and abducting some rich men who were still captive. The Peshwa's agents and Sindhia's wakil urged that a union of the three southern powers would lead to certain victory. But Haidar argued that even if the Nizam did not join them, that would not mean that he would join the British.⁴ But at last he yielded. The Nizam told Holland in August, 1780 that his chief contribution to the confederacy was the inclusion of Bhonsle. "The Berar Raja on the requisition of assistance made by the Poona ministry prepared to join them and applied to him to know whether he might do this without danger to his own possessions....His Highness thought himself fully justified in declaring that if the Berar Raja proceeded against us his country would receive no molestation from him."⁵ It

1 *Itihas Samgraha*, 1780, no. 98.

2 The Nawab of Arcot wrote, "It is beyond the power of Nizam Ali to side with the English in opposition to the Marathas, nor will an alliance with him, if any can be effected, prevent a British war with the Marathas." C. P. C. V. 1607.

3 C. P. C. V.

4 *Itihas Samgraha*, 1780, no. 49.

5 In his correspondence with the British the Nizam at one stage claimed to have been the adviser of the confederacy but we would not be wrong if we conclude that this claim was asserted in the hope that it

would be wrong to regard the Nizam as the central figure in the diplomacy that led to the confederacy.

The Nizam's lukewarmness when war began supports this conclusion. The plan was that the Nizam should attack Chica-cole and Rajahmundry, Haidar Madras, Mudhoji Bengal and the Marathas face the British on the western coast. But a friendly letter from Hastings reached the Nizam just in time. He wrote to the Governor-General: "As your answer was late in arriving and in the meanwhile the violence of the Governor and the Council of Madras increased I was on the eve of revenging them as was proper when your letter arrived and on the perusal of the explicit contents of it I put a stop to my preparations."¹ Guntur was restored and *peshcush* promised. But though he practically withdrew from the alliance the Nizam would not join the British against Haidar. He was still apprehensive of the restoration of Raghunath Rao and was very much pleased when Goddard had to retreat from the Ghats in April, 1782. He remained neutral but his help would not have been of great assistance to either side. Holland reported (13th Sept., 1779) that his cavalry of 60,000 horsemen was poor and ill-equipped, his sepoy numbering about 8,000 rather less serviceable than common pikepeons and his preparations so little advanced that not a gun was mounted on the walls of Hyderabad.² But Hastings was aware of his influence with Mudhoji, another shaky member of the confederacy. Hastings wanted to make the east coast safe for the British.

Mudhoji Bhonsle was never very wholehearted although he had great power for mischief. "The enormously extended southern frontier of British Bengal from Midnapur to Jalesar would have required half a million men in arms ever on the alert if it was to be sealed effectively against the myriads of light horsemen and pindari looters that a word from Nagpur could have let loose on any point of it. And such a breakthrough, however short and ineffective in its military effect, could

would have the desired effect on British diplomacy. So far as Maratha-Haidar rapprochement was concerned the Nizam had nothing to do with it.

¹ C. P. C. V. 1780, Jan. 19.

² M. M. C. It was the consciousness of the impotence of the Nizam that had made the Madras Government so provocative. But Hastings knew better.

have done incalculable loss to the economic life and settled order of the southern districts of Bengal.”¹ He did indeed send an army of 30,000 men under his son Chimnaji towards Cuttack in October, 1779. But the army moved slowly. It arrived at Cuttack in May, 1780. The Government issued orders to British officers in Calcutta, Burdwan, Midnapur to permit supplies of grain, provision and other necessities to pass to the Maratha camp at Cuttack and to assist their agents in procuring them.² Hastings paid him 3 lakhs in October, 1780 and 13 lakhs in April, 1781. Chimnaji accordingly did not attack Bengal but turned against the Raja of Dhenkanal, while Colonel Hugh Pearse marched from Bengal to Pulicut. On his way Pearse got supplies and other help from Nagpur agents. Mudhoji not only allowed Pearse a free passage through difficult country where the mere withholding of supplies would have been sufficient to stop him³ but even cleared the jungle for him. In vain Nana Farnavis held out before Mudhoji the prospect of a grant of Mandala which he coveted on condition that he fought against the British.⁴ Haidar had perhaps a truer appreciation of the character of Bhonsle. He had asked for no assurance from him but had sought the co-operation of Sindhia alone, who had suggested an independent plan of attacking Bengal. The practical defection of Mudhoji placed the Poona ministers in an awkward position and they even thought of sending Bhawani Sheo Ram, the former Dewan of Sayaji, with 20,000 men against Bengal.⁵

1 *Poona Residency Correspondence. Nagpur Affairs*—Introduction.

2 See Progs., 1780—22nd June, pp. 950-952.

3 Pearse wrote, “I am passing through a country as little known as if it were in the midst of China....a country that seems made up of the shreds and fragments of a world in Dame Nature's shop, producing nothing but sand and craggy rocks, brackish water and pestiferous winds.”—Phillimore, *Survey of India Records*, Vol. I, pp. 40, 51.

To Mudhoji Hastings continued to send his political missions. Between 1778 and 1782 we are to take notice of the mission of Elliot (1778), Weatherston (1779), Thomas (1782), Chapman (1782). Thomas kept a journal of his travels from Benares to Nagpur (Jany. 28 to Febr. 27). For Chapman's embassy a journal was kept by White (25th March to 24th April).

4 C. P. C. He did not make it a condition precedent to his movement that Mudhoji Bhonsle or Tukoji Holkar should assure him but he did insist on an assurance from Sindhia alone among other members of the Maratha confederacy.

5 C. P. C. V. 390, March 5, 1781.

So eager was Nana Farnavis to get the co-operation of Haidar that he agreed to grant concessions. The grants made by Raghunath Rao were confirmed, which meant in effect the extension of Haidar's northern frontier to the Krishna. For these lands Haidar was to pay only 11 lakhs a year ; and the Marathas waived their claim to arrears of tribute. The *Tahanama* (Jany., 1780) or Letter of Agreement stipulated that the amount then paid should be entered as payment for the following year which was to begin about the middle of April⁴ and in view of the huge military expenditure that must be incurred in the common cause the Maratha Government even waived their claims to arrear tribute. The British had not expected that the Marathas would give up so much ; and when the first report of the alliance came through the Nawab of Arcot the Madras Government declared that "the proceedings mentioned in the paper of intelligence are so improbable that we cannot give much credit to them."² But the Maratha envoy at Seringapatam was jubilant and wrote in his enthusiasm—"This agreement is not a small thing. We have together embarked on the same venture. Such a friendship and such understanding could not be established in the days of the deceased Peshwa"³ (Madhav Rao).

But these concessions were made only to ward off the danger from the British ; and it was scarcely to be expected that they were made with no mental reservation. As soon as the situation improved Nana became eager to secure what he had given up.⁴ The war in the north was not favourable to

1 *Itihas Samgraha* Letter No. 49, 1730.

2 Fort St. George, 29th Nov., 1779.

3 *Itihas Samgraha* Vol. XIX, Letter No. 132, 22nd May, 1780.

4 Weatherston from Poona reported in Jany, 1782 : "The minister expressed to Hari Pant his displeasure at the contents of a letter which had been sent him through Luchman Rao Rastia, the channel of Haidar's negotiation at this court and which he observed differed greatly from the proposal made in a former one. In reply to the arguments offered by Hari Pant palliating the mistake which he said would probably be rectified in the next letter the minister repeated his dissatisfaction with some warmth and declared he would never consent to request made by Haidar of permitting Rastia to raise a body of troops for his service in his jagir which it seems is situated on the banks of the Krishna towards the Carnatic but that he might if he pleased propagate the report of his intention to do so."

the Marathas. British armies penetrated into the heart of Sindhia's territory and forced him to open negotiations with Col. Muir in August, 1781. A treaty was concluded with Sindhia on the 13th October and Sindhia promised to mediate peace between the British and the Poona Government.¹ The terms of the treaty were discovered by Nuruddin Muhammad Khan and Pandit Narsing Rao, Haidar's vakils at Poona, who promptly informed him. The British were anxious to get Maratha help against Haidar or at least a separate peace with them. Nana Farnavis candidly avowed that the Peshwa was in reality Haidar's enemy but as a treaty of alliance had been made and there was no failure on Haidar's part "it was not possible consistently with honour and regard for public faith to commence hostilities against him and therefore the following was the only plan which suggested itself to him to answer the view both of the English and the Maratha State, viz. to settle immediately the terms of general peace in which Haidar should be included and afterwards as the Peshwa would, on such an event, be absolved from all tie whatever he could be at liberty to join the English against Haidar."²

In his talks with Weatherston Nana insisted upon the inclusion of Haidar in any treaty of peace as a necessary preliminary.³ But he also used the British offer to bring pressure to bear on Haidar. To Nuruddin, Haidar's wakil, he expressed his intention to accept Mahadji's mediation and threatened to join the English to compel Haidar to make a reasonable peace.⁴ But he added, Haidar could prevent this by evacuating the territories north of the Tungabhadra and renouncing his claims on the Poligars south of it. Then the war would be continued. Haidar naturally wanted to protract these negotiations.

The treaty of Salbai was concluded with Mahadji Sindhia as the mediator and guarantor on the 17th May, 1782 and

1 There were many pacificators at this time in the field. Weatherston was sent by Goddard to Poona in February, 1782. Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, Macpherson & Macartney also addressed a letter to the Peshwa and forwarded it to the wakil of Muhammad Ali expressing a desire for peace.

2 Weatherston's letter to Macartney 26th Feb., 1782.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Wilks, II, p. 364.

ratified at Calcutta on the 6th June. Articles 9 and 10 ran thus—"The Peshwa engages that whereas the Nabob Haidar Ali having concluded a treaty with him, both disturbed and taken possession of territories belonging to the English and their allies, he shall be made to relinquish them and they shall be restored to the Company and Nabob Muhammad Ali Khan. Haidar Ali Khan shall be made to relinquish all such territories belonging to the English Company and their allies as he may have taken possession of since the 9th of Ramzan in the year 1181 by the date of his treaty with the Peshwa...and the English in such case agree that so long as Haidar Ali Khan shall afterwards abstain from hostilities against them and their allies and so long as he shall continue in friendship with the Peshwa they will in no respect act hostilely towards him."

"The Peshwa engages on his behalf as well as on behalf of his allies the Nabob Nizam Ali Khan, Raghuji Bhonsle and the Nabob Haidar Ali Khan that they shall in every respect maintain peace towards the English and their allies."¹ The terms of the Treaty of Salbai make Haidar appear almost as a dependant of the Marathas.

But the Poona Government delayed ratification. Grant Duff attributes this to their hope of recovering Salsette, but probably it was to persuade Haidar to yield. Haidar had reasons to feel nervous. An alliance between the British and the Marathas would almost certainly secure the adhesion of the Nizam. It may be that Nana already envisaged an alliance with the Nizam against him for the restoration of lost Maratha territories. It is not unlikely that he also wanted to avail himself of any success which Haidar might achieve on the eastern coast in alliance with the French against the British and utilized fully the British diplomatic oversight of not fixing a time-limit for the exchange of ratification.

In September, 1782 Haidar sent his wakil Sobha Ram to the Nizam with costly presents and later another wakil Srinivas Pundit arrived at the Hyderabad court with letters from Haidar and Bussy. That celebrated Frenchman enjoyed great prestige with the Nizam. He was almost a legendary figure in his *Darbar*. Bussy informed the Nizam that 'he had reached

1 Aitchison, III.

Mauritius with a fleet and an army would soon sail for India to fight with Haidar against the English. Haidar also sent his vakil Narsingh Rao to Sindhia and according to Grant Duff offered liberal subventions in return for co-operation. It is doubtful whether these overtures would have changed the course of events. But Haidar died suddenly on the 8th December and the Poona Government promptly ratified the treaty on the 20th December. The death of Najaf Khan had opened to Sindhia possibilities at Delhi to exploit which he needed the neutrality of the British. Maratha diplomacy calculated to make Tipu conform to the treaty of Salbai but Tipu did not wish to appear as a dependant of the Marathas. In the Treaty of Mangalore, 11th March, 1784, there was no mention of the treaty of Salbai.

In his dealings with the Marathas, Haidar appears to have over-reached himself. Both he and they had independent reasons to fight against the British and their alliance was made in the interest of each. In such circumstances to force the cession of territory from an ally he could neither conquer nor control was a step not likely to lead to loyal co-operation or permanent friendship.

CHAPTER XX

The Second Anglo-Mysore War :

The Victory of Palur (Pollilore), 10th September, 1780

Haidar was now determined on war and made no secret of his intentions. He treated Gray, who came on a mission of peace in February, 1780 with studied contempt.* On the 28th May—an auspicious day as his Brahmin astrologers assured him—his vanguard marched out of Seringapatam and he himself followed the next day. For 22 days he waited at Bangalore for his troops to assemble and then resumed his march.¹

Although his intentions and preparations were well-known the Government of Madras supinely took no steps to concentrate their forces or to reinforce their garrisons. Col. Lang from Vellore on the 10th July and Col. Keatinge from Ambur four days later reported that the Mysore army was on the march. But nothing effective was done. The British troops

* GRAY'S REPORT

“Pursuant to your orders of the 14th January, I went to Seringapatam where I arrived on the 17th February. The Nabob Haidar Ali Khan had of his own accord liberated the gentlemen whose enlargement I was directed to solicit so that it only remained for me to return him thanks....when I had done this I took occasion at the same time to express to the Nabob the sentiments of regard and friendship which the Government of Fort St. George and the English nation in general entertained towards his Highness but I am sorry to say my professions on that subject...were answered with reproaches of expected breaches of treaties and the British nation was charged with a positive breach of treaty. Notwithstanding this unpleasant manifestation of the Nabob's sentiments I continued at Seringapatam in hopes of finding some favourable opportunity of an explanation but I was completely disappointed ; for he never permitted me to visit him again till the 19th March, when he sent me purposely to give me an audience of leave. I have to observe that my reception at the court was neither friendly nor respectful, a few instances of politeness were overbalanced by many more of inattention and slight and I will venture to say that the latter had the appearance of being evidently marked”.—M. M. C. 1st April, 1780, pp. 438-439.

1 *Campaign of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan*—Trs. by Sarkar.

were scattered. The main forces were 2,000 sepoy under Col. Cosby at Trichinopoly, 1,500 men under Col. Braithwaite at Pondichery, 2,800 men under Col. Baillie at Guntur and about 5,000 under Sir Hector Munro at Madras.¹ The frontier outposts and the towns were poorly fortified and weakly held. The inactivity of the British in the face of Haidar's threat astonished both him and other observers. "They have no conduct", remarked Haidar, "and when I have assembled my whole force to enter the country they have not shown the least glimmering of ability."² One of the Frenchmen in Haidar's army wrote, "The English, who have astonished all the princes of Asia by their vigilance, their activity and above all the promptitude which they have shown in their military operations have not yet presented one man to oppose the progress of their enemy. . . . The mistake which they made in not assembling their army for their first contest with Haidar is clear. The mistake is irreparable."³

Haidar had gathered a formidable force for the campaign. According to the most reliable estimate—that of Wilks derived from Purnea, who based it on the returns of actual payments—it consisted of 55,000 foot and 28,000 horse, besides rocketmen and others to a total of about 90,000. There was also a corps of a few hundred Frenchmen, some mounted, under Puymorin and Lally, as well as some pieces of cannon. With Haidar

1 *Hist. of the Br. Army*, III, p. 440.

Late War in Asia—I, p. 141.

2 Paper of Intelligence from Muhammad Ali, 25th July, 1780.

3 *Campaign of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan*—Trs. Sarkar, 1780.

The incredible incompetence of the Madras Government is nowhere more evident than in the instructions sent by the Governor on 25th July, 1780 to Baillie who was then at Inaconda—"As Haidar has openly commenced hostilities against the Carnatic, we are desirous of employing the troops under your command to annoy him in his territories to the northward. If from the information you may have acquired of the situation of the fort at Cuddapa, you think it can be taken by your detachment, we would have you use your endeavours for that purpose with the utmost expedition. . . . should you be of opinion that it cannot be done without heavy cannon, you must wait until some can be sent and in the meantime employ the detachment so as to answer our views of distressing the enemy as much as possible".—Military Consultations—24th July, 1780.

were his two sons, Tipu and Karim Sahib, the latter in his first command.¹

As soon as Haidar crossed the Ghats and descended into the plains by the pass of Changama (21 July) he detached 15,000 cavalry in four divisions to attack the isolated British garrisons. They plundered and burnt Porto Novo, Conjeveram and Trinomali at about the same time. The charge of indiscriminate and wanton destruction of the countryside has been disproved by Wilks. At first Haidar limited his destruction to the country round Madras and Vellore and the lines of communication. Later, he burnt the sea-coast from Cuddalore to beyond Negapatam, but this was with a military objective—to make the movement of British troops as difficult as possible.

On the 30th July Haidar was at Trinomali, having travelled fast. The British tried to defend the temple of Tiruvannamalai by joining its four bastions and placing five cannon on the walls but they evacuated it on Haidar's approach, after firing a few shots. Here Karim Sahib joined Haidar bringing according to popular report the booty of Porto Novo on 200 camels. On the 6th August Haidar reached Chetput which was defended by a garrison of 300 men behind walls with 12 strong bastions and a ditch. It fell the same evening. Arni surrendered on the 12th after a weak resistance. The fall of these places was attributed in part to cowardice and treachery but it is difficult to see how any of them could have stood out for long. The Arcot troops were a discontented rabble. Heavy rain hampered, but did not stop Haidar's advance. Dobigarh and Chambargarh fell next ; and on the 20th he was before the important town of Arcot and erected batteries for its siege. But at last the British had begun to move and on the news of Munro's approach Haidar raised the siege. At Arcot, Tipu, who had gone as far as Kaveripak, rejoined his father.²

1 *Ms. Eur. E.* 87—100 European cavalry, 600 infantry under Puymorin and Lally, 1,500 topasses, 12,000 well-mounted cavalry, 40,000 irregular horse, 20,000 sepoys, 30,000 matchlock men, 8,000 lascars and 42 pieces of cannon—Rumour very much magnified the number of Haidar's troops and this British estimate had perhaps no other basis.

Campaign of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan, 1780—20,000 sepoys, 20,000 cavalry, 10,000 Bedars, 16,000 peons, 6,000 comatis, 2,500 Pathans and 40 pieces of ordnance, also 450 Europeans under Lally and Puymorin.

2 *Campaign of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan, 1780.*

The British had lost the first round and the initiative as well as many of their strongholds and garrisons. Now at last they began to stir. Munro's plan was to use Cosby's force to harass Haidar's communications, to move Braithwaite from Pondichery to Madras by way of Chingleput, and to effect a junction of Baillie's force with his own at Conjeveram to cover Madras and offer battle. Munro's second in command Lord Macleod demurred and drew attention to the danger of attempting to assemble the army in Conjeveram, an open town in a region dominated by the Mysore horse, rather than in the immediate neighbourhood of Madras. Munro replied : "If the committee have nothing in view but guarding Madras and the Jaghire, Lord Macleod may be right with respect to the troops being assembled at or near the Presidency but as it is not only intended to secure Madras but if possible to prevent Hyder Ally from getting possession of the principal forts in the Carnatic, I as a member of the committee thought then and do think now that the troops might and ought to be assembled near scene of action or where in all probability the operations of the campaign will be carried on than at or near the Presidency."¹

Part of this plan was carried out with some success. Braithwaite marched north to Madras and from Karanguli detached Capt. Flint with 100 sepoy to save Wandewash. Flint reached the fort just in time to prevent its surrender. "Flint effected for Wandewash", says Malleon with rhetorical exaggeration, "what Pottinger effected for Herat in 1837. It was the shield which protected Madras." Braithwaite, reinforced as he advanced, reached Madras with 3,700 men on the 11th August and perhaps Haidar missed an opportunity in not attacking him on the march.²

Orders had at first been sent to Baillie to move towards Cuddapah, threaten Mysore from that side and harass Haidar's

1 M. M. C. 1st Aug. 1730, pp. 1075-1079.

2 *Ms. Eur. F. 87*. When Haidar was encamped between Arni and Chetput, it was thought that he intended to attack Colonel Braithwaite's detachment. "It is difficult to account for Haidar's neglecting such an opportunity for surely he had as much reason to expect success against this detachment as he had in attacking Colonel Baillie's when joined by Colonel Fletcher and the grenadiers of Sir Hector Munro's army".

northern communications.¹ It was decided, however, that a large concentration in the Carnatic was wiser and Baillie was ordered to join Munro at Conjeveram. Munro set out from the Mount with 5,200 men and 37 guns and on the 29th August reached Conjeveram, closely watched by Lally whom Haidar had detached for that purpose.² Haidar himself thereupon broke up camp from Arcot and marched to within a few miles of Conjeveram.

Meanwhile on the 25th August Baillie had reached Vengal on the banks of the Kartalliyar.³ The river was dry but he halted on the north bank. During the night torrential rains swelled the river so that he was unable to cross till the 3rd September, "a most remarkable proof and example of the dangers of procrastination." On the 6th he arrived at Perambaukam,⁴ where he was attacked by the Mysore cavalry under Tipu but after a three hour fight he beat them off.⁵ Munro, only 15 miles away, heard the cannonade and marched two miles north, watched by Haidar a short distance away, Haidar only making some discharges of rockets. On the 8th Munro wrote to the Madras Government, 'Col. Baillie informs me that I must join

1 Charles Smith in his dissentient minute of 30th July, 1780, wrote— I lament most sincerely that the majority of the committee are determined to persevere in their resolution of ordering Colonel Baillie's detachment to proceed into the Cuddapah country. By not recalling that detachment the Carnatic may be exposed to the utmost hazard and danger. Cuddapah and that country is of very small importance to Hyder Ally and he will retake them at his leisure.

2 Lally informed Haidar that Munro had to carry not only victuals but also forages and fuel.—*Campaign of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan.*

3 From a study of their respective positions on the 24th August when Baillie was at Goomrapoondy within 28 miles of Munro's encampment at St. Thomas's Mt. Wilks concludes that the junction could easily have been made at Connitoor on the 26th.—Wilks, II, p. 267. This was not done, according to this view, to justify an erroneous opinion, Munro's professional pride being nettled by the criticism of Macleod.

4 Baillie is said to have written to the Madras Government that he would descend to the mouth of the river and be ferried over to Ennore. He did not receive any reply to this letter (Wilks II, 269)—Pollilore or Palur 17 miles S. W. from Tripassore; Perambaukam 9 miles S. W. from Tripassore, Tacallam 5½ miles from Perambaukam.

5 Baillie wrote to Governor and Council of Madras at 3 p.m. on the 6th Sept.—"I engaged a great part of Haidar Ali's army commanded by his son from eleven until two this day and have had the fortune to beat them." M.M.C. 1780; 71A, p. 1361.

him before he moves from his camp at Perambaukam. I shall march a detachment from the army towards him this evening and with the rest watch the enemy and cover Conjeveram. The enemy is two miles from us. We are watching each other.”¹ This was a fatal decision. The desire to protect Conjeveram made Munro divide his army and send Baillie reinforcements which were not strong enough to extricate him and served only to increase the magnitude of the disaster. Wilks comments, “The original and needless error of a division was aggravated by the further risk of a third division leaving the main army dangerously weak.”

On the night of the 8th, Munro sent 1,000 of his best troops under Fletcher to join Baillie. The junction was effected on the morning of the 9th and Baillie had now 3,320 sepoys and 510 Europeans. It is said that Fletcher’s guide was in Haidar’s pay but Fletcher wisely took another road. Haidar’s officers, including the French, advised retreat when it was known that Fletcher had safely reached Baillie lest the Mysore army be caught between Munro and Baillie. Haidar made arrangements to retreat if necessary but he received news from his excellent intelligence service that Munro was not preparing to move. Haidar, thereupon, boldly decided to attack Baillie. It was a risky move but Haidar appears to have accurately gauged the irresolute and cautious character of Munro.

When it was dark he sent infantry and heavy guns to join Tipu, remaining behind with his cavalry and light artillery to distract Munro if he showed any sign of activity. As the British camp remained quiet he followed himself in the early hours of the morning of the 10th. At the same time he took all possible precautions against surprise, the movements of Munro being correctly and incessantly reported to him throughout the action that took place on the 10th September.

Baillie resumed his march on the evening of the 9th. Two or three hours later, Muhammad Ali, one of Tipu’s commanders, attacked the rear and Baillie halted to ensure the safety

1 M. M. C. 1780, Vol. 71A, p. 1375—This letter in cypher from the camp near Conjeveram is curiously enough dated 9th September, 1780. It must be a mistake of the copyist because other letters prove that Fletcher joined Baillie on the morning of the 9th.

of his baggage. The halt continued till morning.¹ Wilks attributes this decision to halt until daylight to Baillie's desire "to have the credit of joining without the loss of any equipment which he could not hope to do after a night march." At any rate, the inactivity of the British enabled Tipu to place guns to command the roads. When Baillie began to move he found himself under heavy fire on both wings and Muhammad Ali pressed his attack on the rear. Haidar's main army also was now near. At 9 a. m. two of Baillie's tumbrils blew up and the only ammunition left was grape. Baillie made his troops halt and ordered a company of British grenadiers to strengthen his rear. The order was misconstrued by the sepoy who also began to fall back precipitately. A section of Haidar's cavalry charged the sepoy who fled or became mixed with carts or baggage. Baillie's troops lost all formation and the little band of Europeans alone stood their ground for a time. They were fired upon from all sides. Seeing that resistance was hopeless Baillie waved a white handkerchief and ordered his men to surrender. But in the confusion there was still some straggling fire and the Mysoreans rushed in and killed many. Puymorin intervened to save some of these unfortunate victims of fury and misunderstanding. Among the prisoners was Baillie, who had suffered a wound.³ Fletcher fell fighting. About 50 British officers were captured. Baillie's army had ceased to exist.³ Munro had heard the sounds of battle and marched to Baillie's assistance. If he had been quicker he might yet have saved the day, but by the time he had arrived within a few miles the news came that all was over. The battle lasted from 6 to 10 a.m.⁴

This victory revealed Haidar's best qualities as a general—his accurate intelligence,⁵ his correct estimate of the mental

1 Fletcher is said to have been opposed to this halt. On being asked by some officers why Colonel Baillie halted he modestly answered that Colonel Baillie was an officer of established reputation and that he no doubt had reasons for his conduct.—*Late War in Asia*, I., p. 154.

2 Baillie died in captivity in November, 1782.

3 M. M. C., 1780 Vol. 71B, pp. 1430-1431.

4 Munro placed great confidence in the detachment under Baillie as reinforced by Fletcher because he had there "the best troops in the service headed by men of established reputation." *Ms. Eur. F.* 87, p. 13.

5 "Haidar had exact and constant intelligence of everything that was done in the English camp, ...he knew the hour that Colonel

qualities of the enemy, his readiness to run a considerable risk to win a great success. The defeat of a British army was a rare achievement in Indian wars and a French officer of Haidar wrote, "There is not in India an example of a similar defeat."² It is true that the armies were not evenly matched. In numbers, in cavalry (of which the British had none) and in artillery Haidar had a great superiority ; and it was the mistakes of the British and the inactivity of Munro that caused the disaster. Nevertheless Haidar had seized his opportunity and used it brilliantly. The moral effect was great. Philip Francis wrote to Godfrey a month later, "Sir Eyre Coote is going to the coast to recover the Carnatic which is lost or to save Madras. He must be the distinguished favourite of heaven if he succeeds."³

Fletcher was to march, the strength of his forces and that he had no cannon." *Late War in Asia*, I, p. 150.

When after this junction two hircarrahs brought the news that Munro's army was not making any preparations to move, Lally thought that they were lying with a view to betray the Mysore army (*Late War in Asia*, I, p. 151). But Haidar knew he could depend on his information.

2 *The Campaign of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan*, 1780.

3 *European Mss. in the Indian Office Library*—Vol. II, part 2, Kaye and Johnstone, p. 561.

Wilks comments—"If the commander of either of these bodies had on the 9th been guided by the ordinary dictates of military experience both bodies would probably have been saved and if both had acted aright, the Mysorean instead of the English would have suffered discomfiture". Wilks seeks to belittle this achievement on the basis of his 'ifs'.

CHAPTER XXI

From Palur to Porto Novo :

10th September, 1780—1st July, 1781

The disaster of Palur (Pollilore) lowered the prestige of the British. It might have done much more if Haidar had immediately turned against Munro or advanced on Madras. Lally urged Haidar to pursue Munro, who was in great danger. But Haidar's inactivity enabled Munro to retreat safely if precipitately.¹ He threw all his heavy artillery and baggage into the great tank at Conjeveram and reached Chingleput on the 12th, having marched from morning till dark on the first day and till daylight the next. Here he was joined by Cosby with 2,000 men from Trichinopoly. Chingleput was ill-provisioned and on the 15th Munro arrived at Madras.

Haidar was content to let him go, merely sending Tipu with some cavalry to harass the retreat. He himself went to the Round wells and established a hospital for his wounded at Kaveripak. Baillie and four other officers were kept with the army but the rest of the prisoners—55 officers and 430 men—were sent to Bangalore.²

1 Munro wrote from Chingleput on the 12th Sept., "The troops now at this fort have marched two days past from daylight till dark, the first day; and the second till daylight this morning. No rice here; therefore they must beat paddy into rice. Please on receipt of this to send rice to meet us at the Mount and some in boats to Sadras as I cannot determine the route I shall take, till some hirt currahs come from the enemy's camp or near it who are gone to bring-intelligence of their motions".—M. M. C.—71A, pp. 1378-1379.

Acc. to Innes Munro—*Narrative of the War on the Coast of Coromondal*—about 500 sepoys were killed or wounded between Conjeveram and Chingleput.

2 *Campaign of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan*. It was the opinion of some of the French officers with Haidar that if the Mysorean had pursued Munro the British General would have been obliged "to throw down his arms and to submit himself a prisoner of war with all his army."

Haidar seems to have decided on conquest and plunder rather than on a decisive victory. Coote, after he arrived in Madras in November, wrote : "I am almost confident had Haidar Ali followed his successes at that time to the gates of Madras he would have been in possession of that important fortress—he has lost that opportunity." "Age", suggests Malleson, "was beginning to tell upon Haidar." At any rate instead of marching on Madras Haidar renewed the siege of Arcot on the 18th September. The town was seven miles in circumference and was weakly held by 150 British and 150 sepoys, 1,500 troops of Nabob Muhammad Ali and some irregulars. Deep approach trenches were dug and eventually two breaches were made in the pettah. The town fell and with it the families of many of the Arcot sepoys who deserted in consequence. On the 3rd November a battery of sixteen guns opened fire on the citadel. Resistance was hopeless and Capt. John Dupont, who commanded, capitulated on condition that all the troops, Europeans and sepoys, should be allowed to march out with the honours of war and that the officers should be escorted to Madras or Chingleput on the parole of honour not to fight in the war and that they should be furnished with provisions and tents. The rest of the British force were also to be sent to Madras as prisoners of war. Some of the officers of Nawab Muhammad Ali and their families were also to be conducted to Madras. These terms were on the whole kept by Haidar but it has been said that most of the sepoys were seduced and only thirty out of the hundred and fifty reached Madras.¹

1 M. M. C. 72B. 4th Dec., 1780, pp. 2034-2038.

According to a French version the insinuating manner of the negotiator Hugh Montgomery, 3rd Captain and some political reasons induced Haidar to agree to the articles of capitulation proposed. Acc. to Ms. Eur. E. 87 it was Capt. Pendergast. But he had been seriously wounded and the capitulation was signed by Dupont. Wilson—*History of the Madras Army*, Vol. II. p. 12.

No agreement was made about the troops of the Nabob of Arcot but in the written agreement under the seal of Haidar we find that Najib Khan, Arshad Beg Khan, Aka Beg, Hashimuddin Khan, Hashim Ulla Khan with their families were also to be conducted to Madras, presumably they were officers of Muhammad Ali—M. M. C., 72, pp. 2034-2038.

Haidar made Arcot his headquarters, repaired the walls and strengthened the fortification. He proceeded to attack other places in the Carnatic, all of which lay exposed and ill-defended. Gingee and Karnatgarh fell without a struggle. Karanguli and Chidambaram were captured in November. Permacoil was besieged the same month and Vellore and Wandewash in December, Ambur was surrendered on the 15th January, 1781, Capt. Keatinge being allowed to march out with the honours of war and go to Madras. Wilson says, however, that the garrison was forced to march to Arcot where Keatinge had to agree not to serve again in the campaign and the sepoys were drafted into Haidar's army.¹ A French fleet was expected on the coast and Haidar was anxious to secure his communications with the coast.

Meanwhile on the 5th November Coote had arrived in Madras with some reinforcements.² The situation of the British was, however, unenviable. On the landward side the Mysore army ranged unchecked. The Poligars of the country as well as officers of Nabob Muhammad Ali, confirmed in their respective appointment, attended his *darbar*. He also succeeded in occupying and fortifying practically every station of consequence between the British and him.³ The monsoon made use of the sea difficult. The Nizam in spite of the restoration of Guntur and the Bhonsle of Nagpur were hesitating, their attitude still uncertain. The morale of the British army had fallen low and some of the sepoys, who had families or relatives in Haidar's power, deserted. Coote's first task was, therefore, to reorganise his army in Madras. He wrote in January, 1781 : The enemy's cavalry in detached parties are all around us. "They daily make their appearance in one quarter or another. Yesterday they were so daring as to come within the range of the cannon on the wall of the black town, plundered the washermen of all their linen and cut off the small supply of

1 Wilson II. p. 12. "Haidar justified himself on the ground that the garrison had been reduced to ammunition of one day, whereas according to the usages of war Keatinge was bound to have surrendered whenever it had been reduced to quantity sufficient for three days' expenditure."

2 330 European infantry, two companies of artillery of 100 men each, 630 lascars, between 40 and 50 gentlemen volunteers (Memoir of Pearse).

3 Sec Progs. 18th Dec. 1780.

fowls and vegetables which used to come from a few miles to the north for the use of the inhabitants of Fort St. George. But until I am in a condition to move, the army to act, it would be impolitic by going a few miles further to destroy the influence which it now has in obviating the idea of a siege.”¹

Permacoil and Wandewash, however, could not be allowed to fall and on the 17th January, 1781, Coote took the field with 8,000 infantry, 800 cavalry and 62 pieces of cannon.² Haidar promptly raised the siege of Vellore, Wandewash and Permacoil. Coote was obliged to march near the coast as he was supplied by sea. A flotilla followed him. His objective was Pondichery which had declared for Haidar. Just beyond Wandewash he heard of the arrival of the French fleet and hastily retraced his steps towards Karanguli, prepared to march back to Madras if it appeared that the French and Haidar were threatening the city. Karanguli had been recaptured on the 20th January and the improvements and repairs made by Mysore troops had aroused Coote’s admiration. “The works which have been rebuilt” he wrote, “are not only well executed but disposed of with as much skill as if superintended by a regular bred European, although there was not one in the fort.”³

At Karanguli news reached Coote that the French fleet of seven ships of the line and three frigates was sailing to Pondichery and that there were no French troops on board. Coote sent forward a detachment which found the fleet being victualled by surf boats (masolla boats) thirty three of which were burnt.⁴

Coote had imagined Haidar to be at Arcot, but suddenly he heard that Haidar was marching on Cuddalore in force. Coote hurried to Cuddalore on the 7th February and marched out three days later to offer battle, which was refused.⁵ Haidar

1 *Ibid*—25th Jany., 1781.

2 *Late War in Asia*, I. p. 181.

3 *Sec Progs.* 20th Feb., 1781—Appendix.

4 *Sec Progs.* 27th April, 1781—Sir Eyre Coote’s Letter dated 1st Mar., 1781.

5 “Haidar made a show at first as if he meant to accept it—after remaining three days without tents, and sending out the cavalry to provoke him to an engagement the General returned to his former ground near Cuddalore.” *Ms. Eur. E.* 87.

held the trump cards and had only to wait, for with the French fleet in the offing no supplies could reach Coote by sea nor any by land with the Mysore cavalry on all sides. Provisions ran very low, when suddenly the French fleet which had moved into Cuddalore road sailed off for Mauritius. Rice vessels arrived on the 17th from Madras and Sadras. "By this time," wrote Coote, "the inhabitants of the town were next to starving and some absolutely had died from want and two days more would have completed the melancholy scene, as the troops must have been without a grain to eat. I had decided in this last extremity with 3 days' provisions I had secured to force my way into the Tanjore country. Now I can continue in my station."¹ "At that crisis", comments Holland Rose, "the French squadron was paralysed by the indolence or cowardice of Admiral D'Orves, whose retirement from off Pondichery to I'lle de France robbed Haidar of an otherwise certain triumph over Sir Eyre Coote. Either by bad management or bad fortune France never had at hand an able general or an able admiral."²

Nevertheless, the British army was tied to the coast by the necessity of obtaining supplies and the whole of the interior lay open to Haidar's attack. He plundered and burnt all the country along the coast from Cuddalore to beyond Negapatam and his cavalry ranged over the country from Tiruvendpuram to Pondichery. By the middle of March all the important places between Cuddalore, Tanjore and Trichinopoly were either invested or taken by Haidar. Tipu laid siege to Tiagar (Tyaga Durgam) which surrendered on the 5th June on the same terms as Arcot.³ Lalla Mian besieged Nagar. Udaiyarpalyam, Ariyalur and Palamcottah were taken. Coote was more or less confined to Cuddalore, from which, however, he issued some-

1 Sec Progs, 27th April, 1781—Sir Eyre Coote's Letter, 1st March, 1781.

2 H. Rose—"The Indecisiveness of Modern War."

The title of the book sounds antediluvian.

3 *History of the Madras Army*. II, p. 12—Wilson asserts that the terms of capitulation were not violated only at Arcot and later at Cuddalore. It is relevant to note that the terms of capitulation at Tiagar were also observed.

times to make raids, for instance, on the 16th April and 27th May on Tiruvendpuram. Reinforcements reached him by sea when the fleet under Sir Edward Hughes reached Cuddalore from Bombay on the 25th May and dropped 80 Europeans and 900 sepoys.¹ Haidar moved from Tanjore to Lallagoody, 10 miles from Trichinopoly. His troops had some small successes, captured a British outpost on the Venar near Tanjore and some guns and destroyed a detachment of 500 sepoys under Capt. Hall which had come out of Trichinopoly to protect grain convoys. He even talked of besieging that fortress.

Coote could not long remain inactive without danger. On the 16th June he attacked Chidambaram, entered the pettah and assaulted the pagoda. The first gate was forced but the sepoys were repulsed from the second and had to retreat with a loss of 200 in killed and wounded. Coote fell back on Porto Novo and was preparing for a second attempt when Haidar, making a forced march of over 100 miles in two days and a half, appeared between Porto Novo and Cuddalore and promptly erected batteries on the sandhill commanding the road.²

Coote was now cut off from his base at Cuddalore and his best chance was to attack Haidar before he could fortify his position. Haidar, although he had detached a large force under Tipu to invest Wandewash, had a powerful army—according to Coote's estimate, 620 Europeans, 1,100 topasses, 40,000 cavalry, 18,000 trained infantry and 47 pieces of artillery, long guns very well-served and a large number of pikemen and rocketmen. This is probably an overestimate and the entire army was probably not more than 40,000, many of them irregular cavalry. Coote had 8,500 men.³

1 Ms. Eur E. 87, p. 37—*Late War in Asia*, I, p. 189. "The arrival of Sir Edward Hughes with English squadron and transports on the 14th of June."

2 Ms. Eur. 87, 43-45.

3 Coote's source of information was a Portuguese officer in Mysore service who had come over. The British General was a little inclined to exaggerate the strength of the army against which he fought. According to Coote's letter written from Cuddalore on the 6th July, 1781, Tipu invested Wandewash on the 30th June with an army of 30,000 and 13 pieces of cannon. Haidar must have left some of his troops at Arcot and other places. The strength of the army with which he entered the country was 83,000 according to Wilks. We would not therefore

The battle was fought on the 1st July, 1781. At about 5 a.m. the British army advanced leaving a guard for the baggage. Haidar's lines were well-defended by front and flanking batteries. His right flank rested on a network of ravines which was unassailable. The centre was heavily protected by artillery. On the left on seaward side Haidar had begun a large redoubt for about 20 pieces of cannon but this was incomplete. As the British advanced they came under direct artillery fire and halted. Coote saw that the only chance was to turn Haidar's left. He resumed his march at 9 a.m. in two lines in echelon, a force of two battalions with eight field pieces forming a third face and guarding the left flank. Under heavy fire the British found a road on the right and advancing along it and beyond some sandhills debouched on Haidar's left, taking his guns on the flank. The sandhills which Haidar had not been able to hold were occupied by the second line. Haidar sent a force round Munro's left to get round the sandhills but it was thrown back by the second line under Stuart. Repeated attacks made with great spirit were repulsed. With their rear safe, the first line advanced. Haidar threw his cavalry on Munro's left but the attack was dispersed by musketry and artillery fire. The Mysore horse which had been sent round tried to get at the baggage, but was driven back by the fire of the schooner "Intelligence" which was moored near the coast. Finding his left turned, Haidar drew off with his guns and retreated in fair order.¹

be wrong if we conclude that the effective strength of Haidar's army at Porto Novo was perhaps 40,000. *Sec Progs.*, 7th September, 1781.

1 Coote gives the following description of the battle in its early stages leading to the success of the turning movement—"We had not advanced above one mile before the enemy's batteries were discovered on our intended road of march. I halted for nearly an hour. It was necessary to explore the ground on our right in order to advance yet avoid the enemy's direct fire from their batteries and by chance of gaining the left of their posts to turn or otherwise command them.... We were obliged to suffer a warm cannonade. We reserved our fire. I determined on the movement to the right, proceeded about 9 o'clock, the two lines marching parallel to one another. It only required their facing to the front to reassume at any time their original order. Two battalions with eight field pieces were to form a third face, the flanks of the corps joining both lines on the left to keep some batteries in check from that quarter. A practicable road was found on the right made by Haidar for the purpose of drawing his guns to a large redoubt about half a mile from the sea. The work required another day to

After the preliminary manoeuvres, the battle raged from 10 a.m. to 3 p. m. Coote estimated that Haidar lost "upwards of 3,000 men, besides a number of horse", among them Meer Sahib, Haidar's brother-in-law and one of his favourite generals, who died of wounds. The British loss was about 400 or 500, but including very few officers.¹

"The victory," says Fortescue, the historian of the British army, "was not in the ordinary sense a great one for Coote had no trophies to show of guns and prisoners taken nor of the enemy's army destroyed but it was the salvation of southern India". Malleeson regarded it as one of the decisive battles of India and as Haidar's Leipzig. Haidar's army was still large, intact and mobile. He was still able to continue the war on equal terms and the defeat was not in any way crushing. A tactical victory without any very important strategic effects cannot be regarded as a very decisive military event. But he had received a serious check. The British recovered much of the prestige they had lost at Palur (Pollilore). Tipu had to raise the siege of Wandewash and Haidar had to evacuate the Tanjore-Trichinopoly region. The British army regained its freedom of movement. And perhaps it is not too much to say that the treaty of Salbai might not have been concluded but for the British victory at Porto Novo.

complete it. We proceeded towards his field galled by his fire. On passing the road I had to reduce my front and as soon as the ground permitted formed in order as before, a thick caldera hedge covering my right and some sand-hills luckily unoccupied, favouring my plan of operations. I gained the flank of the enemy's batteries, waited till I had ascertained that the heights in my rear were possessed by the second line and then moved on with the first as far as order and an advancing fire would permit."

1 M. M. C. 75A, pp. 1689-1692.

CHAPTER XXII

From Porto Novo to Sholinghur :

1st July—27th September, 1781

The battle of Porto Novo did not cripple Haidar, who had still a numerous army ready to act on the defensive or offensive as opportunity offered. But it gave the British some freedom of movement. Coote marched to Cuddalore intending to relieve Wandewash and then join hands with the reinforcements from Bengal under Pearse which had reached Nellore. As Coote advanced, Haidar who had taken up his position near Pondichery a few miles from the Red Hills, retreated along the Gingee road. At Arcot he was joined by Tipu who had abandoned the siege of Wandewash on the approach of the British. Thence he marched to Arkonam where he detached Tipu with 8,000 horse, 5,000 foot and 14 guns to join Lalla Mian and bar Pearse's way. On the 10th June Lalla Mian had crossed the Pulicat Lake to Irakam, an island of the Dutch where many of the inhabitants of Madras had sent their valuables for safety. After plundering Irakam as well as Pulicat, Lalla Mian had withdrawn to Satyavedu where Tipu arrived from Tiruvallur on the 25th July. There he stayed till he learnt to his surprise that Pearse had effected a junction with Coote on the 3rd August.¹

What happened was that while Tipu was watching one road, Pearse had taken another. The lake of Pulicat is really an inlet of the sea about forty miles in length from north to south and six miles broad at its widest. The long narrow strip of land between it and the sea is pierced by two openings, one at the north and the other at the south end. The main road to Madras, which Tipu was guarding, runs to the west of the lake about fifteen to twenty miles from the sea. But Pearse, arriving at Durgarajaputram, spread the news that he was marching to Arcot. Instead, with the help of the Raja of Venkatagiri, who had joined the British he had his troops—44,000 men—ferried across both straits to Pulicat, at the

1 Ms. Eur. E. 87, pp. 49-55.

southern end of the lake, where Coote had arrived via Karanguli, Chingleput and St. Thomas' Mount. The combined force of about 12,000 men fell back on Madras.

Haidar thereupon moved from Arkonam to Conjevaram and recalled Tipu who was devastating the Venkatagiri country. Coote had now a powerful force, but he was weak in transport which was sufficient to carry provisions for only two and a half days¹ nor could he hope to live on a devastated country. Expecting to find stores at Tripasore, which was held by a Mysore garrison of 300 regular and 900 irregular as well as Poligar troops, he laid siege to it on the 19th August and took it on the 22nd before Haidar's relieving forces appeared. When he suggested an exchange of prisoners, Haidar, incensed at the surrender of the garrison, replied that "the men taken at Tripasore are faithless and unworthy, they know they dare not approach me; they are your prisoners and I advise you to put every one to death speedily".² Coote, who had found only six days' paddy in the fort, was forced to release on parole the prisoners he could not feed. Without supplies he could not besiege Arcot for the defence of which, he heard, Haidar had sent 10,000 men and 30 guns. His only chance was to defeat his enemy in the field and force him to evacuate the Carnatic. Fortunately for him Haidar gave him the opportunity.

On the 24th, at Tripasore, Coote heard that Haidar's whole army was encamped at "Pooleloor, 17 miles south-west from . . . Tripasore, on the very spot where about a year before Baillie had been compelled to surrender."³ Coote advanced to Perambaukam where he met the advance pickets of the enemy who withdrew. From Perambaukam Coote marched on the 27th at daybreak, left the fort of Takkolam on the right. At about 9 a. m. he sighted Haidar's army about a mile and a half ahead. The British were marching along an avenue of

1 He had conveyance for only 2½ days' provisions and the sepoy carried their subsistence for four days only.

2 "About an hour after Tripasore had surrendered, a large force of the enemy horse and foot, approached to the westward as if intending to relieve it." Ms. Eur. E. 87, p. 60. Wilks II, p. 324.

3 M. M. C. 12th September, 1781, p. 2452.

From a principle of superstition Haidar had chosen to meet Coote on the ground in which he had been successful against Baillie.

large trees a strong land wind blowing in their faces and raising clouds of dust from the dry land which reduced visibility. "Immediately opposite to and stretching along our right", described Coote, "there was a plain interspersed with thick bushes or brushwood, here and there intersected by water-courses. On our left flank was also a plain the very spot on which the fate of the detachment under Lt. Colonel Baillie had been determined, intersected by much deeper nullahs or watercourses than other". Haidar's army was drawn up on the left flank of Coote's line of advance, his left resting on the village of Palur (Pollilore) and his right on another village, while a detachment under Tipu barred the British in front. Coote was at first under the impression that the main Mysore army was in front of him and made his dispositions accordingly. With three battalions he occupied a thick grove about 800 yards to the left of his advance guard. His first line of three brigades under Munro was formed to the right, while the second line of two brigades under Stuart was meant to support either. This meant that the British forces were not in front of Haidar's main army but at a considerable angle to it. When the first line was getting into position it was heavily enfiladed by Tipu's artillery. A change of front was necessary. The troops penetrated through a jungle and formed upon a plain beyond it. An 18-pounder was dragged up to the bank of a tank. This gave some superiority to the British commander and exposed to its fire. Tipu withdrew and joined the main body. The second line also suffered from Mysore artillery fire while deploying over against the grove. Haidar had concentrated a heavy fire of artillery on that position and Coote found it necessary to send in succession all the battalions of the second line there to hold and to extend the position. Mysore Poligars, lining the bank of a dry tank towards the south on the left of the grove, also kept up a galling fire on the grove. The battalions from Northern Sarkars were ordered to dislodge the Poligars, who fell back on a ruined village behind. The battalions ordered to push them back, fell into complete confusion and had to be called back to the grove. The 20th sepoy battalion of the second line, however, stood firm and somehow averted disaster, although the grove was subjected to a hot fire. To protect his left flank, Coote now called up a brigade from the first

to the second line. The Mysore cavalry threatened to attack the English baggage on the opposite side of the avenue and the brigade had from time to time to wheel back to save it. Fire from the guns at length compelled the Mysore horse to retire. Coote now saw clearly that Haidar's main army was to the left and south of him and changed the position of his first line for the third time. The British advanced on the village of Palur which covered the left line of the Mysore army, took it in spite of fire from the houses and compelled the defenders to retreat hurriedly. Coote now ordered his whole force to advance. His first line on the right, however, found the way obstructed by bad ground and deep paddy fields and could not move forward. His left pushed on and, in face of its approach, Haidar limbered up his guns and called off his troops.¹ More than once, during the battle, the British were in serious peril. When Munro submitted that the ground between the two armies was impossible, Coote is reported to have rebuked him, "Sir, you talk to me when you should be doing your duty". Two tumbrils blew up. At least one attack ended in confusion. A confusion of orders prevailed. The repeated change of front of Coote's army was fraught with danger if the Mysorean had seized the opportunity. "Had the enemy," says one critic of Coote, "charged our men with his numerous cavalry from the left at any period of two hours during which our affairs were in the perilous situation, it is not improbable that we would have suffered discomfiture and defeat; and that the Plains of Ticollam, a second time strewn with the mangled bodies of the English would have rivetted the superstition and inflamed the cruelty of the barbarian conqueror."² Even in the end it was, in the words of Wilks, only "a dubious victory". Coote estimated Haidar's loss at about 2,000 men and his own at 420. The battle gave no advantage to the British and want of provision compelled

1 *Ibid.*

2 *War in Asia I.* p. 206.

Coote was inclined to overestimate the strength of the enemy he so often defeated. He says that Haidar had at Pollilore 1,50,000 men (Despatch from Tripasore, 2nd Sept., 1781), an absurd figure. His estimate of the number of killed in the defeated army was based on the number of horses in the field. The Indians generally made a point of carrying off the men who fell.

Coote to march back to Tripasore on the 30th. Returning to Madras he resigned as a protest against the want of transport and provisions. Persuaded to withdraw his resignation, he again took the field and on the 21st September marched from Tripasore to relieve Vellore.

Learning of this move Haidar posted his army on the road to Vellore at Sholinghur, about 15 miles west of Palur (Pollilore). Heavy rain hampered Coote's progress and on the 27th he rode forward to reconnoitre. He found a long ridge of rocks manned by the advanced pickets of Haidar's army. Moving up, he sent forward a brigade which dislodged the pickets and from the top of the ridge the British could see their enemy in full force about three miles to the south.

Haidar, for once, was caught unprepared. He had calculated that the heavy rain of the night would keep Coote from moving the next day. Many of his men had gone to the neighbouring villages for provisions and the cattle had been driven out to pasture. Haidar had, however, chosen his position judiciously. His army was drawn up behind the crest of a long ridge, in front of which the ground was flat and swampy for about 1,500 yards, with a rivulet, the Cooum along the middle.¹ Wherever small rises or clusters of rocks provided shelter cannon were placed. Coote wished to force Haidar to change position so that his small army might take advantage of the confusion with any such movement would involve. His tactics were the same as in his earlier battles, "an offensive movement against the enemy's flank with one wing, pivoted on the other which was echeloned in a strong position." His first line was protected on its flanks and rear by hills and rocks, but the second brigade on its right pushed on too far and came under heavy fire. Coote ordered it to move without halting inclining to the left and signalled general advance. The Mysore horsemen countercharged with, says Coote, "resolution hitherto unexhibited by them". "Coote's men were obliged to break line and form into columns to avoid the

1 Ms. Eur. E. 87. p. 73 "The ground on which the action was fought was about 17 miles—N. N. E. from Arcot".

Haidar was so posted that he could either choose to stand or file off by other roads than that by which Coote was advancing and reach Arcot or Vellore before the British.

groups of rocks in their way and into the gaps between the battalions Haidar hurled his cavalry. But the British met the determined charges of "Sanoorpatam horse" and "Haidar Ali's select corps of stable horse" with the utmost steadiness, reserving their fire till the horses were almost on their bayonets. Two standards of the select corps were captured as also a sixpounder gun which had been taken from Baillie.

Meanwhile the second British line was attacked by Tipu and the fight went on till some battalions ran almost out of ammunition. To meet the threat of outflanking, Coote ordered the line to change front "opposing in full force the enemy on their left, keeping up also the necessary communication with the baggage. They were in this position ready by filing off from their right to follow and rejoin the first line, if absolutely necessary. "After this change of front the Mysorean troops not being equally expert in the corresponding movement suffered considerably from the English guns." Tipu then withdrew about the same time as the main body to Kaveripak.

The British loss was not more than 1000. Of Haidar's army "750 horses and 400 men reckoned on the field" and Coote estimates his total casualties at 2,000. Other estimates are 1,500 and 1,000 and a large number of horses. Wilks' statement—of which I cannot find the source—that Haidar lost more than 5,000 men must be a gross exaggeration.¹

Sholinghur was an undoubted defeat and a severe blow to Haidar's prestige. One result was that the Poligar chiefs of Karvetnagar and Kalahasti withdrew from his army with their levies. Coote marched into the territory of the chief of Karvetnagar, in search of supplies, while Haidar on his side sent plundering columns to punish the chief. It was from Attimanageri, the chief place of Karvetnagar, that Coote wrote his despatches on the battle to Macartney.

¹ Coote's tendency to overestimate the strength of Haidar as also his loss is also evident in his despatches on the battle of Sholinghur.

CHAPTER XXIII

From Sholinghur to Annagudi

(27th September, 1781—19th February, 1782)

After the battle of Sholinghur the war dragged on in the old desultory inconclusive manner. Haidar had never been able to defeat Coote and the main British army and he wisely avoided a new encounter. Nor, so long as the British remained in command of the sea, was an attack on Madras or on any of the other British strongholds on the coast feasible. All that Haidar could do was to try to harass and wear out the enemy by surprise attacks on detachments and convoys and on isolated outposts and forts and, as far as possible, to confine their power to the coast. This he did with a considerable measure of success.

The British, on the other side, were forced to act chiefly on the defensive. On the coast their position was impregnable ; in the field Coote was invincible. His forces, however, were never large enough to inflict a crushing defeat on Haidar : and his weakness in cavalry and baggage train prevented him from following up a victory or turning a defeat into a rout. The cumbrous and heavy baggage train was always a handicap to the British, slowing movement, dictating battle tactics and impeding pursuit. Haidar's army was far more mobile and he generally retained the military initiative.

After Sholinghur, Haidar encamped near Kaveripak, ten miles from Coote. When the British moved into the country of Bumrauze, a party of Mysore horse under Lalla Mian raided Bumrauze's *pollam*. Coote, however, with three regiments, surprised Lalla Mian's camp and although the cavalry escaped they had to leave their arms, baggage and some horses and bullocks behind.¹

To intercept the supplies coming to Haidar through the Damalchery pass Coote had sent Lt. Col. Owen with six battalions, 200 horses and twelve field pieces.² This was just such an opportunity as Haidar was always on the watch

1 Ms. Eur. E. 87, p. 78.

2 *War in Asia* I, 214.

for and he hastened after Owen. Owen did not know of the pursuit till Haidar's army was almost in sight. Early on the morning of the 23rd October, when the British were about a mile and a half from the Veracundalore pass, the Mysoreans appeared, hurrying forward to get between Owen and the pass. Owen left his tents and baggage behind and hastened to reach the pass. Part of Haidar's army stopped to plunder the camp but two Mysore guns on a hill top enfiladed the British army on the march. More guns were rapidly brought up and the Mysore cavalry made frequent charges.

A British gun at the entrance to the pass, however, gallantly stemmed the tide. Meanwhile the main Mysore forces arrived and both sides together streamed into the pass, which was there threequarters of a mile broad. A confused engagement followed. A battalion of sepoy under Capt. Walker was routed, Walker himself being killed and a six-pounder taken ; but Capt. Moore at the head of a company—of grenadiers recaptured it. From the adjoining hills the Mysoreans kept up continuous musketry fire. Owen, however, pushed on and by 2 p.m. reached more open country, when the Mysore force's fire slackened.¹ Owen had sent an officer quite early in mid-day to apprize Coote of his danger ; but by the time Coote arrived in the evening Haidar had marched off to Arcot. The British losses were two officers killed and five wounded and about 300 men killed, wounded and missing. Their estimate of Haidar's loss was at least 700 killed.²

After this the war in the Carnatic degenerated into a series of petty sieges. From Veracundalore Coote returned to Polipett (Pallipatta) and then marched to relieve Vellore and thence to attack Chittoor. Two twelve-pounders on a hill near the southern angle of the fort kept up a destructive fire, every shot falling within the fort but the besieged continued to resist. The pettah fell which brought the besiegers within three hundred yards of the gate and walls. A breach was soon made and the commandant Husain Ali Beg offered to surrender if the garrison were allowed to march out 'with arms, baggage and everything appertaining to the Circar'. This was refused

1 Ms. Eur. E. 87, pp. 80-82.

2 *Ibid.*

by Coote and the next day the breach became practicable and an attack was ordered. The *qiladar* now requested that the garrison might be allowed to go to their homes in small parties 'as they must be for ever disqualified as soldiers if their arms were taken from them'. Coote agreed in the hope of getting provisions within the fort. The siege had lasted four days.¹

About the same time Lalla Mian routed a detachment under Lt. Pearson who had joined the *amildar* of Parangoly to attack Trevide (Tiruvendpuram). Pearson and the *amildar* Shiva Chidambara Pillai were taken as prisoners.²

Coote had left detachments at Polipett and at Polour to protect the baggage and collect grain while he marched to Vellore. When Chittoor was besieged, Haidar attacked Polipett, forced the outer barrier and compelled Capt. Temple to abandon his guns and baggage and retire within the stronger inner enclosure. Haidar did not attempt to attack this but withdrew, as his main object of forcing Coote to raise the siege of Chittor was not fulfilled. Tipu and Lally, meanwhile, were ordered to attack Lt. Birkmyre who had been left at Polour with the heavy artillery. Birkmyre exploded his guns by a double charge, abandoned the fort at night and hastened north, pursued by the Mysore cavalry. He proceeded to Ellourpollam, thence to Nagaricottah and then joined Bumrauze and with Bumrauze's family escaped into the Kalahasti country which was ravaged by Mysore horsemen. He eventually returned to Madras with the remains of his party.³

As the British still remained at Chittoor Haidar sent Tipu and Lally to lay siege to Tripasore, which was defended by Capt. Bishop. The siege began on the 17th November and a breach was soon made but the garrison resisted stoutly and Tipu had to raise the siege when Coote arrived by way of Polipett and Nagari on the 22nd November. The British army then went into cantonments.

Haidar meanwhile devastated Bumrauze's country and the Kalahasti country and sent Tipu to besiege Chittoor. The

1 *Ibid*, p. 89.

2 *Ibid*, p. 89.

3 *Ibid*, pp. 95-99.

town was invested on the 10th December and as a practicable breach was made by the 22nd the garrison under Capt. Lamott surrendered. Tipu then marched to Chandragiri and took it by assault, slaughtering the Nawab's garrison.¹ At the beginning of January, Coote marched to the relief of Vellore, which was suffering from want of provisions. Haidar attempted to fall on the rear and seize the baggage but failed and a second attack on the same spot as Coote returned was equally ineffective. Coote again withdrew to Madras.

The small forts in the Carnatic were seldom strong enough to resist a determined attack or stand a prolonged siege. But the strongest fort was Vellore, in the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley one of the strongest country forts he saw in India.² Situated at the entrance to the Ambur Valley which leads to one of the principal passes to Mysore, it commanded a very important convoy route of the Mysore army. Convoys had to be strongly guarded to prevent their interception by the garrison. A staff officer described the fortifications thus—"The fort is traced on an irregular foursided figure. The fortifications consist of a main rampart broken at irregular intervals by round towers and rectangular projections. Below this there is a *faussie braie* ornamented at intervals with machicaulated turrets; there is a broad wet ditch varying a good deal in width in different parts....there is a solid masonry counterscarp and covered way round three sides....the main walls are built of massive granite stone, admirably cut to point and fitted together without mortar....the parapet of

1. Sec Progs. 25th Feb., 1788; Coote's despatch 11th Jan., 1782. *Manual of N. Arcot District*—Cox.

Abdul Wahab Khan, Nabob of Arcot's brother was at Chandragiri. It is said that he had treasonable correspondence with Haidar and when the fort surrendered practically without a struggle Haidar alleging previous breach of faith sent the whole family as prisoners to Seringapatam.

2. Owen—*Selections from Wellington's Despatches*, p. 280.

When we take into consideration the protracted siege or blockade of Vellore British relief operations for other forts must be regarded as altogether of minor character. It is relevant to note that in the code of military regulations issued by Tipu Sultan there is reference without the name to the repeated provisioning of Vellore by Sir Eyre Coote in the face of superior armies—Wilks III. p. 259.

the *faussie braie* is of solid stonework, the upper row of stones being cut to a semicircular shape, affording loophole defence. The counterscarp is strongly built of stone in chunam. There are no outworks, caponnières, galleries and traverses. The old entrance was by a winding roadway with massive gates and protected by a drawbridge. On the south side there is also a footway which crosses the ditch on a stone causeway. There is no other means of entrance across the ditch."¹ Three hills at no great distance overlook the fort which is within artillery range from them. The hills were crowned with 'drugs' or fortifications. The chief hill, later known as 'Sayer's hill', was only a mile away. Late in 1780 the Mysoreans attacked it and on the 23rd December Meer Sahib opened the batteries. The fire from the fort was so brisk that the advance of the besiegers was slow. At length a portion of the walls on one side was destroyed and approach trenches were carried to within twenty yards of the breach. An assault on the 14th January, 1781 was repulsed as were two more attempts at storming with ladders. When Coote advanced with his main army, Haidar was obliged to withdraw and convert the siege of Vellore into a sort of blockade. Col. Lang who commanded in Vellore and had 250 Europeans, 500 sepoys and 1,200 of the Nawab of Arcot's troops with him took advantage of the respite to repair the hill fort and to lay in stocks of rice with money from Madras. He failed, however, to capture the hill fort of Kailasdrug, six miles from Vellore. Its possession enabled Haidar to maintain the blockade and his troops cut off the noses of persons found carrying provisions to the garrison. Supplies had become scarce when Coote arrived on the 3rd November, 1781 and brought fresh stocks which were, however, sufficient only for eight or ten weeks. Accordingly on the 31st December, 1781, Coote marched again from Madras to the relief of Vellore with a train of 1,400 coolies carrying provisions. He reached the fort on the 11th January, 1782 with three months' food and 20,000 pagodas. Fresh supplies came on the 14th June largely through the help of the Raja of Venkatagiri and the son of the Kalahasti Raja. Haidar's forces could intercept only the returning coolies and bullocks. Coote came again

1 *Manual of N. Arcot District*—Cox, p. 188.

about the 12th August, 1782 ; and the capture of a Mysore grain convoy of three or four thousand bullock-loads at Policanda provided the garrison with provisions to last till March, 1783.¹

During the period there was fighting also in the Tanjore-Trichinopoly area. The British and Muhammad Ali were practically in undisputed command of this region till the prospect of French co-operation drew Haidar to Cuddalore in February, 1781. But after the defeat of Porto Novo he withdrew to the north. When war with the Dutch began in Europe Lord Macartney ordered Colonel Braithwaite to collect troops for an attack on Negapatam. Meanwhile Major Galway who commanded Arcot troops at Killacottah invited Braithwaite to co-operate in an attack on Trictapilly (Tirukkattuppalli). Galway was recalled to Trichinopoly but Braithwaite with 2,500 men and six field guns besieged the fort. Two breaches were made in the walls on the 13th August, 1781 but an assault at night was repulsed with heavy loss, the defenders behaving with great resolution. Braithwaite retreated to Tanjore. But on the 22nd August Col. Nixon at Trichinopoly heard that the Mysoreans had abandoned Tirukkattuppalli and withdrawn to the north of the Coleroon and he sent his troops to take possession of it. Braithwaite marched again from Tanjore and laid siege to Pattukottai to open his line of communications with the sea (30th Aug.) but was again repulsed and he himself wounded. Macartney reinforced the southern army with European troops. Meanwhile the Dutch had made an alliance with Haidar and also, as it was said, with the disaffected Tinnevely poligars. Report said that they sent 400 sepoys, 200 Malays and six field pieces from Negapatam to join Haidar's forces at Kumbakonam, but for some reason they were withdrawn.²

1 *Manual of N. Arcot District*—A. F. Cox, 1881, pp. 64-68, 188. Ms. Eur. E. 87. pp. 19, 27, 87, 113-118, 188, 207-208, See Progs. 25th February, 1782, pp. 837-42.

2 Of the Articles of agreement made between Haidar Ali and Reyneir Van Vlessingen, Governor and Director on behalf of the Dutch company three are important. Article 8th—"As the enemy from Tanjore and Trichinopoly may act against the troops of His Highness stationed at Cumboconum the Honorable Company promise on their part to send

Nixon, in temporary command of the Tanjore army attacked Manarcoil (Manargudi) and took it easily. Next, after several repulses, he captured Mahadevapatnam, taking advantages of dissensions in the garrison. At Adriapatnam he received supplies from Madras but had to fall back on Manargudi which was threatened by the Mysoreans.

Braithwaite having recovered from his wounds, resumed command of the army on the 27th September, 1781, intending to attack Nagore and Negapatam. On the way, hearing that a Mysore detachment was collecting grain at Alangudi, he took the village, drove the enemy out and captured a gun and two French battalion commanders. Fearing that an attack on Negapatam was impracticable before the monsoon, he withdrew to Tanjore but sent Nixon to Nagore. On the way Nixon destroyed the Pagoda at Kumbakonam and with the help of a frigate off the port, drove the enemy out of Nagore, and got four of their guns. Meanwhile Munro had begun the siege of Negapatam on the 5th November and the garrison surrendered a week later.

Dutch power in South India was destroyed but a French fleet now appeared on the Coromondal coast. Haidar, thereupon, moved towards Wandewash and detached Tipu with a large force to destroy Braithwaite. The latter had now 1300 horse, 2,500 infantry and six guns and was at Annagudi four miles North East of Pandanallur on the southern bank of the

from hence to thence 2,000 men including Europeans, Malays and sepoys, with five or six pieces of cannon and European officers, in order to assist the above people of the Nabob and to rout the enemy, and should the English lay siege to Negapatam His Highness the Nabob is then to send his troops in order to drive them from thence. The Company promise that at the arrival of the aforesaid troops of His Highness they will furnish them with good quarters.

Article 9th—Since His Highness the Nabob has been graciously pleased to give over to the Dutch Company places belonging to Tanjore, viz. the provinces of Kivaloore, Weedamconan, Toppatoore, and Nagore with the villages thereon depending. So we shall take care that no grain or provisions be exported from any of the above places to the enemy. And with regard to the expenses of the detachment which may be sent by the Hon'ble Company to the assistance of the Nabob it shall hereafter be settled (unanimously agreed in the citadel of Negapatam—Sept. 4, 1781).

Ms. Eur. E. 87, pp. 106-107.

Coleroon, charged by Munro with the duty of protecting the crops now ready for harvest. Tipu had 6,000 horse, 12,000 infantry and twenty guns. Braithwaite was unaware of Tipu's rapid approach till on the morning of the 17th February, 1782 he was attacked on all sides. He held his ground but decided to retreat at night. Leaving behind the cavalry and battalion of infantry to deceive the enemy, he marched at 10 o'clock with two battalions of sepoy towards Mayavaram. But Tipu was on the watch and got in between Braithwaite and his rearguard. Braithwaite fought his way back with great difficulty and effected a reunion. The artillery and rocket attacks of the Mysoreans caused great confusion in the British ranks. Fighting continued and at 11 a.m. Braithwaite marched towards a pagoda about a mile distant. But as he drew near, one of his battalions broke line and made a run for the pagoda abandoning their guns when they saw the enemy charging. The whole army was thrown into confusion and the Mysoreans dashed into the broken ranks. Braithwaite received a wound on his back. The sepoy had been fighting almost incessantly for two days. The officers decided to surrender at discretion. After the flag of truce was sent no person was killed but the remainder of the detachment was taken prisoner. One of the battalions which had reached the pagoda was also obliged to surrender. About 700 sepoy and some Indian officers managed to escape in the course of the next few days but the Europeans were sent to Seringapatam, Braithwaite being kept by Haider in his own camp.¹ This defeat was a great blow to the British and it undid the effects of Porto Novo. British hold on the south became precarious and they could no longer get grain and cattle from the rich plains of Tanjore.

Fighting was also going on on the west coast. A small British garrison under Major Abingdon had been maintaining a resolute defence at Tellicherry against Haider's troops under Sardar Khan since August, 1780. The garrison was reinforced in the spring of 1781. On the 8th December, Abingdon made a

¹ M. M. C. 30th March, pp. 871-874.

Sec Progs, 11th March, 1782.. Letter of E. M. Fallowfield.

surprise night attack and completely defeated Sardar Khan, one of the favourite officers of Haidar. His army was completely annihilated and he was captured with his family and chief officers. All his guns, ammunition and stores fell into the hands of the English. Abingdon followed up this victory by taking Calicut but he was unable to take Mangalore so that Haidar still had a base on the coast.

In spite of the victory of Annagudi, Haidar realised that the prospects for the future were not very bright. His original calculations had been based on the grand alliance with the Nizam and the Marathas. He had perhaps expected that these allies would carry on vigorous war with the British and that, attacked on all fronts, the British would be unable to keep any considerable army in the south. At any rate, his own frontier in the north would be secure and he would have only one enemy to face. The progress of the war had clearly revealed that he was unable to defeat the main British field army or to pin it to Madras. It was about this time—after the victory of Annagudi and before the actual landing of the French force on the 10th March—that he told Purnia what Purnia later told Wilks that ‘there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction but no sufficient cause for war’ between him and the British. “The defeat of many Baillies and Braithwaites,” he added, “will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea : and I must be very weary of a war in which I can gain nothing by fighting.¹ The course of events was also making it clear that his allies were not to be depended on. From the Nizam he had never hoped for much. Mudhoji Bhonsle was from the beginning lukewarm and Haidar now heard that Mahadji Sindhia had concluded a treaty with the British and the Poona Government might do so at any time. He knew that the Marathas would try to reconquer what they had ceded to induce him to join the alliance. Haidar had counted on the lands between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra to form a wide barrier between Mysore and the Maratha incursions but now it seemed as if he would have to fight the Marathas as also the British. He had driven a very hard bargain and could scarcely expect the other side to honour it when it

¹ Wilks II—pp. 373-374.

no longer suited them. "No man of common sense," he told Purnia, "will trust a Maratha and they themselves do not expect to be trusted." The new Maratha attitude was considered by him as a betrayal of the common cause but it is difficult to overlook the fact that he had done nothing to earn their goodwill, had done nothing to secure their good faith and such a thing as a common cause did not really exist.

Another ally from whom he had hoped for much was the French. A French fleet would have neutralized British sea power and a French land force would have given the necessary stiffening to his own army. But D'orves had left him in the lurch at Cuddalore. He had waited for Bussy in vain for months and if when Bussy came Haidar had to go to the north to repel a Maratha attack, the French would blame him. "I must go alone against the Marathas and incur the reproach of the French for distrusting them, for I dare not admit them in force to Mysore," he told Purnia. The French might be useful tools to use against the British but it would be dangerous to allow them to become again a great power in India. But, on these terms, it was scarcely likely that he would be able to secure the whole-hearted co-operation of the French. Nevertheless, the arrival of the French fleet under Suffren seemed to offer a last chance of success in this protracted and indecisive struggle. He had decided to dismantle some of his posts and even mined the fortifications of Arcot when the news reached him of the arrival of a French fleet and his hopes were revived.

CHAPTER XXIV

From the Battle of Annagudi to the death of Haidar.

Haidar, as we have seen, was becoming rather weary of a war which, he realized, would be both protracted and indecisive and might even be dangerous if the Marathas became aggressive on his northern frontiers. But just at this time appeared a powerful French fleet off the Coromondal coast under the ablest admiral France ever sent to the East. If M. de Suffren could sweep the British fleet off the Indian Ocean and if his own levies could be stiffened by a considerable French army, the way would at last be open for the destruction of British power in South India.

Fortunately for the British they had also at this time a fleet of almost comparable size under a competent admiral. The first action between the two fleets took place off Pulicat on the 15th February and was indecisive but the British fleet had to sail to Trincomali in Ceylon to refit. Suffren arrived at Porto Novo but did not land the army till negotiations with Haidar were complete. Haidar moved from Arcot to Wandewash and Coote naturally thought that he would menace the south, especially after Braithwaite's defeat. He sent a convoy of over 3,000 bullock, 2,000 coolies and about 100 carts with rice guarded by battalions and a regiment of sepoys under Major Byrne to Chingleput. On the way back the appearance of a body of Mysore cavalry and rocketmen, which he mistook for the main force of Mysore, made Byrne hurry on, leaving the bullocks to fall into the hands of Haidar's men.¹ This loss which could not easily be replaced hampered Coote's movements. The Mysore party of about 2,000 then hovered round the British near the Mount, attempting to cut off parties of foragers and their bullocks. Coote sent a detach-

¹ Sec. Progs., 11th March, 1782, p. 800.

"Chingleput continued to be the key to the British possession of the country between St. Thomas's Mount and the tract lying on the other side of the Palar."

Manual of Chingleput District. C. J. Crole.

ment at night to attack their camp at Manimangalam, but they managed to escape with slight loss.

On the 10th March, 2,000 French troops landed at Porto Novo under Duchemin and on the 1st April laid siege to Cuddalore, which surrendered on the 4th without firing a shot. Tipu with Lally and his small French detachment had gone after the defeat of Braithwaite to Karur. He had returned about the middle of March and proceeded towards Cuddalore to act in concert with the French. His presence in the neighbourhood perhaps accelerated the surrender of Cuddalore to the French.¹

On the 10th April Coote set out from the Mount to check Haidar's designs against Permacoil and Wandewash. On the 14th he sent for a British regiment from San Thome. Haidar, who was about twelve miles South East of Wandewash, detached a force of 4,000 horse, 2,000 sepoys and 2,000 Poligars with six guns under his son Karim Sahib to intercept this regiment. But he could do no more than harass its rear. Then Karim Sahib moved towards Madras, attacked without success a redoubt on the Poonamalee road a few miles from Madras and marched towards the city. Troops under Amir-ul-Omrah, the second son of Muhammad Ali, defended the garden houses and as the enemy was reinforced Karim Sahib drew off and returned to Conjeveram via Perambaukam. The threat to Madras induced Coote to recross the Palar and hurry back to intercept Karim Shaib, but he was too late. Haidar rebuked his son for withdrawing and Karim advanced again but retreated precipitately once more. It was clear that "Karim Sahib was not born for pre-eminence as a soldier."²

Coote's position was embarrassing. He explained that his provisions were insufficient for any move south and he could not count on getting supplies by sea. Further, "this would drive the French and Haidar into that union which certain ceremonies and a distrust of each other have hitherto kept off but which my advancing would render necessary for the interests of both. An action would most probably be produced of which no man can possibly say what would be the issue.

1 Sec. Progs., 29th April, 1782. p. 1590.

2. Ms. Eur. E. 87 p. 158.

But even allowing it were successful if we could neither (from a want of a sufficiency of provisions) pursue the blow or keep our ground, we would be obliged to retreat and thereby not only discover our weakness but draw upon ourselves a degree of discredit for which all the honour and advantage to be expected from a victory could not compensate."¹

Coote could not advance from Tambaram before the 17th May though he had received information that Permacoil was invested by Haidar on the 10th. He had serious differences with Macartney at this time and at one stage even thought of resigning his command. Haidar was able to invest Permacoil on the 10th May. He easily stormed the pettah and having carried his approaches close to the main gate opened a battery on the 15th. A breach was made the next day and on the 17th Lt. Plow, who was in command, offered to capitulate, all the Europeans being allowed to return to Madras under an escort.²

Meanwhile, on April 12, Hughes and Suffren had fought another indecisive battle off Ceylon and both sides had gone to different ports of the island for repairs. The French and Haidar concluded 'a union of necessity' and after the fall of Permacoil the combined army marched on Wandewash.

Coote, however, was on the move and as he advanced from Karanguli to Wandewash, Haidar and his allies fell back towards Pondichery. Coote came near and found them posted in a long line between Villenour and the Red Hills.³ To draw them from this strong position, Coote threatened Arni, Haidar's principal provision depot. On the 1st June, he was near Arni. Haidar had to hurry back, leaving the French who had instructions from Bussy not to fight a general action till he arrived.

The battle of Arni, 2nd June, has been described by Wilks as "a day of severe fatigue and varied cannonade rather than of battle and a succession of skilful manoeuvres to combine with the essential protection of the baggage the means of closing with enemy."

1 Sec. Progs. 4th July, 1782, p. 2024.

2 Ms. Eur. E. 87, p. 164.

3 P. 176.

A rivulet on the Chetput side leads to a gentle slope, broken by a vale and ascending gradually to Arni. Haidar had sent a detachment under Tipu by forced marches to reinforce the garrison. As the British van approached the fort early in the morning, it was fired at from fort at the long range as well as by Tipu's force and Haidar's army opened fire on the rear. Coote placed his baggage in a dip with five sepoy battalions and all his cavalry to guard it. Haidar now appeared on the left and Coote had to face right about. He could not pursue his route towards the Arni side. As usual his men were formed in two lines. The second line quickly occupied a village which commanded the whole position and the first line then crossed the ricefields and compelled Haidar's army to retire. Meanwhile Haidar was also threatening the British baggage and Coote had to change his disposition. "I therefore ordered the first line", he wrote, "to pass in the rear of the second and to form on the right of the first line and then the whole to advance in line of battle." Haidar's men fell back but as the British army advanced about two miles they again found the Mysore cavalry getting round to attack the baggage, which had to be moved up while the British halted. A Mysore detachment took advantage of this pause to occupy the British camp of the morning on the Vangimangalam plain, a more commanding position than that which the British now occupied. The Mysore artillery again opened fire. The baggage now secure, the British first line now advanced quickly, compelling Haidar to retire hurriedly. On the banks of a river they had to cross, the Mysoreans lost a long brass six-pounder and some ammunition. Even while the pursuit was going on, a body of Mysore cavalry again threatened the baggage but they were checked in time. The British returned from the pursuit about six in the evening. The losses on both sides were trifling as the battle was one of manoeuvre and distant cannonading rather than of hand to hand fighting.¹ Coote deplored the lack of provisions which prevented him from pressing the attack on

1 Coote wrote, "The enemy's loss I have not been able to obtain any certain account of, but I do not conceive it could have been considerable."

M. M. C. 15th June, 1782, p. 1835 ; Coote's letter, 10th June Sec. Progs. 4th July, p. 2054. Ms, Eur. E. 87. pp. 177-181.

Arni. He pretended to attack it again on the 4th hoping to draw Haidar into another battle but Haidar appeared to pursue serenely the road towards Arcot. While the British were encamped at Trivatore on the way to Wandewash, Haidar succeeded in ambushing part of it. The grand guard of the British army was cut off. The British loss was 166 infantry, 59 cavalry, 2 three-pounder guns. Haidar, with Tipu and Lally and 600 chosen horse, was present at this action, which, as Coote said, was so rapid and bold that it was over in five minutes. When Haidar reached his camp he fired a salute in honour of his success. The British army withdrew to Manimangalam.¹

Coote was unable to make any definite move, ignorant as he was of Haidar's intentions and of the situation of the fleet. "Both my progress and resolution," he wrote, "receive an unavoidable check." On that day the 6th July another indecisive naval action was fought off Cuddalore. But Hughes was so handicapped that Suffren was able to sail for Ceylon and attack and capture Trincomali before the British could arrive. After a fourth battle on the 3rd September, equally indecisive, Hughes was obliged to go to Bombay for refitting and Suffren to Acheen in Sumatra.

Early in August, Haidar, in expectation of a French naval victory was encamped between Trivedy (Tiruvendapuram) and St. David between the Gadilam and the Poonnaiyar; the French force at Cuddalore, Tipu at Lallpet, north of the Coleroon (15 miles south west of Chidambaram) planning to cross it and march on Negapatam.² The victories of Colonel Nixon had forced the Mysore troops to abandon Kumbakonam and the country south of the Coleroon. Haidar was expecting Bussy's arrival. Coote, as we have seen, revictualled Vellore and he also succeeded in destroying the fort Calghery, about six miles from Vellore. On the 20th August the British marched to Tambaram, intending to attack Cuddalore, while a frigate conveyed several country vessels with provisions for the army. Haidar was at that time no longer covering the French at

1 Coote's letter, Camp, Outramalore, 13th June, 1782.
Ms. Eur. E. 87—pp. 182-184.

2 M. M. D. 1782—Vol. 81-c. 3rd Aug, 1782, pp. 2316-2317.

Cuddalore. He was encamped between Arni and Dobigarh. As soon as he heard of the march of the British army southward, he sent two battalions to reinforce the French at Cuddalore and made it appear to Coote that he was moving towards Tripasore. At Kiliyanur Coote heard of the fall of Trincomali. Soon after he himself fell ill and as the convoy did not arrive in time he withdrew to Madras from the Red Hills near Pondichery. A contemporary writer compares this campaign to an 'expedition of feudal times when Kings could 'only keep the field for thirty or forty days'¹. The indecisiveness of the naval war made the land operations equally indecisive.

There was more activity on the western front. After his victory, Major Abingdon wished to advance to Coimbatore, but the Bombay government did not wish to scatter the British forces and urged the support of the Zamorin and the other chiefs who were in rebellion against Haidar. But this plan did not work. The British army in Malabar was reinforced and Col. Humberstone was put in command. His original plan was to march into Tanjore by way of Anjengo and "create a diversion sufficient to awaken Haidar's attention to it". But in April, 1782 he decided to march on Palghat, "Pallacottah, a strong fort situated about one mile from Pallacatcherry about 80 miles from Calicut and thence on Coimbatore." Near Tricalore, about 20 miles south of Calicut, he encountered a Mysore force of about 1,000 horse and 3,500 foot under Mukhdum Ali. The British advance was so quick and fierce that the Mysoreans fell into confusion, the Commander and 300 of his men were killed and 200 taken prisoners. A violent storm, however, damaged his ammunition and stores and Humberstone had to abandon Calicut till the monsoon abated. According to Wilks these British operations resulted from a coincidence of circumstances and were not the effect of digested measures.

On the 2nd September he took the field again with 900 British and 2,000 Bombay sepoys. He advanced to Tirtalla, while his stores came up the Ponnani river. Leaving his heavy baggage at Ramgery he pushed the Mysoreans back and advanced upto Palghat. But a sortie led to the loss of almost all his provisions. The rains began again and instructions from

1 *War in Asia* I. p. 409.

Bombay ordered his return to the coast. He fell back none too soon for Tipu was waiting to fall on him when he marched further inland. Tipu with Lally and 20,000 men followed by forced marches, missed the enemy at Mankarai, and came in contact with them at Ponnani where he attacked them on the 29th November. Humberstone, however, succeeded in crossing the Ponnani at night the troops wading chin-deep. He thus escaped the fate of Braithwaite¹. Col. Macleod had taken command. Tipu now waited for his heavy artillery, but on receiving news of his father's death he fell back quickly, unperceived by the British and hastened to his father's camp where the news of Haidar's death had been kept concealed until Tipu arrived and was proclaimed.

In the last period of the war Haidar thus more than held his own, confining the British generally to the coast and reducing Coote to comparative immobility. Wilson's comment that but for the peace with France the south of India would have been lost to the English and Madras would have fallen to Tipu and the French is perhaps an exaggeration. But it seems fair to say that Haidar generally had the initiative and the wounds he had given to the British were deeper than any they had inflicted on his army². If Suffren had won command of the sea Haidar's land operations would probably have been bolder and more decisive.

1 Ms. Eur. E-87, pp. 165-170.

War in Asia, I, pp. 462-472.

2 *War in Asia*, I, p. 289

CHAPTER XXV

Haidar and the French

As a soldier, Haidar admired the military efficiency of the European nations. For military success he wished to have some European troops to stiffen his own levies and to procure guns and ammunition. This could not be expected from the British. In the treaty of 1770 the Bombay Government undertook to supply him with guns, saltpetre and lead but the Court of Directors naturally disapproved of this engagement. After the fall of Mahe Braithwaite wrote: "I hear from all quarters that the artillery and stores here are a great object with him. He is upon no terms with the Dutch, has no opinion of the Portuguese and does not know where to look for supplies which he thinks the English will never supply him with."¹ The Dutch were sometimes at war with the British but their power in India was too weak to make them effective allies. Haidar was asked to provide transport for some guns they had promised to send him.² Against the Marathas the Portuguese were of no use. The Government at Goa informed him through their representatives at Mangalore that Maratha territories encircled Goa and if they joined Haidar against the Peshwa not only would Goa be in danger but their commerce would be destroyed and they could not afford the heavy expenses of a war.³ Still less would they provoke the British who

1 M. M. C. 18th Oct., 1779, pp. 1403-1412.

2 In the Anglo-Dutch war of 1781 there was naturally some co-operation between Haidar and the Dutch at Negapatam—In the Articles of Agreement between the Dutch Governor and Haidar Ali, the Dutch agreed to help to drive away the British fleet in co-operation with the French and to supply guns, firelocks and ammunition to Haidar. But they were obviously too weak to be helpful. When Negapatam surrendered to the British, Article 20 provided that the aid troops of Haidar Ali were to be given a free pass and four Dutch representatives in the camp of Haidar Ali were to enjoy the full grant and force of the capitulation. Ms. Eur. E. 87

3 Portuguese Document, VII.

commanded the sea. In 1768 they did not even defend their factory at Mangalore against the British.

There remained the French, a great nation who still had possessions in India and whose ambition to become an Asiatic power had been frustrated by the British but still remained alive. As enemies of the British Haidar and the French naturally came together. Individual Frenchmen like Alain and Hugel had been in the Mysore army from the beginning and later there was a French contingent under Lally and Puymorin of about 400 men. It may be true as Bowring says that "in their dealings with the natives of India at this period the French were more sympathetic than their hereditary enemies the English."¹ But this is too facile and too superficial an explanation of the Franco-Mysore concert in the later years of Haidar's life. It was really common interests that linked Haidar and the French. They had supplied arms and military stores to him through Mahe and received special treatment in Malabar. When war broke out between England and France in 1778 and Haidar and the British in 1780, it was naturally to be expected that Haidar and the French would co-operate.

The French, however, were at a disadvantage in carrying on active warfare in India. Their nearest naval base was Mauritius, which in those days was regarded by the French as the key to the Indian Ocean but which was about 2,500 miles away from the Konkan coast. A base which cannot supply a fighting force is of no more importance than is a sentry base without a sentry. The Indian seas were commanded by the British. In India the French had no large forces. The conditions for any effective attack on the British in India were the command of the sea and the alliance of some strong Indian power. "Europeans landed here", wrote Sir Robert Harland in 1772, "even though very numerous without the assistance of a country power would find so many difficulties that no great mischief could be apprehended from them."² Haidar's embryo navy was too weak to cope with the

1 Bowring, p. 106.

2 Richmond, p. 57.

British under Hughes. But at last in 1778 it looked as if these conditions might be fulfilled.

Haidar had always remained in touch with the French. He had a *vakil* with Bellecombe in Pondichery and the two kept up constant correspondence.¹ When Haidar took Cuddapah and French influence increased at the court of Basalat Jung, the British feared that the two would establish contact also on the Coromondol coast. British eagerness to secure the Guntur Sarkar was perhaps strengthened by this suspicion.² The Governor and Council of Madras were so reluctant to restore it as they were apprehensive that Haidar would try to secure possession of the district. But Pondichery was captured by the British in October 1778, Mahe in March 1779 and the British concluded a treaty with Basalat Jung in April 1780.

1 Whitehill, the Madras Governor, wrote to Hastings in 1778 (M. M. C. vol. 61A), "From Mr. Bellecombe he receives every assistance the French can at present afford him". C. P. C. V, 1608, Sept. 21, 1779 Newswriter at Haidar's camp to the Nawab of Arcot—"A few days ago Haidar sent a letter and some presents to the King of France. He has just received a reply to it from Mauritius accompanied by the following presents, a pair of pistols, a pair of three-chambered rifles, a pen knife the handle of which is studded with diamonds and several pieces of broad cloth and velvet." The letter adds that a powerful French army is assembled at Mauritius. "On 21st April the French commandant at Pondichery received a letter from General Bellecombe intimating that Kot Krishna, a Brahmin who represented the latter in the Court of Haidar Ali Khan had returned to him after successfully accomplishing his mission there. As a reward for this service the Brahmin has received a jagir consisting of several taluks in the district of Kondapalli. He has further obtained a palanquin, a royal umbrella, a robe of honour, besides a permanent situation as ambassador to Haidar's court. General Bellecombe has embarked from Mahe and will soon reach the fort of Pondichery". C. P. C. V. 955. June 15, 1778.

2 Braithwaite wrote from Mahe in Aug., 1777 (M. M. C. 1779, Vol. 68A.)

"I have been told by a Frenchman that when Haidar found that both Bengal and Madras were sending such large force to the Malabar coast he considered it in a very precarious state and formed an intention of opening a communication with the sea on the coast of Coromondal by the reduction of Cuddapah and Basalat Jang's country that he might still act unitedly with the French and that a despatch had been sent from Mangalore to Mauritius soon after the reduction of this place with the plan of operations intended."

There were rumours as early as September, 1779, of the impending arrival of a French armament from Mauritius, but it was not till the 9th October 1780 that D'Orves actually left Mauritius. He cruised eastward to intercept the China ships of the East India Company and arrived off Madras on the 28th February, 1781. He was under instructions not to land his men, to be back by April, and to make only a "political demonstration.....to show the Indian princes forces that would give them confidence in our power."¹ When he arrived there was no British fleet in the coast. Coote marched towards Pondichery, off which the French were lying but Haidar followed on a parallel course. With the French fleet off Cuddalore road and Haidar close by, Coote was in a very perilous position. "D'Orves had only to ride at anchor in the finest season of the year and see his enemy starve."² Coote, it is true, destroyed the surf boats supplying the fleet with water but D'Orves could have watered at one of the Dutch ports or with ships' boats in the river at Porto Novo.³ Haidar urged him to remain and he had no enemy at sea to fear. But D'Orves was wanting in nerve and initiative. He pleaded his instructions and sailed away. The Governor of Mauritius wrote, "By this astonishing obstinacy of M.D'Orves which was reported to the ministry at the time, we lost an opportunity such as will never recur of becoming absolute masters of the Coromondal coast."⁴ It was said that if he had even left two frigates off Cuddalore the results might have been fatal to the British.

The incapable D'Orves sailed again from Mauritius on the 7th December, 1781. But his death on the 9th February, 1782 put Suffren in command. Pierre Andre de Suffren was one of the greatest of French seamen. But he came a year too late. British power was now much more secure everywhere in India and Haidar Ali was no longer at the summit of his fortune. Above all, the British also had a fleet on the coast

1 Malleon, p. 9.

2 *Ibid.*—p. 8.

3 Richmond—pp. 108-109.

4 Quoted by Malleon—*Later French Struggle*, p. 9. n. from a memoir in the French naval archives.

not much inferior to the French and under a competent admiral. The outstanding genius of Suffren "lit up brilliantly the events of his time, shed an unnatural glow on men and affairs and after a short spell disappeared without leaving any noticeable trace on the steady march of time."¹

Suffren had with him 11 ships of the line mounting 720 guns, manned by 5917 sailors, 4 frigates mounting 118 guns, manned by 1390 men, 3 sloops with 350 men, a fire-ship, a hospital ship and 8 transports, carrying 2253 European troops, 1157 kafris and 47 sepoys. On the way the French fleet captured the British ship *Hannibal* sailing from St. Helena for Madras. Hughes had nine ships of the line mounting 588 guns and two frigates with 32 guns.² The French land forces were commanded by Duchemin. Suffren's first object was to land the troops and rid himself of the transports. While passing Pondichery he sent Lt. Col. Canaple to inform Haidar of his arrival and his plans. The British attempt to cut off his transports led to an engagement off Sadras on the 17th February, 1782, which lasted from 3-30 to 7 p.m. and in which, although five of the French captains did not obey orders, Suffren inflicted heavier losses than he suffered. Haidar meanwhile had moved towards Wandewash. The French troops were landed at Porto Novo on the 10th March, 1782. Haidar supplied provisions for the fleet. Lally was frequently with Suffren to explain Haidar's intentions and matters were partly adjusted. Haidar admired Suffren,³ but he would not hand over Chidambaram to the French as their depot but advised the capture of Cuddalore. On the 23rd March, Suffren, after informing Haidar, sailed south to intercept reinforcements for Hughes. He himself had been strengthened by another man of war.

In Suffren's absence misunderstandings multiplied. The French negotiated for a treaty, whereas Haidar wanted immediate action. He sent a lakh of rupees but was unwilling to grant all the demands of the French. Three Brahmins represented him. So long as it was a matter of dividing country to be yet conquered, Haidar was willing to give away what

1 Panikkar—p. 68.

2 Ms. Eur. E. 87, p. 130-31.

3 J. B. p. 108.

was not and might not be his. But he refused to give more than a lakh of rupees monthly for three thousand Europeans although the French promised receipts and repayment. Haidar wanted the full list of officers and the salary of each of them. Chenniville, the French envoy, tired of the protracted negotiations, wished to leave but could not get a farewell audience for some time. Haidar at last let him go promising to send an agent to make a treaty. The French took Cuddalore on the 3rd April but the troops were dying in large numbers and the French army marched to Mundiampakkam.¹

Banaji Pandit now arrived at the camp as Haidar's envoy but he was not authorised to do anything more than pass on the French demands. The question of pay created interminable difficulties especially as the number of European troops gradually dwindled. Haidar pointed out that peace in Europe would at any moment deprive him of the help of the French troops in India and asked that the French in India should continue to assist him as long as he was at war with the British. This condition alone was an insuperable obstacle to any treaty.

Meanwhile the troops were not paid for long periods and their morale suffered. Haidar put difficulties in the way when Duchemin wished to see him.² The two armies at last joined between Tindivanam and Wandewash and the next day was

1 Haidar hoped that the Franco-Mysore alliance would have some influence on the Marathas. At one stage he insisted upon the French envoys speaking thus in the presence of the Marathas in the open *Darbar*—"Although the French generals on land and on sea inform you in their letters about the motives which have brought them here they have charged me to repeat to you again that the intentions of His Majesty in sending his armies to India were to take revenge for the outrages committed against the French nation by the capture of Pondichery without declaration of war on the part of the British Government and above all to eliminate the burden of oppression on the various nations of India which they have subjugated and to render to their legitimate rulers the countries which they have conquered."—J.B.

2 Haidar laid siege to Permacoil without asking the French to come to his help. As they came the French were asked to encamp at the foot of Permacoil where they remained idle till Permacoil fell. Duchemin then heard that the Nabob would encamp to the north-west of Permacoil and there the French General could see him. But when Duchemin marched at the head of a column he was informed by a courier that the Nabob had gone back to his army.—J. B.

fixed for an interview. But Haidar on the pretext of a British march towards Wandewash asked the French to fall back on their earlier camp. The withdrawal was so precipitate that it resembled a rout. The army became more and more demoralised ; the soldiers, without pay, blamed the general and some of the coolies deserted.

After these humiliations, Haidar granted Duchemin two or three interviews. He asked the army to camp near Valdâour, but invited Duchemin and some officers to join him to witness his attack on a British convoy to Vellore. On the 29th May Duchemin set out but after 23 hours he was unable to overtake Haidar and returned to the camp exhausted and ill. At last he died on the 13th September and the command passed to the Comte Höfflize.¹

Meanwhile on the 20th June, Suffren, his repairs complete, anchored off Cuddalore and replaced his losses from Duchemin's army, which was thus further reduced.² He decided to take Negapatam. This led to the third naval action on the 6th July off Karikal. It was indecisive but prevented the French from attacking Tranquebar. Suffren returned to Cuddalore for repairs and Haidar who had put off Duchemin so long hastened to meet Suffren. The great French seaman was magnificently received, not a mark of honour or respect being omitted. The interview took place on the 26th July.³ At a second meeting Haidar expressed his disappointment at a French alliance and the need of leaving the Carnatic to defend his northern frontiers against Maratha raids. It was with difficulty that Suffren persuaded him to wait for Bussy. Before he left, Suffren handed over his British prisoners, about 60 officers and 400

1 An intercepted letter written by Duchemin's secretary to a Captain Chenn in the French service at Tranquebar, dated 2nd June, contains the following information—"The general with 20 officers set out on the 29th May at night to attend Haidar who sent him word that he was going to pursue the English, that the general after having been 23 hours on horseback without being able to overtake Haidar, returned to camp, much fatigued and in high fever."

2 Colombo records quoted by Richmond, p. 5 as corroborated by J. B. 124.

3 Gaudurt Catalogue Tome 6. no. 5275.

men, to Haidar. He had negotiated with the Governor of Madras for an exchange of prisoners but the British wanted the exchange to include the British prisoners in Haidar's hands. This was beyond Suffren's power, he did not wish to transport them to Mauritius or to hamper the French army by prisoners whom it would be necessary to guard. He also wanted to earn Haidar's good will. He is said to have written to Souillac, Governor of Mauritius, "It is far more to increase his confidence in me than to reply to the proceedings of Macartney, Hughes and Coote that I am confiding the English prisoners to the Nabob."¹

After Suffren's capture of Trincomali in Ceylon came the fourth battle on the 3rd September. Hughes could not retake the harbour and Suffren came to Cuddalore and landed some troops before sailing for Acheen in Sumatra. He urged Haidar to wait for Bussy who would arrive by the end of November. The captor of Trincomali, with the weight which an assurance from him alone could carry, succeeded in persuading Haidar to remain. Haidar waited but Bussy did not land till the 17th March. Haidar was then dead and Tipu was on the west coast.

Haidar perhaps felt that he was justified in putting his faith in Suffren who must have communicated to him with his usual earnestness and enthusiasm the French plan of action on Bussy's arrival. The plan may be stated in Suffren's words—"If Haidar was still in Arcot the troops should be landed at Masulipatam in order to operate in the country which had not already been pillaged and could, therefore, furnish food. He would take Masulipatam and Paliacotta and advance down the coast to Madras to join the armies of Haidar and the French from Cuddalore. The capture of Madras would be the final stroke, the high way to peace" (Suffren to de Castries). "Attacked from the south by the army from Cuddalore, from the north by Bussy's and from the west by Haidar's..... Madras should fall in 25 days" (Suffren to Piveron, Oct 6.)²

On the whole the alliance of Haidar and the French produced more friction than substantial advantage to either side.

1 J. B. 234.

2 Richmond, p. 314.

Haidar had a real admiration for Suffren who had boldness, energy and talent to recommend him and treated him well. Suffren wrote on the 3rd May, "Bahadur provides me with food in abundance"¹ and when Suffren wanted timber for spars, Haidar agreed to have them made in Mangalore and brought round. It was to Haidar's interest to keep the French fleet on the coast and this consideration of strategy coupled with personal esteem made his relations with Suffren smooth and easy. But he had little liking or respect for other French leaders. The departure of D'Orves had planted distrust in Haidar's mind. After assurances of an army of 10,000 men, the arrival of Duchemin with 3,000 was a fresh disappointment. In view of their number Haidar first wanted them to take service under him as did Lally and his contingent.² To this the French would naturally not agree. They had come not as mercenaries and instruments of Haidar's policy. They had their own ambitions in the country though Haidar thought that their strength was not equal to their pretensions. They talked about a treaty, "that all the country from the Koleroon as far Karanguli, Chetput, Tiagar with all the forts and durgams be ceded to them and (Haidar) to rebuild the fort of Pondichery for them, to put 10,000 sepoys under their command and Haidar's army and theirs to be separate to give as much land on the Malabar coast as will produce the value of one lakh of pagodas."³ They did not wish to fight till a treaty had made their mutual obligations clear. Nor were Duchemin or Hofflize men to win Haidar's respect nor was their army large enough to extort a respect the commanders did not deserve. Haidar complained of the expenses of their administration,

1 *Ibid.* p. 234.—Lord Dorset, British ambassador at Paris, wrote to Lord Carmarthen, the British Foreign Secretary, July 31st, 1788, "The ambassadors of Tipu, I understand, are commissioned to cancel a debt of 8 millions due from France to Tippoo Sultan for provisions supplied to M. de Suffren's fleet while it was in that part of the world during the last war". I found this extract from Br. archives in the unpublished London University Doctorate thesis of Dr. S. K. Dutt on Tipu Sultan (1793-1799).

2 *Sec. Progs.* 27th Aug., 1782, p. 606-607.

3 *Ibid.*

food and hospitals and insultingly remarked that he did not know white people ate more than black. From March to October 1782 he supplied no more than 5 lakhs of rupees.¹

The inactivity of the French land army and its constant demands for money made it more contemptible in his eyes. The hope of substantial French help had kept him in the Carnatic when he might have more usefully gone elsewhere. If Haidar did not give protection to the small French force at Cuddalore the British would destroy it.²

As he told Piveron once in anger, the British were prepared to make peace if he would dissociate himself from the French. The French, he complained, were a light-hearted nation without character or regard for engagements and promises.³ The truth is that neither Haidar, nor the French were prepared to co-operate except in as far as suited their own purposes and loyal co-operation was impossible. Haidar had no desire to drive the British from India only to bring the French in.

1 J. B. 299.

2 If it was not necessary to cover this force he might have gone to the unravaged northern provinces plundering and recuperating. He had also the alternative open to him of going to Malabar where the British had become active (Piveron to Suffren, 3rd October, 1782).

3. J. B. 143.

Occasions for outbursts were in the beginning very frequent. One characteristic incident is referred to by Daniel Philips, a British agent, in his letter dated 12th April, 1782—"About the 27th March a dispute arose between the French and Haidar's people at Chidambaram pagoda. The French wanted to hoist their colours on the pagoda. The Brahmin informed them that he could not permit it without an order from his master on which a French officer drew his sword and cut the Brahmin in two or three places upon which an account was sent to Haidar. His answer was to turn them and the stores out of the pagoda which they did and the French with the help of coolies were obliged to drag their cannon back to Porto Novo"—Sec. Progs. 12th April, 1782, p. 1001 :

CHAPTER XXVI

Civil Administration

Haidar was an all-powerful autocrat. But he was not an innovating ruler. He generally followed the established practices as also the local customs and laws of each region under his sway.

In Mysore Haidar maintained the fiction of the rule of the Wadiyars. At the annual *Dussera* festival the Raja or Kartar as the ruler of Seringapatam was designated was permitted to show himself to the assembled people. As late as September, 1781, a foreign observer records—"a grand gentoo feast at which the King of Mysore was present, a lad about twelve years of age. This Royal prisoner is allowed to appear in public only at the festival time."¹ Haidar was there in Mysore ostensibly as the person who combined in himself the functions of the *Dulwai* and *Sarbadhikari*. A Mysore inscription of 1764 refers to him as *Karyakarta* or regent². The Wadiyar Kings as state prisoners were, in this respect, perhaps as useful to Haidar as were Ram Raja and his successors at Satara to successive Peshwas at Poona and Shah Alam II to Mahadji Sindhia at Delhi after 1784. There was thus no violent break with tradition and the nominal prince gave a varnish of legality to what might be regarded otherwise as usurpation.

Haidar succeeded in establishing himself in power when Chikka Krishna Raja Wadiyar was the reigning monarch (1734—1766). After him the nominal succession devolved on his eldest son Nanja Raja Wadiyar (1766—1770). He was not, however, considered to a "safe pageant" as he had at one stage communicated with the Marathas. He was ultimately strangled in 1770.³ His brother Chama Raja Wadiyar was registered as the nominal ruler and was the pageant king until

1 *War in Asia*, II, p. 49. He also records the homage paid to this nominal crowned head during the administration of Tipu in the *Dussera* feast of September, 1782.

2 Mysore Archaeological Report, 1924, pp. 56-58.

3 Wilks II, p. 152.

his death in 1776. As he died childless another prince was chosen at random by Haidar from all the children of the different branches assembled together for the purpose. This prince also named Chama Raja outlived Haidar. Haidar could have very easily put an end to this fiction that appeared to some observers only as one of his pastimes. He was no doubt secure enough but he perhaps thought that this fiction conciliated his Hindu subjects who formed the vast majority of the population of Mysore. In diplomatic negotiations, whenever it suited his aggressive policy, he made claims on the basis of former treaties because his government was in theory that of the Wadiyars. He again and again referred to the right of the rulers of Mysore to Trichinopoly.

Haidar's conservatism is evident also in his coinage. His earliest coin was the so-called Bahaduri pagoda. It was copied from the pagoda of the first Ikkeri Raja of Bidnur who had, in turn, imitated the pagoda of Sadasivraja of Vijayanagar. Haidar asserted for the first time the sovereign right of striking coins in his own name not in Mysore but in Bidnur which he named Haidar Nagar, where the well-known Haidari pagodas and fanams were struck. In Mysore the gold coin which the people of Mysore had been accustomed to see for generations in their homes and in their bazars had the figure of the Hindu god Siva and his consort Parvati on the obverse. Haidar showed remarkable toleration as also extreme caution in retaining these figures of the Hindu deities. The Haidari pagoda had his own Persian initial. The half pagoda had on the reverse a seated figure of Vishnu, on his right a discus, on his left a conch. The obverse had Haidar's initial 'He' on a granulated field. At Chitaldrug he followed the Beder Poligar model in his coinage. The Beder Poligar had, however, followed a Vijayanagar model of Krishna Raya. The pagoda struck by Haidar at Gooty was in imitation of the coin of Murar Rao, a re-issue of an earlier Mughal pagoda of that mint. The coins with Canarese numerals were re-issues of similar coins of the Mysore Rajas. On the chequered reverse Haidar's initial is found but that does not indicate whether the coins were issued by Haidar

or Tipu. Haidar's policy of copying earlier issues is indicated everywhere. A coin of A.H. 1190 (1776—1777) can be seen, its obverse having the figure of an elephant advancing with uplifted tail. This Gajapati pagoda originated in the days of the Ganga dynasty of Mysore. At Calicut the Hun and the Adda Hun with Haidar's monogram in a circle of dots became familiar. Gold fanams, called the Cannanore and the Verary, were before Haidar in extensive use in Malabar. After the establishment of Mysore rule Haidar ordered that the fanam should have stamped on one side the Persian letter '*He*' but he saw to it that the Haidari fanam did not differ in any other respect from the Verary. Comparatively few varieties were struck by Haidar. In 1195 A. H. (1780-81) Haidar struck copper *paisas* (duddu) at Seringapatam with the elephant obverse. The only indication of his personal authority was the initial '*He*'. He adopted the Hindu coinage in pagodas and fanams. His son Tipu introduced the system of *mohurs* and rupees. According to Ramchandra Rao silver rupees were struck by Haidar at Nagar but this must be a mistake. "Rupees struck by Haidar are not known to numismatics". Silver coins were first issued by Tipu who also issued the Sultani Ashrafi, used the Arabic letter for the number of regnal years and gave fresh and unfamiliar names to mint towns. The Sultani Ashrafi of Tipu had the inscription "din Ahmad dar jahan roshan se fateh Haidar ast" i.e. the religion of the Prophet is made illustrious in the world through the victory of Haidar. But Haidar, whose name his son thus tried to perpetuate, was never pompous or flamboyant like his successor.¹

Mysore administration under Haidar had, according to western observers, "a vigour hitherto unexampled in India". This vigour it derived almost entirely from the ability of its ruler. De La Tour thus describes the daily routine of Haidar—

"Haidar normally goes to rest after midnight, rises about 6 o'clock. As soon as he is risen, the Majors of the army on duty the preceding day and night and those who relieve them

1 Allan—*Catalogue of coins in the Indian Museum*—Vol IV.
 J. R. Henderson—*The coins of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*.
 Rice—*Mysore and Coorg Gazetteer*—Vol. I, Appendix.

enter, make the reports, receive orders to be transmitted to ministers and generals, who themselves have the privilege of entering his dressing room if they have anything extraordinary or pressing to communicate. The couriers who have arrived during the night or in the morning also come and lay their despatches at his feet. Between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. he quits his apartments and repairs to a saloon, where a number of secretaries wait for his appearance. Into their hands he puts the letters received, giving them instructions for the answer. His sons, his relatives and those lords who are honoured with his intimacy enter, and if it be nine o'clock they take the usual refreshment. If he has leisure he appears at a balcony and receives the salute of his elephants. After the repast, which ends about half past ten, Haidar enters into the hall of audience, or the grand tent if at the army. All persons who have permission or access, of which the number is very great, may come and those who have affairs to transact, may either request admittance by means of the mace-bearers or put their request into the hands of those officers by whom it is carried to the Chief who places it at the feet of the prince, where it is immediately read and answered. It is not customary here to stop the prince by the offer of petitions, when he goes out, unless the affair is very urgent and extraordinary. At this audience thirty or forty secretaries are seated along the wall to his left, who write continually. Couriers arrive almost every instant and are conducted with great noise and bustle to the feet of the prince, where they lay the despatches. A secretary kneeling takes the packet and sitting on his hams before the prince opens it and reads the letter. Haidar immediately dictates the particulars of the answer and the letter is carried to the office of a minister. Contrary to the customs of the princes of the East, who affix their names by means of a seal, Haidar signs the despatches in order as they are completed as well as a number of private orders. Many writers report the contrary to this which only proves that they have never seen Haidar half an hour at a time. The orders that issue from the offices of the ministers have no other signature than that of the great seal and the despatch is closed with the private seal

of the minister. The letters signed by Haidar are closed by the seal of the sovereign of which the principal secretary is guardian. Ministers, Generals, Ambassadors, and other great men rarely appear at this audience, unless commanded or unless urged by extraordinary affair. It is peculiar to their dignity to see the prince only in the evening when none but men of consequence are admitted...This audience continues till after three o'clock, which is the hour he returns to his apartment to sleep.....About half past five the prince returns into the hall of audience or some other large apartment where he places himself in a balcony to see his troops exercise and his cavalry defile before him. The Secretaries are buried in reading letters or writing.....The great men ministers and ambassadors visit the Nabob only at night.....there is for the most part a comedy every night that commences at eight in the evening and last till eleven. Haidar to whom the entertainments of the stage are very indifferent discourses with his ministers or ambassadors, sometimes passing into a Cabinet to speak with more secrecy and continues as in the morning to despatch business without seeming to be busy.....when he is obliged to remain a month in the camp or in any town he usually goes to the chase twice a week."¹

The missionary Swartz also refers to the regular succession and rapid despatch with which Haidar's affairs proceeded one after another in his court. But he says that Haidar could not read or write. He used to order one man to write a letter, read it to him and then he would ask another to read it again in order to ascertain whether instructions were correctly followed or not.² But De La Tour refers emphatically to Haidar's signing letters but this accomplishment perhaps consisted only in writing the initial of his own name 'He' in an inverted form.³

The central administrative machinery consisted of 18 departments. Chikkadeva Raja Wadiyar had divided his kingdom into two units with separate headquarters at Mysore and

1 M. M. D. L. T.—pp. 17-24.

2 Wilks II, App. II.

3 Rice I, p. 396—ref. to a grant in the Inam Office.

Seringapatam and had created 18 departments. This departmental organisation was retained by Haidar.

1. *Atthavanam* or Department of Revenue accounts and administration in charge of the collection of Revenue from the Poligars etc. having powers to appoint the officials and the staff.
2. *Kandacharam*—Department of Military Accounts in charge of affairs relating to the infantry and having control over the appointment of military officers, sardars, etc.
3. *Chagala-Kandacharam*—Department of Military Accounts in charge of affairs relating to the cavalry, having control over the maintenance of garrisons in different parts of the kingdom.
4. *Sunkam*—Department of Customs duties on imports and exports (*jahaz*).
5. *Devasthanam*—Department in charge of Religious Endowments, like temple properties, etc., temple incomes, etc.
6. *Pommu*—Department in charge of levy and collection of duty on cloth.
7. *Mysore Hobali Vicharana Chavadi*—Department which was the central office to which all correspondence relating to the administration, accounts, etc., of the province under the jurisdiction of Mysore was sent for being submitted to the king for orders classified, and despatched to other departments according to their subjects.
8. *Patnam Hobali Vicharana Chavadi*—A similar establishment as the above for dealing with matters concerning the province under the jurisdiction of Srirangapatnam.
9. *Mysore Behum Chavadi*—or Department of Public Information which received all informations relating to the daily occurrence in each village of the province of Mysore. The information was gathered by local officials, who despatched it through runners to the pargana headquarters from where it was finally sent to the central office or Department of Public Information, i.e. *Behum Chavadi*.

10. *Srirangapatnam Behum Chavadi*—A similar establishment like the above for the province under the jurisdiction of Srirangapatnam. The General Post Office was also attached to this department.
11. *Avakottu Chavadi*—The Department or Office where all correspondences and accounts relating to all the chief departments and offices of the state were scrutinised and reported to the King who daily attended the office. The establishment was situated near the King's palace.
12. *Patnam Chavadi*—The Central Court where all the disputes arising either in the town or in the country were heard and settled according to the code of Vijnanesvara, and punishments inflicted.
13. *Dodda-Ugranam*—or Commercial (Civil ?) stores department where accounts relating to the imports of grain and other stores into the city and their daily consumption by the army establishment, temples, chaultries and the general public were prepared and kept.
14. *Khabbesam Chavadi*—or Department of Military Stores where accounts relating to military equipment like cannon, rifles, gun-powder, cannon-balls, swords, arrows, etc, their disbursement to different garrisons and army divisions were prepared and kept. The work of repairing arms was also undertaken by this department.
15. *Uru-Hobali Chavadi*—Department in charge of Foreign Relations, exercising control and supervision over the barracks where foreign armies were received and stationed and generally in charge of foreigners.
16. *Chikka Vontiri*—or the King's body-guard establishment.
17. *Arazu Begi*—or Office of the *Inti Uligam* Secretary : The duty of this officer was to receive reports of and consider all matters relating to the business of government and the conduct of officials submitted to the king for consideration, represent them to the king and obtain his orders.
18. *Ashtagramam Chavadi*—or Department of Agriculture in charge of supply of provisions to military garrisons etc. Accounts relating to the grain produces were

kept and advice given to ryots in matters of cultivation etc. by the department.¹

Haidar maintained these arrangements almost in tact. In the civil affairs of government the two most important charges were no doubt finance and police. His first Dewan or minister of finance was Khande Rao. As is well known, he plotted against Haidar and failed. Khande Rao's successor was another Brahmin Venkatappa who died in 1765. The fortune which he had made in the service was confiscated and in view of his patent honesty his family was not tortured. Another Brahmin Chenna succeeded him to be plundered and dismissed in 1768. His successor, a Navayat Asad Ali Khan, died in 1772, as alleged, under torture. The next man was also a Navayat Sallahyet Khan. He was found unequal to the task and was imprisoned, the money which he had honestly accumulated being confiscated on his death. His successor was Mir Sadik who held the office until the end of the dynasty.

After Haidar's reorganisation in 1779 the department of police included intelligence as also post office. It was presided over by Shamia, a Brahmin of undoubted ability, The two departments thus united together investigated embezzlements. After Haidar's death Shamia was found implicated in a plot for the dethronement of Tipu and met with a violent end. Haidar's investigation of embezzlements is said to have been very successful. But many public officers of trust had also to answer got-up charges. It has been asserted by Wilks on the basis of a manuscript in his possession that "those who had executed their respective trust and were really unable to pay the sum demanded died under the torture and those only escaped with life who had enriched themselves by exaction and were compelled to disgorge".² Even Appaji Ram is said to have told Purnia, who told Wilks later that probity in Mysore under Haidar's rule was an impracticable virtue. It is further said that Haidar's one great passion was avarice and in 1779 he went so far as to levy a very heavy contribution on bankers. This was something very unusual because he must

1 Mackenzie *Ms Account of Srirangapatnam*.

2 Wilks II, pp. 201-202.

be credited with knowing "where to impose contribution without drying up the springs of industry."¹ What he did in 1779 was a great blow to confidence.

How could administration be carried on in such an atmosphere and how could efficiency and spirit of service be maintained. The answer is supplied by Munro in the course of his criticism of the British administrative system much later. He wrote in 1806, "it is a mistake to suppose that the higher orders have any respect for the Company's Government for they would prefer that of any native power, Mussalman or Hindu, because under such governments they can not only acquire great wealth but fill the highest civil and military offices of the state and they are stripped of a great part of their property by arbitrary exactions and deprived of liberty and even life on the most groundless pretences, they think the prospect of riches and distinction, with all its attendant dangers which the same service of the country powers offers is much more eligible than the humble but safe mediocrity which that of the Company affords.... The merchants, manufacturers and cultivators look to nothing beyond their own occupation and wish only to be allowed to pursue them in tranquillity but the attachment of such men is of little consequence while the Brahmins by whom they will always be led and directed are dissatisfied."² This very discerning servant of the East India Company thus adequately explains why Haidar Ali was so much better served than the East India Company in spite of the fact that he squeezed his finance ministers, treasurers, and collectors. The ministers of Haidar's court, as Swartz testifies, were mostly Brahmins.

Provincial Governments :

There were very few provincial governorships. The two most important were Bidnur and Malabar. Of Bidnur or Nagar the Governors in succession were :³

1. Adavanni Venkappaiah.
2. Raja Ram.
3. Golla Bhadro Timma for 4 months.
4. Shaikh Ayaz.

¹ *Late War in Asia*, Vol. I., p. 125.

² Munro—*System of Br. Statesmanship in India*—Selections from the records of the Bellary District, 10th April, 1806.

³ Mackenzie Ms. (Kanarese)—*Haidar Kaifiyat*.

The provincial government of Malabar was first entrusted to Srinivas Rao who was assisted by Sardar Khan and then to Arshad Beg Khan. Haidar's tendency was to continue the old system of administration as much as possible but powerful poligars were either removed or weakened as far as possible.

Poligar Policy :

The poligars were military chieftains who held their districts in return for military service. A poligar "was to consider his territory not as a Nadu, a country, but as a Palaiyam or encampment".¹ Some were bandit chiefs, others derived their descent from ancient rajahs and from those who had held offices under previous dynasties. We have very detailed information of Haidar's poligar policy with regard to Dindigul and in the region later described as Ceded Tracts. The policy pursued by Haidar as *foujdar* of Dindigul has already been referred to. In the northern part of his dominions he extirpated the refractory poligars, conciliated the conciliatory and in general increased the *peshcush* that was paid. In the days of Haidar poligars who were expelled never dared to return and remain privately in possession in collusion with the *amildars*. But this not infrequently happened in the days of Tipu.

The system of *Cawelly* in the northern districts later known as Ceded Tracts was common. The *Cawelgar* was paid a contribution and he was expected to make good stolen property. But the *Cawelgar* never fully repaid losses unless he robbed in another quarter. Normally this system enabled the *Cawelgar* to maintain a bigger force than he could do otherwise in his own hereditary district. Haidar put a stop to his allowance. This system increased anarchy. In this connection the comment of the principal collector of the Ceded Tracts in 1802 is relevant. He wrote, "All native governments are little more than an assemblage of poligarships, under a superior chief, who though he has a general control over the whole, possesses very little authority in the internal management. Haidar Ali was the only Indian sovereign we know of who ever subdued all his petty feudal chiefs and was really master of the country. He knew all the advantages to be derived from *Cawelgar* and he thought it wise to abolish them."² But Haidar retained the 'Cawely' system in Dindigul

1 Caldwell, p. 103.

2 Fifth Report III, p. 428.

independently of *pollams* and in some areas he even allowed the poligars to retain *Cawel*. It would be wrong to think in such matters of uniformity in Haidar's administrative policy. Everything depended upon his appraisal of local needs and local remedies. He escheated zamindaris and jagirs in Balaghat but did not infringe immunities and privileges in Baramahal. He was essentially a practical man of affairs not at all anxious for unworkable uniformity.

Revenue System :

The most important work of civil government was the adjustment and collection of land revenue. As has been already said, Haidar followed everywhere the established custom but was always intent, upon making additions to the government demand and incorporated whatever a skilful *amil* had added in any locality. The heads of revenue were generally—land tax, *sair*¹ including *Abkari* known in those days as *Panchabab* (five items consisting of 'toddy,' 'arrack,' 'ganja,' 'betel,' and 'tobacco') and *Bajebab* which included other taxes of various kinds. There were 'izaradars' or subrenters of *sair* duties but in some the *sair* was *amani*, i.e., under government management. In Malabar export duties called '*adlami*' were imposed. The English had between 1770-79 the advantage of paying customs revenue at the rate of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.²

The general tenure of land has been described as "the hereditary right of cultivation or the right of a tenant and his heirs to occupy a certain ground so long as they continue to pay the customary rent of the district." Details regarding *Devasthanam* and *Agraharam* supplied by Purnia to the Mysore Commissioners after British conquest of Mysore give us an idea of the remissions allowed by Haidar in Mysore.

Devasthanam and *Agraharam*—1,93,959

Maths of Brahmins — 20,000

Tipu granted to Muhammadan establishments of a similar nature a remission of 20,000.³

With regard to 'inam' grants in general the policy followed by Haidar and Tipu in Baramahal has been very fully described

1 Variable import distinct from land revenue consisting of customs, tolls, licenses and duties on merchandise.

2 Logan—*Collection of Treaties and Engagements relating to British affairs in Malabar*, pp. 71-73.

3 Wilks' Report, p. 43.

in British records. Haidar more or less observed the same principles perhaps in Mysore proper. On the basis of the reports of Alexander Read, Captain Macleod and Thomas Munro we can give a general outline of the various forms of 'inam' grants.¹

Ekabhogam—Villages in freehold entirely one person's property.

Agraharam—Villages or streets in freehold or paying some rent (jodi) the property of Brahmins. *Sarvamaniyam agraharam*, owned by Brahmins were perpetually free of rent. *Ardhamanyam* enjoyed half the former estates free of rent.

Srotriyam—Villages in perpetual lease paying a certain fixed rent.

Kraya Agraharam—Were purchased by some merchants and Brahmins of the Mysore Raja some time before Haidar's coming to power. The sum to be paid in such bargains was ten times the annual rent.

Devasthanam—('pagoda inams') i.e. 'inams' granted to important places of worship.

Uligamaniyam—Sarkar lands granted to officers of revenue down to the Toti in lieu of pay.

Khairati Grants—free alms in inam villages to Mussalmans made by Haidar and Tipu.

True to his conservative administrative policy Haidar allowed most of these immunities to continue. Even the *agraharams* continued in freehold. Tipu resumed most of these except what the British described as *pagoda inams* but he was good enough to restore most of these resumed lands in *Srotriyam*. His surveyors were Brahmins and their Muhammedan superiors connived at their favouring their castemen in return for bribes. In Haidar's days such concealment was not possible. When Haidar came to power he resumed many of the *Kraya Agraharams* in order to compel owners to clear off arrears and also in most cases insisted upon an addition of the purchase money. In cases where the actual rent was found to exceed the rent entered in the sanads he resumed if the *inamdar*

¹ Baramahal Records—Section V, pp. 8, 9, 32-33, 42, 45, 47, 116, 136 ; also Section VI.

had sufficiently indemnified himself. But the *Kraya Agraharam* was never as sacrosanct as the charity *agraharam* and temple *agraharam*. So far as this policy of resuming inams is concerned the opinion of Munro should be recorded—"It does not appear that the Hindu princes were much more scrupulous than Tipu in resuming inams...for as almost every prince gave away had none resumed the whole country would in a short time have been converted into inam".¹ Haidar conformed generally to the practice of the ancient Hindu government. The principle which he followed in assessing *agraharams* was to fix the rent from $\frac{1}{3}$ rd to $\frac{1}{2}$ of that paid by the Sudras for such lands. The Brahmins were thus in some measure *inamdars*.

Haidar's machinery for land revenue collection was the same as under previous governments. He rented large districts to *Amildars*. They were generally regular in their payments. They levied private contributions besides realising the settled sarkar revenue. Haidar, well served by his spies, knew more or less accurately the extent of these forced contributions, asked them to attend the *darbar*, forced them to disgorge, gave each a small present and transferred them to other districts to pursue once again the same course of action. "Haidar was at all times accessible to complaints and never failed to pursue to its source the history of an irregular demand and to recover it with additional fines from the exactor".²

In his report on the ceded districts Munro wrote, "every village is a kind of little republic with the patel at the head of it". In another interesting report he wrote, "whoever rules the province he rules the village".³ The patel stood between the village and political vicissitudes at the capital. It did not matter who ruled. The twelve village officers were together styled the Barbaluti or Ayangadi, the four most important of them being the 'gauda' or patel who combined in himself the functions of the judge and magistrate, the Karnam or public accountant, the talari or police officer and the toti or the watchman of the crops. Besides them there were the Nirganthi

1 Baramahal Records—Sec. V & VII, p. 101.

2 Gleig, Munro—Vol. III, p. 97.

3 Munro System—p. 237.

or the man who distributed water and the astrologer, the smith, the carpenter, the potter, the washerman, the barber and the goldsmith.¹

Over ten, twenty, forty or a hundred villages there was a zamindar, a poligar or an *amildar* with his *pykes* or peons, who received revenue from the village patel. The administrator of revenue had the powers of a magistrate as also the authority of judge. The most important of the traditional institution was the *panchayat* which was an assembly of local inhabitants before whom local cases were heard. The *panchayat* was differently composed according to the matter to be decided.

*Bidnur and Sunda*² : In Bidnur and Sunda region the proprietary right of land was vested in the landholder with hereditary right of succession. Hereditary property and fixed rent were institutions attributed to Sivappa Nayak (1648-1670), the Bidnur chief. Military service was a condition of the tenure. After the conquest of Bidnur in 1763 Haidar recognised this hereditary right of the landholders. But not long after this a conspiracy supported by these landholders for the assassination of Haidar was discovered. He hanged three hundred of the conspirators, commuted military service for money payment and established a garrison of peons. He added to the existing rent at the end of the Rani's government the *tankhas* to peons. Shaikh Ayaz as Dewan of Bidnur and Canara raised the rent of all cocoanut plantations, calculated the amount of *russooms*, i.e. services exacted from the ryots by *qiladars* and *amildars* and added all this to the land-rent. After British annexation it was found that Haidar's commutation of 1764 was moderate. This was adopted as the basis of British assessment. The landlords leased out those parts of the estates as sufficed to discharge their revenue obligations. Their own farm lands were cultivated by serfs described as Pannayal, Papiyal, Adami. It is said that after the loss of his dominions Tipu resorted to a proportionate increase in his remaining possessions. This led to the ruin of his finance. It is not possible to assert with certainty how much he actually succeeded in realizing. Munro

1 Rice—I, p. 574.

2 Fifth Report, Vol. III, pp. 302-335.

wrote in 1801 about Canara—"The small landlords are probably as comfortable as in any country in Europe. The never-failing monsoon and the plentiful harvests of rice far beyond the consumption of the inhabitants secure them from ever feeling the distress of scarcity. Rents are therefore easily collected. I could not help observing the difference that good feeding makes on men as well as on other animals. The landlords in Canara are, I am convinced, fatter in general than those of England. I was sometimes tempted to think on looking at many who had large estates and particularly at the patels that they had been appointed on account of their weight."¹ In Canara and Sunda property was vested in individuals, not in communities. In Mysore, Baramahal and other areas village communities were powerful organizations like corporations and municipalities in which they and the *Sarkar* shared the attributes of property between them.

Malabar²

In Malabar there was no systematic land tax previous to Mysore conquest. The Brahmins and Nair landholders subject to the local chiefs were summoned for military service and were occasionally subject to contribution for extraordinary emergencies. In the dominions subject to the Zamorin of Calicut and in Chericul the chief came gradually to realise one fourth of the produce as revenue besides customs duties, mint duties and succession duties. Fines realised from offenders, escheats of the estates of persons who left no heirs and a poll tax called *tallapanam*, together with some professional taxes paid by weavers, fishermen and distillers swelled their income. All gold ore was claimed as royalty as also elephants and their teeth as also all game. The teak tree, bamboo, honey, wax, hides and fins of sharks and the wreckage of vessels formed part of the chief's income.

The Nambudri Brahmins and the Nairs were landholders of Malabar. They leased out their estates to farmers who were called Kanumkars. Under Haidar when systematic land

¹ Gleig—III—p. 162.

² Report of a Jt. Commission 1792-1793 ; Minute of Sir John Shore, February 24, 1794 ; Fifth Report, Vol. III, No. 23.

tax was established in North Malabar as also in South Malabar the Brahmin landholders as also the Nairs would not come to the *cutcheries*. The assessment was therefore made with these Kanumkars, who true to their trust, made some reservation for the Jenmkar or landholder usually 3/20ths, deducted 11/20ths for their support and profit and agreed to pay 6/20ths to the government. Calculated on a grain estimate Arshad Beg's arrangement in Southern Malabar can be thus described—I *purreh* or measure of seed was expected to produce in a year 10 *purrehs*, 5½ of which was the share of the cultivator. 1½ that of the Jenmkar and 3 of the Government. This was technically known as *Dhanmurry*. Of betelnut, cocoanut and jack trees and pepper vines according to Arshad Beg's arrangement the Government claimed "One moiety of value" because the Government recognised that this required greater labour and expense and took a long time to come to maturity.

Arshad Beg's settlement of Southern Malabar in 1783-84 was 4,08,267-6-8 nearly 90,000 pagodas less than the first year's assessment of Haidar. It is suspected that the complicity of the assessors was responsible for this lower assessment, Arshad Beg might have made this deduction in order to conciliate the people. In the northern districts Haidar did not fix any regular direct assessment in Cherikul, Cottiate and Cartinad but after Tipu's accession there was a regular assessment by his own officers. So far as pepper vines were concerned half of the produce was generally taken in Northern Malabar which was most productive in that article.

In Malabar there were many disturbing elements in the days of Mysorean rule—the expelled princes of the Zamorin family and the jungle Moplahs. Malabar was never thoroughly subdued and settled. "It was a scene of confusion in which the financial part of the business could not possibly have been very successful".

Haidar conquered the country from Cherikul to Cochin. The Raja of Cochin became tributary, paying to the Mysorean 30,000 pagodas for his whole country or, as was later said, for that part of his dominion that lay to the north of the Travancore lines. After 1774 Haidar's direct Government and administration became established throughout Southern Malabar. In Northern Malabar Maan Varma, the Raja of Cartinad submitted and was restored to his territory on his paying in

future Rs. 50,000 per annum. The Cottiotte Raja would not submit. But the Raja of Cherikul submitted and was established in Cherikul, Cottiotte as also Irvenaad on an annual *jama* of 1,25,000 and a *nazrana* of about 4 lakhs. In 1776, the Cherikul Raja had to pay a second *nazrana* on his being restored to his original district. Two *risalas* of cavalry numbering about 1,000 were placed in his territory. As he had to meet the expenses of this military establishment this cost him annually one lac of rupees. Shankar Varma, nephew of Maan Varma displaced the latter as Raja of Cartinad. He agreed to pay a *nazrana* of 4 lakhs and arrear tribute and a future *jama* of rupees 1,30,000 annually. Many of the Northern Malabar chiefs joined the British in the second Anglo-Mysore war. The treaty of Mangalore left the Malabar chiefs at the mercy of Tipu. Arshad Beg Khan followed a conciliatory policy and made settlements with the Rajas. His total for the northern divisions was 3,13,750 and for the southern division 5,08,283. But even this rental was never realized, the local charges always exceeding the receipts and he could not make a remittance more than once to Seringapatam.

Total revenue :

The estimated net revenue of the territory owned by Haidar was 79 lakhs of C. Pagodas equivalent to Rs 2,37,00,000. It should be noted that the gross revenue of what remained of Mysore was estimated in the partition treaty of 1799 at Rs 14,12,553 but even in the first year of Purnia's administration the actual gross revenue was Rs 21,53,607. Our estimate of Haidar's total revenue as based on Tipu's schedule of 1792 should be considerably modified. So far as the ceded districts were concerned Tipu's schedule of 1792 was overrated because he knew that these districts would possibly fall to the Nizam's share but he undervalued Gurumkonda, Mulbagal, Baramahal in the hope of his ultimately being able to retain them. The revenue of the territory that he knew he would be able to retain he also undervalued. The revenue mentioned in the Treaty of 1799 was also greatly underestimated. We would not be very wrong if we place the total figure of net revenue of Haidar considerably higher than the total indicated in the 1792 schedules.

In his *Political Survey of Northern Sarkars* James Grant estimates (1786) that Haidar owned territory approximately 75,000 sq. miles and his 'yearly effective revenue cannot exceed 2 krores twenty lakhs. A saving might have been made in times of peace to support the extraordinariness of meditated ambitious war of one krore of rupees annually'.¹

His conquests brought him almost every year treasures hoarded in the past. It is difficult to estimate his income from this source. The year 1763 was particularly fortunate in this respect in which he is said to have secured jewels, bullion, and other valuables worth more than 105 lakhs, possibly much more.²

Justice and Police

Justice was mainly a local concern. Under Haidar's government no noticeable alteration was made in the customary dispensation of justice. References have already been made to the Central Court of Justice at Seringapatam and to the judicial activity of the ruler who acted as the Court of first instance as also of appeal. The revenue officers and the poligars also acted as judges. There was in addition a Sadar court at the capital to administer justice according to Muhammadan law to those of the Muhammadan faith. Qazis in the principal towns decided matters concerning succession, inheritance and other matters according to Muhammadan law so far as the Muhammadans were concerned. It does not appear that *panchayats* were employed in criminal cases. Petty thefts were, no doubt, dealt with by village officers. Serious criminal cases were investigated by the *amils* and reference was made to the *huzur* for final judgment. Munro regarded justice as administered by the *panchayats* as 'prompt and regular if not perfectly just or impartial'. He was never tired of praising *panchayat* justice. He wrote, "There is enough of tradition to make a very good common law.....on this tradition and on common sense their decisions are grounded..... this justice with all its imperfections, from its cheapness and

1 Acc. to Orme Ms. Vol. 33. pp. 111-113 Haidar's Revenue in 1767 was 1,68 lakhs. In Madras Report to Warren Hastings of the 15th January, 1778 Haidar's Revenue was estimated at 3 crores.

2 Orme Ms. Vol. 33. pp. 111-119.

expedition will be better than the correct justice of English law with all its expense and delays.¹

The Patels and Karnams were aided in the performance of their police functions by two subordinates—the talari (or talliar) and the toti who were maintained by *Inam* and *Muniyam* grants. Besides the terror of his name and the severity of his punishment there was another factor that contributed to the peace and tranquillity of his realm. He effectually drained the country of all turbulent spirits, gave them employment according to the tastes and means of livelihood. The Kanda-char or irregular peons who corresponded to what might be described in the history of Bengal in the early British period as *pargana* battalions numbered 110,000 in Haider's days. His garrisons of forts were also evenly distributed and this contributed further to the preservation of tranquillity.

Trade, Commerce

Mysore proper was destitute of sea ports and even navigable rivers and commerce could not attract the attention of its ruler. He acquired his first sea port in 1764. In view of the previous habits of his life and the traditions of rule in Mysore the development of a commercial policy could not, of course, be expected. Immersed in war almost throughout the period of his rule he could not be blamed for not devoting much attention to this aspect of a possible development of his own resources and those of his people. But it is going too far to say that he was interested only in the "traffic of warlike stores and in living instruments of destruction". Wilks wrote in 1805—"His notions of commerce were entitled to the negative praise of not being altogether so barbarous as those of his successor."²

From Malabar the European nations including the British exported pepper, chillis, sandalwood, cardamoms as also rice. The most important trade centres in normal years of peace were Bangalore, an entrepot for trade with the Nizam's territory and with Arcot, Per'yapattana, an entrepot for trade with

1 Rice I, p. 622 ; Gleig I, p. 405.

Munro System. Letter to Allan dated 22nd July, 1794.

2 Wilks' Report, p. 39.

the west coast, Candhully for trade between centres above and below the Western Ghats, Kaveripuram occupying the same position with regard to the Eastern Ghats. At Nidy Cavil between Mysore and Malabar 200 ox-loads of goods passed in one day in Haidar's time. Sirsi in Sunda was an intermediate mart for the cotton and arecanut trade.¹

The duty on areca in money varied in different districts according to quality and price. The road duties being principally derived from home trade were not also abolished by Purnia in 1799-1800 in which year the *sair* revenue in Mysore was 2,26,659 (28,845 from toddy and spirituous liquor 4,308 from tobacco). This enables us to form some idea of the *sair* revenue in Haidar's days from his much more extensive dominion. Among surplus products must be included areca, pepper, cardamoms, tobacco and sandalwood. About sandalwood the universal opinion in Mysore was that it would not thrive in artificial plantations.²

The shroff and the merchant suffered much in the days of Tipu. Under him the *sarkar* tried to monopolise the whole exchange and his government entering into the market as a wholesale dealer the growth of trade and industry was checked and in some cases even paralysed. Haidar never made any such attempt to regulate the bazar exchange.

Public works.

The *Dariya Daulat* or the summer palace and the *Lalbagh* were Haidar's works in Seringapatam. The celebrated bazar town named Ganjam Shahr grew up in Seringapatam. The pleasant gardens and groves of Bangalore are also referred to by the Europeans who went to Seringapatam via Bangalore. In gardening the taste of Haidar accorded more with the English than that of his son. It is said that the palace of Dilawar Khan at Sira was of such elegance that Haidar made it his model on which to build his palaces at Bangalore and Seringapatam. They were richly decorated with gilding and

¹ Buchanan—*A journey from Madras through the countries of Mysore, Kanara and Malabar*, Vol. I.

In the days of Haidar, according to Buchanan the trade of Bangalore was great, its munufacturers numerous. I, p. 193.

² Wilks' Report, p. 39.

colour. The *Makbara* or the Mausoleum of Haidar's family at Kolar was a notable work of this period.¹

The most famous public works were the Malabar roads. Tipu followed in the footsteps of his father and projected and finished an extensive chain of roads. In Bidnur and Sunda Haidar paved some of the passes with laterite and granite and cleared footpaths through forests. These Haidari paths can be seen near the Bingi and Kadra hills and at Kadvad, Sadasivgad and Mirjan. All these activities were dictated by strategic reasons. The building activity of Haidar was to a large extent confined to strengthening of the most important forts in his dominion including Seringapatam and Bangalore.²

The old embankments and water courses in Mysore were works of great antiquity constructed with admirable skill along the slope of the hills and sometimes across ravines. These water courses issuing from embankments fertilized large areas in Mysore. According to the testimony of Wilks these were much neglected during the later years of Tipu's government. But according to contemporary writers Haidar did not certainly neglect them. In fact, as Swartz wrote in 1779, Haidar took particular care for the preservation of the ancient works of public utility. He wrote, "On the 22nd July being a Sunday, we made a halt according to my custom at Madenemuley, a fine town, where there is a strong bridge (built by Deo Raj about 1735) of twenty-three very substantial arches. After each rain the magistrates of the place must send people to replace any earth that may have been washed away. Haidar's economical rule is to repair all damages without losing an instant whereby all is kept in good condition and with little expense."³

Religious policy

It has been the practice of historians to contrast the tolerant spirit of Haidar with the intolerant bigotry of his

1 *Haidarnama : Late war in Asia*, II, p. 41 : Rice, I, p. 521 ; Buchanan, Vol. I.

2 *Bombay Gazetteer—Kanara*, p. 39.

Gazetteer of the Malabar District, p. 264.

3 Wilks' Report, p. 38 ; Wilks' Vol. II ; App. II, p. 573.

son. Wilks set the fashion when he wrote—"Haidar with all his faults might be deemed a model of toleration by the professor of any religion. Tipu, in an age when persecution only survived in history, renewed its worst terrors". Haidar's attitude towards religion is best described in the words of Swartz—"He has none himself and leaves every one to his choice". Swartz performed divine service to a band of Christians without asking anybody's leave. Though surrounded by Haidar's spies he knew that he could speak of religion night and day without giving Haidar the least offence. We have already seen that Haidar continued the old privilege of *Inam* grants to the Brahmins as also to important places of worship. It should also be recorded here that after the fall of Tipu when Purnia's administration began it was necessary to spend only Rs. 2,869-8-2 for opening the Hindu places of worship that had been shut in Tipu's government.¹ When we take into consideration the large revenue remissions and grants as pagoda inams under Haidar as also under Tipu we are justified in saying that there was no material departure from the policy pursued by the Wadiyars. Wilks refers again and again to Haidar's half Hindu propensities because of his order for "Jebbum" to be performed in Hindu temples before embarking on expeditions, the unqualified indemnity granted to the temple of Tirupati in 1781 and such other pro-Hindu orders and observances. The French officers of Haidar have recorded that the grand army set forth from Seringapatam in May, 1780 only after the Brahmins had assured him that the day was auspicious. As the Nabob came out, sacrifices of buffaloes were made in accordance with Hindu tradition. In 1774 the house of Kadimuddin in Seringapatam caught fire which spread and burnt many buildings including a portion of the temple of Ranganath. Haidar rebuilt the temple of Ranganath in one month. A celebrated Muslim "peerzaddah" once told Haidar that some Hindus of Seringapatam had beaten his followers (who had attacked a Hindu procession) and he demanded redress from Haidar as the head of a Mussalman Government.

1. Wilks' Report, p. 112.

Haidar's reply was characteristic—"who told you that this was a Mussalman government?"¹ Tipu also furnished Shree Shankaracharyya of Sringeri with funds for reinstalling the displaced image in the Sharada temple desecrated by the Pindaris of the Maratha army under Parasuram Bhow and for performing ceremonies like *Sata Chandi Japa* and *Sahasra Chandi Japa*. In his letters to the Swami of Sringeri the sentiments he expressed give lie to the assertion that he was a fanatic. The great Math of Sringeri continued to enjoy inam villages valued at 4810 pagodas throughout the period of the rule of Haidar and Tipu.² Tipu's cant and humbug, his zeal and activity might have unnerved people accustomed to the quiet religious atmosphere of Haidar's days, but facts belie the theory of active religious persecution by his successor.

In the light of later history this seems rather unusual. We have moved away so far from that age that we find it difficult to recapture its spirit. An atmosphere of tolerance prevailed very different from the state of things in India in the twentieth century. The Nabobs of the Carnatic like Haidar and Tipu were also "wonderfully liberal in their religious views." As the British made annexation after annexation they saw that Indian tradition demanded that the government in taking over the assets of the previous rulers should also take over the liabilities and continue the state endowments of Hindu and Muhammadan worship. The East India Company's patronage and management of Hindu and Muhammadan religious institutions and ceremonies also continued up to 1844.

It has been said about Haidar that "appropriate talents regulated his choice of instruments to the entire exclusion of religious preference." For his army he naturally selected Muhammadans but for civil administration he would rely mostly upon Hindus. Swartz recorded in 1779 that the ministers of Haidar's court were mostly Brahmins. In December 1782 at the time of Haidar's death the five most important officials in charge of different departments were—Abu Muhammad Mirza, Mir Muhammad Sadek, Krishna Rao, Purnia, and

1 Valentia's Travels, Vol. I, p. 417.

2 Wilks' Report, p. 106.

Shamia. His revenue officers and diplomatic agents were mostly Brahmins, the doyen of diplomats being, of course, the celebrated Appaji Ram.¹ In this respect Tipu differed much from his father. His choice of Mussalman *tahsildars*, many of them from the lowest ranks of the military, undermined completely the efficiency of his revenue department. Wilks goes too far when he says about Tipu that "in the Hindu no degree of merit was a passport to favour in the Mussalman, no crime could ensure displeasure". This preference accorded to the Muhammadans should not be construed into a general persecution of the Hindus, resulting in universal discontent. The effect is best described in the words of Munro that this so disgusted the old servants of his father that many of them retired from public affairs to lead a private life in their own homes. Tipu's finances became deranged.

Haidar is said to have persecuted the Christians in Malabar. As has been already shown this persecution was entirely due to political reasons. He granted privileges* which he revoked in Malabar because he felt that the Portuguese were pro-English and did not deserve any such consideration

1 If Peixoto is to be believed Appaji Ram was for some time Governor of territories formerly belonging to the Kingdom of Sunda—VI, p. II.

* Logan, p. 70.

Copy of a translation of a Parwana of Nabob Haidar Ali Khan Bahadur dated in the Malabar year 941 answering to the year 1766.

Parwana sent to the Governor of Calicut, the Rajah of Coimbatore, called Madhye VI to give to the Padre vicar of this church, 3 gold fanams per day to the Portuguese factor, 2 gold fanams per day, to one clerk, one gold fanam per day to an interpreter, $\frac{1}{2}$ gold fanam per day, altogether making $6\frac{1}{2}$ fanams per day, also to the servant to the padre 80 fanams a year, in general amount, yearly fanams 2420, as this is an ancient custom, and now by the representation made to me by the Padre it is ordered that the above be executed and I order also that the rent and revenues or benefits of the landed property, belonging to the said church be not taken and in the same manner I have granted the church of Parpangaddy. On arrival of the Portuguese King's ship in the port of Calicut, the necessary assistance be given them in providing water, provisions etc., according to the ancient custom. Everyone of the Christians that may commit any guilt or crime, the justice thereof belongs to the Padre and the factor.

—Supervisor's diary. 2nd July, 1783.

from him. Other Christians who depended on them were also tarred with the same brush.

Haidar had some of his European prisoners circumcised and pressed into his service. He formed his Chela battalions by converting boys of tender age—most of them Bedar boys taken from Chitaldrug and Nair boys taken from Malabar. The most inaccessible and turbulent regions in Malabar were used by Haidar as the recruiting ground for his Chela battalions. He hoped by this crude means to improve the quality of his army.

As we review Haidar's administrative system we find that it was characterised by an unusual respect for ancient well-established traditions. He governed and governed well. It would not be irrelevant if we quote an extract from a letter which Munro wrote to Elphinstone in 1818—"It is too much regulation that ruins everything. Englishmen suppose that no country can be saved without English institutions. The natives have enough of their own to answer every useful object of internal administration and if we maintain and protect them our work will be easy. If not disturbed by innovation the country will in a few months settle itself."¹

There is so much in common between these precepts of Munro and the actual administrative policy of Haidar that we feel that the instinct of the successful administrator enabled the Indian to do what the Englishman, with a feeling perhaps of regret, thought that his government ought to have done. In this respect Tipu resembled the Englishman but he did not possess the Englishman's capacity to reconstruct in his own interest and in the light of his own exotic ideas. Tipu's innovations unsettled everything. He tried to introduce a system of checks and balances. His Asafs were checked by his Sadars, the qiladars being under the Sadars, the tahsildars under the Asafs. But all parties agreed in dividing the public money and the result was only an increasing defalcation of revenue.²

As a ruler Haidar Ali failed in only one part of his dominion—Malabar. But it was a country very difficult to bring

1 Gleig, III, p. 253.

2 Gleig, III, p. 97.

under complete control and the problem of pacification of Malabar was more military than civil. His fierce raids and terrible monuments of vengeance could not ensure tranquillity. His persecution which he hoped would terrorise people only embittered them further. British attacks on the Malabar coast encouraged the Malabar insurgents more than once. His navy was twice destroyed by the British and he was unable to secure that command of the sea which was necessary in Malabar for the success of his military operations, for feeding and communications. Arthur Wellesley succeeded no doubt where Haidar had failed. But he enjoyed the command of the sea and he had also more time at his disposal. He cleared the jungles, deprived the Nair of his concealment, hunted out his resistance, checked symptoms of renewed resistance, established a mild government, thus pacifying Malabar. Haidar's civil Government in other parts of his dominion was mild and just so far as it concerned the common man. Here it was rough, ready, ferocious but Malabar baffled his military skill and the Nair was never thoroughly subdued by him.

From the standpoint of an autocratic ruler, civil administration is calculated to give full effect to the resources at his disposal. His government, simple in its structure, crude in many of its manifestations had certain characteristics that are best expressed in the language of one of the most successful British civil administrators in India. Munro wrote, "The Mysore government is the most simple and despotic monarchy in the world, in which every department, civil and military, possesses the regularity and system communicated to it by the genius of Haidar and in which all pretensions derived from high birth being discouraged, all independent chiefs and zamindars being subjugated or extirpated, justice severely and impartially administered, a numerous and well-disciplined army kept up and almost every department of trust or consequence conferred on men raised from obscurity, gives the government a vigour hitherto unexampled in India.¹

1 Gleig, I, pp. 84-85.

CHAPTER—XXVII

Haidar's Military System

Haidar's regular army in 1767 was composed of 11,000 cavalry, 12,000 sepoys and 8,000 peons. The military establishment also included horse-keepers, artificers, and officers to keep the account. He had also 10,000 bullocks besides 100 elephants and 800 camels for purposes of transport.¹

Besides this regular army Haidar had garrisons at the most important forts—Seringapatam, Sira, Nagar, Chitaldrug, Chikballapur, Dodballapur, Bangalore, Kolar, Dindigul, Coimbatore and other places. We do not know the exact number of Poligar troops in 1767 because Haidar did not pay them normally from his treasury. Of garrison expense no reliable figure is given because they are found mixed up with various other items.

We have also another and a slightly different version of the number and composition of Haidar's field force in July, 1767—

60 European Cavalry	5,000 Grenadier Sepoys
150 European Artillery	8,000 Sepoys with European muskets.
<hr/>	
210 Europeans.	
<hr/>	
800 Excellent Mughal Horse.	1,000 Topasses with muskets.
12,000 Other Cavalry	4,000 Matchlockmen.
<hr/>	
13,010	18,000 Infantry.
49 Cannon of all sorts—irregular, infantry not counted. ²	

In spite of some difference in details two versions give us almost the same total strength of the regular army which numbered about 30,000, the regular cavalry numbering about 2/3 of the regular infantry if we include in that category also matchlockmen.

In 1780, when Haidar embarked on his celebrated Carnatic expedition his regular army according to Wilks included 14,000 stable horse, 15,000 regular infantry, 12,000 veteran peons and

¹ Orme Ms. Vol. 33, pp. 111-119.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 63-105.

2,000 rocket men.¹ *Silhadar* horse or mercenary cavalry numbered 12,000 and those from Savanur 2,000. Besides these there was another category of troops—irregular infantry and irregular cavalry—furnished by the poligars, numbering 10,000. There were also 18,000 troops from local establishments for the purpose of garrisoning. According to Purnia, in 1782, at the time of Haidar's death payments were made from the treasury to 88,000. The gaps caused by the war must have been systematically filled up. This augmented number included a new levy of 5,000 on the northern frontier.²

Besides the regular army a considerable proportion of the force was irregular infantry and cavalry. Out of an army of 83,000, if we take the figures of Wilks, who had Purnia to guide him, about 33,000 were cavalry. That makes the proportion nearly 3/8, the proportion of the best regular horse and foot being almost equal. The regular troops who could fight in pitched battles did not perhaps number more than 40,000 at any time. The irregular cavalry, infantry and the veteran peons no doubt played an important part in campaigns but so far as figures for pitched battles are concerned the irregulars should not be taken into consideration. The *silhadar* troops and poligar cavalry did excellent reconnoitring work, kept open the communications, harassed the communications of the enemy and cut off his supply lines. Wilks, as also other writers, conveys the impression that the Mysorean troops were eight times the number of the British. But irregular cavalry, poligar infantry, pikemen and matchlock peons should not be regarded as effectives in pitched battles. Haidar outnumbered Coote no doubt but the proportion was 4 to 1.

A Frenchman who quitted Haidar's service after the taking of Chetput described the army organisation of Haidar in December, 1780 and the part played by Europeans in this organisation. Infantry *risalas* were formed of 1,000 men each—

1 Acc. to one version the rocket was invented and first used in the Deccan. The idea of the Congreve rocket introduced into the British service in 1806 is said to have been obtained by the British from those used by Tipu Sultan at Seringapatam in 1799 where Congreve was present as a subaltern. Irvine—*Army of the Indian Mughals*, p. 148.

2 Wilks, II, p. 419.

every *risala* having 4 guns of 4, 8 and 12-pounders. There were about 1000 pieces of cannon of various calibres, an elephant to every gun, 70 bullocks to every 24-pounder and to other guns in proportion with spare cattle in great number, all of them very large and very good. There were 150 European horse under Puymorin and Lally had under him 100 European horse and 200 foot. The guns of the *risala* were mostly manned by Europeans but they were not embodied in one corps. The Europeans in Haidar's army were altogether 1,500 in number including those who were appointed to the guns, those who were attached to the *risalas*¹ and those who were placed in garrison duties in the forts. Puymorin commanded the old French troops. He is described by an English prisoner in Haidar's camp as "the godlike captain whose name it is impossible to mention without the liveliest emotions of gratitude, admiration and love."² He fell while besieging Arcot. Next to him in command of those troops was Bouthenot (described in the letter of Lannoy to Bussy as an interpreter speaking French almost like a Spanish cow). Besides Lally, a Savoyard, two other French officers are mentioned as of some consequence, Cariera and Le Beuf. Europeans in the *risalas* only exercised the sepoy and had no command whatever.³

In order to get a good idea of Haidar's military system it would be necessary to compare Haidar's army organisation with that of Tipu during the period 1790-1799. This will make the contrast and its consequences more clear. In 1790 Tipu had 45,000 regular infantry and about 20,000 horse exclusive of irregular peons called Candachar.⁴ In 1799 his stable horse numbered 3,502, silhadar horse 9,392, regular infantry 23,483, armed militia 6,209; matchlockmen and peons 4,747.⁵ In 1799

1 Sec Progs. 19th Jan. 1781—Hollands' letter dated 29th Dec., 1780.

2 *War in Asia*, II, 27.

3 From the author of *Late War in Asia* we learn the names of Mons. Goddard, a French Officer (p. 5), Mons. Gastro, a French Surgeon, who attended the British prisoners at Arni (p. 24). Among Europeans in Haidar's service mention is also made of a Hungarian sergeant (p. 25) and another French surgeon Mons. Fortunio.

4 Br. Mus. Add. Ms. No. 13659, pp. 79-85.

5 Owen, Wellington's Despatches, p. 60.

Tipu's revenue was half of what was Haidar's in 1780 but Tipu's regular infantry numbered 23,000 whereas Haidar's was only 15,000 in 1780. The difference in the proportion of cavalry to infantry indicates the most significant feature of the departure from the principles of the army organisation of his father. With only 3,503 stable horse in 1799 Tipu could not possibly follow Haidar's methods of carrying on warfare.

Haidar's army was habituated to the exercise of war in campaign after campaign. The Frenchmen no doubt helped to give to officers and men of the regular army smartness in parade. But the frequent wars with the poligars, the rebel Nairs, the Marathas and the British as also new acquisitions of territory almost every year from 1760 to 1778 enabled him to give his regular troops the necessary training in actual combat conditions. The cavalry *khas* as also the *silhadar* played a very important part in his military system. His efficient horsemen increased, the mobility of his army. His outpost service, advance guards, ambuscades, surprises, communications, retreats were admirably organized as Smith, Munro and Coote experienced in the First as also in the Second Anglo-Mysore War. His reconnaissances, alarms and demonstrations were excellent in their effect. In his pitched battles with Coote his guns and infantry were, of course, in much greater use than his numerous cavalry. But the operations directed against small parties and the operations calculated to distress the British were effectually carried out by his cavalry. At Porto Novo Haidar's plan was formed on the following basis—The English would be engaged in storming the batteries in front. That would produce confusion in British ranks. The main body of his cavalry should rush from behind the batteries and complete the rout. But the British discovery of the road to the right foiled his plan. Haidar still attempted to attack the rear with cavalry, to get at the baggage and to penetrate into the interval between the two lines. In all this he failed. At Sholinghur his horsemen were brought under British cannon and suffered greatly. As he had to make a hurried retreat his guns and infantry became huddled in a miry place. The English

advanced rapidly and the Mysore guns were on the point of being lost. Haidar sent his best horse to charge the British left. This charge gave the infantry and artillery more time to get the guns through the bad ground. The horsemen received many discharges of grape but galloped through an opening in the line.

The cavalry in Haidar's scheme of things was not merely an adjunct or an auxiliary. In the first Anglo-Mysore war he compelled Wood and then Smith to pursue him up and down and thus weakening the British by 'fatigue, by climate and by bad nourishment', marched past Smith to Madras and intimidated the government into a dishonourable treaty. Haidar's bullocks, camels, elephants also helped him to secure this rapidity of movement. It is relevant to note that in the First Anglo-Mysore War Smith represented to the field deputies his inability to come up with Haidar by pursuit and recommended the adoption of some other plan. The deputies as also the Government of Madras were of opinion that Haidar should be vigorously pursued and might be brought to action. As the army moved after him one day Haidar, as if in mockery, kept his army in review until the English came within three miles and then moved off. With his numerical superiority, his ample supplies and his thorough knowledge of the country-side he also pinned Coote on the defensive and Coote's superiority in fire power, skill and strength of infantry did not very much avail. With weak draft, very inadequate supply of carriage cattle, Coote had to do everything slower. Haidar had the best draught bullocks, able to draw off his artillery before those of the British could be moved. His field pieces could be moved across the country by these bullocks even where there was no road. Haidar's most celebrated cattle establishment was the *Amrut Mahal*.¹ Chikka Deva Raya (1672-1704) had brought this cattle establishment into existence. Haidar strengthened this establishment which numbered 60,000 bullocks, classified as grain bullocks, plough bullocks, etc. "This *Amrut Mahal* breed stood in the same relation to other Indian breeds as thorough bred

1 Mysore District Gazetteer, Vol. V ; Hayavadan Rao, p. 720, III. p. 185.

horses to horses generally." "It was this establishment," wrote Sir Mark Cubbon, "which enabled Haidar Ali to march 100 miles in two days and a half to the relief of Chidambaram and after every defeat to draw off his guns in the face of enemies, which enabled Tipu Sultan to cross the Peninsula in one month for the recovery of Bidnur." It is not difficult to account for the rapidity of Haidar's movement.

Critics of Tipu's military system agree in asserting that Tipu made a mistake when he weakened his cavalry in order to increase his regular infantry. This strengthened him against other Indian powers, the poligars and the local chiefs but this also facilitated his overthrow by the British. Tipu had to fight battles or stand sieges whereas Haidar had carried on a protracted and harassing war by distant cannonades and interception of supplies. The infantry was the strength of Tipu's as of any other army but this infantry could never be so good as that of the British. Haidar knew it and his plan was formed on this basis. Tipu's successes in the campaign against Medows in 1790 were largely due to the fact that he followed the example of his father. Tipu's attack on Colonel Floyd at Satyamangalam, the way in which he frustrated the plan of Mysore invasion via Gazalhatty pass, his attack on Maxwell before his junction with Medows, his doubling back by the Thapur pass and penetration into the heart of the Coromondal country—all this showed the skill in strategy which was the chief characteristic of his father's campaigns in 1768-69 and 1780-1782. Like his father Tipu also relied in the campaign of 1790-92 on cavalry and artillery. Cornwallis who kept absolutely ignorant of the approach of his Maratha allies by Tipu's skirmishers, in traditional Haidari style. Tipu was defeated in the campaign of 1792 because of Anglo-Maratha combination. The Marathas saved Cornwallis in 1791 when with the half-starved army he fell back upon Chinkurali after destroying his siege train. As Munro puts it—"without them he could never, after falling back from Seringapatam in May, have advanced again beyond Bangalore." But after 1792

Tipu's abandonment of Haidar's military system was almost complete. In the campaign of 1799 we find him on the defensive, relying primarily on the defence of Seringapatam.

This naturally raises the question—how far was Haidar's military system effective against the Marathas ? The better cavalry of the Marathas with no pretension to tactical discipline had an interior organisation that enabled the chief to wield this apparently disordered mass and make admirable arrangements for forage and supplies. The Maratha horseman could subsist very often without a previous collection of grain and forage. As it has been said, they subdued countries rather as locusts than as soldiers. Mysore was very defenceless on the North-West and as Wellington wrote later : "a body of Maratha horse could overrun the whole of the rich province of Bidnur, could plunder Bidnur itself and might push their devastation to within several miles of Seringapatam"¹ The Marathas could easily penetrate anywhere except across a big navigable river. Haidar was, therefore, so very intent upon putting two rivers the Krishna and the Tungabhadra between the Marathas and what he regarded as the heart of his dominion.

Haidar had to fight with Gopal Rao of Miraj in 1759, with Visaji Pandit in 1760, with Peshwa Madhav Rao in 1764-1765, 1766-1767 and 1770 with Trimbak Rao in 1771-1772, with Raghunath Rao in 1774 and with Parashuram Bhow and Haripant in 1776-1777. He was not very successful against the Maratha chiefs and the success which he achieved later was largely due to political reasons not to military superiority. In view of the nature of Maratha warfare Haidar was generally on the defensive. He garrisoned the forts as well as walled villages with peons and he kept the regular force entire for field service. He thus strove to keep the Maratha army of horse from towns and villages at the same time that he strove to maintain the civil and military possession of the country. As Wilks wrote later, "Maratha invasions have entered so habitually into the calculations and arrangements of every inhabitant of Mysore that a town would speedily be deserted which should

1 Gurwood I—p. 363.

not appear to afford the means of protection against this dreadful scourge".¹ Haidar's plan was calculated to prevent the Marathas getting regular supplies in his territory. They were made to depend on their own bazar and as this method of defence gradually developed, the main body of the Marathas moved less fast than it had done in the earlier stages of Maratha-Mysore conflict.

This defensive plan did not enable Haidar to achieve any spectacular success in the battlefield, it cost him dear but in the end by his long endurance and his faith in himself he emerged with credit. On more than one occasion his attempts to defeat the Maratha field force ended in his complete defeat. The Mysore country was overrun by the victorious Marathas but they had to quit because they could not get possession of Seringapatam, which formed the prop of Haidar's defensive system. The forts in his territory were numerous. In 1799 Tipu possessed 27 principal forts and 113 lesser forts with a garrison of 29,928.² We would not be wrong if we double this number of principal forts, lesser forts and the garrison for the period of Haidar's rule. The position of Seringapatam is best described in the words of Wellington. "An army which should besiege it must determine at once to attack it from the north or from the southern side of the river or from the island. No army could be brought there sufficiently numerous to form three divisions or two divisions, large enough to make two or three attacks upon the place because these divisions would be effectually separated from each other and each must be strong enough to defend itself against the army which would be employed to raise the siege. In providing a garrison for the defence of Seringapatam no more men will be required than would be necessary to defend it on one point of attack. But looking to Seringapatam as a place liable to be attacked it has a singular advantage over every other fort in India, viz., that from the month of June to the month of December it is impossible to approach."³ Wellington also pointed out that a big

1 Wilks' Report,—p. 47.

2 *Ibid*, p. 112.

3 Memorandum upon Seringapatam. Gurwood, I, p. 343.

garrison there could be sent out to operate on the communications of the hostile army in the country. When Tipu decided to remain on the defensive against the British he naturally remembered what his father had done after Chinkurali and carried on repairs in most of the forts, particularly Seringapatam. Between 1792 and 1799 he laid out 12 lacs of pagodas for its defence and upto the opening of the campaign he did very little to stop the progress of the armies that reached Seringapatam in March and launched the final assault on the 4th May before the rains could swell the river. Of course the British this time succeeded in bringing into the field an army superior to that of Tipu in infantry as also in cavalry, in quality as also in number. If Tipu had retained the army organisation of his father and followed his principles of warfare he could have succeeded in retarding British advance towards Seringapatam till the beginning of the rainy season, thus getting a respite for six months during which he could have succeeded in winning over some of the lukewarm Maratha chiefs. This might have created an altered situation, military as also political.

The efficiency of Haidar's field army and the success which he achieved was not a little due to his admirable intelligence service. We need quote only two British reports. On the 27th May, 1781, a British sepoy found some letters under a tree, one of which was from Haidar to Mir Saheb. In these letters Haidar gave his lieutenant a particular account of the arrival of the British fleet, the number of troops they brought and other details that were absolutely correct. The author of "War in Asia" wrote, "A battalion was never despatched from our army but Haidar had the earliest notice of it. Of Haidar's capital movements we had not the smallest intelligence".¹

Two other distinctive though minor features of Haidar's military system should also be noted—the Chela battalions and Candachar peons. The Chelas were recruited chiefly from children and young men taken in war. Almost all of them were of Hindu origin. The practice began in Malabar. Captive

1 *War in Asia*—I, p. 150.

Hindu boys of a tender age were sometimes converted and received as slaves of the palace. The most famous of these Chelas was the Nair convert Shaikh Ayaz. The first regular military establishment of captive converts dates from the conquest of Chitaldrug. He is said to have carried 20,000 captives to Seringapatam. From the young boys the first Chela battalions were formed. In 1779 Swartz saw a battalion of these "orphans" at exercise. Haidar's successor increased the number of Chelas very considerably. Wilks has compared them with the Turkish Janissaries. The comparison is inexact. The Ottoman slave household of which the Janissaries formed a part was a device to exercise dominion over the entire body social of an alien civilisation. It was a daring experiment on a large scale the essence of which was the "picking and training of human watchdogs to keep the Padishah's human cattle in order and his human neighbours at bay. To become an Ottoman public slave of the highest order was the most arduous, important, dangerous and magnificent profession that could be followed by any Ottoman subject.....reserved almost exclusively for persons who were infidel born."¹ The Chela battalions played no remarkable part in the military system of Haidar and Tipu. This practice was a mere device to pacify certain areas that were turbulent and at the same time to secure recruits for the army whose forcible conversion would help to tear them out of their environment. The organisation was very imperfect and Tipu's Ahmadi Chelas in 1792 took advantage of his failure at the Sultan's Redoubt to march off with their arms, their wives and children back to Coorg.

The Candachar peons in Haidar's days numbered 110,000. These irregular troops were variously armed but generally with matchlocks and pikes. They were originally cultivators of the soil embarking on military enterprises during the idle months. Haidar employed them in large number in his garrisons and in his armies. Thus their depredatory propensities were checked and they felt an interest in the stability of their government—the same principle on which the British

1 Toynbee—*History*, Vol. III.

employed the Khassadars to guard the Khyber Pass. Tipu reduced their number in order to increase his regular infantry. Even after the fall of Tipu Purnia kept as many as 20,000 Candachar peons. He most probably followed Haidar's example in the matter of payment. "The Candacher peons, when at the respective houses, receive a small pay, partly in waste land partly in money of from 2 to 3 rupees per month. When called out for service within Mysore they receive an addition of one pagoda and on foreign service the same batta as the regular pay."¹ On return from service they received rewards in the shape of *khilats*, pecuniary presents or reimbursements for losses. Many of these peons accompanied Haidar's field armies. They cleared roads, made batteries, garrisoned captured towns and did such other very essential army service leaving the regular army free for field operations.

1 Wilks Report, p. 144.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Significance of Haidar's Career

The life and work of Haidar Ali can be studied best from the records of his professed enemies, the British and the Marathas and the neutral or friendly records of the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French. The original materials, though copious, are not always sufficiently illuminating. The Persian chronicles and the manuscripts in Tamil, Telegu and Canarese are dull, and except in minor details useless. History can be based upon the facts we have but we miss percisely that which a historian also wants—contemporary comments which tend to clarify those facts. We have almost a full view of the events as also of the background of habits and atmosphere but we miss the strictly contemporary records of conversations and moods. In the throng of soldiers and courtiers only the following personalities emerge into some sort of distinctness—Shaikh Ayaz (Hyat Saheb of British records), Appaji Ram, Mir Reza, Faizulla Khan, Lally, Puymorin, Purnia and Mir Sadik. Even here, our imagination cannot penetrate through the records to the full human realities they represent and we cannot delineate to our satisfaction the part they must have played in the drama of history. Except Haidar Ali no other personality, not even Tipu, emerges with the vividness we should expect. However gifted Haidar might have been, he could not possibly have monopolised the direction of affairs to such an extent that he alone was a living man and the rest were gliding shades.

Haidar, who was an autocratic soldier-ruler, was a very successful administrator. A detailed investigation does not in any sense detract from the quality of this achievement. It must be admitted that his vices were many : he was sensual, foul-mouthed and not unoften ribald in conversation. Although never wantonly brutal he liquidated his rivals and enemies in a very cruel manner. Except in some very rare instances, as in the case of his brother-in-law Mir Reza, he could not forgive and forget. His administration gives us an

illustration of Montesquieu's dictum that the principle of despotism is fear. The backs and sides of his negligent and extortionate servants were frequently softened by stripes of the whip. (G. L. T. p. 259). Even his eldest son, his chosen heir-apparent, did not escape this kora or whip, if he was remiss. But this despot had no foolish pride or vain glory. The subjects of his conversation were generally order and regulation of his administration, swords, muskets, guns, jewels, horses, elephants, invigorating medicines, etc. (D. L. T. 260). His court lacked elegance. It was not a narrow circle of rich idlers as most Indian courts were in the 18th century. He was, of course, studiously splendid in the darbar and at parade ; but as a rule there was ostentation but no luxury. Autocrats generally develop an ostrich digestion for flattery and court chronicles normally give us an impression that no dose is too strong for their appetite. But in Haidar's darbar there was no other standard of values except efficiency, and no man succeeded by mere flattery. He told Lally who got a smaller pay for bringing less troops than he had stipulated—"Be quiet and be grateful for getting so much. I do not give an officer 5,000 rupees a month for the beauty of his single nose." (Wilks, II—204). All operations and measures were supervised by himself. He was very strict and indefatigable in dictating the most minute orders himself—"even leather, the lining of bullock-bags or tent walls and strands of rope." (D. L. T. 260). He was a very good judge of men and was very seldom deceived except in the case of Khande Rao. He no doubt inspired fear in the instruments of his rule but he also knew very well how to quicken human energies. The mass of the people felt a great respect for his administration because of its efficiency. Part of his success, no doubt, lay in hard work and constant attention to detail. His son also possessed these virtues but he did not have his father's discernment nor his judgment and things.

The impress which Haidar has left on history is that of a great enemy of the British in India. In October, 1781 when John Malcolm, a candidate for a writership, was taken to the India House and was on a fair way to be rejected, one of

the directors said to him, "Why my little man, what would you do if you were to meet Haidar Ali?" "Do, sir? I would out with my sword and cut off his head." "You will do," was the rejoinder. "Let him pass," was the comment. (Kaye—*Life and Correspondence of Malcolm*, I, p. 8). The record of this oral examination shows the impression about Haidar Ali in the mind of the average English school boy who knew anything about India. He brought them almost on the verge of destruction in India. But the adoption of an anti-British policy was not due to passion, prejudice, malice or insolence. It was inevitable in the existing situation.

Before his advent Mysore had enjoyed the comfortable obscurity of an internal position. Suddenly it got the stimulus of a political frontier. The pressure of Maratha expansion southward and the clash of arms between the European nations in India created new opportunities for a career that was not in harmony with the general trend of Mysorean history. One emergency followed upon another and his career took shape. It was altogether a new environment, free from the incubus of old traditions of decaying courts. It was almost inevitable in such circumstances that he and his son would not think of pursuing a policy that might appear expedient to the Nizam. In the 18th century things in India appear to have reached the nadir. But even in this decline there was no lack of variety and colour. Those who inherited the older tradition showed utter ineptitude and preferred without offering opposition a tottering, drivelling, paralytic longevity. The comparatively new-born powers were stubborn in their opposition to the British—the Mysoreans fought four wars, the Marathas three.

As circumstances changed, the anti-British policy inaugurated by Haidar failed in the days of Tipu. Mill's analysis of this change is significant. Haidar had to contend only with the East India Company which had not resources enough and which was watched by a jealous home government. But after 1784 the ministry took possession of the government of India. "It was not in reality the East India Company with which Tipu had now to contend but the English government and the East India Company combined, the resources of both of which

were clubbed to provide for the war." (Mill, V—326). This statement is made with reference to the war of Lord Cornwallis with Tipu, but this is true about Wellesley's war as well. Haidar fought with the East India Company and Tipu with the East India Company and the British Government.

But this analysis of the causes of the failure of the anti-British policy initiated by Haidar does not give us a full view of the situation. Haidar had certain rules which made the practice of power politics in his hands relatively safe. He never raised a cloud of enemies against him as did his son who looked abroad for allies. He sent embassies to Turkey in 1784 and 1785, an embassy to France in 1787-88, an embassy to Zaman Shah in 1796 and prepared also to send embassies to France, Turkey, and Afghanistan in 1799 which were intercepted by the British. Haidar's policy was more firmly rooted in the earth. His diplomacy was calculated to ensure that his enemies in India never combined against him. He would not fight with the English unless he was on good terms with the Marathas and he would not go to war with the Marathas unless he was confident that the British would not join them. Tipu's extraordinary self-sufficiency and arrogance set at nought all these principles of his father's foreign policy. The French alliance had disappointed Haidar. Still Tipu hoped for assistance from France but he would not have received it even if the Bourbons had remained in power. In foreign policy there was the same contrast between Tipu and Haidar as between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Bismarck.

Smith wrote to Orme in 1775, "The powers of Indosthan are become extremely jealous of our prowess and not one amongst them but that wishes it lessened and seek every opportunity to effect it." Between 1780 and 1782 these Indian powers combined to some purpose against the British. But their jealousy of the British was never so strong as their jealousy of one another. Indian incapacity to combine was never more conspicuously displayed to the detriment of Indian interest than in the last decade of the 18th century. Haidar's distrust of his Maratha enemies was so great that he drove his bargain very hard. The alliance had therefore no secure basis

and British diplomacy very successfully widened the fissure. In view of the previous history of Maratha-Mysore relations it would be perhaps unhistorical in the light of later events to demand a more generous Mysorean approach. Admitting that Haidar could not be moved by passions and inclinations where higher policy was concerned, it would be too much to expect that he would shake off his distrust. It was unfortunate but it was perhaps the logic of history.

As a soldier Haidar suffered repeated defeats. But he never despaired. He did not show any very conspicuous ability as a tactician but he showed great ability as an organiser and his general plan of a campaign was always sound. His army, compared with that of the British, was inferior in leadership as also in the fighting qualities of the soliders. In numbers, supplies and equipment it was always superior. But in this respect also the situation of the British Government with regard to the Indian powers underwent a change in the days of Tipu. As Munro wrote later, British military superiority was now so great that the issue of any struggle in which they might be engaged was no longer doubtful (Gleig, Munro I, p. 461). Coote fought with Haidar at the head of an army not exceeding 12,000. But in 1799 the British army under Harris numbered 35,700 fighting men of whom 8,700 were Europeans (Gurwood I, p. 35). In the words of the Governor-General an army more completely appointed, more amply and liberally supplied in every department or more perfect in its discipline and in the acknowledged experience, [ability and zeal of its officers never took the field in India (Gurwood I, p. 14). The only prospect of success of the Indian powers against the British was in a combined effort, but Tipu's diplomacy was not calculated to achieve the end. Haidar's ability to stand the shocks of war was superb. He was always animated by his difficulties. When adversity came upon his successor he could not look it steadily in the face. The gloom of final defeat is only relieved by the gleam of personal heroism and the disaster that eventually befell him was not blackened by disgrace.

APPENDIX A

Peshwa Madhav Rao I and the First Anglo-Mysore War

When war began between the British and the Haidar-Nizam coalition (25th August, 1767), the contestants did not know the attitude of Peshwa Madhav Rao. He was courted by the Nizam and Haidar Ali as also by Muhammad Ali and the British. Mostyn came to Poona from Bombay, Nagoji Rao came from Madras, Sher Jang came as the *vakil* of Nizam Ali and Chanda Saheb's son as the agent of Haidar Ali.

In the instructions of the President and Council to Mostyn we find a record of the motives of the British. But Mostyn did not think it prudent to place all his cards on the table. The British at Bombay expected Madhav Rao to take part in the war against Haidar, especially if they invaded Haidar's possessions on the western coast. They wanted to hold before the Peshwa the bait of Bidnur and Sunda, expecting in return Salsette, Bassein and the Maratha share of the revenues of Surat. If the Peshwa declined to make this exchange the British would try to put someone else in possession of Bidnur and Sunda, guaranteeing the annual *chauth* to the Marathas. The British envoy was also asked to ascertain, if he found the Peshwa willing to conclude an alliance against Haidar, whether some Maratha cavalry could be had to make up for the deficiency of cavalry on the eastern front.¹ Charles Broome accompanied Mostyn as his assistant to attend to any representation Raghoba might make, in other words, to foment domestic dissensions.² The memorandum for Nagoji contained terms almost identical and also included the following instruction; "In case Madhav Rao

1 Forrest, *Selections from the State papers preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, Maratha-Series*,—English Embassy to the Marathas in 1767.

2 Raghoba told Broome that he had applied to the President "that a gentleman might be sent him, with whom he would concert measures for revenging his cause, hoping for assistance from the English, but as he had waited in expectation without receiving any favourable answer he was obliged to accommodate matters in the best manner he could—he hoped to engage the English on his side and receive help from them when he might take up arms, which after the rains he was fully resolved on."

makes difficulties and listens to the proposals of Haidar Ali Khan and the Nizam, he may be given to understand that the Raja of Berar has been soliciting the friendship of the English in Bengal and of this Court and that they will doubtless give him their friendship if Madhav Rao does not engage it.”¹

A few days after the arrival of Mostyn, Madhav Rao sent Gopal Rao, Anand Rao Raste, Babuji Naik, Visaji Pant and Naru Rao Ghorpade to Miraj to collect an army of 24,000 horse and then go to Sira and Maddagiri and there await instructions. Apparently the Maratha *Darbar* was for watching events before coming to any resolution. When Mostyn made an enquiry why so large a force was sent under Gopal Rao to the Carnatic he was told that it was sent only to collect the revenues which could not be done without a force. The British ambassador was, however, clearly told that the Maratha *Darbar* could not say what part they should act until they had heard what the different agents had to say.

It is interesting to note that there were rumours even in Northern India that Madhav Rao was sending an army of 20,000 horse to the assistance of the confederacy with Gopal Rao as the commandant. Richard Smith stationed at Allahabad even proposed to seize those Maratha chiefs who had come to bathe at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna to keep them as hostages until they could discover the truth about Gopal Rao's destination.²

But Haidar Ali was the professed enemy of the Marathas and would, whenever free from difficulties, give them trouble. Therefore, unless he would make it very materially their interest to support him, it was not likely that they would lend their assistance to him. Moreover, Haidar's affairs were in a bad way. He was himself defeated at Changama and Trinomali. The Nizam, always a lukewarm ally, separated from him. Finally, the Peshwa had his own domestic difficulties. Mostyn perceived this. He wrote, “I am well assured that it is not in Madhav Rao's power to take the field this year, first on account of his apprehension and engagements to Raghoba and

1 Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*.

2 Select Committee Proceedings, 10th February, 1768.

the low state of his finances.”¹ With the Nizam eliminated from the hostile coalition,² and the Peshwa preoccupied with the opposition of his uncle, the Bombay Government felt themselves in a position to send an expedition for the reduction of the possessions of Haidar on the Malabar coast, even without referring the matter to the Peshwa’s *Darbar*. Madhav Rao’s differences with his uncle became more and more acute, culminating in an open fight in June, 1768, in which Raghunath Rao was taken prisoner. The Peshwa was now free from his domestic preoccupations to take advantage of the Anglo-Mysore conflict. In the meanwhile the attempt of the Bombay Government to conquer Haidar’s possessions on the Malabar coast had failed, Haidar and Tipu succeeding in driving the British to the sea.

With the Maratha attitude still uncertain the campaigning season opened again in September, 1768. This time Charles Broome was sent from Bombay to reside at Poona to procure intelligence and report any occurrence worthy of notice. Madhav Rao must be given his due share of credit for hoodwinking the British for a very considerable time as to his real intentions. From Madras it was proposed that Madhav Rao should be offered assistance in reducing Bidnur “if no other means can prevent him assisting Haidar, for however adverse we may be to add to the power of the Marathas, which is already too great, yet we would not hesitate when the two evils threaten, the one present, the other distant, which to prefer.”

Broome reported that Haidar offered to Madhav Rao, on his consenting to assist him, the tribute due for the last two years, i.e. 30 lakhs—17 to be paid to the army when it started and 13 on its joining Haidar. His *vakil* also proposed that for the maintenance of the army half a rupee per horse for each day would be paid. Madhav Rao did not give his final reply and said that he would await the arrival of the English envoy. But he took the field about a *kos* distant from Poona. The ambassador reported, “I think the *Darbar* are on the very brink of breaking with us.”³

¹ Forrest, *Selections, Maratha Series*.

² A treaty was concluded between the Madras Government and the Nizam on the 2nd March, 1768.

³ Select Committee Proceedings, 13th December, 1768.

The Company's General letter to Fort St. George¹ recommended an immediate conclusion of a treaty, offensive and defensive, with Janoji Bhonsle on his ceding the province of Orissa to the East India Company, as the most effectual support that could be given to the Madras people. The Governor and the Select Committee of the Presidency of Fort William wrote, "Our principal object of bringing about a treaty with Janoji was to divert Madhav Rao from entering the Carnatic to the assistance of Haidar Ali."² But the British negotiations with Janoji failed. Madhav Rao had to some extent misled the British as to the aim of his preparations and had even sent his fleet to cruise off the Bombay harbour, though he was really concerting with the Nizam a plan for marching against Janoji. By that time Haidar had brought the war to a close.

We must not think that British diplomacy twice succeeded in bringing about a diversion of the Maratha power. We shall not be certainly justified in accepting the proposition that Madhav Rao really intended to help Haidar against the British.³

From Haidar's side no such offer was made that might induce Madhav Rao to join hands with him, especially after the defection of the Nizam. Madhav Rao certainly wanted to strengthen his home front before he would think of embarking on such ambitious schemes of foreign conquest. Raghunath Rao and Janoji were the two domestic enemies whom he must first dispose of. Madhav Rao must not be taken to be a man of confused thinking to whom first things did not come first. It is significant that only after Janoji had been effectively checked did Maratha policy adopt a more decisive and vigorous tone both in the North and in the South. Haidar had encroached on

1 Select Committee Proceedings, 13th May, 1768, p. 681.

2 Select Committee Proceedings, 13th December, 1768.

3 This was the assumption of the Bombay Government. Thomas Hodges from Bombay wrote to Richard Bouchier in Madras on the 30th September, 1767, "We shall immediately pursue such measures as may appear to us most eligible for answering your intentions in respect to the Marathas, which we shall be the better enabled to do from a difference which is likely to arise between Madhav Rao and his uncle Raghoba, which we shall do our utmost to foment and embrace any other opportunity which may offer for drawing [of the attention from the Carnatic]."—Gense and Banaji, *Gaikwards of Baroda*, Vol. I.

the Maratha sphere of influence and hoped in future to encroach more and more. There was a much greater clash of interests with the Marathas than with the British, though Haidar was actually at war with the latter. The fact that the ministerialist party at Poona later enlisted his support against the British during the First Anglo-Maratha War, must not make us think in the same strain about the years 1767-1769. By 1779, Haidar's greed for territory at the expense of the Marathas had been satisfied, partly by his own conquests and partly by the readiness of the Poona *Darbar* to meet his wishes. Haidar could not expect an alliance with the Marathas in 1767-1769.

Neither of the contestants expected Madhav Rao to be an ally, but both were apprehensive that he might throw his weight on the other side. His neutrality was what each could really hope for at the utmost and that policy was forced on Madhav Rao by Raghunath Rao and Janoji. Otherwise, it was not unlikely that Madhav Rao would have taken advantage of this war to attempt to crush Haidar completely, a policy which he tried to pursue in his third expedition undertaken towards the close of 1769.

APPENDIX B

Haidar and the Bombay Government

The Bombay Government was generally more friendly to Haidar than the Government of Fort St. George. The attitude of William Hornby and his colleagues at Bombay during the years 1779 and 1780 shows that the regionalism of the foreign policy of the British in their different Presidencies in India did not disappear until the First Anglo-Maratha War and the Second Anglo-Mysore War became merged in one. The Government of Madras was anxious for a peace with the Marathas in view of the hostility of Haidar but Hornby's government, on the other hand, wanted to secure the friend-

ship of Haidar in view of their war with the Marathas and, if possible, they wanted to secure his co-operation in the war. The diplomacy of the Bombay government was a remarkable contrast to that of Madras but the formation of the grand confederacy against the British left the Bombay government no diplomatic initiative.

In May 1778 the President and Council of Bombay had made the proposal of appointing a Resident at the Court of Haidar to counteract the designs of the Dutch and the French (p. 165). In a minute dated 18th February, 1780, Hornby emphasised the urgency of this measure in view of the latest political developments. He proposed to send a gentleman to Haidar to secure his friendship and co-operation. He hoped thereby to create a diversion which would favour Goddard's operations and enable the British to settle themselves most effectually in their new acquisitions. He also thought that he would be able to induce Haidar to play into the hands of the British as the Maratha power was the great object of his jealousy. Of course as a preliminary to all, to stop all hostilities in the Malabar region and to make a settlement in Malabar in a manner favourable to British commercial interests. He proposed to appoint George Horsley, Resident at Onore for this mission. The Council agreed with the President and would not permit of losing any time in consulting Calcutta and Madras. They decided to send Horsley as soon as the proper passport arrived from Haidar Ali. But Haidar did not return any answer to the President's proposal of sending a gentleman to him. The intended journey of George Horsley had to be countermanded (Sec & Pol. Diary 22/1780 pp. 79-83 ; 89-91).

If George Horsley had gone to see Haidar his reception would not have been perhaps very different from that of Gray who came from Madras to see Haidar in March, 1780. It should be noted that the Bombay Presidency's subordinate factory at Tellicherry created difficulties that undoubtedly increased the hostility of Haidar. Though George Horsley at Onore waited in vain for the passport which never arrived it is interesting to note that the factors at Tellicherry under

instruction from Bombay drew up a very interesting memorandum on trouble in Malabar for his guidance in the discussion to take place at Seringapatam. A summary of the document is given below (Sec & Pol. Dept. Diary no 22/1780 pp.297-305)

In 1766 Haidar deposed the prince of Chericul who withdrew to Tellicherry where he remained inactive till March 1774. Tired of this life he went to Haidar Ali and through the influence of the linguist Domingo Rodriguez he obtained possession of the Cotiote Country. He again went to Seringapatam in 1776 and obtained a grant of Colastria. He was now hostile to the English East India Company. In March, 1777 he sent a body of his troops into English territory who seized and plundered some of the inhabitants. He was, however, persuaded to desist from his hostile activities. In October, 1777 his men again demanded to be put in possession of all the districts except those given to the French. When hostilities between the English and the French commenced on the Malabar side he was ordered by Haidar to assist the French at Mahe. The old King of Cartinaad in whose territory Mahe is situated, the four Nambiars and other Nair chiefs privately assured the factors at Tellicherry that though they had been asked by Haidar to help the French they would never do it, but would rather join the English if at any time that became necessary. The former king of Cotiote who lived concealed in the woods behind Calicut offered to side with the British and promised to give them all the concessions that they wanted in his country provided the Tellicherry people gave him protection and assistance. The prince of Chericul, on the other hand, began to assist the French to the utmost of his power. In February 1779 he stopped all provisions and necessities coming to the British from the country in his possession. The old King of Cotiote, the old King of Cartinaad and the four Nambiars joined together and fell upon the prince of Chericul. They were helped by the British with a small supply of military stores. As the British siege of Mahe began, the prince of Chericul prevented supplies from reaching the besiegers. With British help the malcontent chief succeeded in driving away the Prince of Chericul. Supplies now began to pour in

and the British succeeded in taking Mahe on the 19th March, 1779. The prince of Cherikul was so hard pressed by his rival chief that he withdrew after considerable loss to Nettur and he was relieved by reinforcements sent by Haidar under Balwant Rao. The Cherikul prince and Balwant Rao now fell upon the king of Cotiote and his allies and dispersed them. They then marched to Cartinaad, removed the old king and placed his nephew there. During the troubles in Cotiote and Cartinnad a large number of inhabitants sought shelter after the failure of the Cotiote and Cartinaad chiefs in British territory "as the natives of the neighbouring countries had always found protection in this place from the calamities of war particularly in the years 1766 and 1774 when the Nabob entered the country with fire and sword without his taking particular umbrage at it." It was rumoured that the prince of Cherikul intended attacking Tellicherry in October, 1779. He commenced hostilities in the province of Rhandeterrah. Fighting continued between the British on the one side and the prince of Cherikul and the new chief of Cartinaad on the other hand. They could not, however, gain any considerable advantage over the British. For the defence of Tellicherry the factors thought it necessary to have a chain of posts to cover the district owned by the British 'from Codolly fort round to Moylan fort.' As the number of their troops was insufficient they secured the services of 2,000 Cotiote Nairs who made their way through the country possessed by the princes hostile to the British. This was the situation of affairs when Horsley was asked to get ready for the intended mission. The factors added, "the attack the King of Cotiote made upon the prince of Cherikka during the time the latter was assisting the French, gave him an opportunity of unjustly possessing the Nabob with an idea that we secretly fomented the troubles in the country." They added, "The Nabob wrote the President in February last (1780) that if the principals were delivered to the prince of Cherikul the troubles here would cease but the step supposing it justifiable cannot now be taken for many of them are dead and others with their families are retired into the interior part of the country." All this to a certain extent substantiates Haidar's charge that the Tellicherry people fomented troubles in Malabar.

APPENDIX C

Haidar's negotiation with Sir Eyre Coote

February-August, 1782.

Sir Eyre Coote informed the Supreme government in February, 1782 that Haidar's old wakil at the Presidency wrote a letter to one of his servants with a view to bringing about an accommodation with the British. It was expected by Haidar that the first overtures would be made by him and that would enable Haidar to know the real sentiments of the British. The reply that was sent by Coote was to the effect that Haidar knew the power of the English army, the English Nation and of the English fleet and he knew very well what had passed. The reply from the old Wakil was to the effect that Haidar was "in every particular well inclined to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship" and he was anxious to know British intentions. Coote's reply was to the effect that immediately after his arrival at Madras he had proposed a general exchange of prisoners or a general release on condition that they should not serve against him during the war and he had referred to the general inhumanity of the treatment of the prisoners. Haidar had then rejected the proposals on the ground that this was not agreeable to the customs of Hindusthan. He wanted Haidar to agree to this as a striking proof of his friendship. He would then ask the Supreme government of Bengal to have a friendly alliance between him and the East India Company (Secret Proceedings 4th March, 1782, p. 844).

In their reply to this communication of Coote the Secret Committee informed him that in view of the conclusion of a treaty with the Peshwa in which Haidar Ali had a claim to be included as an ally a separate negotiation might embarrass the Poona government and he might as well be referred to the Peshwa for the conditions of his participation. Further, as he entered into this war without any claim or demand he could not advance any and it would be sufficient if the British did not demand any reparation for injuries. But he must separate himself from the French and dismiss the French

forces sent for his assistance. Coote was further told—"But you are to keep in mind the probable contingency that when this letter reaches your hands, a treaty may have been actually concluded and executed with the Marathas which will, of course, preclude us from entering into any separate or direct engagement with Haidar Ali." (Secret Proceedings, 18th March, 1782). It is relevant to note that negotiations for an Anglo-Maratha treaty had been going on for some time but the treaty was not actually concluded till May 1782, though not ratified by the Poona Darbar until seven months after.

On the 19th June, 1782 a person named Md. Osman came from Haidar to see the English general with instructions to inform him that Haidar was desirous of coming to an accommodation and he would like to have a friendly alliance with the East India Company. In reply Coote referred to the Treaty of Salbai recently concluded as the grand basis of all negotiation and added that he should first of all withdraw all his forces from the Carnatic and separate himself from the French. Md. Osman said that there would be no difficulty provided the Mysorean claims on Trichinopoly were ratified conformably to the terms of the treaty extant on that head. Coote wrote to the Supreme Government, "At a time when our affairs in Europe stand so much in need of counter-balance.....I submit whether a point of that kind should prove an obstacle to an object of such national importance." (Secret Proceedings, 8th July, 1782.)

Warren Hastings and Council wrote in reply (Secret Proceedings, 8th July, 1782)—"However necessary it may be to restore the peace of the Carnatic and whatever sacrifices it may appear advisable to make for attaining that important object yet we ought by no means to submit to fresh terms with Haidar Ali as would enable him to retain any part of the footing which he has acquired in that country or make a cession of any additional territory in it.....the cession of Trichinopoly and the consequent command which he would obtain of the south division of the Carnatic would, in that case prove both an encouragement to him to renew the war and an advantage in prosecuting it. We lose no time in

requesting that you will give a peremptory refusal to this and every other demand of the like nature proceeding from Haidar Ali and require his simple and unqualified acquiescence in that article of the treaty concluded with the Peshwa which respects him as it stands."

In his letter to Coote dated the 1st July, 1789 (Sec. Progs. 12th August, 1782, p. 2475), Haidar wrote, "Before the receipt of his letter 4/5 others reached me but neither in these, in that now before me or in the verbal communication of Md. Osman are the conditions of peace and friendship specified. It is well known that a war of years accompanied with so much bloodshed cannot have prevailed without cause. You are a man of sense, of discernment and if you are desirous of peace you can communicate the condition on which it can take place to Srinivas Rao."

Col. Braithwaite, who was also made Haidar's medium of communication with Coote, was also informed by the British general (Sec. Progs., 12th Aug., 1782, p. 2478) that "the late treaty of friendship and alliance settled between us and the Marathas in which the Nabob Bahadur Haidar Ali Khan has been included is now groundwork of all negotiations, the business of which being once settled other matters may be taken into consideration".

In a conference between Haidar Ali and Srinivas Rao, a wakil who represented Coote, [Forrest, III] Haidar moderated his demands so far as to tell the wakil, "I do not say that Trichinopoly and Madura are to be given up to me but as the lands in the province of Dindigul are in some parts intermixed with the confines of the Trichinopoly district, I wish to have the matter properly settled." He also referred to the engagements previously executed between Mahammad Ali and Saunders and he expected some surrender of territory.

In these circumstances nothing tangible could emerge and a break-down of the negotiations was almost inevitable. On the basis of statement of Purnia's, Wilks writes that in December 1781 Haidar expressed regret for his war with the British. The words actually attributed to him are—"I have committed a great error, I have purchased a draught of seandee at the price of a lakh of pagodas.....between me and the English

there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction but no sufficient cause for war and I might have made them my friends in spite of Muhammad Ali." If this was really his attitude he had the opportunity between February and August 1782 of terminating the war on the basis of the state of things antebellum. But he continued to refer to his territorial demands in the Tanjore-Trichinopoly area. That is not the way in which a statesman would express his regret if he was convinced that he was pursuing a wrong policy. The words must have been expressed in a mood of depression that very soon passed away or to put it in a different way the confidence that Suffren inspired and the prospect of the coming of Bussy with an army revived hopes that lay dormant. He could now refer to these negotiations with Coote in making his demands on the French and in countering their demands on him.

The author of "Memoirs of the Late War in Asia" (II.403-404) gives a new colour to these peace negotiations. He writes that Coote, invested with the power of peace and war, wanted Haidar to accede to the Treaty of Salbai and with a view to carrying on negotiations independently of Lord Macartney, the Madras Government, left Madras and approached Haidar. But he was a most unequal match for the Mysorean in the art of diplomacy, was duped and Haidar protracted the negotiations till the army had consumed its rice as also that of the garrison and then withdrew from the negotiations leaving the general in total darkness.

It is relevant to note that negotiations had been going on since February 1782 and Coote was at one stage even anxious to conclude a treaty on Haidar's own terms. If what this author says is true, the remark applies only to the last phase of the negotiations.

APPENDIX D

Treatment of the Prisoners of War

Some officers and men of the British army become prisoners of Haidar Ali after the First battle of Palur and after the defeat of Braithwaite at Annagudi. Suffren also surrendered to Haidar a large number of seamen who were his captives. Haidar also captured some stragglers from other detachments of the British army like sergeant Christie of the Bengal detachment led by Pearse. Two Englishmen taken at Erod in 1768 followed the profession of armourers in Mysore. They regarded themselves as prisoners of Haidar. Most of the sepoys who were taken prisoner were induced to join Haidar's service. In India it was not the custom to imprison ordinary soldiers.

The author of the *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia* expatiates at length on the sufferings of the European prisoners of war who fell into the hands of Haidar. The first charge is inhumanity. After the defeat of Baillie, Haidar's people did not give much attention to the wounded, forced some of the Englishmen to carry the severed heads of their countrymen but he adds (Vol. II. p. 3) that "touched with a latent spark of humanity, Haidar ordered the practice of bringing severed heads before him, while the English gentlemen were present, to be discontinued." When we examine his charges of inhumanity we find some very interesting remarks—"Some of the European officers were carried in palanquins without any covering." "The doolies are inhuman vehicles." "To each one seer of rice, sometimes a little lean mutton, one spoonful of ghee, a small quantity of curry stuff, half spoonful of salt and two or three sticks of firewood." (p. 23). Each of the servants of these officers got "3 cash per day and one seer of rice with a little salt." With characteristic naivette he adds in one place that officers had to go without wine, tea, sugar or any other comfort. The more serious charges are that they had sometimes to sleep on bare earth and were put in irons.

Haidar himself indignantly denied the charge that he did not treat the European prisoners well. He told Sirinivas Rao,

Sir Eyre Coote's vakil, "They are in no want of food and raiment. Let some one be sent on your part to see them and Braithwaite who was taken in the Tanjore country is here in the camp, you may see him for yourself—a sheep for ten men is their daily allowance and some that were lean when they were with you are grown fat since I have had them. They that have told you all this have told you lies. They have not to be sure fine clothes but they are sufficiently supplied with white linen." [Forrest, vol. II].

Some of the European prisoners who were young, were circumcised, dressed in Muhammadan fashion and were called European Mussalmans. They were each given one gold fanum per day with provisions and clothes and they were to teach discipline to the Chela battalions. Haidar was anxious to induce the European prisoners to take service under him and he even offered to the prisoner who later wrote the book *War in Asia* Rs. 300/-per month if he entered his service.

In view of the fact that so much has been heard of Tipu's illtreatment of his prisoners, of his even poisoning some of them, it is interesting to remark that the same author speaks of Tipu as crown prince treating his prisoner well (p. 83); of his paying every attention to them that was necessary (p. 114), Ms. Eur. E. 87 gives us the following description of Haidar's treatment of his European prisoners—"Haidar for some time had treated his prisoners with more than usual rigour ; he had ordered all the Europeans to be put in irons ; 42 officers were confined at Bangalore in a square of about 100 feet, along the walls of which they were permitted to build small huts sufficient to contain two persons. Every evening they were allowed to walk in the enclosure, which helped to preserve their health. Their food, a measure of rice, a small quantity of ghee each and four poor sheep among the whole. To these was added 9 cash, 12 of which are equal to a Madras fanam. Their wardrobe consisted of only a few coarse shirts and drawers of their own making. Shoes they had none, but habit and use soon prevented their feeling it as an inconvenience. Their guards treated them with civility."

APPENDIX—E

Bibliography

English : Unpublished Records.

National Archives of India.

Foreign Department Records :

Select Committee Proceedings 1767-1772.

Secret Proceedings 1773-1782.

There are practically no records relating to Haidar Ali before 1767. The official letters of Sir Eyre Coote and Sir Edward Hughes, as recorded in the Secret Proceedings 1780-1782, give us the most satisfactory account on the English side of the second Anglo-Mysore war.

Madras Government Record Office.

Military Consultations, 1760-1782.

Military Department: Despatches to England from 1756.

—Ditto— Despatches from England from 1759.

The records in the Madras office contain very full information on Haidar. British relations with "country powers" are described in detail. As regards Haidar's relations with the British up to 1767, the Madras records are our only source.

In the Military Consultations we have much valuable information not merely on military matters but also on Haidar's relations with the French, his attitude towards the Nizam, formation of the anti-British confederacy, his revenues, the Frenchmen in his service and other important topics.

India Office.

Orme Manuscripts :—

No. 8—Mr. Stuart's account of the battle between Haidar Ali and the Marathas, 5th March, 1771.

No. 33—Extract from a letter from John Strachey to the Governor and Council of Bombay, 31st October, 1765.

No. 33 (5)—From Joseph Smith to Orme—The campaign against Haidar Ali.

No. 33 (7)—The events from September, 1766—October, 1770. Proof that Orme intended to continue his history through the campaign with Haidar Ali.

No. 33 (9)—Correspondence regarding General Joseph Smith's offer of resignation.

No. 40—Sketch of Colonel Wood's military conduct during war with Haidar Ali—extracts from Madras records.

No. 49 (2)—Deals with the first war with Haidar Ali—6th June—25th July, 1768.

No. 64 (3)—An account by Captain Mathews of the attack of the rock Mulbagal.

No. 71—Details of the war with Haidar Ali from the commencement to the 23rd February, 1769—A letter from Madras.

No. 72—Sketch of Haidar's career by Parkinson.

No. 92—Smith's letter to Orme—private—refers to Haidar's increasing greatness. Date—February, 1775.

No. 215—Journal and Orderly Book of Brigadier-General Joseph Smith—15th February, 1767—2nd April, 1769.

Manuscript Fur. E. 87 :—

Narrative of the Second War with Hyder Ali Cawn pp. 258. This narrative covers the period from 12th August, 1779 to 2nd September, 1782. It ends abruptly in the middle of a sentence—“At 7 p.m. the body of the French fleet hauled their wind to the southward the ship in our rear still keeping a.....”

There is no indication of the date of composition. But the description of some of the battles agrees so well with the language of Sir Eyre Coote that there can be no doubt that the author had access to official reports. The catalogue informs us that the document is marked in pencil—“Macartney papers Mysore War 329”.

Bombay Government Record Office.

Dr. V. G. Dighe of the Bombay Government Record Office very kindly sent me a complete list of records relating to Haidar Ali in the Bombay Archives. On the basis of this descriptive list I wrote to him for typed copies of certain manuscripts, which were duly supplied. Copies of some of the records in the Bombay archives are to be found in the Madras archives as well. I thought the Bombay records would throw more light

on the formation of the confederacy against the British but I have been disappointed.

English : Published Works :—

Orme, *History of Military Transactions in Indostan*, vols. I. & II. The account of Orme is that of a contemporary who was present on the scene. It comes down to 1761. The references to Haidar are incidental and therefore all the more valuable. Orme succeeds in giving a vivid picture of the period in spite of the confusion prevailing then.

Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai.

This "Indian Pepys" was a very acute observer. He kept an account of what happened at Pondicherry and also recorded other historical events that had repercussions in the French Indian capital. Of the twelve volumes available in English, only volumes VII—XII were useful to me. It was inevitable that he would sometimes record mere bazar rumours, or give to trivial things exaggerated importance. In such cases, we have to be guided by probability.

Wilks, *Historical Sketches of the South of India in an attempt to trace the History of Mysore*. 3 Volumes. 1810—17.

Wilks says that he was induced to collect materials "without any definite object beyond that of rescuing from oblivion, before it should be lost for ever, the information possessed by living characters and an imperceptible consequence was the examination of written authorities. The volumes of Wilks are valuable to us not so much because of the "written authorities" which are still available to us as because of the evidence he derived from "living characters." "I went over the ground accompanied by men of observation and intelligence who witnessed them." "It is stated by the family of Khande Rao and particularly by Butcherow who was then sixteen years of age and distinctly remembers the particulars." "Rani-Lachmi whom the Raja married in 1760, was a sensible and amiable old lady whose observations on the incidents of her eventful life are highly interesting and intelligent."—such statements abound in the work of Wilks. The inner history, the crisscross of personal rivalries and antagonisms that might otherwise have remained unrevealed are thus presented as a living picture. For principles and policy ample recorded evidence

is available. These bits of information are at times imperfect fragments, at times obscure, sometimes even contradictory. Occasionally we have no alternative but to compare and to conjecture. But invaluable details of many revealing episodes have been preserved only in this way. We may be better informed about data but Wilks gives us a living picture.

Memoirs of the Late War in Asia with a narrative of the imprisonment and sufferings of our officers and soldiers by an officer of Colonel Bailie's detachment, London, 1788.

The author's aim was "to describe not only our own but the valour and address of our enemies and to particularise the merits and hardships of our countrymen and others in our service." He depended for his materials on the most authentic written memorials or on men of strict honour for his information. It is naturally the most important source of information on Haidar's European prisoners.

Report on the Interior Administration, Resources and Expenditure of the Government of Mysore under the system prescribed by the order of the Governor-General in Council, dated 4th September, 1799. Lt. Colonel Mark Wilks, Fort William, 4th May, 1805.

For civil administration in the days of Hyder Ali this book is an indispensable source. It refers frequently to the administrative system in the days of Haidar. I read the copy of the book in the National Archives of India.

Baramahal Records—Section V—Property. Madras, 1914.

This Madras Government Record office publication relates to the years 1792-1798 and contains accounts of such experts on land revenue administration as Capt. Munro, Capt. Macleod and others. On inam grants these records throw considerable light. References to the administrative system of Haidar are plentiful.

Fifth Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India Company, 1812, Ed. W. K. Firminger, Vol. III (R. Cambray)

Appendices 23, 24, 25 and 26 give us many significant facts about Haidar's administration in Malabar and in Canara and throw considerable light on Haidar's poligar policy.

Calendar of Persian Correspondence, Vols. V, VI. Imperial Record Department.

For Maratha-Mysore relations, 1779-1782, this is the most important source of our information, the most important letters being those to Mudhoji Bhonsle and those from Mudhoji Bhonsle.

Report of a Joint Commission from Bengal and Bombay appointed to inspect the state and condition of the province of Malabar in the years 1792 and 1793. Reprinted at the Fort St. George Gazette Press, 1862.

If we read this report along with the minute of Sir John Shore dated February 24, 1794 (National Archives of India, O. C. Feb. 24, 1794). We get a satisfactory picture of Haidar's administration in Malabar.

East India Military Repository (Dum Dum 1822-24)—
Letters of T.D. Pearse.

Other Published Works

British Indian Military Repository 1822.

Memoirs of Colonel Thomas Deane Pearse of the Bengal Artillery.

Forrest, *Selections from state papers of Governor-General Warren Hastings*, 3 volumes. Calcutta 1890.

Forrest, *Selections from the letters, despatches and other state papers.* (Maratha Series). Bombay 1885.

Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*. 3 vols. London 1913.

W. J. Willson, *History of the Madras Army*, Vols. I & II, Madras 1882.

Gense & Banaji, *The Third English Embassy to Poona, comprising Mostyn's diary and Mostyn's letters*.

Gense & Banaji, *The Gaikwads of Baroda* (English documents), Vols. I-III.

Ramchandra Rao, *Memoirs of Hyder & Tipoo* (1849).

Translated by C. P. Brown.

Henderon, *The Coins of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*, Madras 1921.

Caldwell, *History of Tinnevely*.

Panikkar, *Malabar and the Dutch*, 1931

Mill, *History of British India*. Vols III, IV (5th Ed.).

M. M. D. L. T., *History of Haidar Shah and Tipu Sultan* (trs. revised and corrected by Prince Gholam Muhammed), Calcutta 1908.

Stewart, *Memoirs of Hyder Ally*, 1809

Robson, *Haidar Ali*, 1781.

Asiatic Annual Register, 1800. The biographical memoirs designed to illustrate the rise of Hyder Ally Khan.

A Selection from the Wellington Despatches—Owen, Clarendon Press, 1880.

The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington (1799-1818). Lt. Col. Gurwood, Vol. I. London, 1837.

Mysore Gazetteer—Rice, 2nd Edn., 1897.

A Manual of N. Arcot District—A. F. Cox. 1881.

A Manual of S. Arcot District—J. H. Garstin. 1878.

A Manual of Chingleput District—Charles Stewart Crole, 1879.

Life of Munro—Vols. I, II, III—G. R. Gleig, 1830.

Life of Sir Eyre Coote—H. C. Wylly, 1922.

A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and other papers of importance relating to British affairs in Malabar—Logan.

The Munro System of British Statesmanship of India—K. N. V. Sastri, 1937.

Portuguese :

Chevalier Panduranga Pissurlencar, Archivist, Nova Goa, sent me reprints or transcripts of rare Portuguese documents from Nova Goa and Lisbon. A descriptive list is given. These are all to be found in his published work *Antigualhas*, Vol. I. fasciculo I, section VII and Vol. I, fasciculo II, Mr. Estanislau Mesafonte Sousa helped me to translate the documents. The following are the most important.

Document I—dated January, 1764—Report of the progress of Haidar, written by the Portuguese Viceroy, Count of Ega.

Document II—Official letter of the Viceroy dated 26th January, 1764—giving an account of the career of Haidar Ali—translated by Dr. S. N. Sen and incorporated in his book, *Early career of Kanhoji Angre and other papers*.

Documents IV & V—Contemporary accounts narrating the progress of Haidar Ali.

Document VI—Concerns the Kingdom of Sunda.

Documents VII to LXXXII—Other contemporary papers on Haidar's relation with the Portuguese.

Peixotc—*History of Nawab Haidar Ali Khan Bahadur*. Ed. Charles Philip Brown Ms. Eur. D. 296. India Office.

Brown worked from an English translation made by one who had an imperfect command of style. The original was written in Portuguese. Peixoto was a Portuguese, his mother probably a Kanadi. He became a commandant of artillery under Haidar whom he served from 1758 to 1767 and from 1769 to 1771. He gives us much valuable information relating to Maratha-Mysore relations as also Haidar's first expedition to Malabar. He alone gives a very detailed account of the critical years 1760-1761. He very naturally tries to appear more important than he really was but he was not very different from other European adventurers of the 18th century.

Dutch :

Madras Record Office publications Nos. 5 & 13.

Madras Record Office : Letters from Cochin dated :—

5th October, 1775. 17th November, 1775. 17th December, 1775. 17th October, 1776. 3rd August, 1781. 3rd October, 1781. 31st October, 1781. 21st December, 1781.

Father Fruitier translated these records for me. They give us some new information about Haidar's Malabar expedition and naturally form the most important source of information about his relations with the Dutch in that region.

French :

Journal de Bussy (31st November, 1781-31st March, 1783).
Ed. by P. A. Martineau, Pondichery, 1832.

My chapter on Haidar's relations with the French is based, to a very considerable extent, on this original source. This journal explains fully the torpor of the French army under Duchemin and Hofflize. On pp. 316 and 326 Haidar's treatment of the French is contrasted with that of his successor—"The son appears to have neither the capacity nor the brain of his father and above all infinitely less friendship...the father a prodigal in comparison with the son in the matter of

supply to the French army." Late Dr. P. C. Bagchi very kindly translated the relevant extracts into English for my use.

Gaudart, E. Catalogue des Manuscrits des Anciennes Archives de l'Inde Française.

The Campaign of Nawab Haidar Ali Khan, after his departure from Seringapatam. (From the Livro das MonCoens No. 161B ff. 469.). French text printed in Pissurlencar's *Antigualhas* Vol. I, fasc II. Eng. trans. Printed in *Islamic culture*, 1941.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has translated this French account into English. He kindly lent me his MS. for my use. The entries in this journal made by some Frenchmen in Haidar's service extend from 28th May to 4th November, 1780. Unfortunately the story ends abruptly with the fall of Arcot.

Michaud, *Histoire des progres et de la chute de l' Empire de Mysore sous les Regnes d' Hyder Aly et Tippoo-Sub* Paris 1801 to 1809, Chap. II.

Michaud's book is written with sympathy and is perhaps the most interesting book I have read in this connection. The passages quoted in the book were kindly translated for me by Late Dr. P. C. Bagchi.

Martineau—*Dupleix*, Vol II.

Marathi :

Khare, *Aitihāsik Lekh Samgraha*, Vols. II-VII.

Rajwade, Vols I, IV, V. *Itihas Samgraha* by Parasnis.

Selections from Peshwa Daftar. Vols. 20, 27, 28, 36, 37, 38, 39.

About the Marathi sources. I need only say that they have given me a new outlook and the extensive use I have made of *Aitihāsik Lekh Samgraha* and *Peshwa Daftar Selections* proves how indispensable this material has been.

Tamil, Telegu and Canarese :

Mackenzie MSS: Local records, Vol. XI—p. 51

„ XIII—p. 345.

„ XXII—p. 345.

Contents—*Accounts of Sri Rangapattam and Kaiyyat of Haidar.*

Document No. 17-5-11. *Karnataka Rajakkal Savistara Charitam*—Tamil, Two extracts.

Local records, Vol. XXIV.

Haidar Kaifiyats, Kaifiyat of Bidaruru.

Canarese, *Haidar Kaifiyat*, No. 18-15-15.

We had to ignore brief incidental notices on Haidar scattered among the accounts of different villages. The materials contained in these papers have been fully utilised in my chapter on civil administration.

Haidarnama—A Canarese MS., portions of which were published in the Annual Report of Mysore Archaeological department and in the Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 3rd session. The date of this composition was 29th June, 1784. The published fragments do not justify the claim that the book is a corrective to existing accounts.

Persian :

Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal, MS. No. 20 : *Nishan-i-Haidari* by Husain Ali Kirmani. Translated by Colonel Miles.

I compared the translation of Colonel Miles with the Asiatic Society MS. and wherever I found that there was no material deviation from the original I have quoted Miles. But this Persian account has not the merit we expect from the best Persian writings on history. Its chronology is not correct, the topography is unreliable and the sequence of events is very often wrong. Wherever the author describes Haidar's relations with the Marathas, there is wilful misrepresentation. It was with great caution that I accepted some of his statements concerning Haidar's early career.

Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal, MS., No. 201 : *A History of Coorg* from Canarese and Persian sources by Hussain Luhani, written by order of Maharaj Vir Rajendra Vadiyar. It gives the history of Coorg from 1637 to 1807.

British Museum MS. Or. 1865, date of composition November, 1778: A contemporary account of Haidar. Absolutely useless. A patient attempt to extricate historical material from this MS. is like "rummaging a rubbish heap on the problematical chance of discovering a cigar end."

Tuzuk-i-Walajah, Vols. I & II. Translated into English and published by the Madras University.

I thought it would throw some light on Haidar's early career and give some details of his relations with Muhammad Ali. How useless these volumes are for our purpose can be illustrated by one quotation—Vol. II, p. 103: "Haidar Nayak was brought up in the house of Abbas Quli Khan, the qiladar of Sira. Owing to a theft in his master's house, Haidar ran away fearing punishment and became an attendant of Karachuri Nandaraj." Wilful vilification cannot perhaps go further.

A Persian MS. History of Mysore, noticed by Mr. Abdul Qadir in the half yearly Journal of the Mysore University, Sept, 1944. This MS. was found in a collection of books presented by Md. Abbas Sait to the Idara-e-Adabiyat-e-Urdu, Hyderabad, Dn. It professes to give the history of Mysore from 1713 to 1799 but from the detailed description of its contents it does not appear to contain anything new.

Fathu'l Mujahidin—Asiatic Society of Bengal's Persian MS. No. 1650. It gives some information on the organisation, drill and employment in action of the different branches of Tipu's army. My chapter on Haidar's military system gives only its general features. This MS. may be of use to a writer dealing with the Mysore military system under Haidar and Tipu in greater details.

INDEX

A

- Abaji Mahadev, 130
 Abbas Quli Khan, 2, 38
 Abdul Hamid Khan, 23
 Abdul Wahab Khan, 209
 Abingdon, 213, 214, 221
 Abu Muhammad Mirda, 255
 Acheen, 220
 Adavanni Venkappaiah, 241
 Adoni, 55, 124, (See Basalat Jang)
 Alain, 32, 60
 Ali Nawaz, 143
 Ali Raja, 147, 150, 160, 161
 Alvoes, 27n, 30
 Amir-ul-Omrah, 217
 Ambur, 76, 184, 209
 Anand Rao Raste, 23, 110, 276
 Anantapur, 41, 51
 Anawatty, 49, 50, 97
 Anekal, 30, 31
 Ankole, 45
 Annagudi, 206, 212-214, 287
 Anwaruddin, 6
 Appaji Ram, 111, 115, 116, 240, 256, 270
 Arcot, 186, 194, 201, 215
 Arialur, 88
 Arni, 186, 218, 219
 Arsad Beg Khan, 241, 248, 249
 Asad Ali, 240
 Aurangzeb, 6, 8
 Azalares, 163

B

- Babuji Naik, 5n,
 Baillie, 113, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192
 Baji Rao, 5
 Baji Rao Barwe, 116, 125
 Balaji Baji Rao, 5, 18, 19
 Balwant Rao, 282
 Balwant Rao Mehindele, 22, 23
 Banaji Pandit, 228
 Bangalore, 4, 22, 24, 25, 30, 39, 55, 76, 79, 81, 84, 85, 97, 98, 108, 112, 251, 252, 259

- Bankapur, 46, 49, 49n, 52, 53,
 Barabhai league, 115, 118
 Barkatullah, 17
 Baramahal, 30
 Basalat Jang, 37, 38, 164, 165, 168, 169, 177, 225
 Basavapatna, 18, 52
 Basavarajdrug, 42
 Bellalraydrug, 41, 42
 Bellary, 4, 54, 55, 116, 121
 Bellecombe, 225
 Bento de Compos, 27
 Bhawani Sheo Ram, 179
 Bidnur (Nagar), 44, 46, 51, 53, 55, 62, 144, 147, 234, 259, 265
 Bonjour, Major, 71, 72, 90
 Bourchier, 64, 65, 66, 89n
 Bouthenot, 261
 Braithwaite, 185, 187, 211, 212, 213, 223, 225n, 287, 288
 Broome, Charles, 277
 Budikote, 1, 84
 Bussy, 182, 215, 218, 229-230
 Bumrauze, 206, 208
 Byrne, 216

C

- Calghery, 220
 Calicut, 5, 20, 145, 150
 Call, 83
 Calliaud, 65
 Calvert, 76
 Campbell, 90
 Canacona, 45
 Candhully, 252
 Cannanore, 152, 160
 Cape Ramas, 70
 Careira, 261
 Cartinad, 262
 Castro, Mons, 261
 Caveripuram, 252
 Chanda, Saheb, 7
 Chandragiri, 209
 Changama, 71, 72, 186
 Channapatna, 24, 25
 Channaraidurga, 55, 57, 121

- Chen Basaviya, 40, 41, 41n, 42, 43
 Chennai, 240
 Chericul, 282
 Chidambaram, 194, 197
 Chikkadeva Raja, 263
 Chiknaikanhalli, 97, 98
 Chinnaji, 179
 Chinkurali, 102, 105-108, 109, 122, 264, 266
 Chitaldrug, 18, 40, 41, 52, 54, 96, 259, 267
 Chittoor, 207, 208
 Christie, 287
 Clive, 10
 Cochin, 5, 152, 155.
 Coimbatore, 22, 32, 83, 112, 146, 150, 151, 259
 Conjeeveram, 75, 89, 90, 186, 188, 189, 191
 Congreve, 260
 Coorg, 118-120, 155, 268
 Coote, Sir Eyre, 181, 191, 193-222, 263, 283-286
 Cosby, 185, 192
 Cotiote, 287
 Cranganore, 152, 155, 160, 161
 Cuddapah, 5, 8, 22, 116, 134, 143
 Cuddalore, 186, 195, 220, 221
 Cunha Cusmao, 157, 158
- D**
- Dalton, 12
 Damalchery Pass, 206
 Darga Quli Khan, 1
 De Lannoy, 152
 De La Tour, 62
 Devanhalli, 2, 4, 6, 9, 24, 39, 56, 98
 Devappa Raja, 120
 Devaraidurg, 98
 Devraj, 2, 3, 7, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
 Dharampuri, 81, 83
 Dhenkanal, 179
 Dinamarca, 163
 Dindigul, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 30, 62, 83, 148, 170, 259
 Divakar Pandit, 175, 176
 D'orves, 196, 215, 226
 Dodappa Nayak, 121, 121n
 Dod Ballapur, 1, 38, 56, 57, 112, 116, 121
 Duchemin, 217, 227-229, 231
 Dupleix, 14
 Dupre, 91
 Dutch, 149-150, 152, 153, 155, 159, 161, 211-212, 223
 Du Muy, 62
 Dupont, 193
- E**
- Elliot, 173
- F**
- Faizulla, 31, 37, 38n, 44, 45, 270
 Fateh Ali, 143
 Fateh Singh Gaikwad, 175
 Fitzgerald, 71, 73, 74, 78, 88
 Fletcher, 189
 Flint, 187
 Fortuno, 261
 Francis, Philip, 191
- G**
- Galway, 211
 Ganjam Sahr, 252
 Gavin, 82
 Gingee, 194
 Goddard, 176, 178
 Golla Bhadra Timma, 141
 Gooty, See Murar Rao
 Gopal Rao Patwardhan, 23, 24, 25, 29, 48, 49, 56, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 265, 276
 Gray, 184
 Gul Muhammad Khan, 148
 Guntur Sarkar, 177, 178
 Gurumkonda, 56, 85, 86, 112, 121
- H**
- Haidarnagar, 43
 Haidar Saheb, 2, 3
 Harihar, 47, 52, 96
 Hari Singh, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 22
 Haripant, 125, 127, 129, 131, 132, 133, 180, 265

- Harpanhalli, 40, 54
Hoffize, 229, 231
Holalkerc, 44
Holland, 173, 178
Honaver, 42
Hornby Wm, 279
Horsley, George, 280
Hoskote, 4, 24, 37, 38, 56, 57, 81, 116, 121
Hubli, 18, 60, 224
Hughes, Sir Edward, 163, 281
196, 218, 227, 233
Husain Ali Beg, 207
- I**
- Ibrahim Saheb, 2n
Ibrahim Khan Dhaunsa, 125, 131, 132, 133
Ismail, 29, 30, 50, 51
- J**
- Janoji Bhonsle, 53, 95, 278
Jaswant Rao Mane, 132
- K**
- Kabaldurg, 18
Kabir Beg, 30
Kadattanad, Chief, 147
Kalahasti, 205, 208, 210
Kaliandrug, Treaty, 189
Kannivadi, 24, 25
Karanguli, 90, 194, 195
Karim Saheb, 186, 217
Karur, 60, 61, 62, 63, 88, 90
Karvetnagar, 205
Karwar, 44
Kattemalalavadi, 33
Kaveripak, 186
Kaveripatnam, 76, 78, 81
Kaveripuram, 252
Keatinge, 184, 194
Kellamangalam, 31
Khammamet, 79
Khande Rao, 21, 25, 25n, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 60, 61
Khande Rao Ghorpade, 39, 40
Kolar, 4, 24, 56, 85, 88, 89, 98, 112, 253, 259
Kollattiri, 147
Kolhapur, 5
Konher Rao, 125
Kortalliyar, 188
Kottayam, 148
Krishnagiri, 31, 32, 81, 82, 83
Krishna Rao, 255
Kumbakonam, 211, 220
Kur'si 41
Kundgal, 18
Kurnul, 5, 47, 55, 121, 165, 169
Kurpa, 47
- L**
- Lachman Rao, 129
Lakshman Hari, 96
Lalla Mian, 196, 200, 207, 208
Lally, 185, 188, 192, 220, 222, 224, 261, 270
Lamott, 209
Lang, Colonel, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 184, 210
Latif Ali Beg, 162
Lawrence, Major, 10, 12, 13
Le Beuf, 261
Leslie, 174
Lindsay, Sir John, 138, 139
Lingana, 41
Linga Raja, 119, 120
- M**
- Maan Varma, 248
Macartney, 181, 218
Mackay, 83
Macleod, Lord, 187
Macpherson 181
Madaksira, 40, 56
Madanna, 150, 151, 154
Maddagiri, 42, 43, 56, 57, 75, 112, 116, 121, 276
Madhav Rao, Peshwa, 47-49, 50-54, 57, 67, 68, 96-101, 114, 115, 118, 123, 137, 154, 180, 265, 275-279
Madhav Rao, Narayan, Peshwa, 116

- Madura, 286
 Mahadji Sindhia, 133, 145, 181, 214
 Mahe, 167, 168, 225
 Mahimaji Sindhia, 95, 96
 Mahphuz Khan, 6, 63, 64, 67
 Makhudum Ali, 20, 22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 60, 70, 97
 Malabar, 144-150, 151-155, 257, 258, 267
 Manaji Sindhia, 132
 Mangalore, 42, 44, 81, 83, 145, 157, 158, 163, 183
 Monoli, 126, 127
 Manimangalam, 217, 220
 Martanda Varma, 148, 152, 153, 154
 Mathews, Capt. 87, 91
 Mauritius, 226
 Melpatty, 70
 Melukote, 103, 104
 Menzes, 50, 100
 Mercara, 155
 Mir Faizulla, 31, 47, 48, 49
 (See Faizulla) 50, 51, 107
 Mirian, 44, 253
 Mir Reza, 56, 57, 58, 94, 27, 98, 122, 124, 134, 270
 Mir Sadik, (Mir Md. Sadek) 240, 225, 270
 Moraba Farnavis, 133, 173
 Mostyn, 175, 275, 276
 Moti Talab, 105, 111
 Mudda Raja and Muddaya, 119
 Mudhoji Bhonsle, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 224
 Mudhol, 49
 Muhammad Ali, (of Arcot) 6, 10, 12, 15, 18, 57, 62, 63, 68, 72, 73, 140, 141, 142, 165, 170, 211, 276
 Muhammad Ali (Haidar's Grand father), 1
 Muhammad Ali (Kumidan), 111, 125, 126, 127, 128, 182, 190
 Muin-ud-daula, 175
 Mulbagal, 83, 86, 98
 Mundiampakkam, 228
 Munro, Hector, 185, 187, 188, 189
 Murar Rao, 5n, 7, 10, 11, 12, 22, 23, 49, 46, 52, 57, 58, 84, 94, 96, 100, 115, 121-133, 164
 Muzaffar Jang, 6
- N**
- Nagmangal, 97
 Nagoji Rao, 275
 Nagore, 196
 Nana Farnavis, 183, 135, 172, 174, 177, 181, 182
 Nandidrug, 39, 40, 98
 Nanjaraj, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 32, 35, 61
 Narayan Rao Peshwa, 98, 114, 118
 Narsingh Rao, 181
 Naru Rao Ghorpade, 276
 Nasir Jang, 6, 8
 Navy of Haidar, 144, 145
 Negapatam, 186
 Nidy Cavil, 252
 Nilkantha Rao Sindhe, 125
 Nixon, 211
 Nizam Ali, (Nizam), 3, 7, 53, 55, 56, 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70-81, 124, 131, 168, 169, 176, 178, 182
 Nuruddin Muhammad Khan, 181
- O**
- Onore, 162
 Orton, 88
 Osman, 285
 Owen, 207
- P**
- Palghat, 221
 Palni, 16, 35
 Palur (Pollilore) 184, 190-91, 192, 232, 288
 Pandurang Rao, 125, 126, 129
 Parasuram Bhow, 99, 110, 120, 127, 128, 132, 133, 255, 265
 Peach, Colonel, 80
 Pearse, Hugh, 179, 200
 Peixoto, 29

Perambaukam, 188
 Permacoli, 195, 217, 218, 228
 Periyapattan, 251
 Ponda, 45
 Pondichery, 9, 32, 59, 60, 225
 Porto Novo, 186, 197, (Battle)
 198-200, 262
 Portuguese, Haidar's relations
 with, 156-159
 Purnia, 185, 252, 255, 260, 268, 270,
 285
 Puymorin, 185, 224, 261, 270

R

Raghunath Rao, 51, 52, 53, 95,
 114, 116, 118, 124, 167, 173,
 175, 176, 178, 265, 275, 277-279
 Raghuji Bhonsle, 182
 Raja Ram, 241
 Raja Saheb, 63, 151
 Rakshasabhuva (battle), 54
 Ramchandra Rao, 71, 79
 Ramchandra Rao Huprikar, 128, 129
 Rama Varma, 148, 153
 Ramgery, 221
 Rastia Lachman Rao, 180
 Ratehalli, 48
 Roydurga, 40, 52, 54, 55, 121
 Rayakottai, 31
 Richard Smith, 60, 61
 Ruknuddaula, 56, 79

S

Sadhasiv Rao Bhow, 5, 18, 20, 124
 Sadasivgad, 45, 223
 Saidu Mian, 102
 Salabat Jang, 6, 8, 14, 18, 37
 Salbai (Treaty) 181, 182, 183
 Santa Bidnur, 41
 Sardar Khan, 160, 213, 241, 241
 Satyamangalam, 19, 21, 83
 Savai Immadi Sadasiva, 44
 Savanur, 5, 22, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53, 260
 Sayaji Pant, 49
 Sira, 1, 4, 37, 38, 46, 52, 55, 56,
 67, 112, 116, 121, 259, 276

Seringapatam, 27, 55, 97, 98, 102,
 103, 105, 107, 108, 109, 112,
 125, 238, 252, 259, 264, 266,
 267
 Shahbaz, 1, 2, 3
 Shah Alam, 76
 Shahu, 5
 Shaikh Ayaz, 134, 241, 246, 267,
 270
 Shamia, 240, 256
 Shankar Varma, 249
 Sher Jang, 275
 Shiv Rao Ghorpade, 39, 125, 126
 Sholavandam, 17
 Sholinghur, 204, 205, 262
 Singarepettah, 71, 74, 75, 81
 Sirhatti, 125, 126
 Sirsi, 25
 Siveswar, 44
 Smith, Colonel, 65n, 70, 71, 74, 75,
 76, 77, 79, 81, 85, 87, 89, 93, 263
 Sonpat Rao, 67
 Souillae, 230
 Srinivas Rao Vakil, 92, 113, 169,
 Srinivas Rao Barakki, 24, 155,
 156, 241, 285, 287
 Stannet, 161, 162
 St Lubin, 93, 174
 Suffren, 215, 216, 218, 226-231
 Sunda, 44, 46, 62, 144, 159
 Swartz, 237, 241, 253, 254, 225, 267

T

Tahir Khan, 1
 Tambaram, 218, 220
 Tanjore, 59, 218
 Tellicherry, 82, 213, 280-282
 Tiagar, 31, 52, 196
 Tipu, 82, 97, 108, 112, 186,
 188, 192, 202, 205, 220,
 222, 235, 252, 253, 255, 257,
 263, 264, 266, 267, 270, 273
 Tiruvendpuram, 197
 Travancore, 4, 152-154, 156, 157, 161

- Trevide, 208
 Trichinopoly, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 28
 Tricalore, 221
 Trimbak Rao, 100-107, 109, 110
 111-113, 265
 Trincomali, 216, 220
 Trivalore, 220
 Tukoji Holkar, 179
 Trinomali, 70, 72, 74, 75, 81,
 186
 Tulaji Puar, 130
 Turuvekere, 98, 99

U

 Uttamapalyam, 15, 63

V

 Valdaour, 229
 Vaman Rao, 103, 110, 111, 112
 Vandalour, 90
 Vellore, 184, 194, 195, 207, 209,
 210, 220
 Veniyambadi, 77
 Venkatappa, 240
 Venkatagiri, 83, 200-201, 208, 210
 Venkatapati Ayyam, 18
 Venkatapatiya, 29
 Venkatapiya, 44
 Venkat Rao Barakki, 8, 24, 97
 Viranna Chetty, 25n, 29
 Virupakshi, 16, 63
 Visaji Pant, 19, 30, 32, 265, 276
 Vithal Shivdev, 48

W

 Wali Muhammad, 1
 Wandewash, 89, 194, 195, 217
 Watson, 82
 Weatherston, 181
 Wellesley, Arthur, 258
 Wood, 73, 78, 81, 84, 85, 87,
 88, 93, 263
 Wynnad, 155

Y

 Yasin Khan, 36, 106
 Yusuf Khan, 17, 59

Z

 Zamorin, 148, 149, 155, 156, 248.

